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1 Introduction
Over the last four decades Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) of Multinational
Corporations (MNCs) have received increasing attention from academics as
well as from politicians. The reasons for this rising interest are twofold.
Firstly, FDI flows have experienced tremendous growth and cannot be ig-
nored as a significant economic factor anymore. The global inflow of FDI grew
between 1970 and 2006 at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)1 of
14%.2 In fact FDI flows have grown faster than bilateral trade relations and
have been interpreted as a highly visible indicator for the rising degree of a
liberalized3 global economy.4
In terms of FDI growth Eastern Europe has been one of the most striking
regions. Since 1990 FDI inflow has soared at an impressive CAGR of 31% in
19 Eastern European countries (EECs) until 2006.5
Secondly, the assessment of FDI and other activities of multinational cor-
porations has altered in recent years. Governments in particular have adopted
a more optimistic view of FDI inflows that stresses the positive effects on
host economies, i. e. countries that receive inward FDI. Amongst other things
they presume a positive impact of FDI on the growth of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and favorable spillover effects on their economies.6 In the case
1 Average growth = (current value/ base value)1/# of years - 1.
2 See UNCTAD FDI website (2008); own calculations.
3 Note: this thesis is written in American English.
4 See Blonigen (2005); Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003).
5 See UNCTAD FDI website (2008), including former Yugoslavia from 1990-1991 and
without former German Democratic Republic; see also Moosa (2002), p.4; own calcula-
tions.
6 See te Velde (2001), p.4; Enderwick (2005); Blomstro¨m (2002), p.165.
2 1 Introduction
of Eastern Europe most scientific analyses have confirmed that FDI has indeed
largely contributed to the growth and the transition of the former communist
countries.7
While the importance of FDI and the interest in FDI has undoubtedly risen,
the academic discussion has also become more complex. This is particularly true
in relation to the reasons of companies for moving parts of their production or
of their business activities abroad. The reasons why companies become MNCs
and what determinants drive FDI has triggered a vast amount of research.
Nonetheless, open questions remain – especially for governments of those host
countries of FDIs that want to learn how they can attract further and more
sustainable foreign investments in the future.
In fact when governments ask why investors come to their country rather
than to any other country, they receive few consistent answers from academics.
Furthermore, when they ask for specific public policy implications from aca-
demic researchers in order to attract more FDI, recommendations remain scarce
or contradicting.8
It may appear stunning that governments have obtained only limited assis-
tance to their obvious and compelling questions. However, four reasons are apt
to help understanding why only few studies exist regarding the possibilities and
limits of public policy in order to attract FDI of MNCs:
1. The common methodologies often seem too selective in their variables
analysis (econometrics) and have difficulties in weighing determinants
(surveys).
2. Comparatively little is known about the interdependence of MNC de-
terminants and corresponding state actions due to the lack of an inter-
7 See, for example, Neuhaus (2006); Eller, Haiss, and Steiner (2006) and UNECE (2001).
8 See Mudambi (2002), p.265; Wells and Wint (2000), p.2; Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez,
and Li (2006), p.2.
3disciplinary approach, focusing too strongly on an either Economics or
International Business interpretation.
3. Frameworks developed by FDI studies have until now been unable to
reflect the different ways in which public policy can influence FDI deter-
minants or the different organizational forms of investment policy.
4. Many studies lack a multi-country perspective that explains what one
country can learn from the other’s experience in terms of FDI attraction.
The aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to overcome this outlined
paradox:
“Reforms and Foreign Direct Investment –
Possibilities and limits of public policy
in attracting Multinational Corporations.
A multiple case study of Romania and Croatia”
The theoretical approach is first of all based on the FDI theory of locational
competition (Siebert 1996, 2000, 2005 ) sharing the view of this thesis that
states are in permanent rivalry with other countries for foreign investments.
The second theoretical pillar is the New Institutional Economics (NIE)
theory (Williamson 1975, 1985, 2000 ) whose market approach and concept
of institutions and organizations can overcome the limitations of current FDI
theory in terms of evaluation and categorization of investment policy measures
and actors.
To avoid the methodological difficulties of earlier studies the empirical part of
this thesis is based on the case study approach (Yin 2003 ) that enables for
a more comprehensive analysis of the public policy impact on the investment
decision of MNCs. This makes a consideration of approaches from Economics
and International Business theory as well as from political science possible.
4 1 Introduction
More precisely, a pre-selected list of country determinants will be tested in
expert interviews and through and company materials as well as analyzed from
the state perspective based on expert interviews, state document and secondary
literature.
Romania is an interesting country for FDI research because of its fairly large
market size, its remarkable FDI surge in recent years and its interesting reform
dynamics in the context of EU accession in 2007. Croatia is also an attention-
grabbing example for an FDI study because of its high FDI stock, its specific
reform challenges after the war in former Yugoslavia, and its current efforts
in preparing a potential EU accession. Furthermore, the combination of the
selected countries seems rewarding since Romania and Croatia are the most
important FDI recipients of the Southern and Eastern European Countries
(SEECs) and the cross-country analysis is conducted on a qualitative and not
on a quantitative basis.
The analyzed MNCs originate from Germany and Austria; the two coun-
tries are among the three leading investors in the SEECs, possess equal lan-
guage preconditions, and benefit from similar and fairly good historical ties to
the host countries.
This thesis may be of particular interest for scholars from Economics and
Business Economics but also for policy makers from other transition countries
(such as Ukraine or Serbia) who want to learn from the experiences of Romania
and Croatia and may benefit from the conclusions of this thesis for FDI policies
in their countries.
In the remaining parts of this chapter, section 1.1 elaborates key questions
and hypotheses and section 1.2 provides an overview of the structure of this
thesis.
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1.1 Key questions and hypotheses
Derived from the increasing relevance of FDIs – especially in Eastern Europe
– and from the sketched problem of current research to provide consistent
analyses of the impact of investment policy, the key research question of this
thesis is:
1. What role can public policy play in order to attract FDIs in transition
countries?
The reference to the role of public policy9 here reflects the fact that this thesis
elaborates the “possibilities and limits” (see title) of governments’ investment
policy. It is therefore analyzed to what extent states can actually influence a
company’s decision to invest abroad at all, what array of measures governments
possess to attract FDIs and how they can influence the kind and value of the
investment. This thesis’ goal is to match FDI country determinants of MNCs
(e. g. legal certainty, investment incentives or political stability) on the one
hand with the expectations of governments and their investment policy on the
other.
As part of this wider question (1), four underlying questions will also be
considered. These relate to (2) the MNC’s view, (3) the state’s overall perfor-
mance in attracting FDI, (4) the organizational forms of FDI policy, and (5)
the cross-country view:
2. What policy measures have influenced the decision of MNCs to invest in
the selected countries?
This sub-question analyzes why companies have invested in a specific country
and to what extent and with what levers public policy was able to play a role in
their investment decision. It also examines what factors were decisive and why
9 See definition of “public policy” in section 2.1.3.
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some companies may end up deciding not to invest in the selected countries at
all.
3. How successful has investment policy been in Romania and Croatia in
creating attractive conditions for FDI?
This thesis explicitly considers the countries’ experience in setting up a legal,
economic and political environment that is favorable for investments; there-
fore, it analyzes the development in specific policy areas that may have had
an influence on the investment decision of MNCs since 1990. Thus this sub-
question underlines this thesis’ unique approach since it comprises not only the
company’s view but also the state’s view.
4. What state actors are most suited to create favorable conditions for FDI?
This thesis is also interested in analyzing what state actors are most suited to
induce more investments and what characteristics make them more successful
in this field than other players.
5. What can be learned from the cross-country analysis?
Eventually, this thesis aims at going beyond the inner-country perspective and
at elaborating what results from this thesis are country-specific and what re-
sults are valid in general for the experience of transition countries with invest-
ment policy.
A graphic overview of the outlined key research questions is displayed in
figure 1.
The five questions will guide the analyses of this thesis and will be answered
throughout the text and in the conclusion. Moreover, the following five initial
hypotheses are supposed to sharpen the analysis of this thesis even further and
focus the study on the most crucial issues:
1. The impact of public policy on the investment decisions of MNCs is
greater than assumed in the literature.
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Figure 1: Overview of key questions
A review of the literature (see section 2.2.4 for details) shows that most classical
FDI studies see only limited possibilities for governments in order to decisively
improve the chances that companies will invest in their specific countries. How-
ever, more recent studies on institutional quality10 and locational competition11
as well as the growing interest of governments in investment tools established
by international organizations, e. g. by the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) or the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD)12, suggest that the impact of public policy on
FDIs may have been underestimated so far. Initial expert interviews also sup-
port this hypothesis, e. g. a German company deemed legal certainty – clearly
10 See Dunning (2006); Wei (2000b).
11 See Siebert (2000); Siebert (1996).
12 See e. g. OECD (2006a); OECD (2006b); UNCTAD (2003b) and for the general trend
Brewer and Young (1997), p.175; Hanson (2001); Enderwick (2005).
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a determinant driven by public policy – to be too weak in Croatia in 2001 and
thus did not invest in a tourism project at the Croatian coast.13
2. Determinants of investment decisions are much more diverse than shown
in most FDI studies.
When analyzing public policy issues as determinants for FDI, academic studies
have usually focused on a limited number of possible levers; public policy issues
that are discussed most frequently include tax policies, investment incentives
and trade policies.14 Other determinants have usually been seen as less im-
portant for MNCs and are in addition to this, difficult to measure. However,
initial interviews have indicated that determinants for a company’s investment
decision are much more diverse. Thus, in addition to classical FDI determi-
nants critical issues for the interviewed companies were the legal situation, the
living conditions for the expatriates, the attitude of locals towards foreigners
in the host country and many more aspects.15 Recent studies have also begun
to analyze broader sets of FDI determinants that can be influenced by host
governments.16
3. The removal of obstacles for FDIs is more effective than the creation of
investment incentives.
An initial analysis of Romanian reforms17 as well as initial interviews with
investors in Romania and Croatia18 lead to the conclusion that indirect poli-
cies have a more positive impact on MNCs’ investment decision than specific
13 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
14 See for example Feldstein, Hines, and Hubbard (1995); Mallya, Kukulka, and Jensen
(2004); Globerman and Shapiro (1999).
15 See interviews with Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007) and Intv. Germ. MNC
- Engineering (2007).
16 See for example Resmini (2006); Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Li (2006).
17 See Zu¨hlke (2006).
18 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007) and Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering
(2007).
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measures that promise financial incentives to investors. Thus, measures that
do not primarily aim at foreign investors, such as a decrease in waiting time at
legal trials or an increase in political stability seem to be more important for
investors in transition countries than tax exemptions or direct subsidies.
4. Organizational forms below the central government level have the greatest
impact on the FDI decision of MNCs.
Studies of public policy measures usually focus on the central government
and their actions, (e. g. the modification of tax laws or the legal status of for-
eigners) which are proposed by a minister and ratified by the parliament.19
However, initial interviews with figures such as the Managing Director of a
Croatian authority20 and with an Austrian investor in Romania21 have indi-
cated that actors on a lower state level as well as semi-state players (e. g. busi-
ness chambers) have a stronger influence on the investment decision of MNCs
than government actions in Zagreb and Bucharest. Thus, financial incentives
seem to be less important than the efficiency of local administration and the
information and contacts provided by sub-governmental organizations.
5. Overall, Romania represents a good example for Croatia of how lagging
integration efforts towards EU accession can prevent accelerated FDI in-
flows.
As earlier studies have shown, the efforts of EECs to be admitted into the EU
led to higher FDI flows into these countries.22 However, the speed and intensity
of integration have clearly varied across candidate countries. Initial analyses
19 See e. g. Nicoletti, Golub, Hajkova, Mirza, and Yoo (2003); Goodspeed, Martinez-
Vazquez, and Li (2006).
20 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
21 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
22 See e. g. Bevan, Estrin, and Grabbe (2001); Kusˇic´ and Cvijanovic´ (2002); Disdier and
Mayer (2003); Zakharov and Kusˇic´ (2003); UNCTAD (2004a) pp.42-45.
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by the author23 have indicated that Romanian reform efforts remained slow
and hesitant until the early 2000s. It was therefore primarily the concern of
the Romanian government that EU accession would be further delayed that
prompted the necessary reforms. Hence, a significant increase of FDI inflows
to Romania did not set in until 2003.24 It can therefore be assumed that
Croatia – a current candidate country for EU accession – could learn from the
Romanian experience how to proceed and what issues to avoid in terms of EU
integration in order to achieve both EU accession and higher FDI inflows as
rapidly as possible.
An overview of the hypotheses that are to be tested in this thesis and their
matching key questions is provided in figure 2.
Figure 2: Key questions and hypotheses
23 See Zu¨hlke (2006).
24 See section 6.2 for details.
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1.2 Structure of thesis
The following section gives an overview of the structure of this thesis that is
summarized in figure 3. This thesis consists of four parts and nine chapters,
each of which includes several sections and subsections. The introduction and
conclusion parts (chapters 1 and 10) surround the scientific foundation for this
thesis in chapters 2-4 and the analytical core of this thesis that is elaborated
in chapters 5-9.
Chapter 1 gave an introduction to the topic of this thesis, developed
guiding key questions as well as hypotheses and displays the thesis structure.
In chapter 2 the theoretical approach is outlined. Key terms are defined
and a review of the relevant literature and theories regarding FDI together
with the key questions about its effects, occurrences and determinants is given.
The NIE theory and its relevance for this thesis are also presented. The last
section of this chapter summarizes the theoretical framework that serves as a
basis and guideline for the proceeding in this thesis.
Chapter 3 clarifies the methodological approach of this thesis. The se-
lection of Romania and Croatia as host countries for FDIs and the selection
of Germany and Austria as MNC home countries – i. e. the countries from
which FDI flows to host countries originate – is elucidated. Moreover, it is
explained why the case study methodology is well-suited to answer the outlined
research questions. The chapter concludes with the set-up of a methodological
framework that is used throughout this thesis.
Chapter 4 outlines the intermediate results of the preceding chapters and
thus summarizes the scientific foundation of this thesis.
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Chapter 5 presents the empirical data – expert interviews and expert doc-
uments – and disusses how the data is incorporated in the analyses of the thesis.
Chapter 6 gives an introduction to the economic development of Romania
and Croatia since the early 1990s and briefly discusses the non-policy FDI
determinants for the two countries in question.
In the main section of this thesis, chapter 7, determinants that can be
influenced by public policy are studied. Based on the expert interviews and
documents as well as under the consideration of secondary literature it is
explored how successful Romanian and Croatian public policy state have been
since the 1990s in improving the performance of these determinants and what
impact these determinant have had on the investment decision of MNCs from
Germany and Austria. In a subsequent step insights for transition countries in
general are derived for each determinant.
Chapter 8 gives an overview of findings for Romania, Croatia and transition
countries in general.
Based on the results of the previous sections, chapter 9 analyzes FDI deter-
minants using an NIE approach. This chapter establishes several frameworks in
order to examine the impact of different public policy actors (“organizations”)
as well as the relevance of the time horizons for FDI.
Chapter 10 summarizes the findings of the thesis, resumes an assessment of
the initial key questions and hypotheses and also gives an outlook of potential
research questions for future scholars.
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The analyses of this thesis are illustrated by numerous graphs and figures.
They are usually based on primary data but contain further evaluations by the
author if indicated. Backup sheets for all calculations are available from the
author.
2 Theoretical approach
The following chapter elaborates the foundation of the theoretical approach
and the line of argumentation of this thesis. To begin with, key terms of this
thesis are defined and expounded (section 2.1). Subsequently, the current status
of FDI theory, especially regarding its four key questions, is reviewed (section
2.2). This section also explains why this thesis follows Siebert’s approach of
“locational competition”25 and pre-selects the country determinants that are
to be tested in the empirical part.
Section 2.3 discusses the fundamentals of the New Institutional Economics
(NIE) and elaborates why its main ideas can be transfered to the FDI analysis
approach used in this thesis. Furthermore, this section shows how the NIE
provides a framework to analyze and categorize FDI determinants and its
respective actors in a convincing manner.
The final section of this chapter (section 2.4) summarizes the theoretical
framework based on the FDI theory of locational competition and the NIE.
This theoretical framework will be applied to the remaining parts of this thesis.
2.1 Definitions
The subsequent section comprises a definition of the key terms of this thesis –
FDI, MNC, public policy, reform, and transition – in order to reach an under-
25 See Siebert (1996); Siebert (2000); Siebert (2005).
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standing of the meaning and the delimitation of these terms in the context of
this thesis.
2.1.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
For the purposes of this thesis, the following aspects should be clarified; (1)
a definition, (2) the components, (3) the motives, (4) the forms, and (5) the
different measurements of FDI (see also title). The most common sources
used in this field by academics and governments are the OECD benchmark
definition of FDI26 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) balance of
payment manual.27 Despite the existence of these definitions and a considerable
harmonization of international FDI statistics in recent years, country-specific
differences and recurring problems of governments to provide detailed FDI
data remain.28
(1) FDIs are defined as capital flows from a company that is based in one
country and creates, expands or purchases an affiliate abroad. This does not
only include the initial but also all subsequent investments.29
Investments have to fulfill two criteria in order to be classified as FDI: first of
all, FDIs are only shares and acquisitions that involve a long-term relation-
ship between a resident entity and a non-resident one.30 A second precondition
for FDIs is the control over the investment. Thus, the investor needs to exert
“a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise resident
in the other economy”31; a mere financial obligation of the subsidiary is not
sufficient to meet the control criteria for FDI.
26 See OECD (1996a).
27 See IMF (1993).
28 See Wolff (2006), p.37; UNCTAD (2005), p.298.
29 See Krugman and Obstfeld (2005), p.157; IMF (1993); OECD (1996a).
30 See UNCTAD (2005), p.297; see also IMF (1993) and OECD (1996a).
31 See section 2.1.2 for a definition of “significant”; see also UNCTAD (2005), p.297;
Krugman and Obstfeld (2005), p.157.
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Until the 1960s Foreign Portfolio Investments (FPIs) represented the
classical idea of foreign investment. FPI, however, signifies the ownership of
bonds and other financial assets without the ability to control the issuer of
the bond etc. In further contrast to FDI, the goal of FPIs is solely the maxi-
mization of interest income through arbitrage in a rather short period of time.32
(2) FDI has three components: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-
company loans.
The most common FDI component is equity capital. This is defined as
the shares purchased by the investor abroad. It includes equity in all branches,
subsidiaries and associates as well as other capital contributions abroad that
meet the FDI criteria mentioned above.
FDIs can also consist of earnings that are not distributed (e. g. as dividends)
but reinvested in host country activities by the foreign investor.
Finally, intra-company loans and debt transactions between parent com-
panies and foreign affiliates are potential FDI components.33
(3) Theory generally distinguishes between different motives of FDI, the
most common ones of which are horizontal and vertical.34 Horizontal FDI
aims at the exploration of new markets. The MNC then produces the same or
similar products abroad as in the home country.
Vertical FDI, on the other hand, are investments in which parts of the
production processes are moved to a different location in order to leverage cost
advantages.35
32 See Gokkent (1997); Fischer (1995); Heiduk (2005), p.318.
33 See UNCTAD (2005), p.297; OECD (2006d), p.6.
34 See section 2.2.3.3 for the theoretical background.
35 See Moosa (2002), pp.4-5.
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(4) FDI can occur in different forms or market entry modes. Therefore,
the FDI investment can consist of (a) greenfield investments, (b) acquisitions,
(c) privatizations, or (d) other forms of FDI investment.
(a) Greenfield investments describe the set-up of new facilities and new
affiliates as well as expansions of existing entities in a host country in which
the foreign investor possesses partial or complete legal and operational respon-
sibility. A greenfield investment can comprise, for example, a production site
but also a sales point or a new call center.36
(b) Acquisitions or “brownfield investments” refer to the purchase of an ex-
isting local company or company part in the host country by a foreign company.
Mergers with local companies are also subsumed under this category.37
Whether companies decide for a greenfield investment or an acquisition de-
pends on factors such as the degree of its vertical integration, its risk-aversion
and the attractiveness of the investment conditions.38
(c) Privatizations are also acquisitions, the only difference being that the
state is the owner of the company being sold. In Eastern Europe privatization
has been the most important driver of FDI.39
(d) In addition, other forms of investment can fulfill the requirements of
FDIs. Examples are joint ventures, licensing, franchising, management con-
tracts, marketing contracts, turnkey contracts, international subcontracting
deals, production agreements, product sharing, and risk-sharing agreements. In
these cases the investor generally gains sufficient control over the management
to be defined as foreign direct investor without acquiring equity shares of the
foreign company. However, these data often do not appear in the countries’
36 See UNCTAD (2005), p.36.
37 See UNCTAD (2005), p.36.
38 See Go¨rg (2000).
39 See sections 6.2 and 6.3 for details; see also Hauser (2005), p.9; Neuhaus (2005), p.15.
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FDI statistics.40
(5) FDI can bemeasured in different ways depending on the type of FDI and
the aim of the analysis. The most common measurements are inflows, outflows
and stocks.
FDI inflows (or inward FDI) are defined as the capital provided by an
investor to its foreign affiliate. The money can be channeled through the for-
eign direct investor directly or through related companies. FDI outflows (or
outward FDI) on the other hand, are known as the activities of affiliates of
national firms abroad.41
When statistics display FDI stocks they usually indicate the accumulated
FDI net stock, which is defined as:
net stock year N+1 = (stock year N) + (inflow year N+1) - (outflow year
N+1).42
This thesis looks at policies that attract FDIs (see title) and therefore focuses
on FDI inflows and stocks without covering the FDI outflows of the analyzed
countries.43
2.1.2 Multinational Corporation (MNC)
According to the definition of UNCTAD (2005) Multinational Corporations
(MNCs) (see also title) “are incorporated or unincorporated enterprises com-
prising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates”44. This generally means
40 See Blomstro¨m (2002), p.168; Cho (2003), p.109; UNCTAD (2005), p.298.
41 See UNCTAD (2005), p.297; Jaklicˇ and Rojec (2005), p.9.
42 See also UNCTAD (2005), p.298 for a more detailed definition.
43 See Globerman and Shapiro (1999), p.514.
44 See UNCTAD (2005), p.297.
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that the parent company, the foreign investor, holds at least 10% of the ordi-
nary shares or of the voting power of the enterprise in the host country.45
The foreign affiliates of the MNC can have different forms and names de-
pending on the influence of the investor. The most common forms of foreign
affiliates are the branch that is fully controlled by the investor, the sub-
sidiary in which the parent company has majority rights and the associate in
which the parent company possesses more than 10% but not more than 50% of
the voting power or shares respectively.46 Subsidiaries or branches that invest
abroad themselves can be foreign-controlled companies and foreign investors
at the same time.47 The literature has created several synonyms for companies
with activities abroad, including “Transnational Corporations”, “Multinational
Enterprises” and MNCs; this thesis exclusively uses the term MNC.
2.1.3 Public policy
When dealing with the term “public policy” (see also title), three dimensions
are important to elucidate: (1) a general definition of the term, (2) the forms
of public policy and the (3) potential actors of public policy.
(1) In political science public policy is a general term for decisions and
actions taken by state institutions.48 Throughout this thesis public policy
is also comprehended in a broad and general sense as well implying all direct
and indirect measures that are apt to influence the conditions for FDIs.
(2) Public policies are divided into (a) legal (b) economic and (c) political
measures in this thesis.49
45 See IMF (1993), p.86.
46 See UNCTAD (2005), p.297.
47 See Krugman and Obstfeld (2005), pp.157-159.
48 See Schmidt (2004b), p.535.
49 See also Chandler and Plano (1988), p.107.
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(a) Legal measures represents the regulatory dimension of public policy. It
comprises law-making but also – in a broader sense – the actions of central and
local authorities as well as law enforcement (the work of courts).
(b) Economic measures are mainly distributive and redistributive policies
that imply the reallocation of money (through taxation for example) or goods
(through privatization for example).
(c) Political measures consist of constituent policies that aim at the pro-
tection of national interests (e. g. foreign policy), the modification of national
goods (such as human capital) or operations (for example through the combat
of corruption).50
(3) Policy makers can be governments and all institutions that are entitled
to take decisions that are valid for the whole state and its entities.51 Institutions
can be the parliament, ministries, administrations and other state organs such
as courts and central banks as well as state agencies.52 In the specific context of
this thesis this term can also include local authorities as well as agencies closely
connected to state objectives (e. g. chambers of commerce) despite being private
or semi-private institutions. The FDI analysis shows that – as also pointed out
in political theory research – the distinction between public and private spheres
is arbitrary53; nevertheless it is based on the question who could influence public
policy or, in the context of this thesis, the conditions for the investment decision
of MNCs. In this thesis the makers of public policy are either called by their
actual function or referred to more generally as “the state”.
50 See for this whole section Schmidt (2004b), p.535; Chandler and Plano (1988), pp.107-
108.
51 See Schmidt (2004b), p.535.
52 See Nohlen, Schultze, and Schu¨ttemeyer (1998), pp.615-616; Chandler and Plano (1988),
pp.107-108.
53 See Robertson (2002), pp.411-412.
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2.1.4 Reform
The definition of reform can be broken down into (1) the explanation of the
term and its delimitation to “public policy” and (2) the different dimensions
of reform.
(1) “Reform” (see also title) is according to political science theory, the
deliberate and planned change of a part of policy perceived as deficient. Reform
has a more active connotation than public policy, implying change rather than
just influence.54
In the specific context of Eastern Europe reforms are attempts to reduce the
gulf separating living standards from those in Western Europe.55 More specif-
ically, reform is understood in this thesis as the change of the legal, economic
and political situation of a country that has an impact on the conditions for
FDI.
(2) Reference has also been made to different categories of reform in-
tensity. In particular, a socialistic reform with revolutionary implications, an
evolutionary change of significant parts of the economic and social system, and
finally, a gradual modernization should be seen as distinctive categories.56
Today the category of socialistic reform has ceased to represent an option for
most EECs. The second category, of change of systems was accomplished in
most EECs until the end of the 1990s and is analyzed in this thesis together
with the third category, the current modernization efforts of the last five to
ten years.
54 See Nohlen, Schultze, and Schu¨ttemeyer (1998), pp.543-544; Collin (1997), p.239.
55 See Emerson and Noutcheva (2004); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Falcetti, Lysenko,
and Sanfey (2005).
56 See Schmidt (2004b), p.597.
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2.1.5 Transition
This thesis deals with FDIs in countries in transition. In political theory
transition is understood as process of countries moving from an authori-
tarian regime towards a democracy.57 Political scientists and especially
economists often use the term specifically for former communist countries where
transition does not only imply political change but also the development from
a centrally-planned to a market economy.58
International organizations usually define transition countries (also called
“transition economies”) as a third group of countries in addition to “devel-
oped” and “developing” countries.59 Transition countries have traditionally
been divided into four country groups: Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs), Southern and Eastern European Countries (SEECs), Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), and Asian transition countries. The CEECs usu-
ally comprise the Baltic republics, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia. The SEEC group usually consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. The
CIS is defined as the twelve non-Baltic countries that emanated from the Soviet
Union. The definition for Asian countries strongly differs but always comprises
China and Vietnam.60
Recent studies have further narrowed down the term “transition country”
because of the rapid political and economic development in some former com-
munist countries, namely in Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia. Thus in its
World Investment Report 2006 UNCTAD regards only the non-EU countries
in Eastern Europe and the CIS members as transition economies.61
57 See Nohlen and Schultze (2004), pp.1000-1001.
58 See Campos and Kinoshita (2003), pp.1 and 8; Resmini (2006), p.2.
59 See e. g. UNCTAD (2006), p.II; Andreff (2003).
60 See for definition e. g. Zakharov and Kusˇic´ (2003); Murrell (2002).
61 See UNCTAD (2006), p.II and p.79.
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It certainly seems reasonable to exclude from the transition definition
those countries that have shown a quite different development path, e. g.
semi-communist countries in Asia like China and Vietnam. Nevertheless, this
thesis regards all Eastern European and CIS countries as transition
countries since it analyzes developments from the early 1990s up to now and
therefore comprises a period in which these countries were clearly in a state of
transition.
2.2 Theoretical and empirical approaches to FDI
Despite a vast number of publications, there is no comprehensive theory of
FDI. In fact only very few theoretical FDI models exist in Economics (e. g.
derived from Trade Theory) and International Business. The main reason for
this is that FDI flows are complex and show strong interdependences with other
external factors and are therefore difficult to explain in a full-fledged model.62
Due to these problems researchers tend to ask specific questions instead in
order to explain FDI. The four key questions in this context are63:
• What are the effects of FDI on the home country? (section 2.2.1)
• What are the effects of FDI on the host country? (section 2.2.2)
• Why do FDIs occur? (section 2.2.3)
• What are the determinants of MNCs for a specific country? (section 2.2.4)
While the last question regarding the FDI determinants is the most decisive
one for this thesis, the status of the other research questions is also important
62 See Heiduk (2005), p.318.
63 See Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004), pp.15-18; Blonigen (2005); Reker (2003), p.4;
Buch and Lipponer (2005), p.2.
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for policy makers and companies; therefore, these questions are also reviewed
in the following section as far as they are important for answering the ques-
tions of this thesis. Moreover, the literature on FDI is far too extensive for
a comprehensive review. Thus only those research results that are essential
for the theoretical and methodological approach of this thesis are taken into
account. This chapter closes by considering the possible contributions to FDI
research of this thesis (section 2.2.5).
2.2.1 Effects of FDIs on home countries
It is important for governments to know if the investments of their domestic
companies that take place abroad are harmful to their home economies. The an-
swer to this question is also essential for potential foreign direct investors since
negative effects of outward FDIs could increase political and social pressure on
companies not to invest abroad.64
The potential effects of outward FDI about which home country governments
seem particularly concerned are (1) employment, (2) wage level, (3) productiv-
ity, (4) technology, and (5) national politics.65 Lastly, (6) the net effects and
potential problems in this field of research are elucidated. Since this thesis fo-
cuses on FDIs by MNCs from Germany and Austria66, this section exclusively
covers home country effects in developed economies.
The most comprehensive overviews of effects of outward FDI on home
economies are provided by Kokko (2006), Lipsey (2002) and UNCTAD (2006).
(1) The representatives of a skeptical view of the effects of FDIs worry most
about a negative impact on home employment, since they expect that a
64 See Kokko (2006), pp.1 and 18; Nunnenkamp (2006).
65 See Kokko (2006), p.2; UNCTAD (2006), p.169.
66 See section 3.2 for details.
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relocation of production to newly established plants in low-wage countries will
result into job losses in the parent company. Therefore sourcing and production
of labor-intense work in low-cost countries can lead, e. g. according to the head
of the German IFO institute Sinn, to a “bazar economy” and an erosion of the
home job market in developed countries like Germany.67
However, most empirical studies have shown a less dramatic and more encour-
aging picture. U.S. research has only found a very small negative employment
effect in the parent company following FDI activities of American MNCs.68 On
the contrary, studies for Sweden69, Italy70, Japan71, and Germany72 have shown
that MNCs with more foreign activities even tend to increase employment in
the parent company. Possible explanations are a higher labor demand for the
steering of the new foreign operations from the parent company.73 Moreover,
Nunnenkamp (2006) showed that even FDIs aimed at production cost optimiza-
tion can have positive employment effects on the home economy in the long-run
because they can strengthen the competitiveness of the whole industry.
However, other studies have also shown that the employment effects on
the home economy depend on the industry in question. Thus, manufacturing
projects abroad are more likely to lead to job losses at home than service
projects which tend to show positive employment effects.74 At the same time
empiric analyses have clarified that overall employment in advanced economies
has not suffered from outward FDI despite industry-specific differences. The
main reason is that in most developed economies the share of services exceeds
67 See Sinn (2005).
68 See Brainard and Riker (1997).
69 See Blomstro¨m, Fors, and Lipsey (1997).
70 See Federico and Minerva (2005).
71 See Lipsey, Ramstetter, and Blomstro¨m (2000).
72 See Nunnenkamp (2006).
73 See Kokko (2006), p.13.
74 See Kokko (2006), p.1.
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that of the manufacturing industry and has even risen in recent years.75 Thus
Sinn’s image of Germany as a “bazar economy” does not reflect the present
situation of developed economies as a whole.76
(2) Critics of FDIs further argue that MNC activities abroad lead to lower
wages in the parent company as well as in the overall home economy, since
lower-skilled workers then have to compete with blue-collar workers in low-wage
countries.77 The empirical insights from the literature regarding these aspects
are scarce.78 Most of the available studies have only confirmed that the relative
wage level of lower-skilled workers to the average wage does indeed seem to de-
teriorate in home countries following FDIs. More precisely, MNCs’ investments
abroad seem to cause salaries of high-skilled workers in the parent company to
rise while wages of low-skilled workers in the home countries tend to stagnate.79
(3) In addition to this, home countries and scholars have asked how home
productivity changes due to MNC activities. The number of studies that
show robust results on productivity changes within home countries is still
limited.80 Kokko (2006) summarizes the current findings of research by stating
that FDI appears to improve productivity in home economies in the long-run,
while the short-term development of productivity is dependent on where the
investments of the MNCs go to and in what economic condition the home
country is.81
75 See Horn and Behncke (2004).
76 See also Belke, Mattes, and Wang (2007).
77 See Slaughter (1995).
78 See Nunnenkamp (2006).
79 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996); Kravis and Lipsey (1988); Nunnenkamp (2006).
80 See Nunnenkamp (2006); for Germany: Ja¨ckle (2006).
81 See Kokko (2006), p.17 and ibid. for more references.
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(4) Another concern of home countries may be that the surging number of
offshored research and development (R&D) activities may lead to the loss
of technological knowledge in the home country.82
Empirical data however, shows that MNCs rarely shut down their R&D ac-
tivities in the parent company entirely and that the relative share of offshoring
on the global R&D expenses is still marginal. Therefore a loss of technological
skills in the home country seems currently unlikely in most industries.83 On
the contrary, technological spillovers to the home country seem to prevail
because MNCs absorb know-how from other (especially foreign) companies
due to their operations abroad, e. g. through imitation of production processes,
involvement in business associations and the enticing of high-skilled employees
from other MNCs.84
(5) Home country governments may also be concerned that outward FDIs
could increase pressure on national politics. This could be the case when
MNCs threaten to invest abroad if the home country conditions are not altered
to their advantage and the government gives in to the requests of the companies
because it fears job losses, lower tax revenues and – in the end – fewer votes.
Thus the increased pressure on governments could lead to a loss of political
autonomy and a “race to the bottom” for better conditions for MNCs among
home countries.85
However, these concerns do not reflect the findings from empirical analyses.
Studies have focused on areas where MNCs may influence governments, e. g.
82 See UNCTAD (2005), p.195.
83 See UNCTAD (2005), pp.195 and 197; Kokko (2006), p.19.
84 For Sweden see Globerman, Kokko, and Sjo¨holm (2000); for Italy see Falzoni and
Grasseni (2005).
85 See e. g. Rauscher (1995).
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on labor and environment regulations as well as on taxes and found that the
actual impact of these attempts is marginal both in the U.S. and in the EU.86
One reason may be that MNCs, especially in developed countries, see fewer
chances of influencing home country administration to their advantage. On
the contrary, they may hope to be more successful in influencing the host
country of their investment and thus improving investment conditions abroad
since competition may be less intense and administration may be (in some less
developed countries) easier to persuade regarding the requests of the MNCs
than in their home economies.87
(6) Overall, the negative tone of many public debates concerning the net
effects of outward FDI on home economies does not seem to be justified. Espe-
cially outside the U.S. FDIs seem to have little or even a slightly positive impact
on the economies of developed countries. On the bottom line home economies
tend rather to benefit from MNC activities abroad, especially in terms of em-
ployment, rising wages for higher-skilled workers and sometimes even higher
technological know-how. In addition to this, the net effect of outward FDI
tends to be less significant than often proclaimed in the public debate, maybe
because FDIs are not usually accompanied by an outflow of profits, technolog-
ical skills or even the shut down of domestic production. Finally, net effects
may also be softened because the insourcing of goods and especially services in
developed nations is still higher than the outsourcing.88
The most apparent negative impact is the deterioration of the relative wage
level of the low-skilled workers in the home country. Furthermore, the in-
creasing number of R&D centers opened by Western European and American
86 See Kokko (2006), p.22 and see Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006); Mendoza and Tesar
(2005).
87 See Kokko (2006), pp.18 and 20-21 with similar explanations.
88 See Amiti and Wei (2004), p.20; Kokko (2006), pp.23-24 and 30; UNCTAD (2006),
p.183.
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companies in low-cost countries in Eastern Europe and Asia demonstrates
that FDI and globalization in general tend to generate greater competition for
all employees in developed countries. Other negative effects of outward FDIs
depend, e. g. on the business conditions in the home and the host economy,
the size of the home country and its political stability.89
Nevertheless, home countries seem to have become less worried about MNC
activities and have lifted many restrictions on outward FDIs since the end of
the 1980s.90 This thesis thus presumes that home country effects do not rep-
resent a major (negative) driver for FDI country determinants or host country
investment policy.
2.2.2 Effects of FDIs on host countries
Only if host countries can expect positive benefits for their countries from
the inflow of FDI will they actively support policies that improve investment
conditions.91 Thus a knowledge of the overall effects of FDIs is essential for
host countries as well as for this thesis.
The effects of FDI on host economies have been a key subject for FDI re-
searchers and a large range of factors has been analyzed so far. Among the
effects of FDI in the host countries that have frequently been discussed are the
ones on (1) technology and training, (2) productivity and GDP growth, (3)
employment, (4) wages, and (5) trade. Finally, this section discusses (6) the
overall net effect of FDIs on host economies.
The most important sources for the factor selection are Lipsey (2002), Moosa
(2002) and UNCTAD (2006) that also offer good overviews of the current status
of this field of research.
89 See UNCTAD (2006), p.169; Kokko (2006), pp.1, 11, 14, and 20.
90 See Ru¨bel (2004), p.179; Kokko (2006), pp.21 and 25-27.
91 See Lipsey (2002), p.6.
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This subsection reviews what the theory says about FDI effects, how MNCs
perform in comparison to domestic firms, whether spillover effects from foreign
to domestic companies exist and how significant they are. In this context special
attention is drawn to findings on Eastern Europe.
(1) Neo-classical theory expects MNCs to have more advanced technologies,
provide good training for their employees and thus generate positive spillovers
for the entire host economy.92
Empirical evidence, which has also been confirmed for Eastern Europe, shows
that foreign companies use more state-of-the-art technologies (in the host coun-
try) than their domestic competitors and provide more and better training for
their employees.93 One important reason is that MNCs tend to be larger and
thus use high technology equipment to leverage economies of scale. MNCs also
tend to set up new operation facilities. Both factors also lead to extensive
training efforts of the employees by the MNCs.94
Many theoretical studies see technology and training as the two most impor-
tant spillover effects for the host country. Important reasons seem to be that
access to modern technology becomes easier for domestic companies through
imitation, turnover of better-trained employees as well as through linkages to
suppliers and distributors.95 From an empirical point of view technological
spillovers to domestic companies are possible but the evidence is not very clear
so far and the impact appears to be smaller than expected by theorists. Thus
the greatest positive spillover effects seem to materialize if the technology gap
between foreign and domestic firms is rather small.96 One example in Eastern
Europe is the car industry; it has been shown with Volkswagen in the Czech
92 See Moosa (2002), p.86.
93 See Lipsey (2002), pp.36-39; Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.26.
94 See UNCTAD (2006), pp.183 and 193.
95 See UNCTAD (2006), pp.184 and 188; Kinoshita (2001); Nunnenkamp (2006).
96 See Maennig and Wilfling (1998), p.299; UNCTAD (2006), p.188.
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Republic that FDI leads to a modernization of the sub-contractors as well as
of the suppliers.97
Taking the positive effects of MNCs and small but positive effects from
spillovers to domestic companies into account, it is not surprising that studies
find, also for Eastern Europe, positive net effects of FDI for host countries as
a whole leading to a higher “technologization” and an “upgrading (of) human
capital”98.
(2) Given their superiority in terms of technology and training, the theory
also expects MNCs to provide higher productivity99 for themselves as well
as for the host economy as a whole.100 Theory and policy makers also expect
productivity gains to lead to GDP growth in the host countries.
MNCs do indeed show higher productivity than domestic firms due to higher
efficiency, mostly through better technology. Other reasons are a higher capital
intensity and a larger scale of production in MNC plants.101 Among OECD
countries the productivity of foreign companies in the manufacturing industry
exceeds the industry average in the host country by 30%. In Eastern Europe
the productivity gap seems to be even greater since MNCs tend to have better
capital endowment, management, technology, and better access to international
markets.102
However, evidence for spillovers to local firms’ productivity is mixed. Positive
effects may occur and may even be substantial, but quantification is difficult.103
Positive effects seem to increase with local capability and competition, while
97 See Zakharov and Kusˇic´ (2003), p.7.
98 Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael (2001), p.2; see also Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.26;
Walkenhorst (2000).
99 Most studies define productivity as output per capital input; see Lipsey (2002), p.35.
100 See Dunning (1993), pp.372-374 and 287-290.
101 See Caves (1996); Lipsey (2002), pp.34-35 and 40; Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael
(2001), p.4.
102 See OECD (1996b); Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.10.
103 See Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1998), p.24; Lipsey (2002), pp.45-46.
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several studies have shown that productivity of domestic companies may even
deteriorate in the short-term.104 With regards to Eastern Europe Hunya and
Geishecker (2005) have identified positive spillovers to domestic companies
after several years of transition.105
Overall, FDI appears to enhance net productivity in the recipient economy,
but little research has been conducted in this direction so far.106 Eastern
Europe studies on the manufacturing sector107 and on the host economy as a
whole108 show that FDI has promoted overall efficiency increases. However, the
impact seems to depend on the amount of FDI and the stage of the transition
process.109
The theory clearly states a correlation between FDI inflow and GDP
growth.110 Most empirical studies also state that FDI stimulates growth but
the evidence is far from clear111, since some analyses have found only little
impact or even negative growth rates. Negative growth rates could stem from
a crowding out of domestic competition, but overall these appear to be tempo-
rary and go on to cause the evolution of new and more competitive industries.
In the long-run, the economic growth of host countries can also be indirectly
boosted by the creation of forward and backward linkages (sales organizations
and suppliers respectively).112
However, most studies emphasize that certain preconditions have to be met
by the host country in order to materialize growth effects of FDI inflow. The
104 See Hanson (2001), p.14; Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1998).
105 See Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.4.
106 See Lipsey (2002), p.59; Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael (2001), p.4; Borensztein,
de Gregorio, and Lee (1995).
107 See Barrell and Holland (2000).
108 See Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.26.
109 See Skudar (2004), p.9.
110 See Fillat Castejo´n and Wo¨rz (2006), p.3.
111 See Lipsey (2002), p.55; de Mello (1999); Lipsey (2000).
112 See Fillat Castejo´n andWo¨rz (2006), p.3; UNCTAD (2006), p.183; Maennig andWilfling
(1998), p.294.
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most important of these are: a minimum level and amount of human capital, a
minimum degree of openness of the host economy, only a limited technological
gap between home and host country and a sufficient degree of development of
financial markets.113
Only few analyses reveal however, to what extent these preconditions are
complementary or substitutional. Nevertheless, it overall seems that the growth
effects are more substantial in countries in earlier development stages and in
more labor-intensive industries.114
There is significant evidence that FDI has promoted growth in Eastern Eu-
rope. In fact, according to Neuhaus (2005), FDI inflow was the most impor-
tant growth driver in EECs 1994-2003, contributing 74% to total GDP growth.
Figure 4 shows that this correlation is especially true for Romania, Bulgaria,
Poland, and Croatia.115
Nevertheless, the causality of growth versus FDI inflow is not absolutely
clear since models cannot determine to what extent GDP growth stimulates
FDI inflows and vice versa.116
(3) Many host governments are concerned about the impact of FDI on em-
ployment.117 The theory highlights that FDI can influence employment in
many direct and indirect ways. Overall, the theory suggests that a potentially
higher employment in foreign affiliates of MNCs may have a positive multiplier
effect on the whole economy.118
113 See Kru¨ger and Ahlfeld (2005), p.11; Borensztein, de Gregorio, and Lee (1995); Fil-
lat Castejo´n and Wo¨rz (2006), p.10; Bhagwati (1978); Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and
Sapsford (1996); de Mello (1997); Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2001).
114 See Fillat Castejo´n and Wo¨rz (2006); Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004); Lipsey (2002).
115 See Neuhaus (2005); see also: Campos and Kinoshita (2002).
116 See Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.3.
117 See Moosa (2002), p.78.
118 See UNCTAD (2006), p.183.
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Figure 4: FDI contribution to GDP growth in Eastern Europe
With respect to direct effects, country studies underline the fact that the
job impact of FDI depends on the type of investment and the period of analysis.
In particular in Eastern Europe privatization and the subsequent restructuring
of formerly state-owned enterprises often resulted in (temporary) employment
decreases in the MNCs.119 In contrast to this, greenfield investments – despite
an only moderate impact on employment on a global scale – had a significant
job-creating effect in Eastern Europe even in the short-run.120
Looking at indirect effects, the crowding out of domestic competition and
consequent job losses in domestic firms have been identified as a common effect,
also in Eastern Europe, where especially domestic small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) could not survive against larger and technologically more advanced
foreign market players. However, analyses have shown that domestic players
119 See Hunya and Geishecker (2005), pp.6-7; Kalotay and Hunya (2000); UNCTAD
(2004b), p.137.
120 See UNCTAD (2006), p.192; Hunya and Geishecker (2005), pp.7 and 25.
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usually steer towards other industry segments in the longer run and also build
up employment themselves.121
The most important positive long-term impulse for employment growth
seems to be located in other steps of the value chain following an FDI in-
vestment. Analogous to the FDI impact on growth, the creation of sustainable
employment mainly appears to stem from suppliers and distributors of the
MNCs.122
When measuring the net effect of FDI on employment it becomes obvious
that job creation and job destruction is a dynamic and multi-faceted process.
Nonetheless, global quantitative net effects of FDI on employment seem to
be positive, albeit rather modest. They tend to be strongest in countries
in development and transition and more significant in the (labor-intensive)
manufacturing sector than in other sectors.123 Finally, Hunya and Geishecker
(2005) have shown for Eastern Europe that FDI also changes the employment
structure of host economies, e. g. by lowering the demand for medium-skilled
employees.124
(4) Various studies have analyzed the effect of FDIs on the wages of the host
economy. The theory predicts a wage increase in MNCs, domestic companies
and, therefore, also in the host economy.125
Regarding the empirical findings on the remuneration in MNCs Lipsey (2002)
concludes: ”The evidence seems to me overwhelming that foreign-owned firms
in all kinds of economies pay higher wages than domestically-owned firms.”126
121 See Maennig and Wilfling (1998), p.294; Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.7.
122 See UNCTAD (1996), pp.166-168; Cluse (1999), pp.98-102; Hunya and Geishecker
(2005), pp.7-8.
123 See UNCTAD (2006), p.192; UNCTAD (2004b), p.137.
124 See Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.25.
125 See Moosa (2002), p.81.
126 Lipsey (2002), p.29; see also UNCTAD (2006), p.192.
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The literature gives many reasons for higher MNC wages. These include the
MNCs’ eagerness to attract the most capable workers, pressure from the host
country, attempts of MNCs to avoid a high employee turnover, the limited
market knowledge of MNCs, and MNCs’ tendency to focus on activities in
higher-wage sectors.127 For Eastern Europe it has been pointed out, further-
more, that it is primarily the younger generation (aged below 25 years) which
benefits from higher wages while older and unskilled employees face stagnating
salaries or are not even hired by MNCs.128
The knowledge regarding spillover effects of higher MNC wages on domestic
firms is vague and results of country studies are mixed.129 Nevertheless, Lipsey
(2002) sees enough indications from research to conclude that, in the long-run,
wage spillover is positive.130
Overall, FDIs tend to increase the wage level in the host country even though
augmentations of wage inequalities have been identified in some studies as well.
However, results differ across industries and countries as empirical studies in
Eastern Europe and for developing countries have shown.131
(5) Various researchers have investigated with mixed results, whether FDI
and trade are complements or substitutes.132
Empirics demonstrate that foreign firms tend to export more than their do-
mestic competitors. MNCs’ activities abroad already indicate their tendency
toward international business and they usually focus more on export-oriented
127 See UNCTAD (2006), p.194; Lipsey (2002), pp.20-24 and 57.
128 See Hunya and Geishecker (2005), pp.11, 22 and 26.
129 See Crespo Cuaresma, Fillat Castejo´n, and Silgoner (2006), p.5; Lipsey (2002), pp.57-58.
130 See Lipsey (2002), p.32.
131 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996); UNCTAD (2006), p.194; Crespo Cuaresma, Fil-
lat Castejo´n, and Silgoner (2006), p.5; Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael (2001), p.3;
Maennig and Wilfling (1998), pp.296-297.
132 See Moosa (2002), pp.84-85.
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industries and also have better access to international markets than domestic
firms.133
The spillover effect on domestic companies is less-well documented. Even
though various studies found that FDI also increases the export of domestic
firms134, other authors point out that spillovers depend on the type of invest-
ment (horizontal or vertical FDI) and can sometimes even be negative.135
At least in the medium- or long-run the overall net effect of FDI on trade
and therefore on the balance of payment appears to be positive, as most
authors have reported.136 Thus FDI and trade seem to be complements rather
than substitutes. The degree of the impact, however, depends on country- and
industry-specific differences as well as on the motives of FDI.137
(6) According to the neo-classical model, the host economy net effects of
FDI should be clearly positive.138
FDI affects host countries in numerous ways and according to the majority
of empirical literature in a positive fashion.139 Studies have shown that FDI
can speed up the change in economic and competitive structure. By and large
it seems that developing and transition countries benefit the most from FDI.140
For Eastern Europe Hunya and Geishecker (2005) have summarized that FDI
has accelerated the transition process since foreign investors played a decisive
role in strengthening the private sector (e. g. through privatizations), promoting
market-economy behavior, modifying their economic and industrial structure
133 See Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael (2001), p.5; Lipsey (2002), p.53.
134 See e. g. Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997).
135 See Moosa (2002), p.86.
136 See Enderwick (2005), p.104; Maennig and Wilfling (1998), p.295; Lipsey (2002), p.54.
137 See Blonigen (1999); Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1996); UNCTAD (2006), pp.189-190.
138 See Moosa (2002), pp.69 and 98.
139 See UNCTAD (2006), p.183; Hanson (2001), p.13.
140 See Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael (2001), p.5; Enderwick (2005), pp.104 and 106;
UNCTAD (2006), p.183; Moosa (2002), p.92; Bevan and Estrin (2000); Neuhaus (2005);
Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.6.
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(e. g. through greenfield investments), introducing new industries, and opening
host economies to international markets.141
However, in order to materialize positive effects from FDI, host countries
need to offer conditions such as adequate property and competition rights, a
minimum of investor protection and supporting measures for struggling domes-
tic players.142 Moreover, the intensity of the impact depends on the entry time
of the MNCs, the type and the amount of investment, the technology used, the
industry in question, and various host country characteristics.143
These preconditions are also necessary in order to avoid potential negative
net effects such as the creation or strengthening of monopolistic structures
by MNCs.144 Furthermore, FDI could cause a crowding out of inland invest-
ments; small or less productive domestic companies in particular, may have to
restructure or even shut down.145 With respect to Eastern Europe, domestic
firms suffered heavily in terms of output and employment, even though in the
long-run “firms became more efficient and resistant to subsequent competitive
pressure”.146
Nevertheless, positive net effects for economies seem to dominate. The single
as well as net effects of FDI on host economies and in particular in Eastern Eu-
rope are summarized in figure 5.147 This shows that MNCs clearly outperform
their domestic competitors in almost all analyzed factors. The direct effect on
domestic companies seems to be limited, but spillovers tend to create posi-
141 See Hunya and Geishecker (2005); see also Barrell and Holland (2000); Moosa (2002),
p.92; Zakharov and Kusˇic´ (2003), p.2; Lipsey (2002), pp.59-60.
142 See Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael (2001), pp.2-3; UNCTAD (2004b), p.139.
143 See UNCTAD (2006), p.183.
144 See UNCTAD (2006), p.195; Moosa (2002), p.92.
145 See Lipsey (2002), p.58; Neuhaus (2005), p.19; UNCTAD (2004b), p.132.
146 Hunya and Geishecker (2005), p.4.
147 As mentioned before the analyzed effects only represent a selection of the most important
factors. Thus, the row “net effect” does not show an average of the effects discussed but
the overall effect (including other effects) of FDI on host economies as identified by
researchers.
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Category
MNC perfor-
mance vs. 
domestic firms
Spillovers to 
domestic firms Net effect
Net effect for 
Eastern Europe
Technology & training ++ + + +
Productivity & growth ++ + + ++
Employment 0 + + +
Wages ++ + + +
Trade + 0 + +
Net effect ++ + + ++
   --      = rather large negative effect
   -       = rather small negative effect
   0      = marginal effect
   +      = rather small positive effect
   ++    = rather large positive effect
   bold = strong empirical evidence
Source: Author's concept
Summary of empirical finding of host country effects of FDI
Figure 5: Summary of host country effects
tive forward and backward linkages through multipliers in the host economies,
particularly in the case of Eastern Europe.148
However, the economic impact of FDI on the host country is almost im-
possible to measure in quantitative terms, especially because counter-factual
activities and interdependent factors cannot easily be captured. Therefore,
some empirical studies may actually overestimate the positive effects of FDI by
neglecting the endogeneity of FDI, especially regarding growth, employment
and wage effects that also influence FDI inflows themselves; Eastern Europe,
for example, may have been attractive for foreign investors as a low-labor
cost region. However, both reform efforts towards EU accession as well as the
increasing demand for labor have contributed to rising labor costs in recent
years. Thus FDI and other external effects may actually lead to less attractive
148 See e. g. Hunya and Geishecker (2005).
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investment conditions in the long-run.149
In conclusion and despite some methodological doubts, the positive contribu-
tion of FDI on host countries seems to outweigh the negative effects. The con-
tinuous liberalization of FDI regulations also suggests that governments “con-
sider it potentially beneficial for achieving their development objectives”150.
The policies to attract FDI therefore seem a rewarding subject to study, both
for public policy makers and this thesis. Finally, the last two sections on home
and host country effects have shown that FDI is not a zero-sum game. On the
contrary, many of the areas that have been studied, such as technology and
employment, indicate that both home and host countries benefit from FDI.
2.2.3 Why do FDIs occur?
The previous section stated that MNCs tend to perform better than domestic
players. This aspect however, is not sufficient to explain why companies become
MNCs in the first place, since they may show superior performance in their
home countries as well. It is also important for this thesis to understand why
companies choose to open up subsidiaries or build a plant instead of serving
the market by exporting or licensing arrangements.151
As stated above, no general FDI theory exists. Furthermore, the theory of
MNCs is “still in its infancy”152. Traditionally, economists explained FDI and
MNC activities with the classical trade theory (section 2.2.3.1). Not until the
1960s did (mainly International Business) economists develop new MNC the-
ories, summarized in section 2.2.3.2. The New Trade Theory (section 2.2.3.3)
has also attempted to integrate new insights and developments in international
149 See The Economist (2004); UNCTAD (2006), p.184; Heiduk (2005), p.353; Nunnenkamp
(2006), p.11; Moosa (2002), pp.68-71 and 78; Reker (2003), pp.25-26.
150 UNCTAD (2004b), p.123; see also Mu¨ller (2005), pp.135-136.
151 See Blonigen (2005), p.2.
152 Krugman and Obstfeld (2005), p.161; see also Johnson (2005), p.17; Ru¨bel (2004), p.179.
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financial flows into comprehensive models that extend the classical trade the-
ory. Most issues discussed in these theories are valid for the study of MNC in
general, including MNC activities in transition economies. Particular insights
regarding Eastern Europe are highlighted in the subsequent sections where
available. A short conclusion is provided in section 2.2.3.4.
2.2.3.1 Classical Trade Theory
The classical mode of explaining FDI has its roots in the works of Adam
Smith153 and David Ricardo154 who first recognized the advantages of pro-
duction specialization and who established early models of trade movements.
However, their models assume production factor immobility which excludes
FDI by definition.155
The neo-classical Trade Theory extended these early studies that had
been based on goods trade to capital flows. This so-called “differential rate of
return theory” is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem156 and asserts that
capital will flow from capital-abundant countries (with expected low financial
returns) to countries with relatively little capital (with expected high financial
returns). Thus, FDI occurs in countries with higher returns as a result of
arbitrage. Empirical trade research showed on the basis of U.S. data that U.S.
firms had higher returns abroad than at home.157
While the differential rate of return theory found many supporters in the
1950s, this approach has been rigorously contested since the 1960s. Especially
International Business scholars argued that the classical Trade Theory does
153 See Smith (1776).
154 See Ricardo (1817).
155 See Dreyhaupt (2006), pp.20-21.
156 The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem formulates that the export of capital-intensive goods by
capital-abundant countries and the export of labor by labor-abundant countries lead to
an equilibrium of goods and prices. See Dreyhaupt (2006), p.22.
157 See Ohlin (1933); Dunning and Rugman (1985).
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not overcome the deficiencies of the classical view of Smith (1776) etc. and
unrealistically assumes perfect markets and an immobility of production fac-
tors; hence, a distinction between FPIs (pure financial flows) and FDIs (which
assume the set-up of operations abroad) is not possible.158
This approach has also been criticized for viewing trade and FDI as sub-
stitutes for one another while empirical studies show a different picture. In
addition, the “differential rate of return theory” cannot explain why FDI vol-
umes vary across industries and why FDIs flow not only from Germany to the
U.S. car industry, for example, but also from the U.S. to the German car in-
dustry.159 Moreover, more recent empirical studies cannot confirm the above
mentioned findings that higher returns lead to higher FDI flows. In fact, on
a global scale, returns of MNCs declined significantly in the late 1950s while
FDI flows continued to surge. Finally, the classical trade theory widely neglects
firm-specific factors, preferences and strategies.160
Overall, the classical trade theory does not show a very realistic picture of
MNC activity, “cannot explain the bulk of FDI flows”161 and is therefore not
well suited as underlying theory for this thesis.
2.2.3.2 International Production Theory & the OLI-Paradigm
The strong criticism, especially from International Business economists, of the
classical Trade Theory and its limitations in explaining MNC activities led
to a vast amount of other approaches, the most important of which are (1)
the market imperfections approach, (2) the internalization theory and (3) the
OLI-Paradigm.
158 See Ohlin (1933); Iversen (1935).
159 See Mundell (1957); Caves (1996), pp.25-28; Graham (1996); Kokko (2006).
160 See Hymer (1976), pp.11-13 and 49; Caves (1996), pp.25-28; Ru¨bel (2004), p.158; Drey-
haupt (2006), p.23.
161 Hymer (1976), p.9.
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(1) Hymer (1976)162 and his market imperfections approach are widely
accepted as the starting point for the critic of the classical Trade Theory and
the beginning of a theory of International Production.163
He was the first scholar to view FDIs not merely as international capital flows
but as a reaction of companies to structural market imperfections.164 His main
argument against the classical Trade Theory was that companies in perfect
competitive markets are supposed to have equal production costs and falling
profits; therefore, investors should not be able to survive in foreign markets
because their higher costs, e. g. the overcoming entry barriers such as a foreign
culture, language, and legal adjustments, should eliminate their profits and
drive them out of the foreign market.165
Since, in contrast to this hypothesis, MNCs and FDIs have constantly risen
after World War II, Hymer concluded, market imperfections had to be the
reason why MNCs evolve. In order to endure in foreign markets MNCs have to
possess, according to Hymer, specific advantages compared to their competitors
in the host country. Therefore, firm-specific or “ownership” advantages
are economies of scale, but also a superior technology or specific managerial and
marketing skills. These advantages may lead to a quasi-monopolistic position
of the MNCs in the host economy that can, however, only be fully exploited if
the MNC has significant control over its foreign activities and therefore decides
in favor of FDIs instead of FPIs.166
In sum, the true driver for FDI flows for Hymer is the leverage of compa-
nies’ market power and not the host country’s availability of capital or return
advantages.167
162 Hymer’s dissertation was already completed in 1960 but not published until 1976.
163 See Dreyhaupt (2006), p.26.
164 See Cantwell (2000), p.13; Johnson (2005), p.18.
165 See Hymer (1976), pp.34-36.
166 See Hymer (1976), pp.25-26; Johnson (2005), pp.18-19; Cantwell (2000), pp.13-14.
167 See Dreyhaupt (2006), p.26.
2.2 Theoretical and empirical approaches to FDI 45
Hymer has been acknowledged as the “father of the theory of the inter-
national firm”168 and his work has functioned as a catalyst for the further
development of the industrial-organization approach.169 Nevertheless, he has
also been criticized for focusing too strongly on structurally-based market
imperfections and not sufficiently explaining trade as alternative option to
FDIs. Most of all his approach neglects strategic investment decisions of MNCs
and, for example, does not consider that the monopolistic advantage may not
be a precondition but a goal for MNCs to invest abroad.170
(2) The internalization theory is also based on the idea of imperfect mar-
kets and has its origin in the works of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975,
1985) who developed the approach that firms grow more quickly if they min-
imize market transaction costs, e. g. by internalizing certain processes instead
of acquiring them from external providers.171 When analyzing transactions,
Williamson (1975) further categorizes them depending on their volume, their
frequency etc. Thus intermediate goods such as marketing know-how seem es-
pecially apt for internalization, since no tradeable markets exists for these and
because this is an area in which dependence on local agents can be costly or even
dangerous for MNCs. Therefore, when extending its operations, a company is
vulnerable to “moral hazard” or other transaction costs such as opportunity
costs, if the provision of these goods is not controlled internally. Internalization
thus could mean an acceleration of processes, less need for bargaining and less
uncertainty in the negotiation process.172
Buckley and Casson (1976) extended this general idea of internalization to
the international context of FDIs and analyzed what preconditions have to be
168 Ietto-Gillies (2004), p.2.
169 See Cantwell (2000), p.15; Pitelis (2002).
170 See Johnson (2005), p.19; Pitelis (2002), p.21; Heiduk and Kerlen-Prinz (1999), pp.37-
38.
171 See Coase (1937), pp. 333-335, 341.
172 See Coase (1937), p.333; Williamson (1975); Williamson (1985).
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met for companies in order to own the company that runs operations abroad
(FDI) or when other forms of foreign activities (licensing etc.) are more suit-
able.173 Buckley and Casson (1976) also broadened the definition of interme-
diate goods to all goods that are not produced for the end-consumer (raw
material, know-how, experience, management skills etc.).174
Internalization theory has developed three scenarios in which FDI is the best
foreign market approach where MNCs are concerned about hold-up prob-
lems, i. e. through incomplete contracts with local agents due to uncertain mar-
ket developments that may cause uncertain performance of the local agent and
contract fulfillment issues, dissipation of firm-specific assets, i. e. through
the transfer of knowledge capital to local actors that can be costly and prone
for abuse, and finally about agency cost, i. e. the additional cost that stems
from monitoring and motivating employees of the third-party organization due
to asymmetric information of the MNC about its organization and working
processes.175
The internalization theory has been a milestone for MNC theory.176 It
has especially been acknowledged for its extension of Hymer’s rent-seeking
approach to a more efficiency-seeking view and an integration of intermediate
goods.177 Nevertheless, it does not represent a comprehensive theory since it
cannot sufficiently explain why companies go abroad in the first place instead
of investing in the home country, why MNCs invest in a specific location and
why FDI flows sometimes do not occur steadily but in waves.178 Furthermore,
one essential problem of the internalization theory is that it has difficulties
173 See Krugman and Obstfeld (2005), p.160; Ietto-Gillies (2005), p.109; Dreyhaupt (2006),
p.31.
174 Buckley and Casson (1976), pp.36-37, 45.
175 See Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004), pp.36-39; Blonigen (2005), p.2; Krugman and
Obstfeld (2005), p.160.
176 See Hennart (2003), p.131; Ietto-Gillies (2005), p.97.
177 See Ietto-Gillies (2004), p.4; Dunning and Rugman (1985), pp.229-230.
178 See Heiduk (2005), p.321.
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measuring transaction costs and therefore has its limits in proving the quanti-
tative advantage of internal versus external provision of intermediate goods.179
(3) The attempts to integrate the existing theories of international produc-
tion, especially the approaches of market-imperfection and internalization, into
a comprehensive framework has resulted in the OLI-Paradigm by Dunning
(1977, 1981, 1988).180
The framework exists of three pillars, Ownership, Location and
Internalization. More specifically (and on the basis of Hymer’s work) a
company has to have a distinctive ownership or asset advantage over foreign
firms in order to compensate for the information disadvantage that they have
in relation to the foreign firms in the host market. These asset advantages
can consist of property and intellectual property rights, product innovations,
management skills, technological know-how etc. Furthermore, the MNC has
to be able to exclude other firms from using these assets, to transfer them to
their foreign affiliates and to use them in several MNC locations at the same
time. Other advantages of MNCs compared to foreign firms can be synergies
from multi-plant production and sourcing, product specialization and better
access to international financial and consumer markets.181
Furthermore, the envisaged location abroad has to be – according to the
OLI-Paradigm – more or at least as attractive (i. e. profitable) as the home
country. Thus certain country specifics are decisive in determining whether a
company opts for FDI in the host country or for an investment in the home
country. Locational factors include labor costs, access to natural resources,
prices, infrastructure costs but also investment and trade regulations etc.182
179 See Moosa (2002), p.33; Dreyhaupt (2006), pp.34-35; Ietto-Gillies (2005), p.100.
180 First presented in: Dunning (1977); Dunning (1981) and refined in: Dunning (1988).
181 See Dunning (1988), p.81; see also Johnson (2005), p.19; Heiduk (2005), pp.322-24.
182 See Dunning (1988), pp.81-84; earlier roots of this location approach can be found in:
Horst (1972); Vernon (1974); Hood and Young (1979).
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Channel for 
serving foreign
market
Ownership
advantage
Location
advantage for 
foreign market
Internalizational 
advantage
FDI Yes Yes Yes
Exports Yes No Yes
Licensing Yes No No
Source: Based on Dunning (1981)
MNC activites and preconditions of OLI-Paradigm
Figure 6: MNC decision matrix based on OLI-Paradigm
Finally, the internalization pillar of the OLI-Paradigm asks whether com-
panies that have an ownership advantage tend to set up their own operations or
to channel their activities through partner companies (e. g. via licensing). This
question mainly reflects the ideas of the internalization theory presented above;
therefore, a company opts for FDI if internalization leads to lower transaction
costs for certain operations (search and negotiation costs etc.) or is suitable for
the protection of brand reputation, better quality control of intermediary and
final products and the control of conditions for distribution, sales etc.183
According to the OLI-Paradigm and as shown in figure 6, all three criteria
have to be met by FDI for companies to opt for this as an investment form.184
The OLI-Paradigm has been acknowledged as the first framework for a holis-
tic decision-oriented internationalization strategy for companies.185 However,
even though Dunning has been recognized as one of the main contributors of
MNC theory, the OLI-Paradigm has had to face some substantial criticism.
Firstly, theorists have noted that the OLI-Paradigm does not embody a theory
183 See Dunning (1988), p.81; Dunning (1993), pp. 56-61, 429; see also Johnson (2005),
p.19; Lawler and Seddighi (2001), p.356; Heiduk (2005), pp.323-324.
184 Based on Dunning (1981), p.32.
185 See Heiduk (2005), p.325; Lawler and Seddighi (2001), p.358; Toubal (2004), pp.9-10.
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so much as only a shopping list of required factors.186 Dunning has countered
this criticism by clarifying that the OLI-Paradigm is not intended as a general
theory, but as an eclectic paradigm functioning as an umbrella concept based
on different theoretical approaches which tests companies’ decisions on export,
FDI or other forms of investment.187 It can furthermore be argued that gen-
eral theories are difficult to establish in the case of FDI anyway, since they
are difficult to prove empirically because of the many interdependent factors
influencing the investment decision of MNCs.
It has also been observed that the paradigm is rather static, only describing
a one-time investment decision without considering the endogeneity of FDI,
i. e. the reaction of FDI to other companies investments or public policy
measures. Dunning has recently reacted to this criticism by adding policy
and institutional variables to his model without, however, formalizing this
approach so far.188
Overall, and despite some justified criticism, Dunning’s OLI-Paradigm seems
well suited for the general analysis of the decision-making process for compa-
nies for investments abroad, answering the questions why? and how? of the
investment. However, the locational component, the where?, remains too vague
in this framework since his paradigm merely discusses the advantages between
the home country and foreign countries in general; hence, the OLI-Paradigm
cannot provide a sufficient framework for a key question of this thesis – why
companies decide for a specific foreign country. This aspect will be the subject
of section 2.2.4.
186 See Dunning (2000b); Ietto-Gillies (2004), p.4; Caves (1996), pp.25-28.
187 See Dunning (2000b); Dunning (2000a); see also Heiduk (2005), pp.322-323.
188 See section 2.2.4.1 for more details about Dunning’s institutional factors; see also Dun-
ning (2006); Dunning (2000b).
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2.2.3.3 New Trade Theory
While International Business theorists since the 1960s have revolutionized the
way of interpreting the occurrence of FDI from a mainly firm- or microeco-
nomic perspective, trade theory scholars have also made significant efforts
in recent years to modernize the classical trade theory in order to create a
comprehensive model explaining international capital flows. This school of
thought can be divided into (1) the vertical FDI approach, (2) the horizontal
FDI approach and (3) the knowledge-capital model. Subsection (4) discusses
the empirical findings of these approaches. All approaches share an assumption
of perfect markets (unlike the Classical Trade Theory) and increasing returns
of scale; they are all based on the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and usually aim
at explaining FDI flows in general equilibrium frameworks.189
(1) The vertical FDI approach, first formalized by Helpman (1984, 1985),
mainly explains MNC activity with efficiency-seeking motives. Thus FDIs occur
because companies want to leverage cost advantages due to diverging factor en-
dowments in different countries, i. e. lower labor costs. In order to optimize costs
along the value chain, companies transfer parts of their production processes
abroad. This can lead to diversified company operations at different locations,
e. g. one site for highly-qualified and another one for low-qualified work.190
(2) The approach of horizontal FDI, primarily developed by Markusen
(1984)191, focuses on the market-seeking motive of FDI; according to this
approach, firms aim at serving foreign market demand by local production.
Thus in principle the same goods are produced abroad as well as in the parent
189 See section 2.2.3.1; see also Heiduk and Kerlen-Prinz (1999), pp.29-30; Ru¨bel (2004),
p.158-164; Ietto-Gillies (2005), p.140; Blonigen (2005), p.21.
190 See Helpman (1984); Helpman (1995); see also Helpman and Krugman (1985); Buch,
Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005); Zhang and Markusen (1997).
191 See Markusen (1984); see also Brainard (1993) and for further references Markusen and
Maskus (2001).
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company, even though certain product adaptations to local preferences may
be necessary. According to this strand of literature, trade barriers and higher
transportation costs are the main FDI drivers.192
(3) While the debate about the horizontal and the vertical FDI approach
is continuing, the knowledge-capital model aims at combining these two
approaches into a comprehensive model.193 Furthermore, the model, which
is in particular based on Markusen (1995) and Markusen, Venables, Konan,
and Zhang (1996), stresses that MNCs’ advantages primarily emanate from
knowledge-capital, i. e. intangible assets such as intellectual property rights,
human capital and brand reputation.194
(4) Empirical tests of vertical and horizontal FDI have found stronger ev-
idence for the occurrence of the latter. Other authors have described that the
horizontal FDI approach as predominantly explaining MNC activities in de-
veloped countries.195 This does not seem very surprising since almost 60% of
global FDI of USD916B flowed into developed countries in 2005.196 On the
other hand, studies have found evidence for vertical FDI, also for Eastern Eu-
rope and especially for the manufacturing sector.197 Finally, recent trends have
shown an increase of vertical FDI relative to horizontal FDI, especially in East-
ern European transition countries.198
Empirical knowledge-capital models have integrated these two views but also
activities of domestic companies as endogenous variables into a comprehensive
192 See Brainard (1997); Johnson (2005), pp.21-22.
193 See Grossman and Helpman (2003).
194 An overlap to the internalization theory seems obvious; see section 2.2.3.2; see also
Markusen (1995); Markusen, Venables, Konan, and Zhang (1996).
195 See Brainard (1993); Markusen and Venables (1998); Carr, Markusen, and Maskus
(2001); Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005), pp.54 and p.83 and see Ietto-
Gillies (2005), pp.146-147 for further references.
196 See UNCTAD (2006), p.XVII.
197 See Marin, Lorentowicz, and Raubold (2002); Hunya and Geishecker (2005), pp.17, 26;
Ietto-Gillies (2005), p.145.
198 See Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004), p.32.
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model.199 The knowledge-capital model of Markusen and Maskus (2002) con-
firms that FDI is more consistent with the horizontal model; however, a clear
distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is not reached in their models
either.200
In an extension of the discussed approaches, more recent empirical studies
based on firm-level data suggest that MNC strategies are more complex than
a mere distinction into horizontal, vertical and knowledge-capital FDI; thus
an overlap of these models is common and the FDI decision-making process
may include many more factors and motives than modeled so far.201 Initial
extensions to more complex MNC strategy models, e. g. in Yeaple (2003) and
Carstensen and Toubal (2004) hint at a further opening towards the integra-
tion of a more diverse explication of FDI inflows.202
In conclusion the main contribution of the New Trade Theory is its effort
to develop important hints regarding the motives of FDI and, in particular,
to formalize FDI theory in a mathematical fashion. However, vertical and
horizontal FDI approaches can only partly explain MNC activities, whereas
the knowledge-capital approach adds more realism by extending the existing
models.203 Nevertheless, statistical evidence for all models of the New Trade
Theory remains weak and empirical work is only its early phases, mainly
because the complex decision-making process of MNCs depends on various
endogenous factors and is therefore difficult to quantify.204
199 See Markusen (1997); Markusen, Venables, Konan, and Zhang (1996).
200 See also Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004), p.31.
201 See Feinberg and Keane (2005).
202 See Yeaple (2003), p.304; Carstensen and Toubal (2004).
203 See Johnson (2005), p.23.
204 See Markusen and Maskus (2002); see also Markusen and Maskus (2001), p.40.
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2.2.3.4 Conclusion
This literature review has confirmed for this thesis that FDI occurs due to
market imperfections and that the decision making process within MNCs is
very complex. The difficulties of all approaches, i. e. Classical Trade Theory,
International Production and OLI-Paradigm as well as New Trade Theory,
in statistically predicting MNC actions, support hypothesis 2 of this thesis
which states that “determinants of investment decisions are much more diverse
than elaborated in most FDI studies.”205 Furthermore, even though Dunning’s
OLI-Paradigm appears well-suited for the analysis of various MNC decision
processes, the location factor, i. e. the question regarding the specific country
determinants of FDI, remains too vague in this framework and will be discussed
more thoroughly in the subsequent section.
2.2.4 Country determinants of FDIs
As stated before, most FDI models have difficulties in explaining why FDI
flows to one specific (transition) country rather than any other. This section
first discusses the main location determinants theories (section 2.2.4.1), then
reviews the most important studies on FDI in transition countries and analyzes
their findings on the main country determinants (section 2.2.4.2).
2.2.4.1 FDI determinants theories
The FDI determinants theory – or location theory – mainly goes back to five
important strands of research: (1) the classical theory of comparative advan-
tages, (2) the New Economic Geography and the New Trade Theory, (3) the
institutional quality approach, (4) Dunning’s revised OLI-Paradigm, and (5)
the locational competition theory. Good overviews of these theories are given in
205 See section 1.1.
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Benito and Gripsrud (1995), Resmini (2000), Kinoshita and Campos (2002),
and Resmini (2006). No isolated theory has been developed for transition coun-
tries so far.
(1) The classical theory of comparative advantages assumes that
MNCs decide for a selected country because of specific factor endowments that
make the envisaged investment more profitable than in other countries. These
country advantages traditionally include market size, market growth and rel-
ative wages. Later versions of this approach added trade-related determinants
such as tariffs, non-tariff-barriers etc. Thus the initial conditions of govern-
ments are essential for an investment decision that can only be influenced by
governments through the change of economic fundamentals.206
(2) New Economic Geography and New Trade Theory further ex-
tended this classical determinants approach. According to the New Economic
Geography207, FDI is driven to a large extent by industrial agglomeration that
stems from the trade-off between external economies of scale and transportation
costs in specific industries. In the locational context, the New Trade Theory
highlights a similar aspect, the distance of the host country to the home coun-
try; the proximity of two countries in terms of geographic distance but also in
terms of shared language and culture can reduce transportation and transaction
costs and thus foster FDI growth to a specific country.208
Like the classical theory of comparative advantages these two approaches
also strongly focus on the role of the companies and do not concede states
much room for maneuver.
206 Representatives of this theory are e. g. Aliber (1970); Agarwal (1980); Kravis and Lipsey
(1982); Veugelers (1991); Lucas (1993).
207 First presented by Krugman (1991); synthesized by Fujita, Krugman, and Venables
(1999); important contributions, e. g. by Wheeler and Mody (1992).
208 See section 2.2.3.3 for examples, but especially Brainard (1993); Eaton and Tamura
(1994); Brainard (1997).
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(3) The institutional quality approach looks more closely at policy factors
influencing the investment conditions for MNCs and predicts that, for exam-
ple, less corruption and a reliable legal system will promote higher FDI flows.
Without a doubt, this approach gives public policy measures more credit for
their role in influencing MNCs’ investment decision than earlier theories. How-
ever, the evolution of this approach is still in an early stage. No comprehensive
framework has been established so far; neither a clear set of location factors
that actually influence the location decision nor their relative importance could
be determined so far. Furthermore, the perspective of these representatives on
the state is very focused since they basically set institutions equal to national
bureaucracy and mainly analyze their effectiveness, e. g. how to implement
already existing laws or to deal with legal backlogs.209
This thesis, however, follows a broader definition of public policy (see section
2.1.3) considering a larger set of actors (e. g. leading government officials and
local agencies) as well as measures (e. g. privatization success, corporate law,
promotion of the host country’s image abroad).
(4) In his more recent works, Dunning210 expands his earlier view of the
OLI-Paradigm in which the locational advantage was not country-specific
and merely focused on the advantages of a foreign location compared to the
home country.211
More specifically, he acknowledges that locational factors have changed since
the 1970s, focusing his analysis however, little on specific determinants and
rather on the entry mode of FDI (greenfield, etc.) and on the different moti-
vations of FDI, i. e. resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and
209 See Campos and Kinoshita (2003), pp. 4 and 7.; Wei (2000a); Wei (2000b); Antras
(2003).
210 See e. g. Dunning (1998); Dunning (2002); Dunning (2006).
211 See e. g. Dunning (1981).
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strategic-asset seeking.212 In comparison to the 1970s, he now sees less signif-
icance of transaction costs due to agglomeration of FDI in host countries and
an increasing importance of the availability of knowledge-building capacities
in the host country; furthermore, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment
and the institutional environment seem to have become more important just as
those factors “which governments, in their macro-organizational policies, can
and do influence”213.
In Dunning (2006) he also incorporates different institutional variables into
the OLI-Paradigm. As in earlier works however, the revised OLI-Paradigm does
not provide a formalized theory of FDI location either. It pays, moreover, only
little attention to individual public policy measures that distinguish one country
from another and it does not evaluate the relative impact or interdependence
of factors. In the end, the revised OLI-Paradigm remains somewhat vague and
enables little implications for policy makers by stating that FDIs are driven
by a “gamut of government policies favorable to globalization, innovation and
entrepreneurship”214.
Overall, the revised version of the OLI-Paradigm does not seem apt as a
framework in order to answer the questions of this thesis, either.
(5) The theory of locational competition represents the most powerful
approach for this thesis because it incorporates both the company’s view as well
as the state’s view, calls for a consideration of the interdependencies between
different factors and determinants and encourages to analyze the trade-offs of
decisions and actions. This approach has a long tradition in Germany where
it is referred to as “Standorttheorie”, while other research traditions have –
212 See also the section on host country determinants in UNCTAD (2006), pp.157-163 that
is inspired by Dunning.
213 Dunning (1998), p.60; see also Dunning (2002).
214 Dunning (2002), p.13; see also Dunning (2006), p.218.
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to a large extent – ignored this concept so far.215 This section covers the (a)
definition, (b) assumptions, (c) findings, (d) weaknesses, and (e) relevance of
locational competition for this thesis.
(a) According to Siebert (1996, 2000, 2005), the most prominent represen-
tative of this approach, locational competition is defined as the competition
between different geographic dimension, i. e. regions, countries or cities. These
immobile entities compete for mobile factors, i. e. for capital, technology and
labor; this competition again takes place on three different levels: firms, gov-
ernments and workers.216 Thus locational competition comprises a broader
definition of competition than suggested, for example, by the New Trade The-
ory that only focuses on competition between firms.217 In this context Siebert
strongly disagrees with Krugman (1994) who argues that the economic growth
of a country is by and large independent from the competition with other coun-
tries. He insists that competition between countries exists and has even become
more intense in recent decades.218
(b) Locational competition assumes that globalization leads to lower eco-
nomic distance, an international division of labor and thus creates more op-
portunities but also more need for countries to improve their competitive posi-
tion.219 Looking at governments, it is therefore crucial to identify “what kind
of instruments [they can] use to attract or keep mobile production factors”220.
The key problems for governments however, as they are assumed in the loca-
tional competition theory, are the opportunity costs that are caused by the
attraction of immobile factors (e. g. MNCs); thus, public goods, such as infras-
215 See Siebert (1996); Siebert (2000); Siebert (2005); see also Jahrreiß (1984). Nevertheless,
scientific roots of the approach also lead to Tiebout (1956); see also Brakman, Garretsen,
and van Marrewijk (2002).
216 See Siebert (2000), pp.3-4.
217 See Siebert (2000), p.4.
218 See Siebert (2005), p.3; Siebert (1996), p.2.
219 See Siebert (2000), p.12; Siebert (1996), p.10.
220 Siebert (2000), p.6.
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tructure but also investment incentives, have to be financed by taxes and fees.
However, since governments want to “maximize welfare of society, national in-
come, income per head or the votes for the party in power”221, they need to
find the right balance between different factors, e. g. expenditures for infras-
tructure and low taxes; in short, the optimum mix between the attraction of
mobile factors and opportunity costs they cause.222
(c) Analyzing primarily European countries, locational competition has come
up with some important findings. First of all, the number of possible fields of
competition is manifold the most important being taxes, economic and social
infrastructure, institutional rules (i. e. product standards, permitting proce-
dures, or other legal regulations) as well as human capital.223
Moreover, the necessity of governments to balance policies to attract invest-
ment on the hand and keep taxes low on the other hand, also seems to avoid
a long-term “race to the bottom” between competing countries as discussed in
section 2.2.1.224
Finally, Siebert finds that increasing locational competition leads to a
stronger convergence of policies and institutional arrangements across countries
and – in the end – to less scope for policy makers. Especially in the context
of the EU, the increasing number of harmonizations of regulations seems to
decrease the number of possible policy measures for state actors.225
(d) Nevertheless, the locational competition approach has someweaknesses;
up to now it has produced only limited empirical results.226 Furthermore, the
formalization of the theory is still at an early stage, considers only few variables
221 Siebert (1996), p.2
222 See also Siebert (2005), p.9; Siebert (2000), p.6.
223 See Siebert (2000), pp.6-10 and 22.
224 See Siebert (2000).
225 See Siebert (2000), p.15; see also Dreyhaupt (2006).
226 See also Siebert (2005), p.19; Lorz (1997).
2.2 Theoretical and empirical approaches to FDI 59
and possibly focuses too heavily on the neo-classical approach.227 Moreover,
Siebert may be a little too pessimistic with regards to the impact of public
policy and may not sufficiently reflect the possibility that the provision of
public goods does not need to result in levying higher taxes since the pro-
duction and maintenance of infrastructure etc. could be financed by fees; key
FDI attractors also may not cause significant government expenditures (e. g.
relations and assistance of local administration to investors) or be acceptable
for voters etc. if they acknowledge the long-term benefits of the measure such
as a more effective administration and implementation of laws.
(e) Despite the described weaknesses, the locational competition approach
seems to be very relevant and well-apt as theoretical pillar of this thesis.
Firstly, the approach allows for a multiple analysis of country determinants
from the perspective of MNCs as well as from states since they are both part
of the locational competition between countries according to Siebert.228
Secondly, locational competition confirms the assumption of this thesis that
countries need to focus on those locational advantages they can influence in-
stead of relying on given comparative advantages such as natural resources.229
Thirdly, the locational competition approach underscores the necessity to ask
questions about the limits and trade-offs of competitive actions. For companies
this means that the analysis (and interview questionnaires) need to include
questions referring to country specific factors that hinder MNCs in becom-
ing more competitive and profitable. With regards to governments this aspect
means that this thesis also analyzes what limits due to pressure from voters
227 The best incorporation of the approach can probably be found in Dreyhaupt (2006) who
has used the theory extensively for his – mainly analytical – analysis of competition
policy in the context of the EU.
228 The third dimension of competition, the workers, is not considered in this thesis in order
to avoid an overstretching of the – already complex – analysis.
229 Siebert (2000), p.6.
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and interest groups, for example, reduce the possibilities of policy makers in
order to create favorable conditions for MNCs in the analyzed countries.
Fourthly and finally, locational competition helps to sharpen the analysis
in the context of EU integration, asking to what extent reforms of candidate
countries and accession to the EU have an impact on investment policy. It is
particularly interesting whether those areas in which public policy may have
lost some room to maneuver, are actually most relevant for the investment
decision of MNCs.
Turning now to the existing empirical literature on FDI determinants this
thesis now specifically focuses on transition economies.
2.2.4.2 Studies on FDI determinants in transition countries
Resmini (2006) observed that few studies have analyzed FDI determinants
in transition countries so far. Figure 7 provides an overview of the 34 most
frequently cited studies; it also serves as further basis for this section in which
(1) the study selection is further explained, (2) the main insights of these
studies are summarized and (3) the areas in which this thesis can make a
contribution to FDI research beyond the existing studies are discussed.
(1) The overview of studies in figure 7 presents the number of transition coun-
tries analyzed in those studies, the period of the analyzed samples, a summary
of the main FDI host country determinants as identified by those studies and fi-
nally, the empirical method utilized in these studies. The studies discussed only
cover those that deal with countries in transition because the focus countries
of this thesis, Romania and Croatia, are transition countries as well. Another
reason is that research has emphasized that flows to transition countries seem
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# Authors
Transition 
countries 
analyzed
Period 
analyzed Main determinants Method
1 Genco et al (1993) 7 1991-1992
Rule of law, implementation of laws, market access, economic 
reform, privatization, efficient financial system, bureaucracy Survey
2
Lankes and 
Venables (1996) 16 1995
Market access, market size, human capital, proximity, trade 
barriers, political and economic stability, natural resources Survey
3 Savary (1997) 5 1996
Market size, factor costs, privatization, technological know-how and 
human capital Survey
4 Pye (1998) 5 1989-1996
Market size and growth, labor costs, stability for investment, human 
capital Survey
5 Altzinger (1999) 4 1997 Market potential, labor cost, proximity Survey
6
Borsos-Torstila, J. 
(1999) 8 1990-1995 Market size, EU integration, human capital Survey
7 AHK (2006) 14 2006
Willingness to perform, productivity, paying habits, legal certainty, 
educational level, tax burden, tax system, labor cost Survey
8
Lansbury et al 
(1996) 3 1991-1993
Costs relative to other target countries, trade openness, private 
sector share, technological know-how Econometrics
9 Altomonte (1998) 10 1990-1995
Market size, labor cost, distance, implementation of laws, 
investment climate Econometrics
10
Holland & Pain 
(1998) 11 1992-1996
Investment climate, privatization, investment risk, EU integration, 
relative labor cost to other target countries, trade openness, 
productivity Econometrics
11
Brenton et al 
(1999) 10 1992-1995 Market size, proximity, EU integration Econometrics
12
Bevan and Estrin 
(2000) 11 1994-1998
Market size, trade policy & openness, investment climate, EU 
integration, input cost, economic and political cost Econometrics
13 Resmini (2000) 10 1991-1995 Market size, labor cost, trade openness, agglomeration, proximity Econometrics
14
Woodward et al 
(2000) 6 1990-1993
Market size, investment climate, investment incentives, 
privatization, political stability Econometrics
15
Garibaldi et al 
(2001) 26 1990-1999
Market size, fiscal policy, monetary policy, country risk, trade 
policy, natural resources, investment climate, bureaucracy Econometrics
16 Jensen (2002) 18 1993-1997 Investment climate, economic reform, political stability Econometrics
17 Smarzynska (2002) 19 1989-1994
Market size, tax policy, property rights, effectiveness of legal 
regulations, privatization, corruption, trade openness Econometrics
18
Altomonte and 
Guagliano (2003) 10 1990-1997
Market size and growth (potential), regional integration, labor cost, 
human capital, investment climate Econometrics
19 Brada et al (2003) 14 1993-2001
Political stability, market size, trade openness, human capital, 
privatization, natural resources Econometrics
20
Campos and 
Kinoshita (2003) 25 1990-1998
Trade openness, market size, investment climate, labor costs, 
education, natural resources, agglomeration & infrastructure Econometrics
21
Disdier and Mayer 
(2003) 6 1991-1999 Labor cost, proximity, political freedom Econometrics
22
Bevan and Estrin 
(2004) 11 1994-2000
Labor cost, private ownership, financial system, monetary policy, 
trade openness, rule of law Econometrics
23 Bevan et al (2004) 12 1994-1998 Labor cost, market size, proximity, EU integration Econometrics
24
Carstensen and 
Toubal (2004) 7 1993-1999
Market size, labor cost, human captial, privatization, political 
stability, investment climate, trade policy Econometrics
25 Galego et al (2004) 10 1993-1999 Market size, trade openness, proximity, labor cost Econometrics
26
Janicki and 
Wunnava (2004) 8 1997 Market size, investment climate, trade openness, labor cost Econometrics
27
Merlevede and 
Schoors (2004) 25 1992-2002
Market size, privatization, labor cost, political stability, EU 
integration, natural resources, proximity Econometrics
28
Bellak and 
Leibrecht (2005) 8 1995-2003 Labor cost, taxes, market size, privatization, proximity Econometrics
29
B nassy-Quere and 
Lahreche-Revil 
(2005) 8 1990-2002 Labor cost, monetary policy, taxes, incentives Econometrics
30
Clausing and 
Dorobantu (2005) 28 1992-2001 Market size, EU integration, trade openness, tax policy Econometrics
31
Demekas et al 
(2005) 14 1995-2003 Labor cost, tax policy, infrastructure, trade policy, distance Econometrics
32
European Comm. 
(2005) 6 1998-2002 Market access, agglomeration, human capital Econometrics
33
Pusterla and 
Resmini (2005) 4 1995-2001
Market demand, industry and regional characteristics, 
agglomeration, market accessibility, labor cost Econometrics
34
Kinoshita and 
Campos (2006) 25 1990-1998
Rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, natural resources, 
agglomeration, trade openness Econometrics
Figure 7: Key studies on FDI determinants in transition countries
62 2 Theoretical approach
to be driven – at least partly – by other factors than those to developing or
developed countries.230
Furthermore, only studies with multiple country analyses have been consid-
ered in this evaluation since this thesis follows the argumentation of various
authors that a cross-country view is especially effective in revealing the specific
determinants of different locations.231 The analysis of several countries is also
supported by the locational competition approach; thus FDI does not embody
an isolated management decision of MNCs for or against an investment, but
also involves transition countries that are competing – more or less actively –
for the same investment(s).232
The overview of the main determinants lists those factors that are identified
by each of the studies as most relevant for the investment decision of MNCs
in a specific transition country – either in terms of statistical significance as
defined by the respective studies or based on qualitative survey evaluations.
Since the differing methods of analysis in these studies do not permit a pooled
quantification of determinants, figure 7 only shows what locational factors have
repeatedly been analyzed and identified as important by previous scholars. The
overview cannot therefore indicate the relative importance of determinants.233
Finally, the presented list of determinants studies cannot be conclusive;
however, other FDI determinants studies, such as surveys from governmental
institutions, have received only little academic attention so far. In this context
the AHK (2006) survey can be viewed as representative for this category of
230 See Resmini (2006); Riedl, Leibrecht, and Bellak (2006); Holland, Sass, Benacek, and
Gronicki (2000).
231 See e. g. Merlevede and Schoors (2004); Bellak and Leibrecht (2005); Be´nassy-Que´re´
and Lahre`che-Re´vil (2005); AHK (2006).
232 These studies may actually comprise larger country samples, e. g. from Western Europe,
but only the analyzed transition countries are listed in order to facilitate comparisons.
233 In order to make this overview less complex it also does not indicate the sign of the
coefficient or the different motives behind the FDI decision.
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FDI research.
(2) In formal terms, the overview reveals that econometric studies234
clearly dominate compared to surveys (27 versus 7). Furthermore, academic
surveys were mainly used in the early phase of transition until the late
1990s, when econometric analyses were hardly feasible due to data limitations.
Moreover, surveys usually cover, for reasons of practicality, a larger set of
determinants than econometric studies. However, both surveys and econo-
metric studies identify on average about five determinants as key drivers for
the investment decision of MNCs. Moreover, it appears that the number of
FDI studies on transition countries continues to rise, since 18 of the evaluated
studies (or 52%) were published in the last four years of analysis (2003-2006).
Most studies find only few differences among country groups, the most striking
being that between CIS and other transition countries, whereas the former
seem to rely heavily on their natural resources to attract FDI.235
The assessment of the main determinants of the 34 evaluated studies
demonstrates that research has only limited consensus about the driving forces
of MNCs’ investment decision. After grouping the cited factors, a list of 26
determinants can be identified. A closer look at the evaluated studies reveals
however that only a limited set of recurring factors is frequently cited as main
FDI determinants; thus only 13 main determinants are mentioned in over four
studies and only eight in over eight studies respectively. These eight main
factors – market size, labor costs, investment climate, trade openness, prox-
imity, human capital, privatization, and political stability – and their number
of citations are presented in figure 8 and will be discussed in the following
234 Most econometric studies (16) perform a panel data analysis.
235 See e. g. Merlevede and Schoors (2004); Kinoshita and Campos (2006).
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Figure 8: Main FDI determinants in transition studies
passage in further detail.
Market size, the most frequently cited FDI determinant for transition
countries, is measured in different ways, but in most studies the GDP of the
host country is included.236 In addition to this, other authors add GDP per
capita237, purchasing power parity 238, land or population size 239 or GDP
growth.240 FDI flows to larger countries with better performing and faster
growing economies tend to be higher because MNCs seem to expect to grow
faster themselves in these host countries.241
236 See e. g. Bellak and Leibrecht (2005); Campos and Kinoshita (2003); Bevan and Estrin
(2004).
237 See Clausing and Dorobantu (2005)
238 See Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003)
239 See Galego, Vieira, and Vieira (2004)
240 See Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001); see also Pusterla and Resmini
(2005) who focus on regions instead of nations.
241 See e. g. Janicki and Wunnava (2004).
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Market size is not only the determinant most frequently cited by studies on
FDI in transition economies; it is also the factor that most studies identify as
the FDI determinant with the most significant (positive) impact. Studies have
also suggested that market size is a key determinant, regardless of the sector
in which the MNCs invest.242 There is however, little consensus among the
evaluated studies about how much more important market size is in compari-
son to other determinants.
Labor costs are generally measured according to the average wage level in
the host country relative to the home country243 or another set of neighboring
countries.244 Other studies proxy labor costs by the productivity level of em-
ployees245 or specify the average wage level by only using the wages of a certain
industry, e. g. the manufacturing sector.246 Furthermore, authors use different
wage categories; a majority of studies applies nominal and real labor units247
while others utilize total labor costs248 or gross wages.249
Regarding the impact of labor costs on the FDI decision of MNCs Riedl,
Leibrecht, and Bellak (2006) conclude in their literature survey: “Empirical
studies for the determinants of FDI in CEECs show a wide variety of results
with respect to the size, sign and significance of the coefficient of the labor
costs proxy used.”250
Generally – and confirmed by the vast majority of studies –, higher labor
costs and lower productivity seem to have a negative impact on FDI inflows,
242 See e. g. Lankes and Venables (1996); Resmini (2000).
243 See e. g. Pye (1998).
244 See e. g. Resmini (2000); Carstensen and Toubal (2004).
245 See e. g. Holland and Pain (1998).
246 See e. g. Bevan and Estrin (2000); Disdier and Mayer (2003).
247 See e. g. Bellak and Leibrecht (2005); Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005);
Be´nassy-Que´re´ and Lahre`che-Re´vil (2005); Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004).
248 See e. g. Clausing and Dorobantu (2005); Galego, Vieira, and Vieira (2004).
249 Altomonte (1998); Resmini (2000).
250 Riedl, Leibrecht, and Bellak (2006), p.4.
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driven by the rationale that MNCs want to use production cost advantages
of a certain location compared to other production sites, either in the home
country or in competing host countries.251 Nevertheless, a few studies actually
find a positive correlation, which is usually explained by imperfect data proxies
or skill effects in specific countries or industries.252
However, the different measures and definitions of labor costs outlined here
lead to the conclusion that the relative significance of labor costs is difficult to
determine or generalize. The impact of labor costs also depends on the motive
of the investment, the sector, the required skill level of the local employees and
of course, the specific country characteristics.253
Furthermore, investment climate is also one of the main determinants
mentioned by the 34 studies on transition countries analyzed here; however,
the definition of this term varies strongly among the studies and partly over-
laps with that of other determinants. Often the investment climate is used as
synonym for progress in transition.254 The variables most frequently used are
country risk derived from international credit ratings255, FDI restrictions based
on IMF statistics256 and a business climate index comprising a larger amount
of other factors, e. g. economic uncertainty, availability of venture capital or po-
litical continuity.257 Last but not least, surveys may also include the perceived
economic stability of the host country in their analysis.258
Even though the definition of investment climate remains somewhat vague,
studies have repeatedly shown that it has a significant impact on the investment
251 See e. g. AHK (2006).
252 Out of the selection of 34 transition countries only Be´nassy-Que´re´ and Lahre`che-Re´vil
(2005); see also Riedl, Leibrecht, and Bellak (2006).
253 See Riedl, Leibrecht, and Bellak (2006).
254 See also Resmini (2006); Altomonte (1998).
255 See Bevan and Estrin (2000); Janicki and Wunnava (2004); Holland and Pain (1998).
256 See Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001); Campos and Kinoshita (2003).
257 See Altomonte (1998); Altomonte and Guagliano (2003).
258 See e. g. Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993); Lankes and Venables (1996).
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decision of MNCs. Altomonte (1998) even finds that the investment climate
“displays the highest coefficient recorded among the significant variables.”259 A
key driver seems to be that progress in transition reduces investment risks, op-
portunity cost of waiting and economic uncertainty and thus generates higher
FDI flows.260 Campos and Kinoshita (2003) establish that capital controls, e.
g. permit requirements and profit transfer restrictions, reduce FDI inflows to
transition countries. Finally, Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001)
point out that restrictions on FDI seem to be more relevant than those on FPI
that can supposedly more easily be avoided.
Trade openness is usually referred to as the proportion of trade (sum of
exports and imports) relative to the GDP of a host country.261 Other speci-
fications define trade openness as the host economy’s share of trade with the
EU versus its overall amount of trade262, the ratio of imports as a share of the
GDP263 or the percentage of total imports of a host country from the EU.264
These studies – in accordance with the more recent FDI theory (section
2.2.3) – come to the conclusion that larger amounts of FDI flow to transi-
tion host countries with higher trade intensity; thus, trade and investment in
transition countries seem to be complements rather than substitutes.265 This
result appears to be especially true when trade takes places within the same
geographical region and for companies that are export-driven.266 Furthermore,
transition countries that showed a higher degree of openness in the early stage
of transition also demonstrate higher inflows in later periods than other transi-
259 Altomonte (1998), p.19; see similar Pye (1998).
260 See also Holland and Pain (1998); Woodward, Rolfe, Guimaraes, and Doupnik (2000).
261 See e. g. Resmini (2000); Smarzynska (2002); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
262 See e. g. Holland and Pain (1998).
263 See e. g. Clausing and Dorobantu (2005).
264 See e. g. Bevan and Estrin (2000).
265 See e. g. Janicki and Wunnava (2004); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
266 See e. g. Holland and Pain (1998); Janicki and Wunnava (2004).
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tion countries.267 Some studies see a strong correlation between market size and
FDI flows on the one hand and trade flows and FDI flows on the other hand268;
this may indicate that trade and market size are only a different way to iden-
tify attractive markets with high economic activity. Alternatively, Kinoshita
and Campos (2006) assume that MNCs tend to invest in those countries in
which they have already built up relationships and knowledge through trade.
In terms of significance, most studies find that the importance of trade open-
ness as FDI determinant is quite substantial.269 Janicki and Wunnava (2004)
even describe trade openness as the most important driver for FDI in transition
countries. Other scholars only report substantial industry-specific significance,
e. g. for the high-technology sector.270
Despite these empirical results, some doubts about the actual impact of
trade openness on the investment decision of MNCs remain; thus it may be
questionable whether those MNCs without important trade relations to tran-
sition countries actually analyze trade statistics of potential host economies
in order to decide on a specific location. Accordingly, it is far form surprising
that trade openness is identified by none of the analyzed surveys as main
determinant in transition countries.
Proximity is generally understood as the geographical distance between
home and host country and is most frequently measured as the distance in
kilometers between the two capitals of home and host country.271 Other cal-
culations use the distance between the host country’s capital and a centrally
267 See Kinoshita and Campos (2006).
268 See e. g. Resmini (2000).
269 See e. g. Holland and Pain (1998); Clausing and Dorobantu (2005).
270 See Smarzynska (2002); see also for Resmini (2000) industry-specific results.
271 See e. g. Bevan and Estrin (2000); Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004); Galego, Vieira, and
Vieira (2004); Bellak and Leibrecht (2005).
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located city in Europe, e. g. Frankfurt272 or Brussels.273 Last not least, more
complex distance calculation use weighted averages of the economic importance
of the home country in the region or level out regional distortions of economic
activities in the host economies.274
Proximity variables can however, also comprise the cultural distance between
home and host country; thus, some studies add dummies for cultural ties275 or
a common language.276
All studies assume that increased proximity facilitates the steering and su-
pervision of business operations abroad by the parent company. They further
expect that MNCs prefer greater proximity in order to minimize time, risk and
cost of transportation routes.277
The empirical results of the analyzed studies show that proximity plays an
important role for the investors in transition countries – as suggested by the
New Trade Theory.278 Altzinger (1999) even finds for Austrian investors that
in both geographical and cultural terms, proximity is one of the two leading
determinants for FDIs in transition countries.279 More generally, proximity
seems to be an important determinant for those companies that have little
experience in internationalization and want to exploit cross-border labor cost
advantages. In these cases low cultural distance also seems to have some, albeit
limited significance.280
Overall however, proximity appears to be of less importance than, for exam-
ple, market size and labor costs for the investment decision of MNCs, especially
272 See e. g. Altomonte and Guagliano (2003).
273 See Campos and Kinoshita (2003).
274 See e. g. Resmini (2000); Disdier and Mayer (2003).
275 See Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005).
276 See Pye (1998).
277 See e. g. Altzinger (1999).
278 See Brainard (1993) and 2.2.4.1.
279 Market size is even more important than proximity according to Altzinger (1999).
280 See e. g. Altomonte (1998); Altzinger (1999); Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu
(2005); Pye (1998).
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because the distance from transition to investing countries from Western Eu-
rope is fairly similar. For countries that are located further away, such as the
United Kingdom (UK), proximity seems to be completely irrelevant. Moreover,
the importance of distance as an FDI determinant strongly differs according to
the motives for FDI; therefore, it is much more important for efficiency-seeking
MNCs than for market-seeking ones.281
Human capital is usually related to the skill level of potential host country
employees or the existence of the technological know-how in the host country.
The studies analyzed define the skill level of transition countries by calculating
the secondary282 and/or tertiary283 school enrollment as share of gross school
enrollment.
The technological base of a country is measured, for example, by the relative
stock of patents granted to residents of the host country.284
Most surveys analyzed by the author conclude that human capital plays a
decisive role in attracting FDI.285 Econometric studies are more ambiguous
about the quantitative impact of human capital but underline that the level
of education is significant for all sectors286, even though regional specifics may
exist.287 Furthermore, studies identify the technological base as an important
– yet less significant than the skill level – driver of the investment decision of
281 See Altomonte (1998); Resmini (2000); Brenton, Di Mauro, and Lu¨cke (1999); Merlevede
and Schoors (2004).
282 See e. g. Campos and Kinoshita (2003); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
283 See Carstensen and Toubal (2004) and Altomonte and Guagliano (2003) respectively;
see also European Commission (2005b).
284 See Lansbury, Pain, and Smidkova (1996).
285 See Savary (1997); Pye (1998); AHK (2006); Borsos-Torstila (1999).
286 See e. g. Altomonte and Guagliano (2003).
287 See e. g. Campos and Kinoshita (2003) who found – even though in contrast to other
studies – that the level of education is only a significant FDI determinant for CIS
transition countries.
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MNCs in transition economies.288
Privatization is defined in most studies as the private sector share of the
national GDP and is usually based on an EBRD index.289 Lately it has been
criticized that this index shows only little variation over time and may actually
underestimate the dynamics of the privatization progress. Therefore, studies
often use annual privatization revenues290 or – more frequently – the method
of privatization, e. g. vouchers, cash sales, insider privatization.291
Empirical results confirm that privatization increases investment opportuni-
ties for MNCs. Thus FDI inflows were higher in those transition countries with
greater private sector share and higher annual privatization sales, especially
in the first years of privatization until 2000, when MNCs attempted to exploit
first-mover advantages.292 However, more recent studies find more significant
results for the method of privatization; Holland and Pain (1998) show that
countries with cash sales have higher FDI inflows than those with voucher
systems.293 In contrast, the limited transparency and the favoring of domestic
oligarchs in the insider privatization in CIS countries had a negative impact
on FDI inflows from Western countries.294 Moreover, Brada, Kutan, and Yigit
(2003) remark that privatization results may be somewhat misleading because
of the few large-scale privatizations that deter FDI statistics.
288 See e. g. Lansbury, Pain, and Smidkova (1996); Savary (1997).
289 See e. g. Lansbury, Pain, and Smidkova (1996); Holland and Pain (1998); Carstensen and
Toubal (2004); Bevan and Estrin (2004); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Smarzynska
(2002).
290 See Bellak and Leibrecht (2005).
291 See Holland and Pain (1998); Carstensen and Toubal (2004); Merlevede and Schoors
(2004).
292 See e. g. Lansbury, Pain, and Smidkova (1996); Carstensen and Toubal (2004); Bellak
and Leibrecht (2005).
293 Likewise confirmed by Merlevede and Schoors (2004); see also Carstensen and Toubal
(2004); Bellak and Leibrecht (2005).
294 See Merlevede and Schoors (2004), p.19.
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Finally, political stability is often measured on the basis of different EBRD
transition indicators, including, for example, infrastructure, competition policy
and financial reform.295 Other methods of measuring political stability include
political rights or political freedom ratings, e. g. from the Freedom House In-
dex296 or political stability indicators based on World Bank evaluations.297
Various studies support the hypothesis that a (perceived) lack of political
stability reduces FDI flows to transition countries.298 Merlevede and Schoors
(2004) find strong impact of their political risk variable on the investment de-
cision, while others see political rights or the type of government as an impor-
tant determinant for the investment decision in transition countries.299 For the
SEECs Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003) identify the overall political stability
as a major precondition for increased FDI flows.
Nevertheless, it seems impossible to determine a total impact of political
stability since definitions are ambiguous and not suitable for comparison.
In conclusion, the assessment of the main determinants of the 34 studies
on transition countries emphasized that the frequency of citation of the main
FDI determinants in transition countries as presented in figure 8 does not
necessarily correspond with the relative importance of determinants to each
other. While market size does indeed seem to be one of the most important
determinants300, the line of argument regarding the relative importance among
other factors, e. g. labor cost or political stability, is less compelling across
most studies. The main reasons for these ambiguous results are the different
295 See e. g. Merlevede and Schoors (2004); Holland and Pain (1998); Lankes and Venables
(1996).
296 See Disdier and Mayer (2003).
297 See Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001).
298 See e. g. Woodward, Rolfe, Guimaraes, and Doupnik (2000).
299 See e. g. Disdier and Mayer (2003); Jensen (2002).
300 See also Resmini (2006); Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000); but also for
developing countries Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002) as well as for all countries Lim
(2001); Blonigen (2005).
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definitions, evaluation methods and data specifications.301
2.2.5 Opportunities for contributions to FDI research
Despite the existence of more than 30 studies on FDI determinants in tran-
sition countries this thesis can make meaningful contributions to FDI
research because the evaluation of the existing studies discloses (1) method-
ological limitations, (2) a possible underestimation of policy factors and (3) an
often neglected analysis of the state view.
(1) The common approaches, (a) econometric studies and (b) survey, often
reveal methodological challenges for the in-depth analysis of FDI.
(a) On the one hand, econometric studies are to some extent arbitrary
in their choice of determinants. Of course, they try to isolate certain factors
to test their relative impact; thus they cannot reflect all potential factors of
MNCs but have to estimate what the most relevant ones may be. Therefore they
may be able to say something about the importance of a specific factor versus
other selected factors but can hardly reveal a comprehensive set of factors that
influences the investment decision of MNCs. Figure 9 shows an example from
Galego, Vieira, and Vieira (2004) that exposes the shortcomings discussed;
the authors selected a small set of FDI determinants. Despite the fact that the
statistical results show only limited significance, the selection also raises the
question as to why these particular factors have been chosen as key factors for
the investment decision of MNCs, neglecting other factors like the investment
climate, human capital etc.302 Other econometric studies may include larger
sets of FDI determinants303 but the dependence on external data and the risk
to come to somewhat selective results remains.
301 See also Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000).
302 Galego, Vieira, and Vieira (2004) did test the factors wages and trade openness but
without statistically significant outcome.
303 See e. g. Kinoshita and Campos (2006) with 14 analyzed factors.
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Category GLS 
regression
Standard 
error
GDP per capita home country 0.875 0.873
GDP per capita host country 0.867(*) 0.162
Population home country 0.780 0.150
Population host country 0.786 0.149
Geographical distance -0.618(*) 0.199
Common frontier 0.598 0.578
Constant -12.962 8.914
(*) = significant at 1%
Source: Based on Galego et al (2004), own presentation
Determinants of FDI flows (1993-1999) 
according to Galego et al (2004)
Figure 9: Example for methodological challenges of econometric FDI studies
(b) On the other hand, FDI surveys have difficulties in capturing the true
motives of an investment by MNCs, since a group of researchers usually de-
velops the questionnaire itself304, possibly neglecting other important deter-
minants. More crucially, the surveys usually do not weigh the determinants.
A survey of the German Chamber of Commerce (AHK (2006)), summarized
in figure 10, depicts this dilemma; therefore, the institution asked investors in
14 transition countries about their country-specific determinants. The mean in
the second column reveals that all factors mentioned seem to be of significant
importance for the investment decision of MNCs, since the values for all of the
25 factors are between 1.54 and 2.85, where 1 represents a very important factor
and 5 represents a factor that was not important for the investment decision;
hence a clear statement about country determinants cannot be made.
This thesis offers a somewhat new approach to the displayed problem,
the combination of expert interviews, expert documents as well as
304 See e. g. Altzinger (1999); Pye (1998).
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1 = very important; 5 = not important
Category Mean BH BG EE HR LV LT MC PL RO SRB SK SV CZ HU
Willingness to perform 1.54 1.50 1.55 1.51 1.44 1.65 1.28 1.56 1.84 1.56 1.69 1.34 1.80 1.39 1.51
Productivity 1.54 1.60 1.63 1.62 1.50 1.57 1.26 1.38 2.00 1.46 1.75 1.35 1.64 1.28 1.50
Paying habits 1.54 1.35 1.44 1.49 1.59 1.56 1.44 1.38 1.75 1.57 1.52 1.73 1.80 1.44 1.51
Legal certainty 1.57 1.42 1.34 1.66 1.46 1.57 1.86 1.25 1.87 1.43 1.56 1.40 2.04 1.53 1.53
Educational level 1.58 1.50 1.35 1.62 1.64 1.55 1.32 1.57 1.70 1.56 1.82 1.41 1.96 1.48 1.59
Tax burden 1.62 1.62 1.61 1.51 1.75 1.69 1.61 1.24 1.90 1.63 1.82 1.47 1.56 1.70 1.58
Tax system 1.65 1.35 1.50 1.62 1.58 1.74 1.54 1.51 1.84 1.56 2.12 1.59 1.80 1.73 1.62
Labor cost 1.67 1.68 1.81 1.54 1.66 1.59 1.32 1.73 2.06 1.59 1.93 1.57 1.72 1.55 1.58
Availability of skilled workers 1.71 1.55 1.53 1.69 1.73 1.69 1.42 1.67 1.95 1.63 2.06 1.51 2.20 1.61 1.72
Political stability 1.71 1.38 1.47 1.49 1.60 1.84 1.65 1.45 2.22 1.50 1.73 1.66 2.28 1.82 1.86
Corruption & crime rate 1.71 1.26 1.63 1.62 1.53 1.69 1.69 1.36 2.00 1.47 1.90 1.78 2.52 1.71 1.76
Reliability 1.75 1.52 1.63 1.47 1.78 1.70 1.65 1.21 2.06 1.60 1.76 1.81 2.60 1.99 1.65
Local demand 1.77 1.55 1.70 1.87 1.65 2.02 1.50 1.65 1.93 1.96 1.58 1.96 1.96 1.69 1.69
EU accession 1.84 1.94 1.59 1.94 1.78 1.69 1.86 2.18 1.47 1.80 1.91 2.04
Public administration 1.87 1.46 1.72 1.73 1.57 2.02 2.03 1.64 2.17 1.71 2.06 2.10 2.04 2.08 1.87
Quality of suppliers 1.90 1.66 1.66 1.76 2.03 2.06 1.59 1.91 2.38 1.64 2.13 1.90 2.20 1.74 1.90
Flexibility of labor law 1.90 1.78 1.90 1.99 1.84 2.16 1.70 1.67 2.31 1.98 2.09 1.72 1.88 1.68 1.95
Infrastructure 1.93 1.60 1.56 1.80 2.10 2.06 1.86 1.73 2.16 1.85 2.21 2.07 2.04 2.16 1.84
Qualification of graduates 2.03 1.88 2.16 2.31 2.12 2.05 1.66 1.85 2.21 1.99 2.19 1.88 2.28 1.77 2.13
Availability of suppliers 2.12 1.72 2.31 2.02 2.29 2.11 1.94 1.94 2.34 1.78 2.13 2.26 2.60 2.08 2.21
Transparency of tenders 2.24 1.61 2.09 2.60 2.00 2.60 2.03 1.88 2.39 2.02 1.72 2.45 3.00 2.46 2.44
Regional export potential 2.29 2.37 2.50 2.00 2.18 2.50 1.84 1.47 2.15 2.54 2.34 2.52 2.60 2.43 2.61
R&D conditions 2.50 1.86 2.41 2.53 2.56 2.81 2.00 1.91 2.19 2.42 2.93 2.89 2.84 2.81 2.78
Subsidies 2.60 2.59 2.82 2.62 3.21 2.37 1.81 2.33 2.50 2.52 2.99 2.92 2.78 2.39
Availability of unskilled workers 2.85 2.71 2.84 2.49 3.38 2.90 2.35 3.27 2.55 2.26 3.47 2.63 3.08 2.95 3.04
Mean 1.89 1.65 1.83 1.85 1.90 2.00 1.70 1.67 2.09 1.82 2.04 1.90 2.21 1.91 1.93
Source: AHK (2006), own presentation
Locational determinants of German investors according to AHK survey (2006)
Figure 10: Example for methodological challenges of FDI surveys
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primary and secondary source analysis. The elements of this case study
approach are presented in section 3.3.
(2) Most studies appear to see only limited possibilities for FDI determi-
nants to be influenced by public policy. Potential reasons could be (a) an
overestimation of classical variables and (b) limited knowledge about public
policy factors.
(a) Current FDI literature may overestimate the impact of classical, i.
e. non-policy, determinants. Going back to the main determinants of the
34 analyzed studies on FDI in transition countries, a look at figure 11 reveals
that four of the five determinants that are most frequently cited as main FDI
determinants can barely be influenced by public policy actors: market size,
labor costs, trade openness, and proximity. While it may be obvious why public
policy possesses only limited possibilities to influence market size and proximity,
labor costs and trade openness should be further explained. Regarding labor
costs it is important to keep in mind that investors usually focus on net wages
without considering non-wage labor costs. Tax related policies are furthermore
reflected by the country determinant tax policy that is not among the eight
most frequently cited determinants of the analyzed studies. Furthermore states
have only limited influence on wages in the private sector which is most relevant
for investors.
Trade openness, on the other hand, only reflects the trade flows between
countries and should not be confused with trade policy that includes customs,
trade agreements etc. and is also a separate determinant.
Generally, the consideration of these four factors is not surprising since they
belong to the classical factors suggested by FDI theory as presented in section
2.2.3. Thus, most scholars (also) include these determinants in their analyses
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Figure 11: Main FDI determinants and public policy influence
to satisfy theory and may therefore overestimate their real importance. Nev-
ertheless, International Business theory has traditionally assumed the role of
public policy to be minimal.305
A look at the country characteristics of transition countries in particular also
suggests that these classical non-policy factors may be overestimated; hence,
market size may be an important determinant but initial interviews by the au-
thor with investors indicated that markets are more often interpreted in terms
of regional potential; investors’ interest in Romania, for example, has less to do
with its large population than with the large market – including all SEECs – to
which it has access.306 In addition to this, labor costs and trade openness are
despite some differences fairly comparable among the countries in the region307
305 See Mudambi (2002), p.265.
306 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
307 The average hourly labor costs in 2004 were e1.45 in Bulgaria versus e1.75 in Romania;
see Eurostat (2007a).
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and the geographical distance, for example, of Romania or Bulgaria to a city
in Northern Germany is only marginal. Therefore, the classical factors have
only limited credibility in serving as a distinction between countries e. g. in
the SEECs. Thus how can transition countries actually stand out as attractive
location for MNCs? What distinguishes, for example, Romania from Bulgaria?
The answer could be public policy determinants; those factors that can be
significantly influenced by state actors in a limited time-span, i. e. in up to ten
years, seem more apt to characterize country-specific differences.
(b) Until now there is still limited knowledge about public policy fac-
tors as FDI determinants in transition countries. Without a doubt, authors
have repeatedly attempted to integrate policy factors in their analysis; how-
ever, the survey of the 34 studies on FDI determinants on transition countries
unveils once again the shortcomings of the existing literature. First of all, it
lacks a clear definition of public policy variables as has been shown above for
“investment climate” and “political stability”.308 Secondly, current studies are
not able to present a convincing list of policy factors that influence the invest-
ment decision of MNCs, whereas the list of non-policy variables has been fairly
stable in the analyzed studies. Initial interviews by the author have also indi-
cated that the decision-making process is more complex than depicted by most
FDI studies. They suggest that other public policy factors that have not been
discovered by the existing literature on transition countries so far (e. g. the
cooperation with local administration), may play a decisive role in attracting
foreign investors.309 Finally, because of data limitations and the above men-
tioned methodological challenges, results of the relative impact of public policy
factors are still difficult to grasp and little robust in terms of statistical sig-
308 See section 2.2.4.2.
309 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
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Figure 12: Detailed overview of FDI determinants
nificance.310 More recently Smarzynska (2002) and others have acknowledged
a more important influence of public policy with regards to classical variables
than earlier studies but the evidence is far from conclusive.
Figure 12 reveals all determinants that have been identified by the 34 ana-
lyzed studies as main drivers for the investment decision of MNCs.
It confirms that little consensus about public policy factors exists among
FDI studies on country determinants. This list of 19 public policy factors –
again defined by the criteria as to which factors can be decisively influenced
by state actors in up to ten years – is used as starting point for the empirical
analysis of this thesis: investment climate, human capital, privatization, polit-
ical stability, EU integration, tax policy, trade policy, legal certainty, quality
of bureaucracy, market access, investment incentives, monetary policy, imple-
310 See also Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005); Chakrabarti (2001).
80 2 Theoretical approach
mentation of laws, fiscal policy, infrastructure, sound financial system, regional
integration, corruption, and property rights.
In the empirical part of the thesis, this list is to be tested in expert interviews
and based on expert documents and secondary literature.
(3) Furthermore, the existing studies reveal little about the interdepen-
dence of MNC determinants and corresponding state actions; research
often ignores that “the location of FDI is a game with two players”311. This is
not only interesting for those countries making massive reform efforts in order
to master transition but also – at least in numerous cases – to achieve EU
integration. In fact literature on the interaction between host government and
MNC is small and receives little attention in the studies on transition countries
analyzed by the author.312
One reason for neglecting the state view is the limited inter-disciplinary
approach: scholars from International Economics and International Business
usually interpret FDI without paying much attention to the political dimension
of FDI competition, leaving this part to political scientists and international
organizations.
The broad theoretical set-up, various site visits and numerous expert inter-
views seem therefore good preconditions for this thesis to make a contribution
to this dimension of existing FDI research.
2.3 New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory
The previous chapter concluded that this thesis can possibly make a contri-
bution to FDI research in terms of methodology, extensive analysis of policy
factors and adding the state view as (fairly) uncommon methods of analysis. In
311 Mudambi (2002), p.265.
312 See Mudambi (2002), p.265.
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addition to that the New Institutional Economics (NIE) seems to be another
theoretical tool that is well apt in order to gain further insights on the influence
of public policy measures on FDI determinants in transition countries.
This chapter briefly discusses the main ideas of the NIE as far as they are
relevant for this thesis (section 2.3.1) and then focuses on a framework based
on Willamson (1975, 1985, 2000) that will act as guideline for an advanced
categorization of determinants and state actors for this thesis (section 2.3.2).
2.3.1 Main NIE concepts and overlap with FDI theory
The following passage seeks to explain the (1) aim and main hypotheses, (2)
assumptions, and (3) main definitions of NIE and their transfer to FDI theory.
The last section reviews (4) the existing literature on NIE and FDI.
(1) The aim of the NIE is to answer questions related to growth and
development differently and in a more comprehensive way than traditional
economists (Coase (1937) and North (1990a) and others). NIE theory is based
on two main hypotheses: first, that growth and development depend on the
currently valid institutions and second, the context of decisions is essential for
comprehending changes in economies.
This aim and hypotheses of NIE are also transferable to FDI theory.
Therefore, this thesis aims at explaining the possibilities of public policy
to attract FDI in a more comprehensive way. If institutions are understood
as public policy determinants, FDI inflows are – analogous to growth and
development in NIE theory – to a large extent influenced by the existence
and interdependence of different policy measures. As the context is the key
for development in NIE, the transition process and reform dynamics are the
main preconditions for possibilities and limits of FDI policies in the analyzed
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countries, Romania and Croatia.
(2) The key assumptions of the NIE theory diverge from neo-classic the-
ory; therefore, NIE assumes imperfect markets; this includes the concept of
“bounded rationality”313 which presumes that human beings only have lim-
ited knowledge and capacity to cope with all available information and cannot
foresee all possible or ideal possibilities of decision. They try to maximize their
satisfaction in the available context of information which can also lead to the
opportunistic behavior of individuals.314 NIE also assumes asymmetric infor-
mation; before reaching a contract parties often have diverging or incomplete
information about each other. The efficiency of allocation is therefore negatively
affected.315 According to NIE theory bounded rationality and asymmetric in-
formation cause transaction costs, i. e. costs for the use of (inefficient) mar-
kets for information, search, negotiation, implementation etc.316 North (1990b)
extended the concept of transaction cost to political markets (e. g. between
politician and voter) where inefficiencies seem particularly striking.
Moreover, NIE theorists assume that institutional and economic changes are
more likely to occur incrementally than through quick changes and are a result
of the continuous interaction between different actors.317 Last not least, NIE
assumes strategic and political uncertainty; thus the entrepreneur or politician
does not know what the future will bring.318
The outlined assumptions of NIE also seem to be transferable to the FDI
approach used in this thesis; thus, the assumption of imperfect markets is
reflected in the idea that not all countries receive the same amount of FDI.
313 First presented in Simon (1955).
314 See also Williamson (1975); Voigt (2002), pp.28-30; Richter and Furubotn (2003), pp.3-
5.
315 See e. g. Richter and Furubotn (2003), pp.100.
316 First introduced by Coase (1937).
317 See North (1990a).
318 First introduced by Knight (1922).
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MNCs have bounded rationality since they also use irrational determinants
(e. g. private connections to the host country) for their investment decision.
The asymmetric information of FDI is given since public policy actors do not
know the true motives and determinants of MNCs. This situation again causes
transaction costs for both the state and the MNCs, i. e. the investment policy
of the state and country analyses through MNCs. With regards to incremental
changes this thesis further assumes that underlying and time-consuming factors
such as the implementation of anticorruption policy are more important for a
sustainable FDI growth than isolated efforts, e. g. a single large-scale privatiza-
tion. Finally, both groups of actors, MNCs and states, suffer from uncertainty,
e. g. regarding the MNC behavior, government changes, EU accession etc.
(3) NIE theory is marked by two key terms, institutions and organiza-
tions. Institutions in NIE are comprehended as rules or system of rules as well
as the mechanism to implement and guarantee these rules; they are therefore
“rules of the game” as well as the “play of the game”. Moreover, institutions can
be formal as well as informal rules and can comprise, for example, conventions,
customs, religion, rules, laws etc.319
In contrast, organizations represent the “players of the game”. They are
understood as formal or informal groups of individuals with a common purpose
including political, economic and social bodies.320
In the FDI context, institutions can be interpreted as all possible factors
that are apt to influence FDI decisions and embody FDI-related laws and poli-
cies as well as their implementation; they can be formal (e. g. laws and financial
incentives) as well as informal (administrative services, advice etc.). Organiza-
tions in this thesis are all possible actors that are well-suited to influence these
319 See e. g. Kiwit and Voigt (1995); Ostrom (1990), p.51; Voigt (2002), p.33; Richter and
Furubotn (2003), pp.7-10.
320 First formalized by Schmoller (1900); see also North (1990a).
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Figure 13: Similarities of NIE and FDI theory
institutions, e. g. national parliaments, national and local governments, min-
istries, administration, courts, but also promotion agencies etc.
The similarities of NIE and the FDI approach as understood in this thesis
appear convincing, as presented in figure 13.
(4) FDI literature integrating the NIE approach is still in its infancy. Early
elements of NIE thoughts (e. g. of imperfect markets) were already incorporated
in Hymer’s market imperfections approach or in the internalization theory.321
The approach of institutional quality also examines institutions; however this
tends to use organizations in the sense of NIE than institutions per se.322 Other
authors rely more heavily on NIE literature but do not specifically focus on
the countries analyzed in this thesis and do not reflect the specifics regarding
321 See section 2.2.3.2.
322 See e. g. Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004); Barrell and Pain (1999).
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institutions and organization as suggested in NIE theory that are presented in
the following section.323
One of the most well-thought studies that also thoroughly uses NIE concepts
is the dissertation of Dreyhaupt (2006). His research focus is however not the
transition countries but the EU and its competition policy; nevertheless, his
work serves as an important theoretical inspiration for this thesis.
2.3.2 An NIE framework for FDI analysis
As shown above, NIE theory follows an approach to Economics that is well
transferable to FDI analysis as understood in this theses. Furthermore, NIE
has developed tools that may help to better understand the possibilities and
limits of reforms in order to attract higher levels of MNCs. One challenge of
existing FDI literature is to categorize in a compelling way the large amount
of country determinants that have been identified by researchers so far. In
fact, various authors have attempted to group FDI determinants; Lall (1997)
identified nine categories for his 50 plus determinants and OECD (2006a) also
developed ten groups for their 60 plus sub-dimensions and indicators. However,
the literature has not yet agreed on the general terms of FDI determinants
classification. In any case, the given examples of large lists of categories do not
seem to give state actors a good basis for actionable public policy implications.
Moreover, two aspects have been widely neglected in this context: the different
time-horizons of policy measures and the respective actors that are involved in
these processes.
Williamson (2000), one of the founding fathers of NIE, has established an in-
teresting framework to categorize institutions. He identifies four different levels
of analysis. The first level is social embeddedness that includes informal insti-
tutions, customs and religion which only transform after a period of over 100
323 See e. g. Meyer (2001); Murrell (2002); Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004); Jacobs (2003);
Be´nassy-Que´re´, Coupet, and Mayer (2005).
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Figure 14: First approach of NIE framework for FDI categorization
years. The second level is called the institutional environment, also includes
formal rules such as polity, judiciary, constitutional and property laws; they
can be changed, according to Williamson, in 10 to 100 years. The third level
is referred to as governance that embodies the governance structure to manage
contractual relations which can be modified within one to ten years. The fourth
and last level, the resource allocation, is a continuous process and comprises,
for example, the adjustment of prices and incentive alignments of companies.324
Figure 14 shows – in a first approach – how this framework can be transferred
to and extended for the FDI research of this thesis. As well as the translation
of the institutional examples into FDI determinants, this overview also adds
the – preliminary – matching of institutions with the organizations involved, i.
e. the respective state actors.
324 See also Voigt (2002); Dreyhaupt (2006).
2.4 Derived theoretical framework 87
The first level of analysis, as suggested by Williamson (2000), consists of
institutions or determinants that can hardly be influenced by public policy in
the medium-term, reflecting in FDI research, for example, market size, climate,
geography, and natural resources. This level will not be focus of this thesis.
The institutional examples for the second level with regards to FDI theory
could be constitutions, infrastructure, political stability, EU accession, educa-
tion etc. The respective actors could be the parliament or the national govern-
ment.
Level three could be translated into laws e. g. tax, privatization, anticorrup-
tion, environment etc. The responsible actors could again be the government
or specific ministries.
The fourth level could be interpreted in FDI terms as the implementation of
laws, the promotion of investment, administrative procedures, incentives etc.
Various forms of organizations could be involved, including ministries, admin-
istration, courts, local governments, agencies etc.
This adapted FDI framework based on NIE will be thoroughly tested and
adjusted throughout this thesis. It may overall help different groups of policy
makers to better understand their own room for maneuver in FDI policy.
2.4 Derived theoretical framework
This chapter has considered the theoretical foundation of this thesis in depth.
It has been shown that FDI tends to have positive effects on host and home
economies as well as on MNCs and is therefore worth the support of govern-
ments. This is especially true in transition countries where FDI often shows
beneficial effects in terms of development and reform.
Furthermore, this chapter has underlined that FDI theory is complex and
research is extensive; nevertheless, the results of FDI studies often tend to
be ambiguous due to methodological challenges, a possible underestimation
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of public policy factors and the often neglected incorporation of the state
view. Furthermore, most FDI studies lack the convincing categorization of the
measures and its actors necessary for a better understanding of the dynamics
and limits of FDI country determinants.
This thesis therefore aims at making meaningful contributions to these is-
sues, relying on the FDI approach of locational competition analyzing the
possibilities and limits for public policy in attracting MNCs to transition coun-
tries. The NIE will help to categorize FDI institutions and organizations as
well as to analyze state actions from a political science point of view.
Furthermore, a preliminary list of 19 country determinants – based on the
existing literature – has been identified that will be the basis of the further
analyses of this thesis. The methodological implementation of this theoreti-
cal and somewhat inter-disciplinary framework is the subject of the following
chapter.
3 Methodological approach
This chapter elaborates the methodological approach of this thesis. Section 3.1
explains the selection of the host countries, Romania and Croatia, section 3.2
expounds the rationale for choosing MNCs from Germany and Austria in the
analysis and section 3.3 discusses the case study approach. Finally, section 3.4
concludes the derived methodological framework for this thesis.
3.1 Host country selection
The following section infers the host country selection of this thesis. More
specifically it is elaborated why the Eastern European transition countries are
interesting for FDI studies (section 3.1.1), why Romania (section 3.1.2) and
Croatia (section 3.1.3) were selected as host countries for this thesis, and why
the combination of the two countries is rewarding and sound (section 3.1.4).
The findings are wrapped up in section 3.1.5.
3.1.1 Eastern European transition countries
Both analyzed countries, Romania and Croatia, are defined as Eastern Eu-
ropean transition countries; this region comprises eight CEECs325, eight
325 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.
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Figure 15: FDI development in Eastern Europe
SEECs326 and the three European CIS countries (Belarus, Moldova and
Ukraine).327
This region is of particular interest for studying the impact of policy reforms
on FDI because of (1) its significant FDI inflows, (2) its specific transition
situation, (3) its thriving towards the EU, and because of (4) open research
questions.
(1) FDI inflows into Eastern Europe are significant and growing. Thus,
FDI inflow in this region grew at a CAGR of 31% since 1990 and reached
USD68B in 2006 (see figure 15).328
326 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania,
and Serbia.
327 The non-EU CIS members are not included in order to avoid distortions due to their
large distance to Western European home markets, strong economic reliance on natural
resources and – in the case of Russia – large market size.
328 19 EECs including former Yugoslavia (1990-1991); UNCTAD FDI website (2008); own
calculations.
3.1 Host country selection 91
(2) Compared to other regions of the world, Eastern Europe especially stands
out as region in transition (see section 2.1.5). Therefore, a multiple case
study of two transition countries particularly seems interesting because these
countries had similar starting conditions and a comparable starting point in
their competition for FDI inflows – the breakdown of socialism in the late
1980s.
(3) The endeavor for EU accession in EECs has triggered additional
and significant reform dynamics. The speed and implementation of EU-specific
reforms have also substantially influenced the attractiveness of these countries
as investment location.329
(4) Last but not least, the fast-moving economic and political developments
of this region have left various open questions for academic research.
As pointed out above (see section 2.2.5), FDI research has so far gained only
limited knowledge about public policy determinants that influence MNCs’ de-
cision to invest in a specific transition country. In addition to the academic
literature reviewed above, FDI in EECs is also the subject of some publica-
tions of international organizations. They, however, mainly analyze the region
on a year-to-year perspective without capturing causalities of reforms nor the
context of policy changes in this region. Finally, they usually do not reflect the
firm-perspective.330
3.1.2 Romania
Romania is an interesting subject in order to study FDI developments because
of its (1) fairly large market size and high FDI stock, (2) its remarkable eco-
329 By 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia; by 2007: Bulgaria and Romania. Croatia has opened accession negotiations,
Macedonia is an official candidate;
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and even Kosovo are potential
candidate countries. See also European Commission (2006b).
330 See e. g. CICD (2006); OECD (2006a); World Economic Forum (2006b).
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nomic and FDI surge in recent years, (3) its interesting reform dynamics in
the context of the recent EU accession, and because of (4) some blind spots in
academic research.
(1) Romania is an important Eastern European transition country because it
is sizable; it represents the third largest Eastern European market both in
terms of population with about 21.7M inhabitants and in terms of output with
a GDP of e97B in 2006. Moreover, Romania has accumulated a large stock
of inward FDIs of e34.B in 2006 only trailing Poland, Hungary and Czech
Republic.331
(2) Its recent remarkable growth of the economy and its increase of FDI
inflows makes Romania a fascinating example for transition countries. Due to
the economic surge – especially after 2000 – Romania saw high real GDP growth
rates of recently 4.1% (2005) and 7.7% (2006).332 Furthermore, FDI inflow has
significantly risen in recent years, soaring at a CAGR of 27% between 1997 and
2006 – compared to 16% in the other Eastern European transition countries.333
(3) Romania is also interesting to study in the context of its recent aspi-
rations in joining the EU which succeeded in 2007. For any years Romania
suffered from political instability, stagnating reforms and conflicts among in-
terest groups. The goal of EU accession however, set reform dynamics free
that were suitable to narrow down the existing large development gap between
Romania an many other EECs within a few years.
(4) FDI literature on Romania is still scarce. As pointed out for Eastern
Europe before, the few FDI studies from banks, international organizations and
business organizations usually focuses on a year-to-year perspective without a
comprehensive analysis of developments and reforms in Romania.334
331 See Hunya (2006); IMF website (2008); Eurostat (2007a); NBR website (2007).
332 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.22; Bfai (2005), p.33; IMF (2007b).
333 See IMF website (2008); own calcuations.
334 See e. g. BA-CA (2006); Rabobank (2006); European Commission (2006e); OECD
(2005d); International Business Promotion (2006).
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Moreover, the number of academic studies about FDI in Romania is lim-
ited. Of the few studies that only deal with Romania, the majority is outdated
considering the rapid development in Romania in recent years335 or rather
focus on the effects of FDI on the Romanian economy instead of the deter-
minants.336 Mu¨ller (2005) may represent the most recent and comprehensive
work in this context. His dissertation, however, discusses FDIs in Romania –
in a non-empirical analysis – as phenomenon of system transformation and fo-
cuses little on possibilities and limits of governmental institutions to attract
FDI.
3.1.3 Croatia
Croatia is an interesting country in order to study public policy effects on
FDI inflows because of (1) its high FDI stock (2) its specific reform challenges
following the war, (3) its current efforts in preparing a potential EU accession,
and because (4) academic studies on FDI in Croatia are still rare.
(1) Croatia has accumulated a high FDI inflow stock of e21.4B (2006)
and its FDI per capita stock of e4,577 (2006) is more than twice as high than
in all other SEECs. The Croatian FDI stock accounts for 5.7% of Eastern Eu-
ropean FDI stock while Croatians only represent 2.4% of the Eastern European
population.337 It is, therefore, interesting to scrutinize why Croatia has been
so successful in attracting MNCs in the past.
(2) In addition to its transition challenges, Croatia also had to cope with a
war of independence (1991-1995), severe after-war setbacks until the early
335 See e. g. Radulescu (1996); Chiritoiu (1998); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); Voinea
(2002); the most interesting study is probably from Hilber and Voicu (2006) that covers,
however, only the years 1990-1997.
336 See e. g. Smarzynska and Spatareanu (2002); Birsan, Moraru, Cramarenco, and Andrei
(2005); Merlevede and Schoors (2005).
337 See Hunya (2006); Der Fischerweltalmanach 2007 (2006); own calculations.
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2000s and as well as with an ongoing political instability of the region. Thus
it is interesting to examine how Croatia managed to continue attracting FDI
under these circumstances and what the key challenges were.
(3) The analysis of Croatia is appealing because of the current reform dynam-
ics that can be observed in Croatia’s efforts to attain EU accession. These
efforts also include aspirations to improve investment conditions for MNCs.
Furthermore, the pre-accession phase enables Croatia to conduct a fairly in-
dependent investment policy without being completely formally tied to invest-
ment regulations and subsidy limitations of the EU, yet.
(4) Research on FDI in Croatia has only begun to evolve. International
organization like the EU338 and the World Bank339 have published reports that
include observations regarding the status of FDI in Croatia but strongly focus
on the institutional side. This is also true for Croatian governmental institutions
themselves as well as some banks that have conducted various studies on the
state of competitiveness of Croatia without however, extensively reflecting the
MNCs’ perspective.340
The status of academic single country studies analyzing exclusively on Croa-
tian FDI is analogous to Romania: the number of studies is limited, the existing
ones usually do not cover the most recent reforms341 and primarily discuss the
effects of FDI342 and do not consider – in-depth – the Croatian reform policy.343
3.1.4 Country combination
The methodological rationale why it is reasonable to analyze more than just
one country in a multiple case study set-up is elaborated in section 3.3. In the
338 See European Commission (2006a).
339 See World Bank (2003).
340 See e. g. NCC (2004b); BA-CA (2005).
341 See e. g. Lovrincˇevic´ and Mikulic´ (2000); Babic´, Pufnik, and Stucˇka (2001).
342 See e. g. Skudar (2005); Kusˇic´ and Cvijanovic´ (2002); Vuksˇic´ (2004).
343 See e. g. Sohinger, Galinec, and Sˇkudar (2004); Hunya and Sˇkudar (2006).
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following it is scrutinized why the combined analysis of the selected countries,
Romania and Croatia, in particular is promising and feasible.
The main reasons are that (1) both countries are located in the same, inter-
esting sub-region and (2) are the most important FDI recipients of FDIs in this
sub-region and eventually, (3) this specific combination of two countries has
not been analyzed by FDI theory so far. Additionally, potential criticism that
the two countries are not comparable can be countered regarding (4) the dif-
ferent size of the countries, and (5) the supposedly different development stage.
(1) Both Romania and Croatia belong to the SEEC group.344 The study
of FDI in SEECs is especially appealing because of its strong FDI growth at
a CAGR of 45% (1990-2006) compared to 26% in the CEECs in the same
period.345 Furthermore, most SEECs have in common that they have been
somewhat affected by the wars in ex-Yugoslavia346 and, finally, were not part
of the first wave of accession of EECs to the EU.
(2) Within the SEECs Romania and Croatia are of particular interest because
they have been the most important recipients of FDIs accounting for
almost two thirds (38% and 25% respectively) of the inward FDI stock by the
end of 2006 (see figure 16).347
(3) A study that analyzes FDIs in only Croatia and Romania apparently
does not exist so far – to the author’s knowledge. Contributions as well
as the limits of the existing studies on transition economies were reviewed in
section 2.2.4.2. Other studies on SEECs are more descriptive, generally focus
on earlier time periods.348 They will be considered in the further analysis but
344 See for definition section 2.1.5.
345 See UNCTAD FDI website (2008); own calculations.
346 See section 6.2 for details.
347 See UNCTAD FDI website (2008); own calculations.
348 See e. g. Uvalic (2001); Hunya (2002); Zakharov and Kusˇic´ (2003).
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Figure 16: Inward FDI stock in Eastern Europe
leave plenty of room for new insights, especially regarding the multiple view of
MNC and state strategies.
(4) Critics may evoke that a combination of the two countries is difficult
because Romania and Croatia are of different size (22M inhabitants versus
less than 5M). However, this argument is only taking the home market of the
two countries into account. On the contrary, many MNCs investing into the
region are strongly export-oriented and are, therefore, competing in the same
markets,349 aiming at the SEECs with more than 60M inhabitants or at even
larger markets like the whole of Europe (of about 570M inhabitants).350
(5) Moreover, critics may point out that Romania and Croatia are difficult
to compare since they are in a different development stage, with different
349 See NCC (2004b), p.7.
350 Without Russia and Turkey; see: Der Fischerweltalmanach 2007 (2006); see also inter-
views with Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007) and Intv. Croatian Authority
II (2007).
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histories (referring to Croatia’s war experience) and a different political envi-
ronment (referring to Romania’s recent EU accession). However, it is important
to point out, that this thesis does not aim at comparing the two countries in
quantitative terms. Thus FDI figures or interview results will neither be pooled
nor will the current stage of reforms be compared.351
On the contrary the combination of the two countries aims at strengthening
the individual country results of the analysis, interpret them in a qualitative
way and to answer question 5 of the introduction: What can countries learn
from each other? In this context the pre-accession experience of Romania to
the EU can be very valuable for Croatia and its public policy efforts to cre-
ate favorable conditions for FDI. Thus it was already claimed by the NCC
(2004b) that Bulgaria and Romania were reference points for competitiveness
and reform for Croatia.352
3.1.5 Conclusion
In conclusion the host country selection of Romania and Croatia appears to
be rewarding and feasible for the analysis of the impact of public policy on
FDI. Firstly, both countries play a large role for FDIs in Eastern Europe and
a major role among the SEECs. Secondly, the specific economic and political
situation of the countries is interesting to study and thirdly, this thesis aims
at multiple evidence from the two countries and at “lessons-learned” rather
than at a quantitative comparison. Eventually, the current status of research
regarding the two countries and the key questions of this thesis seem to leave
room for further investigations.
351 See also section 3.3.4.
352 See NCC (2004b), pp. 7 and 42.
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3.2 Home country selection
In addition to the selection of Romania and Croatia as host countries of FDIs,
it is important to narrow down the origins of FDIs in order to delimit the
factors that influence the investment decision of MNCs. In terms of the home
country selection companies from Austria and Germany seem to be the most
suited for the envisaged analyses of this thesis because (1) they are among
the largest investors in the two countries, (2) they possess equal language
preconditions and (3) both benefit from fairly good historical ties to the host
countries. Furthermore, (4) research on firm-data level in this field is, especially
regarding Austrian MNCs, only in the beginning.
(1) Austrian and German companies are among the three leading investors
in both Croatia353 and Romania.354 Both countries are also the largest (Aus-
tria) and third largest (Germany) investor in the whole group of SEECs (see
figure 17).355
(2) The common German language further strengthens the similarity
between German and Austrian MNCs. Especially in Croatia German is an
asset for investors since the knowledge of German is widely spread.356
(3) MNCs from Austria as well as from Germany can expect a rather positive
welcome when investing in Romania and Croatia since both home countries
seem to have favorable starting conditions considering their political and
cultural heritages. Austria still has close ties to the SEECs due to its former
dominance in the Austrian monarchy until 1918 and its traditional role as
353 Austria with 28% and Germany with 14% of Croatia’s FDI stock; see CNB website
(2008).
354 Austria with 23% and Germany with 10% of Romania’s FDI stock; see NBR website
(2007).
355 Again with the Netherlands in second place. See Hunya (2006) for 2004 stock figures.
356 According to an EU study 34% of the Croatians are able to conduct a conversation in
German: European Commission (2006c); see also Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
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Figure 17: FDI stock by country of origin
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window to Eastern Europe. Germany had a good reputation in the region as
a mediator for many centuries357 and Romania was an ally during World War
II until 1944. Over and above Germany and Austria were the first countries to
recognize Croatia in December 1991.358
(4) Academic analysis on home country effects of FDI from the SEEC
region in Austria and Germany359 as well as on country determinants for this
region360 is still at an early stage.361 The most notable works have been
brought forward for German companies based on a new firm-level database of
German Bundesbank.362 However, only few country-specific results have been
explored until this point and the cross-country view of Romania and Croatia
as well as the combination of the MNC view with the state perspective have
been widely neglected so far.
357 E. g. at the Balkans conference in Berlin in 1878; see e. g. Stavrianos (2000).
358 See e. g. Armbruster (1991); Grabert (1996).
359 See e. g. for Austria Hunya and Iara (2006) and for Germany Buch and Lipponer (2005);
Ja¨ckle (2006).
360 See e. g. Arnold and Hussinger (2006) and in particular Toubal (2004).
361 See for an extensive review Fontagne´ and Mayer (2005).
362 See Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005); Becker, Ekholm, Ja¨ckle, and Mu¨ndler
(2005); see also for an analysis of the structure of German FDI in Eastern Europe Buch
and Kleinert (2006).
3.3 Case study 101
3.3 Case study
In order to circumvent some of the methodological challenges of earlier FDI
studies (see section 2.2.5), this thesis follows the theory-based case study
approach according to Yin (2003) with Romania and Croatia as two sepa-
rate cases. This section presents the case study method and explains why it
is a valid and rewarding approach for this thesis; section 3.3.1 presents the
goals and preconditions of case studies, while section 3.3.2 elucidates the main
characteristics of case studies. Section 3.3.3 explains the scientific context and
relevance of case studies, before section 3.3.4 elaborates the research design of
case studies.
3.3.1 Goals and preconditions of case studies
A case study, according to Yin (2003), is a research strategy that “investigates
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”363
Case studies are, therefore, used to find comprehensive and casual explana-
tions for interdependent situations and occurrences. In other words, case stud-
ies are an analytic research strategy that is well-apt for answering explanative
(what?) as well as explorative (why?) study questions.364 Thus, the case study
is a promising research approach if three essential preconditions are fulfilled365:
(1) Interdependences are to be captured that are new or have not been explored
in a satisfying manner by researchers so far.
This thesis aims at capturing new interdependences by analyzing the MNCs’
country determinants and the corresponding public policy actions. It further
explores – in a new way – how policy measures, their time-horizon and the
involved state actors can be categorized. Finally, this thesis examines FDI
363 Yin (2003), p.13.
364 See de Vaus (2001); Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2003); Robson (2002).
365 See for a summary Wufka (2006); see also Eisenhardt (1989); Yin (2003).
102 3 Methodological approach
attraction efforts as learning process of an EU candidate (Croatia) from a new
EU member (Romania).
(2) The analyzed phenomenon cannot clearly be delineated from its context
and the examined context has myriad aspects.
The complex context is given in this thesis since other academic approaches
do not seem to be able to entirely capture the true FDI motives of MNCs.
They are also sometimes too selective in their analysis of determinants. Finally,
they cannot combine the multiple perspective on country determinants from
MNCs as well as from state actors.
(3) The status of research in this field is still at an early stage.
As elaborated above research on the specific research questions of this thesis
is still in the beginning, especially regarding the impact of public policy on FDI
decision of MNCs in transition countries, the connection between FDI theory
and New Institutional Economics and the combination of the two analyzed
countries.
Therefore, the case study approach seems to be well-suited to match the com-
plex research context of this thesis and to provide the required methodological
framework in order to answer the outlined research questions.
3.3.2 Main characteristics of case studies
The main characteristics of well-founded case studies according to Yin (2003)
are (1) the incorporation of multiple sources of evidence for the data collection,
(2) the theory-based approach, (3) the openness to other academic disciplines,
(4) the focus on qualitative generalizations, and (5) the strict scientific set-up
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and quality criteria.366
(1) The major strength of case studies compared to other research strategies
is its usage of multiple sources of evidence. These data sources can be
quantitative as well as qualitative. They can include questionnaires that are
based on a statistic selection of questioned persons or companies, secondary
data (e. g. company material), observations of specific company situations,
and, eventually, guided interviews with experts.367
This thesis uses expert interviews with company experts and state repre-
sentatives. It furthermore analyzes company and state documents, secondary
literature and international rankings in order to evaluate the performance of
states in attracting favorable conditions for FDI in Romania and Croatia.
(2) Following Yin (2003) case studies have the greatest impact if they are
theory-based. Thus, the existing research knowledge regarding the field of
study should be the basis for the study questions as well as for the derived
hypotheses.
This thesis is clearly theory-driven. Chapters 1 and 2 built up the scientific
foundation including a theoretical framework, key questions and hypotheses.
(3) Case studies also allow for a broad theoretical approach fostering
the consideration of different strands of theories and even different academic
disciplines in order to achieve – if possible – a complete picture of the examined
object of research.
This thesis makes use of different theoretical approaches. Its analyses are
based on the FDI theory of locational competition as well as on political
science in order to analyze the country determinants of MNCs and the respec-
366 See for this whole section Yin (2003); Lamnek (2005); Eisenhardt (1989); de Vaus (2001).
367 See also Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2003).
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tive state actions. In addition to this, the envisaged categorization of country
determinants and state actors is inspired by the NIE.
(4) Usually, case studies have difficulties to generalize results in a quan-
titative way if they do not incorporate statistically relevant data evaluation
methods in their analysis. They are, however, well-suited to generalize qualita-
tive contextual aspects and causalities; therefore case studies contribute to the
testing of existing findings and theories.368
Qualitative results from the conducted company expert interviews will be
tested through state expert interviews, the analysis of primary documents
and secondary literature. Further qualitative generalizations are generated
through the cross-country analysis and through the categorization of country
determinants and its actors in chapter 9.
(5) Finally, modern case studies are characterized by a strict scientific
set-up and quality criteria.
This thesis follows a clear-cut and pre-defined research process which will
be discussed, however, in detail in section 3.3.5.
In conclusion the case study approach is not simply a data collection method
but a comprehensive research strategy that analyzes different issues and prob-
lems from various angles. It seems well-suited in order to explain the dynamics
and impact of policy on MNCs’ investment decisions in a new and more com-
pelling way.
368 See also Bortz and Do¨ring (2002), p.323.
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3.3.3 Scientific context and relevance of case studies
According to Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2003) case studies can be dis-
tinguished from other empirical research strategies, in particular from (1) ex-
periments, (2) surveys, (3) action research as well as from (4) grounded theory
and theory-building case studies.369
(1) Experiments are especially used in science-related studies in which a
hypothesis is tested through the measurement of certain occurrences. Their dis-
advantage is that they only focus on a few variables in a controlled environment
whereas this thesis aims at the analysis of a multitude of variables (country de-
terminants) in an environment with many actors (politicians, MNCs etc.) and
uncertainties (EU accession etc.)
(2) Surveys also use a deductive (or theory-testing) approach and are usu-
ally based on a standardized questionnaire in order to collect as many data
points as possible. Again a limited number of variables is usually analyzed with
this methodology. While a quantitative generalization is possible, surveys have
difficulties to analyze the specific context and the causalities of variables. With
regards to this thesis, surveys can confirm a certain set of variables (country de-
terminants) but cannot explain the interdependencies of different determinants
and cannot explain the strategy of the state’s investment policies.
(3) Action research is an inductive (or theory-building) research method-
ology; accordingly, researchers become or are part of a company etc. in order
to understand and interpret the context and changes of organizations. With
regards to this thesis, the action research approach will not be used because it
lacks the possibilities to generalize results in a quantitative or qualitative way
since the insights on a MNC’s investment strategy are limited to the unit of
analysis, i. e. one company.
369 See also for this whole section Wufka (2006); Yin (2003).
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(4) Studies based on grounded theory collect data without prior theory;
this data is then used for building hypotheses that are tested through further
observations.370 Grounded theory is closely related to the theory-building
case study according to Eisenhardt (1989) in which the case study is con-
ducted without initial theoretical framework; in a second step, a theory is de-
rived by comparing the case study outcome with existing theories. In contrast,
the advantage of the theory-based case study – as it is used in this thesis – is
its broad incorporation of different theories that already enable a consideration
of all relevant issues during the selection of the case studies as well as during
the data collection phase.371
Overall the broad methodological approach of theory-based case studies
avoids the danger of predetermination and a precipitation of one-dimensional
conclusions of other research strategies – in particular purely quantitative
measurements.372
In terms of scientific relevance, it was once believed that case studies are
only a legitimate research tool for the exploratory phase of an investigation that
cannot describe or test propositions.373 However, case studies have increasingly
gained attention as research methodology. One major reason for the enhanced
scientific acceptance of case study as a valid research methodology has been
the clear-cut criteria for the preconditions, research design and quality proof
as suggested as developed by Yin (2003).374 Furthermore, researchers have
more and more realized that this scientific case study approach may not be
confused with other types of case studies, e. g. those forms of case studies used
for recruiting and teaching purposes or anecdotes in business literature.375
370 See e. g. Suddaby (2006); Glaser and Strauss (1967).
371 See also Pare´ (2004).
372 See Bortz and Do¨ring (2002).
373 See e. g. Lamnek (2005).
374 See sections 3.3.4.
375 See for references other examples and references Lamnek (2005).
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Case studies have traditionally been used in social science research376 but
have gained increased importance in other academic disciplines as well, in par-
ticular in International Business.377 Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004b)
point out that qualitative research has always played role in International
Business research, albeit a minor role.378 In their analysis of six leading In-
ternational Business journals between 1991 and 2001 Andersen and Skaates
(2004) found that only 10% of the studies were based on qualitative studies.
Johanson and Vahlne (1977), for example, used qualitative interviews in their
ground-breaking study to analyze the internationalization decision of Swedish
companies. Lindqvist (1991) who wrote about the same topic divided his re-
search in two empirical phases the authors first conducted qualitative inter-
views managers and then extended their research to about 100 companies with
quantitative mail survey.
In Economics full-fledged case studies are still rare, even though some recent
examples showed an increased openness to this methodology. Both Marinova
and Marinov (1999) and Hannula (2005) use the case study approach in a FDI
context, analyzing, however, only single companies.379 In contrast, this thesis
follows a multiple case study approach, use countries instead of companies
as cases and incorporates different levels of analysis which are elaborated in
further detail in the following section.
3.3.4 Case study research design
Based on the framework by Yin (2003) a sound case study research design
should comprise and define four elements: (1) study question, (2) case study
376 See for a good example Uzzi (1997); see Yin (2003) for further references.
377 See for interesting methodological insights for this thesis in Klaiber (2005); Obadia and
Vida (2006); Wufka (2006).
378 See Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004b), pp.5-7; Daniels and Cannice (2004), pp.186-
187.
379 They analyze Interbrew SA and Sanoma Magazines International respectively.
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type, (3) case study design, and (4) units of analysis. The research design
components and their consideration in this thesis are also summarized in figure
18.
(1) Case studies should always start with a study question that describes
the goal of the study.380 Furthermore, case studies should develop a theoretical
framework and formulate hypotheses. In this thesis the study question is equiv-
alent to question 1: “What role can public policy play in order to attract FDIs
in transition countries?” The theoretical framework (FDI theory of locational
competition and NIE)381 as well corresponding hypotheses382 have already
been developed in the previous sections.
(2) Furthermore, theory suggests different case study types. Most impor-
tantly it distinguishes between a single and multiple case study. The former
is usually used if the analyzed case represents the critical case and if a well-
formulated theory is tested.383 The latter is generally recommended because
evidence from multiple cases is more robust and more compelling than from
single case studies.384 A precondition of multiple case study is however, that
it follows a replication logic selection that requires a well-founded rationale for
the selection of the cases.385
This thesis uses the multiple case study approach with Romania and Croatia
as analyzed cases. This approach reflects that the theory regarding the impact
of public policy factors is not very advanced so far as it would be required for a
single country case study. Furthermore, the cross-country analysis enables more
robust insights on the effects of public policy and is of special interest with
380 See Yin (2003), pp.21-22.
381 See section 2.2.5 and 2.3.
382 See section 1.1.
383 See Yin (2003), pp.39-41.
384 See e. g. Herriott and Firestone (1983); de Vaus (2001), p.226.
385 See Yin (2003), pp.48-49; see also Stake (1994).
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regards to the reforms in both countries that aim(ed) for EU accession. The
replication logic is taken into account since the cases, Romania and Croatia,
have been carefully selected in section 3.1 and since the same steps of analysis
(see below section 3.4) are used for both countries without pooling (statistical)
results.
(3) Academic researchers of case studies should moreover, decide on the
specific case study design which can be an embedded or a holistic one.386 In
the embedded approach the same case study may involve more than one level
of analysis. The holistic approach is used if no logical sub-units of the case
study or studies can be identified.387
The embedded approach seems to be more rewarding for this thesis; the
suggested embedded elements in both analyzed countries are the MNCs on the
one hand and the state actors on the other. This two-sided analysis appears
to be a major contribution of this thesis to previous studies by generating
a broader understanding of the possibilities and limits of public policy in
attracting FDI.
(4) Units of analysis in the case study research design can be individuals,
places, countries but also decisions.388
In the context of this theses the units of analysis are the direct and indirect
public policy measures that are apt to influence FDI inflows that are analyzed
from two different angles (MNCs and state) in two different countries (Romania
and Croatia).
386 See Yin (2003), pp.42-43.
387 See de Vaus (2001), pp.220-221.
388 See de Vaus (2001), p.220.
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Figure 18: Case study research design
In conclusion, the selected approach of this thesis seems to be well in line
with the outlined requirements of research design for case studies.
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3.3.5 Expert interviews
The case study approach encourages the use of qualitative methods and par-
ticularly the conduct of qualitative interviews if the research project involves
complex interdependencies and phenomena that are difficult to delineate from
their context. This thesis uses qualitative expert interviews in order to obtain a
richer picture of public policy actions that are apt to influence the investment
decision of MNCs in favor of Romania and Croatia respectively. The interviews
are conducted with company as well as state experts and are based on the
preliminary list of MNCs’ country determinants that has been derived from
various FDI studies (figure 12). The interview analysis thrives for the test of
the hypotheses elaborated in section 1.1.
This section elaborates the methodology for all expert interviews in this the-
sis with company and state experts in both Romania and Croatia; it discusses
– in the order of the research procedure – the (1) rationale and definition of
expert interviews, (2) expert selection methodology, (3) forms of expert inter-
views, (4) document analysis, (5) interview guide, (6) duration, (7) pretest, (8)
documentation, (9) analysis, and (10) quality control. This section is wrapped
up with a (11) conclusion.389 Each subsection first evaluates the academic
state-of-the-art and then presents how these methodological issues are echoed
in the expert interviews of this thesis. Useful insights regarding the discussed
aspects are particularly provided in various contributions in Bogner, Littig, and
Menz (2002), byMarschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004a) and by Lamnek (2005).
(1) This section explains the rationale for choosing expert interviews as
empirical methodology and provides a definition of expert interviews. It is
shown (a) why qualitative interviews in general are prolific, (b) how expert
interviews are positioned in research, (c) how experts and expert knowledge
389 See for the structure of this section, e. g. Mayer (2004), p.41.
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are defined, (d) what key characteristics expert interviews contain, (e) what
distinguishes expert interviews from other types of qualitative interviews, and
(f) how these aspects are reflected in the expert interviews conducted as part
of this thesis.
(a) The advantages of qualitative compared to quantitative research have
been discussed in detail in section 3.3. Qualitative interviews in Interna-
tional Business and Economics are seen as a good research tool in order to
analyze complex and interdependent issues which are common in these fields
when analyzing different companies, industries or economies. Theorists also
recommend qualitative interviews for cross-cultural studies to avoid cultural
bias. They particularly propose qualitative interviews for developing and tran-
sition countries to overcome existing data gaps and inconsistencies.390
(b) For a long time expert interviews had not been seen as stand-alone
methodology but as part of other qualitative interviews. A more thorough def-
inition and guideline for their conduct has first been elaborated by Meuser and
Nagel (1991).391
Authors see the particularity of expert interviews in the interest in specific
topics and the distinctive style of interviewing. Accordingly, expert interviews
can be “crystallization points”392 of insider knowledge that account for a mul-
titude of observations. The interviews are viewed as part of a reflective process
to pressure-test a pre-formulated theoretical concept. The use of different inter-
view and data generation methods serves as a tool to avoid pre-determination
390 See Marschan-Piekkari and Reis (2004); Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004b).
391 See also Kassner and Wassermann (2002), pp.102 and 104; see for a first comprehensive
analysis of expert interviews as research methodology Bogner, Littig, and Menz (2002).
392 Bogner and Menz (2002b), p.7.
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and bias.393
(c) Experts are defined as people in key positions that have professional
and specialized knowledge as well as knowledge from real life and experience.
Experts are important not as individuals but as advisers on a certain topic.
They have privileged access to information that would not be accessible for the
researcher otherwise or only in a less efficient way.394 This expert knowledge
can be technical knowledge, process knowledge and interpretative knowledge.
Some authors add that experts should also be capable of implementing their
knowledge.395
(d) Key characteristics of expert interviews are (i) that they are semi-
structured and (ii) that the interviewer has a special role. Specific issues need
to be considered if (iii) the expert interviews are conducted with managers.
(i) Expert interviews are generally semi-structured. The research ques-
tions are given, the interviews are usually based on an interview guide, rather
contain topics than questions and are thus flexible regarding the wording of
the questions. During semi-structured interviews the interviewer may answer
questions, make clarifications and add or delete questions. A minimum of stan-
dardization is, however, necessary to facilitate the comparability of different
expert interviews. The catalog of questions is thus prepared in advance but its
content and order can be modified.396
(ii) In expert interviews the role of the interviewer is of particular impor-
tance. First of all the researcher needs to appear as “quasi-expert”397 to win
393 See Pfadenhauer (2002), p.113; Meuser and Nagel (1991); Bogner and Menz (2002b),
p.8.
394 See Meuser and Nagel (1991), pp.442-444, 447; Bogner and Menz (2002a), pp.37, 43-46.
395 See Bogner and Menz (2002b), p.8; Pfadenhauer (2002), p.116.
396 See Schnell, Hill, and Esser (2005), p.322; Berg (2007), p.93; Bortz and Do¨ring (2002),
p.315.
397 Pfadenhauer (2002), p.113; see also ibid, p.120; Bogner and Menz (2002a), p.50-62.
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the trust of the interviewee that is essential to elicit useful information. Per-
sistence, openness and flexibility are also required from the researcher in order
to attain detailed information, to give the interviewees room to jump back and
forth between topics, to elaborate their own thoughts and to develop linkages
between different topics. These challenges lead to the presumption that expert
interviews for a specific study should be conducted by a single researcher to
get the maximum impact.398
(iii) Trinczek (2002) shows that management interviews represent a
particular case of expert interviews that follow different rules. First these
interviews are set in the business world in which the manager is the boss who
generally shows strong signs of dominance – at least in the beginning of the
interview. Furthermore, managers expect short and precise questions from
the interviewer and requests for long narration early in the interview tend to
fail. However, management interviews often have a second phase in which the
manager is more relaxed once mutual trust between the interview partners
has been established. Managers are then often more open to self-reflexions and
even to discussions of sensitive topics.399
(e) Expert interviews can be distinguished from other forms of qualita-
tive interviews, namely (i) narrative, (ii) in-depth and (iii) problem-centered
interviews.
(i) Narrative interviews are mainly interviews that focus on the specific
biographical background of an individual while expert interviews are interested
in insights on specific topics that can be collected from several experts.400
398 See Lamnek (2005), pp.348-350; Mayring (2002), pp.68-69; Mayer (2004), p.36.
399 See Trinczek (2002), pp.212-214, 216 and 220.
400 See Mayring (2002), pp.72-75; Bortz and Do¨ring (2002), pp.315-318.
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(ii) Unlike expert interviews in-depth (or intensive) interviews attempt
to uncover unconscious motives and thoughts of the interviewee and are closely
related to psychoanalysis.401
(iii) Problem-centered interviews focus on a specific topics.402 Their
main difference to expert interviews is the interviewee selection; the respon-
dents of problem-centered interviews are selected from the general population
and do not necessarily need to have specialized knowledge. Furthermore, the
role of the interviewer in problem-centered interviews is not as critical and
they can also be conducted by several researchers.403
(f) The rationale and definition of expert interviews seems to well reflect the
approach and the requirements of this thesis. The reviewed theoretical discus-
sion confirms that expert interviews are an appropriate method to investigate
the guiding research question of this thesis – the context and the interdepen-
dencies of public policy actions and their influence on the investment decision
of MNCs. Qualitative interviews seem to be a good approach to reduce poten-
tial cultural and linguistic misunderstandings when interviewing experts from
Germany, Austria, Romania and Croatia. Moreover, interviews with experts
and their documents seem to help circumventing data deficiencies both in Ro-
mania and particularly in Croatia where not many information about FDI and
the activities of MNCs exist so far.
Expert interviews can indeed function as crystallization points with experts
who possess valuable insights in the investment decision of many foreign com-
panies since they have extensive contacts to investors and investment policy
401 See e. g. Friedrichs (1990), pp.224-234; Bortz and Do¨ring (2002), p.315; Lamnek (2005),
p.371.
402 They are also sometimes called focus interviews; see Kassner and Wassermann (2002),
p.101.
403 See Lamnek (2005), pp.364, 370 and 382; Mayring (2002), pp.67-72.
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makers. This also underscores that in this thesis the expert knowledge on cer-
tain topics is decisive and not the individual biography of the interviewee.
The selected interviewees for the company interviews should be in key po-
sitions in the business world, either closely involved in the decision making
process of MNCs or with privileged knowledge about MNCs’ investment deci-
sion, for example as their lawyers. The interviewees for the state view should
be experts of Romanian or Croatian investment policy, either as state repre-
sentatives or as close observers of the recent reform efforts in both countries,
for example German embassies.
These interviews need to be conducted with experts since other respondents
from the general population could not provide this kind of information. The
outlined key characteristics of expert interviews are reflected by using a semi-
structured interview guide and pretests. The special situation of management
interviews is facilitated by the author’s job experience in this field as manage-
ment consultant in which he conducted, supervised and evaluated a total of
more than 400 interviews on various topics. The author is the only interviewer
of the conducted interviews for this thesis.
(2) This section elaborates the expert selection methodology. It dis-
cusses the (a) theoretical sampling, (b) sampling categories, (c) sample size,
(d) response rate and gatekeepers , and (e) implementation of these aspects in
this thesis.
(a) The interviewee selection in qualitative research is not based on statistical
representation – as in quantitative research – but on theoretical sampling.
This is necessary because the total of a given population of experts on a certain
topic, for example, is often impossible to determine. Furthermore, qualitative
research is not interested in the examination of specific subjects but of specific
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contents. Nevertheless, expert interviews have to aim at the generalization of
results and insights should be transferable to other cases. A categorization and
pre-selection according to specific characteristics is thus important in order to
avoid distortions.404
(b) Theoretical sampling implies the set-up of categories that are sufficient
to cover all dimensions of the research topic and that are generally based on
previously developed research questions.405 According to Merkens (2004) the
categories should enable “theoretical saturation” of the research questions.
Therefore, different preconditions of the expert knowledge, different points
of view, typical cases as well as unusual cases should be represented in the
sampling. With respect to expert interviews it is of particular importance to
identify the correct contact person with the best available knowledge within an
organization. In this context Meuser and Nagel (1991) have pointed out that
these people are often not in the top level of organizations but located in the
second or third level of the hierarchy because they are the ones who prepare
key decisions.406
(c) There cannot be a strict rule for the sample size of qualitative and
expert interviews as discussed above. The number of people to talk to also
depends on the topic of the research. All the same experienced qualitative
researchers speak of at least 20 and a maximum of 50 interviews on a specific
topic. 30 interviews seems to be an average figure that is also recommended
for PhD theses.407
404 See Merkens (2004), p.291; Mayer (2004), p.38; Lamnek (2005), pp.385-386.
405 See Mayer (2004), p.38; Lamnek (2005), p.384.
406 See Meuser and Nagel (1991), pp.443-444; see Lamnek (2005), pp.313-314; Mayer (2004),
p.41.
407 See Warren (2004), p.521; Stroh (2000), p.201; Meuser and Nagel (1991); Mayer (2004),
p.40.
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(d) The selection of interviewees also depends on the expected response
rate. Since experts and functional elites such as managers have little time
and receive numerous research requests, scholars may have difficulties to get
the ear of the minister by simply writing a fax with an interview request.408
Therefore, it is essential for researchers who conduct expert interviews to take
advantage of gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are in central positions or have good
connections to experts and can mediate access to them. Once a contact to an
expert is established, the expert often gives clues to other experts and can
even recommend the researcher to them.409
(e) This thesis uses theoretical sampling for the selection of expert inter-
viewees. Categories need to be established that are based on the key questions
from section 1.1. They aim at filtering out those experts who can evaluate
the decision process of German and Austrian MNCs in favor of Romania and
Croatia as well as the impact of public policy actions on the decision of MNCs.
The number of appropriate experts is obviously extensive. The following cat-
egories should, however, be covered by the interviewees in order to enable a
rich picture of the research issues. The author established contrasting pairs of
categories in order to identify a large span of answers and themes as well as
to cover as many dimensions as possible while (i) reflects the selection of ex-
perts for company interviews and (ii) lists the categories for the state expert
selection. In both cases the first six categories refer to the organization of the
interviewee, while the remaining categories consider the actual respondent of
the expert interview:
(i) Categories for the company expert selection in Romania and Croatia
are:
408 See Wai-chung Yeung (2004).
409 See Merkens (2004), p.293; Odendahl and Shaw (2001), p.307; Bogner and Menz (2002b),
p.8.
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• Internal versus external: Experts can be found within companies and
in external organizations. The internal experts should be closely involved
in the decision making process of FDIs in MNCs, while external (foreign
or domestic) experts should be used as “crystallization points” (see above)
who have observed many investment decisions of German and Austrian
MNCs.
• Domestic versus foreign: The interviewed investors should be from
Austria and Germany in equal parts. The external experts should include
both foreign but also Romanian and Croatian experts to acquire also
the perspective from the home market such as through the Chamber of
Commerce.
• Large firms versus SMEs: Large investors have high visibility in host
countries like Romania and are important interview partners. However,
SMEs account for the bulk of FDIs and their country determinants may
significantly differ; thus experts from both types of companies should be
interviewed. Companies are defined as large in this thesis when generating
sales of more than e500M as industrial and more than e100M as service
company.
• Industry versus services: The parameters for the investment decision
may diverge among investors from different business sectors. Companies
are therefore roughly divided into industry- and service-based ones. The
service category also includes retail companies. Accordingly, experts from
both sectors should be interviewed for this thesis.
• Greenfield versus brownfield: FDI determinants may depend on the
form of the investment and interviews should comprise companies with
greenfield investments and acquisitions or privatizations respectively (see
section 2.1.1).
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• Date of (initial) investment decision: Drastic economic and politi-
cal changes both in Romania and Croatia occurred following government
changes, namely in 2000 when Ivica Racˇan became became prime minister
in Croatia and in 2004 when Traian Ba˘sescu became president in Roma-
nia. Interviews should therefore include companies that invested before
and some that also invested after these dates in the respective countries.
In order to deliver a holistic picture of country determinants, interviews
should include investors as well firms that were interested but finally did
not invest in Romania or Croatia respectively.
• Top versus medium hierarchy level: Experts from different hierarchy
levels should be interviewed (see above). The top level is defined as the
CEO or director and the board while the medium level consists of all other
staff who have influence or significant insights on the decision making
process of MNCs.
• General versus specific questions: Some experts can give useful in-
sights regarding the general country decision for FDIs by MNCs (e. g.
CEOs) while other experts have knowledge about specific questions of the
investment (e. g. lawyers); both types of experts should be interviewed
in this thesis.
(ii) Categories for the state expert selection in Romania and Croatia are:
• State representative versus external expert: State representatives
are decision makers who are clearly associated with the creation of invest-
ment conditions such as the ministry of economy or an investment pro-
motion agency. External experts such as academics or foreign embassies
have special knowledge about these aspects but have less possibilities to
implement this knowledge.
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• Domestic versus foreign: Due to their diverging perspectives on in-
vestment policy developments foreign as well as domestic experts should
be interviewed.
• Governmental versus other organization: Governmental institutions
often show a strong commitment to investment policy decisions; in order
to avoid bias other institutions with respective expertise should thus be
selected, too.
• National versus regional representation: Regional experts such as
mayors sometimes may have a different, more critical view of the overall
investment policy than national experts and should thus not be neglected
in the interviews.
• Direct versus indirect involvement in FDI policy: Some organi-
zations influence FDI policy themselves through laws etc., while others
have indirect influence through pressure, for example, from international
organizations.
• Intense versus occasional MNC interaction: Interviews should con-
tain state experts with strong ties to MNCs (e. g. promotion agencies)
and those with only occasional contact that may have a different image
of MNCs.
• Top versus medium hierarchy level: (see above)
• General versus specific questions: (see above)
On the basis of these designed categories four matrices are developed for
company and state expert interviews in Romania (figures and 20) and for com-
pany and state expert interviews in Croatia (figures 21 and 22). Interview
constellations are needed in which all categories and dimensions are reflected
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by a multitude of interviews. The numerical goal of this thesis is to conduct
60 expert interviews and hence 30 in each country which is in line with the
recommended average sample size. This makes 15 expert interviews each on
the investor’s and the state’s view on FDIs in both Romania and Croatia. Such
a set of experts covering all elaborated categories should be able to achieve the-
oretical saturation regarding the key questions of this thesis. Different matrices
for Romania and Croatia exist because the interview results of both countries
are not pooled but analyzed as two separate case studies whose results are
examined together in the incorporated cross-country analysis throughout this
thesis.
To identify and interview a sufficient number of experts who fit into the
established matrix of categories is challenging. First experiences show that
expert response rates are rather low. Therefore, gatekeepers play an important
role to give access to experts in both countries. Gerromod2007, for example,
recommended the author to various investors, business organizations etc. in
Romania. Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007) accomplished the same
for expert interviews in Croatia. Moreover, the visit of expert conferences and
fairs has provided further expert contacts.410
(3) This section discusses the forms of expert interviews, elaborates
why (a) method triangulation is rewarding, sketches out (b) face-to-face, (c)
telephone and (d) e-mail interviews and presents (e) the proceeding in this
thesis.
(a) Case studies in general and qualitative interviews in particular call for
method triangulation. By and large verbal (face-to-face and telephone) as
well as written interviews are possible and reasonable. They mainly differ in
terms of the interaction between interviewer and interviewee and the degree of
410 Conference on European Economic Integration 2006. The Changing Landscape of FDI
in Europe, Vienna, Nov 20-21; Hanover trade fair 2007. Romania day, April 17.
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Figure 19: Interviewee selection matrix Romania (1) – investor’s view
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Figure 20: Interviewee selection matrix Romania (2) – state’s view
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Figure 21: Interviewee selection matrix Croatia (1) – investor’s view
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Figure 22: Interviewee selection matrix Croatia (2) – state’s view
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standardization of the interview questions.411
(b) Face-to-face interviews are the most common form of expert inter-
views. These in-person interviews are often more interactive than other forms
of interviews, may at times cause more accurate responses because of the nat-
ural conversation and the possibility of the interviewer to react to non-verbal
hints. Moreover, this interview form may be particularly appropriate to discuss
sensitive and complex issues.412
(c) Researchers frequently use telephone interviews for qualitative re-
search. Their critics however point out that these interviews are more challeng-
ing to conduct, because they are more impersonal, more difficult to control and
the reaction of the interviewee is harder to assess than in face-to-face inter-
views.413
However, sometimes face-to-face interviews are logistically impossible, par-
ticularly with managers and politicians who often travel; in this cases experts
are easier to reach via phone, the response rate seems to be higher and cancella-
tions are easier to compensate. Answers in phone interviews tend to be shorter
and more precise. Some researchers prefer phone interviews to ask sensitive
questions because they are more anonymous. Overall, phone interviews seem
justified when research and interview questions are well defined and when they
complement face-to-face interviews.414
(d) Expert interviews can also be written interviews even though their
use is less frequent because they are less spontaneous and need to focus on
few topics; the limited interaction makes inquiring difficult and answering in
411 See Atteslander (2006) p.126
412 See Lamnek (2005), p.343; Shuy (2001), pp.541-544.
413 See Atteslander (2006), p.148; Lamnek (2005), p.346; Odendahl and Shaw (2001), p.308.
414 See Berg (2007), pp.108 and 110; Shuy (2001), pp.537, 540-541 and 545.
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written from is more tiresome for the interviewee. On the other hand written
interviews allow for a higher degree of privacy and more flexibility regarding
time and location. In fact due to time and logistic constraints written inter-
views are sometimes the only way to reach the participation of some experts.415
(e) The use of different interview methods in this thesis avoids bias through
a specific interview form and reflects the wishes and constraints of the inter-
viewees.
Face-to-face interviews should be the dominant form of interviews in this
thesis. They are particularly appropriate to study general evaluations of the
investment decision and interdependencies between different country determi-
nants. They are also best-suited for specification questions and the alleviation
of cultural challenges.416
Telephone and e-mail interviews particular favor the treatment of specific
investment aspects. The special circumstances of expert interviews even some-
times make them unavoidable. The challenges of phone and e-mail interviews
discussed above find only limited appliance in this thesis. Being experts on
MNCs’ investment decision or investment policy, their answers should be
also accurate over the phone and written answers should not be tiresome for
them. Since the personal involvement of the expert is unimportant, the private
atmosphere, the interaction and the spontaneity of face-to-face interviews is
not as crucial. To improve the interview quality an introduction to the study,
a list of topics to be discussed and a short CV to explain the academic and
professional background of the author is sent beforehand to all interviewees.
Furthermore, telephone as well as e-mail interviews are exclusively used for
later stages of the research; the researcher can thus gain sufficient experience
415 See Bortz and Do¨ring (2002), p.308; Lamnek (2005), p.343; Berg (2007), p.113.
416 See also Shuy (2001), p.544 and Odendahl and Shaw (2001), p.308.
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and knowledge in prior face-to-face interviews.417
(4) Qualitative interviews are often enriched by a document analysis,
particularly in International Business.418 Documents are all sources including
texts, movies, etc. that give legitimate conclusions about activities and in-
tentions of the documents’ author(s) and the representing organization. They
cannot be used as stand-alone source since they do not prove how the author(s)
really acted. The documents need first to be described and evaluated before
they are analyzed.419 In this thesis documents are collected from the experts
of the qualitative interviews as additional primary source for the better inter-
pretation of the statements in the interviews about the investment decision of
MNCs and specific public policy actions.
(5) Expert interviews are generally conducted on the basis of interview
guides.420 Semi-structured guided interviews avoid pre-determination by the
researcher and can flexibly respond to unexpected topics and to respondents
with different knowledge, background, language and characters. By using open
questions the use of interview guides also avoids social desirability by renounc-
ing to ask leading questions – particularly regarding sensitive issues – in which
the respondent may give some misleading answers only to fulfill an allegedly
expected social image.421
This section discusses (a) the definition of an interview guide and its struc-
ture422 that can be divided into (b) introduction, (c) warm-up questions, (d)
417 See also Atteslander (2006), pp.151-152; Berg (2007), p.109.
418 See e. g. de Geer, Borglund, and Frostenson (2004), pp.332-334.
419 See Wolff (2004), pp.503-504 and 511; Mayring (2002), pp.47 and 49.
420 See Trinczek (2002), p.209 and 218; Meuser and Nagel (1991), p.448; Mayer (2004),
p.36.
421 See Welman and Kruger (2001), pp.161, 169; Warren (2004), p.523; Lamnek (2005),
pp.341.
422 See for interview guides structures Friedrichs (1990), p.227; Bortz and Do¨ring (2002),
p.314.
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key questions, (e) additional questions and (f) conclusion. All aspects are
reflected (g) in this thesis.
(a) The interview guide is defined as a check list for researchers that helps
not to miss important topics or themes to be covered in an expert interview.
The questions are neither standardized nor previously worded and no strict
order of the questions exists. The questions asked in the interview are open-
ended and not closed-ended.423 Despite this flexibility structure and processes
are important for a generalization of results and for a certain comparability of
the data.424
(b) In the introduction of the guided interview the researcher briefly
explains the study without revealing concept or hypotheses in order to avoid
pre-determined answers. Moreover, the researcher offers a copy of the final
report and discusses the degree of confidentiality of the interview. In this
context a complete removal of “any elements that might indicate the subjects’
identities”425 is generally not necessary for expert interviews; scholars agree
however that (verbal) informed consent of the interviewee is needed. The
researcher has to explain the use of the interview and suggest how interviewees
can remain completely or partly anonymous.426
(c) The actual interview should start with some warm-up questions
about the interviewees and their organization. Additionally, some easy, non-
423 See Stroh (2000), p.199; Atteslander (2006), p.139; Mason (2004a), p.518; Lamnek
(2005), p.355; Daniels and Cannice (2004), p.192; Welman and Kruger (2001), p.161.
424 See Wilkinson and Young (2004), p.207; Bogner and Menz (2002a), p.38; Mayer (2004),
p.36.
425 Berg (2007), p.79; see also Warren (2004), p.521; Sieber (2004), p.474; Lamnek (2005),
p.368.
426 See Kent (2000), pp.81-84; Daniels and Cannice (2004), pp.195, 198; Trinczek (2002),
p.214.
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threatening questions that are clearly connected to the research topic should
assure the respondent that the interviewer knows the topic and is a reliable
interview partner.427
(d) The following key questions of the expert interview should cover the
essential elements of the research study and include questions for specifica-
tions. Themes may jump back and forth and the researcher should give the
respondents room to expand their knowledge and create interdependencies
without too many interruptions. Scholars have recommended that the tone of
interviewing should remain neutral and stimulating-passive but the researcher
should, nevertheless, not hesitate to take challenging positions and to ask
sensitive questions.428
(e) Subsequently additional questions can be raised in order to receive
insights on issues of the study that are of somewhat less priority, to get
overall assessments and to discuss previously untouched topics. Over and
above contacts to other experts and further materials (documents etc.) can be
requested.429
(f) In the conclusion phase of the interview the researcher shows gratitude
toward the respondent and repeats the offer to share the results of the study.430
(g) In this thesis the interview guide is a useful tool not to miss any impor-
tant FDI determinants or issues of the analysis. A flexible order of questions
seems indispensable considering the long list of potential country determinants
427 See Gorden (1977); Warren (2004), p.522; Berg (2007), p.105.
428 See Lamnek (2005), pp.344, 356 and 368; Welman and Kruger (2001), pp.169-170; Kvale
(1996), pp.133-134; Stroh (2000), p.204.
429 See Stroh (2000), p.207; Atteslander (2006), p.125.
430 See Bortz and Do¨ring (2002), p.310.
132 3 Methodological approach
and different knowledge of the interviewees and to avoid the danger of pre-
determined analyses of some econometric FDI studies. The open-ended ques-
tions also help to elicit interdependencies between several determinants by the
interviewee. Finally, the coverage of sensitive questions including corruption
and subsidies, requires a flexible approach.
The guide for the expert interviews in this thesis – as presented in figure 23
for interviews with MNCs – starts with a personal introduction and summarizes
the approach and status of the thesis. Informed consent (see above) is achieved
by discussing how data is used, confidentiality compromises are reached by
agreeing that critical statements can either be deleted from the audio-file or
disguised in the analysis. The following easy warm-up questions contain general
interviewee information and facts about the company and its investment in
Romania or Croatia, including the description of the investment project.
The key questions of the interview guide – not all of them can usually be
covered – focus on the actual investment decision. Questions include the major
reasons for investing in Romania or Croatia respectively and the discussion of
individual country determinants derived from the theoretical part of this thesis;
the interviewer lets the experts freely elaborate their knowledge but he can ask
for more details including recent developments, institutions involved or further
determinants (key questions 1 to 3 of this thesis). Language challenges in the
expert interviews will be reduced by wording the questions straightforward and
by covering only one topic per question.
Additional questions on the interview guide ask for an assessment of the
influence of Romania’s or Croatia political institutions on investment policy
and a comparison of both countries’ performance to countries (key questions 4
and 5 ). This interview phase should also be used to ask for related materials
and documents and for expert contacts. The conclusion of the interview guide
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reminds the interviewer to show his gratitude towards the interviewee and
repeat his offer to share the interview results.
The interview guides for interviews with external company experts, state rep-
resentatives and external state experts follow very similar patterns to the one
introduced. They only drop the questions about the investment facts and the
decision-makers within the MNCs and include questions about potential differ-
ences among industries (external company experts) and the responsibilities for
reforms of public policy actors (state expert).
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B. Informed consent of audio-taping and reproduction 
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Figure 23: Example guide for investor interviews
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(6) The duration of expert interviews strongly varies but can range from
15 minutes to several hours. The average seems to be about 45 minutes. Tele-
phone interviews are usually shorter and do not tend to last longer than 20-30
minutes.431
30 minutes is the minimum goal for face-to-face and 20 minutes for telephone
interviews in this thesis because shorter interviews may lack the required
depth for complex issues such as FDI decisions or policies. The length of written
answers will depend on the specific questions asked and the respondent’s effort.
(7) Various authors stress the importance of pretests before the actually
conduct of the expert interviews, particularly if the sample size is fairly large.
In these pretests the researcher verifies location, duration, interview guide struc-
ture and questions. It needs to be confirmed that all hypotheses can be tested
with the interview guide.432
In this thesis three pretests were conducted with one FDI and two method-
ological experts: The author presented the research and interview questions in
detail to Prof. Dr. L. Resmini (University of Bocconi); Prof. Dr. J. Hoffmeyer-
Zlotnik (Zentrum fu¨r Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, ZUMA) proofread
the interview guide and critically verified the number, set-up and duration of
the expert interviews; Prof. Dr. H. Schuler (University of Hohenheim) con-
firmed the general methodological approach of this thesis.
(8) Elements of the documentation of expert interviews can be divided
in (a) audio-taping, (b) notes, (c) transcription, (d) formal database, and (e)
storage that are also reflected (f) in this thesis.433
431 See Lamnek (2005), pp.354-355; Warren (2004), pp.521-522; Johnson (2001), p.103;
Atteslander (2006), p.125; Berg (2007), p.107; Shuy (2001), p.542.
432 See Friedrichs (1990), pp.234-235; Mayer (2004), p.44; Mason (2004a), p.518.
433 See also for this selection Bortz and Do¨ring (2002), p.312.
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(a) Interview data must be recorded in some way and audio-taping seems
to be the most helpful tool because it can easily be retrieved and hardly distorts
the interview process. In some cases interviewees deny being tape-recorded
especially when sensitive issues are involved or if employees feel awkward to
answer questions without the explicit permission of their supervisor; sometimes
the latter may occur, for example, in transition economies like Romania and
Croatia.434
(b) The documentation quality of expert interviews is further enhanced by
the usage of notes during the interview. They help structuring the answers and
preventing a potential audio data loss. Notes can facilitate to ask specification
questions in later stages of the interview.435 Daniels and Cannice (2004) point
out, however, that respondents may also be more cautious when notes are
taken by the researcher.
(c) Traditionally the recordings from audio-tapes are transfered to verbatim
transcriptions. Various authors have, however, questioned what a valid trans-
lation from oral to written language is. Therefore, verbatim transcriptions do
not necessarily increase the trustworthiness of the transcription, the content
of the interview and especially not its interpretation. For expert interviews
transcripts are important for “what is said, rather than how it is said.”436
Especially for extensive, semi-structured interviews a complete verbatim tran-
scription would be too complex, time-consuming and even confusing. Thus,
extensive transcripts and notation systems are neither necessary nor common
for expert interviews. Researchers rather use transcript protocols to reduce
the magnitude of material. In these transcript protocols researchers paraphrase
434 See Lamnek (2005), p.387; Mayer (2004), p.46; Marschan-Piekkari and Welch (2004b),
p.10; Berg (2007), p.80; see regarding Eastern Europe Michailova (2004), p.372.
435 See Poland (2001), p.637.
436 Poland (2001), p.630; see also ibid, p. 636; Kvale (1995), p.27; Mayring (2002), p.97.
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facts, opinions, judgments, observations in their own words; abbreviations as
well as citations can be used while the questions of the researchers are generally
not documented.437
Despite these transcript liberties all interview aspects need to be documented
in the protocol. Furthermore, after a first transcription of the interview head-
lines are defined and the content is sequenced under these headlines putting
the text in a contextual order to facilitate the subsequent analysis.438
(d) Some scholars also propose a database of formalities to document the
conducted interviews. The documentation should contain all relevant informa-
tion about the interviewees, their representing organization and the interview
settings such as location, duration, language etc. Spreadsheets are generally
sufficient as database.439
(e) All documentation material should be stored safely and electronically
if possible. This comprises the audiotape, notes, transcripts and the formal
database.440
(f) The goal for this thesis should be to audio-tape at least 90% of the
interviews considering the specific difficulties in Eastern Europe. A modern
tape player is used that allows to copy audiofiles directly to the computer.
Notes are taken in all interviews to store a maximum of information and to be
able to jump back to other questions even though some of the easiness of the
conversation may be lost.
437 See Mayring (2002), pp.97-99; Meuser and Nagel (1991), pp.455-457, 460; Berg (2007),
p.79.
438 See Meuser and Nagel (1991), pp.455-456; Mayring (2002), p.99.
439 See also Eisenhardt (1989); Lamnek (2005), p.391.
440 See Poland (2001), pp.634-635; Bortz and Do¨ring (2002), p.313.
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Since not the exact wording but the content of the expert interviews is impor-
tant, transcript protocols seem to be sufficient to master 60 interviews of about
45 minutes totaling to about 2700 minutes of audio material; a detailed protocol
including some citations should take about 5 pages totaling to about 300 pages.
This documentation method should therefore produce plenty of useful material
to cover in the subsequent analyses. In a following step headlines are found in
the transcripts and the material is brought into a logical order. The protocol
also helps to overcome language issues since all answers are summarized in En-
glish while the actual interviews may be conducted in German, English, French
or even in Romanian or Croatian (with an interpreter) depending on the skills
of the interviewee.
All formalities are documented in an Excel database (see section 5.1.1) and
are stored together with all other interview material electronically as discussed
above.
This procedure is valid for both face-to-face and phone interviews while
the documentation of e-mail interviews contains the written exchange of the
interview partners and further material from the respondent.
(9) This section discusses the two types of analysis used in this thesis, that
are (a) the formal analysis and (b) the content analysis.
(a) The formal analysis shows how the introduced methodological require-
ments are fulfilled in this thesis and presents an overview of the conducted
interviews including information on number, duration, interviewee etc. for all
interview types. A separate analysis describes the received expert documents.
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(b) Expert interviews usually use content analyses as data evaluation tech-
nique.441 This section discusses (i) the definition of content analysis and the
steps of this approach which include (ii) categorization, (iii) structuring and
(iv) analytical generalization. Section (v) describes the procedure in this thesis.
(i) Content analysis is defined as the analysis of texts such as interviews
– derived from a theoretical framework – in a systematic way, evaluating the
material step-by-step and based on a category system.442 It is thus not im-
portant to find the individually different aspects of the expert interviews but
to elaborate the representative and generalizable statements and interpreta-
tions. Content analysis is generally not a numerical but a qualitative test of
pre-defined hypotheses. The reader of a study generally cannot directly follow
all steps of the content analysis; it is, therefore, important to make the single
steps of the analysis transparent.443
(ii) The first step of the content analysis encompasses a categorization
in order to enable an analysis of all expert interviews on a common basis.444
Different dimensions of categories should be developed to classify the material
in order to test the previously established theoretical framework of the study.445
(iii) In a second step the structuring brings the interview material in or-
der. The answers of the individual interviews are clustered according to the
established categories even though it is not compulsory to find answers from
all interviews for all categories. Passages of the text must be torn apart because
the insights on certain topics and not the individual experts are important.446
(iv) The core of the content analysis aims at the analytical generaliza-
tion of the interview results. Commonalities, differences and tendencies of the
441 See Welman and Kruger (2001), p.195.
442 See Mayring (2002), p.114; Berg (2007), p.134.
443 See Mason (2004b), p.1021; Stroh (2000), p.202; Lamnek (2005), p.407.
444 See Meuser and Nagel (1991), pp.451-452; Mayer (2004), p.48; Berg (2007), p.135.
445 See Gorden (1977); Lamnek (2005), p.406; Meuser and Nagel (1991), pp.457-458.
446 See Schmidt (2004a), pp.448-449; Mayring (2002), p.115; Meuser and Nagel (1991),
p.458.
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structured and categorized material that go beyond the individual example are
elaborated and generalized. These generalizations are then evaluated and com-
pared to the previously developed theoretical framework including its hypothe-
ses. This comparison between a predicted and an empirically based pattern is
also described as pattern-matching. Scholars recommend to cite typical cases
to clarify the generalization results. The analysis of the received documents will
further strengthen the results.447
(v) The content analysis seems to be well-suited to master the multitude of
the material and the typical challenges for qualitative expert interviews in this
thesis (chapter 5 ). The structuring of the interviews is implemented in an
evaluation spreadsheet and prepares the subsequent analytical generalization
that filters the common insights from the conducted expert interviews that go
beyond the single interview.
(10) Quality control is essential for the conduct of expert interviews to
meet the high methodological requirements of case studies. The quality control
approach can be borrowed from the Yin’s case study approach and should
therefore consist of (a) construct validity, (b) internal validity, (c) external
validity, and (d) reliability. Section (e) shows the implementation of these
dimension in this thesis.448
(a) Construct validity of qualitative expert interviews needs to be ensured
in order to avoid biased or misleading interpretations. This can be achieved
by method triangulation such as using multiple techniques and sources of
447 See Ghauri (2004), p.118; Yin (2003), p.31; Lamnek (2005), pp.403-404; Berg (2007),
p.134; Mayer (2004), p.46; Meuser and Nagel (1991), p.452; Mayring (2002), p.118.
448 See Yin (2003), pp.33-38.
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evidence.449
(b) Furthermore, internal validity is required in order to guarantee the
quality of expert interviews.450 The goal is therefore to establish causal re-
lationships and to be able to explain a specific phenomenon in detail in the
context of a specific event or environment.451 This can be achieved by ana-
lytical generalization, i. e. the juxtaposition and comparison of the empirical
results with theoretical patterns.452
(c) In addition to this, external validity is assured if qualitative interviews
can be generalized and are also valid for other cases, situation and times.
Following the replication logic a further interview would not alter the overall
study outcome.453
(d) The reliability criteria of qualitative interviews is met if a later re-
searcher can follow the same methodological steps as the interviewer and gets
the same results.454 Mayer (2004) suggests that the researcher explains in
detail how data has been generated and documents the interview process.455
(e) In this thesis construct validity is guaranteed by conducting guided ex-
pert interviews with open-ended questions with internal and external, company
and state experts. Moreover, different interview forms are used (face-to-face,
telephone and e-mail interviews). Finally, company material (documents on
449 See Yin (2003), pp.34-35; Lamnek (2005), pp.316-317; Hurmerinta-Peltoma¨ki and Num-
mela (2004), pp.164 and 167; Meuser and Nagel (1991), p.441; Bogner and Menz (2002a),
p.38.
450 See e. g. de Vaus (2001), p.233.
451 See Bortz and Do¨ring (2002); Yin (2003), p.36.
452 See also Pauwels and Matthyssens (2004), p.131.
453 See de Vaus (2001), pp.237-238; see also Yin (2003), p.37; Mayer (2004), p.40.
454 See Yin (2003), p.37.
455 See Mayer (2004), p.55; see also Lamnek (2005), p.390.
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the location decision process etc.) is collected and analyzed from various
companies. Internal validity represents the core of the determinants analysis
(chapter 7) using analytical generalization to evaluate the conducted expert
interviews and to analyze to what extent the empirical results of the interviews
match the findings of the existing FDI literature. External validity is achieved
in this thesis by a thorough expert selection through theoretical sampling and
a semi-structured interview guide. Finally, reliability is considered in this thesis
by the storage of the audiofiles and notes, the transcription of the conducted
interviews and the generation of a database of formalities and a database with
all categorized answers from the interviews.
(11) In conclusion this thesis uses semi-structured expert interviews with
interviewees selected through theoretical sampling. The interviews are based
on an interview guide with open-ended questions. Most of the interviews are
conducted face-to-face, some over the phone or via e-mail. The interviews as
well as written material received from the respondents are assessed by the con-
tent analysis method. The quality requirements are met by construct, external
and internal validity as well as reliability.
3.4 Derived methodological framework
This section summarizes the derived methodological framework. Bearing in
mind the requirements of case studies, this thesis follows four steps of analysis.
In step 1 of the analysis the preliminary list of 19 public policy country
has been elaborated – emanating from the evaluation of 34 existing studies on
transition countries – in section 2.2.5 and that will be the basis of the further
analyses.456
456 See also figure 12.
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Step 2 of the analysis aims at a fuller understanding of country determinants
of MNCs; hence, expert interviews are conducted with MNCs from Germany
and Austria, external company experts, state representatives from Romania
and Croatia, and with external state experts.457 The advantage of the expert
interviews is that determinants that are usually not considered in FDI surveys
or econometric studies can be identified. Moreover, the interviews with key
decision makers allow for a better understanding of the casual relationship
between different determinants as well as of the actual potential of public policy
makers to influence their investment decision.458 Company and state documents
that the author collects from the interviewees help to interpret the expert
statements.
At the end of this step a revised list of determinants is elaborated that
presents those aspects that are most frequently considered by MNCs during
their investment decision process (chapters 5 and 6 )
In step 3 each of the determinant and possible sub-determinants are ana-
lyzed for Romania and Croatia. The performance of the determinants is exam-
ined as well as the reform measures of public policy actors. Furthermore, the
impact of the determinants on in the investment decision of MNCs is analyzed.
Finally, generalizable results are derived for transition countries (chapters 7
and 8 ).
The country determinants are categorized in step 4 of the analysis based on
the NIE theory (chapter 9 ). The aim is to cluster these determinants according
to the public policy actor groups involved as well as to the time horizons that
are needed for MNCs to take an investment decision and for public policy actors
to achieve significant improvements of the FDI determinants.
457 The expert interviews also comprise examples from those companies that considered
investing in one of the respective countries but, in the end, decided not to invest there.
458 See Welman and Kruger (2001); see also section 3.3.5 for the rationale and set-up of
expert interviews in this thesis.
4 Intermediate results
The first part of this thesis has elaborated the theoretical and methodological
framework and established an scientific foundation for the proposed research.
It has identified the possibilities and limits of public policy factors in
attracting FDI from MNCs as an academic question as well as the secondary
questions and hypotheses that this implies. It has also been explained why
the effects of FDI on home and host countries tend to be positive overall.
Based on an extensive analysis of the existing literature on FDI determinants
in transition countries, different dimensions have been identified in which this
thesis can make meaningful contributions.
This thesis uses the locational competition theory as its first theoreti-
cal framework. This theory helps to establish a research approach that covers
the view of both MNC and the states.459 Locational competition furthermore
legitimizes the broad search for those factors that public policy can actually
influence. In this context a preliminary list of the 19 most important policy fac-
tors has been identified that will be the basis for the further analyses of public
policy measures of this thesis. Moreover, the locational competition approach
becomes important for the consideration of the limits of specific measures to
attract FDI; a contribution of this thesis to FDI research seems especially pos-
sible in the analysis of trade-offs of public policy actions in each of the selected
countries, Romania and Croatia, as well as in the envisaged cross-country view
and in the consideration of the success and challenges of EU accession.
459 This lack of a combined view has also been criticized in Mudambi (2002).
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The NIE has been identified as second theoretical pillar for this thesis be-
cause its assumptions (i. e. imperfect markets, incremental changes and uncer-
tainty) and approach (including the definition of institutions and organizations)
are well in line with the proceeding in this thesis; in addition, it can contribute
to a new and more realistic categorization of measures and public policy actors
in the context of FDI.
With respect to the methodological framework the selection of Roma-
nia and Croatia has been explained; the rationale of analyzing only MNCs
from Austria and Germany has also been presented. Moreover, the method-
ological challenges of existing FDI research have been discussed; an alternative
approach, the case study, has been presented and elaborated as the method-
ological approach of this thesis. The selection of the type of cases (explanatory,
theory-based, multiple and embedded) enables the thesis to achieve a more
comprehensive understanding of the impact of public policy factors on the
investment decision of MNCs. It has been highlighted that the case study ap-
proach is especially advantageous due to its openness to other disciplines and
to its use of multiple sources of evidence. In this context it has been pointed out
that this thesis relies on a broad base of sources including expert interviews,
company material, state documents, secondary literature as well as national
and international statistics.
In conclusion, the first part of this work has created a comprehensive and
sound theoretical and methodological framework in preparation for the analyt-
ical core of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
5 Expert interviews and documents – the data
The following chapter presents the empirical data of this thesis, expert inter-
views (section 5.1) and expert documents (section 5.2). Section 5.3 outlines
how the empirical data has been incorporated into subsequent analyses.
5.1 Expert interviews
The conducted expert interviews are analyzed with respect to the fulfillment of
the formal requirements (section 5.1.1) and to the interview contents (section
5.1.2) which also includes a revision and new categorization of the pre-defined
list of FDI determinants from the theoretical part of this thesis (section 2.2.5).
5.1.1 Formal analysis
The formal analysis of the conducted expert interviews reflects the methodolog-
ical requirements and goals for these interviews elaborated in section 3.3.5. This
section discusses (1) an overview of the conducted interviews, (2) theoretical
sampling, (3) the expertise of the interviewees, and (4) further interview details.
(1) Overall, the author conducted 90 semi-structured expert inter-
views between March and December 2007 – the targeted number was 60 inter-
views. Of the 90 interviews, 53 focused on FDI in Romania and the remainder
on Croatia. 50 investors and company experts were interviewed. The remaining
interviewees were Romanian and Croatian state representatives and external
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state experts. Four trips to Croatia, two to Romania, two to Austria as well as
numerous trips within Germany were necessary to conduct these interviews.
All interview details are documented in the database of formalities. Excerpts
with the most important information are presented in figures 24 to 27.
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Interview details - company expert interviews Romania
Int # Interview citation Expert type Name Institution
Home 
country of 
institution
Year of 
investment 
decision
Position of interviewee Nationality of interviewee Expertise
Interview 
form
Duration 
(in min.)
1 Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2005 Disguised German Disguised Phone 30
2 Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 2006 Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 120
3 Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 1999 Disguised German Disguised Phone 45
4 Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 2001 Disguised Austrian Disguised Phone 30
5 Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2005 Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 45
6 Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 2002 Disguised Austrian Disguised Phone 30
7 Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2005 Disguised German/ 
Romanian
Disguised Face-to-face 60
8 Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 1996 Disguised Romanian/ 
Austrian
Disguised Phone 30
9 Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Romania n/a Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 45
10 Intv. Rom. Company - Consulting (2007) External Disguised Disguised Romania n/a Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 90
11 Intv. German Econ. Association III 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Germany n/a Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 45
12 Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007) External Disguised Disguised Austria n/a Disguised Austrian Disguised Phone 30
13 Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007) External Disguised Disguised Romania n/a Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 45
14 Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Romania 1996 Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 75
15 Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany n/a Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 90
Additional interviews
61 Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2006 Disguised German Disguised Phone 60
62 Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Austria/ Italy 1997 Disguised Italian Disguised Face-to-face 60
63 Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 1998 Disguised German Disguised Phone 30
64 Intv. Int'l MNC - Utilities (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised International 1992 Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 60
65 Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 1992 Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 45
66 Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Romania 1999 
(not realized)
Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 75
67 Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 1998 Disguised German/ 
Romanian
Disguised Phone 45
68 Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2008 
(planned)
Disguised German Disguised Phone 90
69 Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 2006 Disguised Austrian Disguised Phone 30
70 Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2003 Disguised German Disguised Phone 45
71 Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany n/a Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 90
72 Intv. German Econ. Association VII 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany n/a Disguised Romanian/ 
German
Disguised Phone 30
73 Intv. Germ. MNC - Medical Techn. 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Germany n/a Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 60
74 Intv. German Econ. Association VIII 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Germany n/a Disguised German Disguised E-mail -
75 Intv. Int'l Econ. Association (2007) External Disguised Disguised International n/a Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 60
76 Intv. German Econ. Association VI 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Germany n/a Disguised German Disguised Phone 30
Source: Author's database of formalities.
Figure 24:
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Interview details - state expert interviews Romania
Int # Interview citation Expert type Name Institution
Home 
country of 
institution
Position of interviewee Nationality of interviewee Expertise
Interview 
form
Duration 
(in min.)
16 Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 75
17 Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 60
18 Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 75
19 Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 90
20 Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 45
21 Intv. Romanian Ministry III (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 30
22 Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 30
23 Intv. German Authority IV (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 60
24 Intv. German Authority I (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 60
25 Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007) External Disguised Disguised International Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 45
26 Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 90
27 Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 90
28 Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 60
29 Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 60
30 Intv. Romanian NGO (2007) External Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 45
Additional interviews
77 Intv. Romanian Ministry II (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 30
78 Intv. Rom. Local Authority II (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 60
79 Intv. Romanian County Council (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Phone 45
80 Intv. German Ministry (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Phone 60
81 Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007) External Disguised Disguised Austria Disguised Hungarian/ 
Austrian
Disguised Phone 45
82 Intv. German Political Adviser (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Phone 30
83 Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Romania Disguised Romanian Disguised Face-to-face 40
Source: Author's database of formalities.
Figure 25: Interview details – state expert interviews Romania
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Interview details - company expert interviews Croatia
Int # Interview citation Expert type Name Institution
Home 
country of 
institution
Year of 
investment 
decision
Position of interviewee Nationality of interviewee Expertise
Interview 
form
Duration 
(in min.)
31 Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2000 Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 90
32 Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 1995 Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 105
33 Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2004 Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 75
34 Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Austria/ Italy 1997 Disguised Italian Disguised Face-to-face 60
35 Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2002 Disguised German Disguised Phone 30
36 Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 1996 Disguised Austrian Disguised Phone 45
37 Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2001 
(not realized)
Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 90
38 Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 1998 Disguised Austrian Disguised Phone 30
39 Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Croatia n/a Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 60
40 Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007) External Disguised Disguised Croatia n/a Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 75
41 Intv. German Econ. Association IV 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Germany n/a Disguised German/ 
Croatian
Disguised Face-to-face 60
42 Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Switzerland/ 
Croatia
2003 Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 120
43 Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007) External Disguised Disguised Austria n/a Disguised Austrian Disguised Face-to-face 45
44 Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Croatia n/a Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 60
45 Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007) External Disguised Disguised Austria 2003 Disguised Croatian/ 
Austrian
Disguised Phone 30
Additional interviews
84 Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 1998 Disguised German/ 
Croatian
Disguised Face-to-face 75
85 Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Austria 1998 Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 45
86 Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007) Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 2004 Disguised German Disguised Phone 60
87 Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II 
(2007)
Internal Disguised Disguised Germany 1997 Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 45
Source: Author's database of formalities.
Figure 26: Interview details – company expert interviews Croatia
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Interview details - state expert interviews Croatia
Int # Interview citation Expert type Name Institution
Home 
country of 
institution
Position of interviewee Nationality of interviewee Expertise Interview form
Duration 
(in min.)
46 Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 45
47 Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 60
48 Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 75
49 Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 60
50 Intv. Croatian Government Team 
(2007)
State Representative Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 45
51 Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 60
52 Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Phone 30
53 Intv. German Authority III (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised Austrian Disguised Face-to-face 60
54 Intv. German Authority II (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 90
55 Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007) External Disguised Disguised International Disguised US American Disguised Face-to-face 45
56 Intv. Germ. Research Institute II 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German/ 
Croatian
Disguised Face-to-face 75
57 Intv. European Institution (2007) External Disguised Disguised International Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 45
58 Intv. Int'l Research Institute I (2007) External Disguised Disguised Germany Disguised German Disguised Phone 30
59 Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007) External Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 45
60 Intv. Croatian University (2007) External Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Face-to-face 30
Additional interviews
88 Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007) State Representative Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised Phone 30
89 Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised German Disguised Face-to-face 60
90 Intv. Croatian Econ. Association 
(2007)
External Disguised Disguised Croatia Disguised Croatian Disguised E-mail -
Source: Author's database of formalities.
Figure 27: Interview details – state expert interviews Croatia
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(2) The interviewee selection was based on theoretical sampling and on
complex interviewee selection matrices that were elaborated in the method-
ological part of this thesis and that were summarized in figures 19 to 22.
The conducted interviews fulfilled all categories established in the method-
ological part or even exceeded the expectations due to the many additional
interviews. Figures 84 to 87 in the appendix show how the interviewee selec-
tion matrices and their categories and different dimensions have been translated
into matching comprehensive interview tables with company and state experts
in Romania and Croatia.460
Accordingly, company expert interviews for both countries cover large firms
and SMEs (21 versus 20 interviews), industry- and service-oriented companies
(15 versus 26), investors specialized in greenfield and brownfield investments
(24 versus 17), and investors whose investment decision took place until and af-
ter 2003 in Romania (13 versus 7) and until and after 1999 in Croatia (7 versus
6).461 State expert interviews were conducted for Romania and Croatia with
governmental and other organizations (25 versus 15), national and regional
representations (35 versus 5), experts with direct and indirect involvement in
FDI policy (10 versus 30), and with frequent and occasional contact to MNCs
(19 versus 21).462
(3) As demanded in the methodology chapter, the interviewees have distinc-
tive expertise in the fields that are relevant for this thesis. Company as well
as state expert interviews included interviewees in top and medium positions in
their organizations (54 versus 36) and those with general but also with specific
knowledge regarding FDI conditions and policies (56 versus 40).
460 Therefore, the numerations of the matched interviews in figures 84 and 86 correspond
to those in figures 19; 20; 21, and 22.
461 See section 3.3.5 for the rationale of the selected periods.
462 Multiple mentions are possible, for example, when a company has invested in both
greenfield and brownfield activities.
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The company experts interviewed were in key positions in the business world,
often directly involved in the investment decision of MNCs. More than 20 CEOs
and managing directors were interviewed for Romania and Croatia. Interviewed
state experts were closely involved in FDI policy or in other areas of reform
policies relevant for these thesis. 19 state interviewees had specific expertise in
economic issues, 12 in political and four in legal affairs while six interviewees
were experts in more than one of these fields.
Further information regarding the explicit expertise of the interviewees are
documented in the interview details in figures 24 to 27.
(4) Further interview details are documented in the database of formali-
ties.463 As targeted in the methodological part the great majority of interviews
(about 70%) were conducted face-to-face. The interviews lasted an average of
56 minutes, and all ranged between 30 and 120 minutes. 62 interviews were
conducted in German. The other ones were held in English with the excep-
tion of one, which was held in Croatian with the help of an interpreter. The
response rate of the contacted interview partners was one third and therefore
higher than expected. 90% of the interviews were tape recorded and notes were
taken in all interviews. The transcript protocols of the 90 interviews conducted
for this thesis add up to 415 pages, an average of 4.6 pages per interview.
The complete database of formalities reveals further interview details such
as information on the investment history of the interviewed companies, details
regarding the disguised interviewees, contact details of all interviewees, dates
and locations of the interviews, and information regarding the contact gate-
keepers.
463 See figures 24 to 27 for a summary.
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In conclusion, the formal requirements of theoretical sampling as well as
the other interview-related criteria that were elaborated in section 3.3.5 have
not only been met but have even exceeded expectations. This is also due to the
various additionally conducted interviews. Overall, this formal analysis of the
conducted interviews already indicates that the envisaged theoretical saturation
may have been reached; this will however be examined further in the subsequent
content analysis of the interviews.
5.1.2 Content analysis
This thesis uses content analysis as data evaluation technique (see section 3.3.5)
which includes (1) categorization, (2) structuring and analytical generalization,
the latter of which is used in chapters 6 and 7.
(1) All expert statements are scrutinized following the transcription of the 90
interviews. As the transcription show the experts discussed many of the 19 pre-
defined FDI determinants from the theoretical part of this thesis but also made
important contributions to other country determinants (such as court system
or reputation of a country) or even to other topics (such as the influence of
political actors or potential future fields of FDI). In consequence it seems that
motivations for MNCs’ investment decision as well as potential FDI policies
are very broad and should not be neglected if they go beyond the experiences
of individual experts.
There therefore seems to be a compelling need for the revision of the pre-
defined FDI determinants. As a subsequent step the statements of each expert
as documented in the transcript protocols are re-grouped according to topics,
for example, to company registration, contacts for FDI decision etc.This also
leads to the elimination of the chronological order of the transcript protocols
which is necessary for a later generalization of the statement analysis.
156 5 Expert interviews and documents – the data
All relevant statement topics (not only all discussed FDI determinants) are
categorized and clustered in six different levels (general statements, legal mea-
sures, economic measures, political measures, non-policy factors, and further as-
pects), 42 categories and 92 sub-categories (categorization). These categories
are also presented in figure 28, where bold type reflects the 19 pre-determined
country determinants of the theoretical part of this thesis.464
(2) Subsequently, a content analysis database is established in order to track
all statements and to facilitate their later analysis. The database includes the
same elaborated categories for all four interview types (Romania company and
state, Croatia company and state).465 The expert statements are then trans-
ferred from the re-grouped transcript protocols to the content analysis database
and to their corresponding categories (structuring). The complete database
contains more than 6,700 entries with expert statements about FDI conditions
and policies in Romania and Croatia. In order to reach a thorough understand-
ing of the issues discussed, all categories in all four interview types are backed
by at least three entries and at least two different sources. In fact, the evalu-
ation of the database as documented in figure 29 reveals that a multitude of
statements and sources are used for all established categories.
464 Including the pre-defined non-policy factors.
465 Even though a few additional country-specific sub-categories exist such as the perfor-
mance of political actors or the impact of the war heritage in Croatia.
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Figure 28: Overview content analysis - categories
158 5 Expert interviews and documents – the data
Formal evaluation of expert interview content analysis
Item Romania Company
Romania 
State
Croatia 
Company
Croatia 
State
Romania 
Total
Croatia 
Total TOTAL
# of interviews 32 21 19 18 53 37 90
# of transcript pages 150 93 93 79 243 172 415
# of categories 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
# of categories in "General" 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
# of categories in "No public policy influence" 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
# of categories in "Legal measures" 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
# of categories in "Economic measures" 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
# of categories in "Political measures" 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
# of categories in "Further aspects" 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
# of entries 1.858 1.574 1.601 1.671 3.432 3.272 6.704
Average # of entries per category 44,2 37,5 38,1 39,8 40,9 39,0 39,9
Categories with <  3 entries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Categories with >10 entries 31 26 31 26 28,5 28,5 28,5
# of sources used* 32 24 23 22 56 45 101
Entries per source 58 66 70 76 61 73 66
Average # of sources per category 13,7 7,9 9,4 7,6 10,8 8,5 9,7
Categories with <2 sources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Categories with >7 sources 30,0 21,0 24,0 21,0 51,0 45,0 96,0
Source: Author's content analysis database; own calculations.
* Deviations to number of interviews above due to consideration of expert statements to other country.
Figure 29: Formal evaluation expert interview content analysis
5.2 Expert documents
Expert documents are a further source type used in this thesis for the analysis
of the impact of public policy on the conditions for FDI in Romania and
Croatia. As already briefly discussed in section 3.3.5, expert documents are
supposed to specify and further explain expert statements. For company ex-
perts documents help to interpret investment decision in the context of business
operations while documents of state experts may be, for example, strategies
that explain the interdependences of governmental actions. In addition, both
company and state documents may help to avoid potential misunderstandings
of verbal statements.
The documents for this thesis are generally retrieved from the experts inter-
viewed and include internal documents, presentations and reports from com-
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panies as well as from external and state organizations. Some of the documents
may also be publically available but are generally difficult to retrieve and most
importantly serve for more thorough interpretation of the expert interviews.
Figures 30 and 31 present the expert documents for this thesis. Of the
large amount of collected materials 40 documents are used for this thesis.
20 documents are collected for each country, 24 documents are designated
state documents and the remaining ones are company documents. 73% of the
documents were collected from the pool of intervieweed experts, while the
other ones were received from further experts that had been contacted but
with whom an interview could not be arranged with such as the Romanian
embassies in Vienna and Berlin. Half of the documents are in English, one in
Romanian and the remaining ones are written in German. More than eight
out of ten documents were composed in 2006 and 2007, and 65% of the ma-
terial was received as electronic version. The total number of pages amounts
to 1,929 of which the National program for the accession of Croatia to the
EU 466 accounts for 38%. The complete document database contains various
further information, for example, regarding the distributor and more thorough
analyses of the content of the documents.
In conclusion, the formal and content analyses of both expert interviews
and documents seem to confirm that the empirical data enables theoretical
saturation and is a solid empirical foundation for the subsequent analyses in
this thesis. Finally, quality control (see section 3.3.5) has been fulfilled since
multiple sources – interviews and documents – are used (construct validity),
theoretical and empirical results are matched through the revision of the pre-
defined categories (internal validity), a replication of the same results is possible
due to the used theoretical sampling (external validity), and since all data
466 See Doc - Min. of Foreign Affairs (2007).
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gathering steps are thoroughly explained and documented in this section and
in the content analysis database (reliability).
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Documents - company view Romania
# Document citation Category Expert type Author Title/ description Explanation Form # of pages Language
1 Doc - Austr. MNC - 
Industrial Goods I (2005a)
Company Internal Disguised Country selection for investment decision Strategy paper (excerpt) Electronic 5 German
2 Doc - Austr. MNC - 
Industrial Goods II (2005b)
Company Internal Disguised Grundstücke in Rumänien Analysis of investment condition at 
Romanian sites
Electronic 3 German
3 Doc - Austr. MNC - 
Industrial Goods III 
(2005c)
Company Internal Disguised Standortentscheidung ist von Gewichtung 
abhängig
Country strategy with factor 
prioritization (excerpt)
Electronic 1 German
4 Doc - DLA Piper (2006) Company Internal DLA Piper Experience with expansion and FDI in 
CEE and SEE - a law firm's point of view
Presentation about investment 
conditions incl. clients experience
Paper 11 English
5 Doc - Economic Chamber 
Vienna (2007)
Company External Economic Chamber Vienna Chancen für die Wiener Wirtschaft durch 
den EU-Beitritt von Rumänien und 
Bulgarien
Speech about of President Brigitte 
Jank about FDI opportunities in 
ROM & BUG
Electronic 8 German
6 Doc - German Economic 
Chamber Romania (2007)
Company External German Economic 
Chamber Romania
Konjunkturbericht Rumänien 2007 Company survey about investment 
conditions in Romania
Electronic 36 German
7 Doc - Austrian Economic 
Chamber Romania 
(2007b)
Company External Austrian Economic 
Chamber Romania
Österreichische Investitionen in Rumänien General presentation about 
Austrian FDI in Romania
Electronic 19 German
8 Doc - Austrian Economic 
Chamber Romania 
(2007a)
Company External Austrian Economic 
Chamber
AWO-Wirtschaftsreport Rumänien Economic report Romania Electronic 6 German
9 Doc - Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt (2007)
Company External Bank Austria Creditanstalt Sectors in CEE. Which are the winners? Presentation on FDI in CEE Electronic 10 English
10 Doc - Rom. Ministry V 
(2007)
State State 
representative
Romanian Ministry - 
Anonymous
Outline of the Operational Programmes 
under the convergence objective
Strategy paper about absorption of 
EU money
Electronic 5 English
11 Doc - Romanian Embassy 
Berlin (2007a)
State State 
representative
Romanian Embassy Berlin Rumänien – Wirtschaft und 
Investitionsanreize
Overview of economic conditions 
and incentives
Electronic 2 German
12 Doc - Romanian Embassy 
Berlin (2007b)
State State 
representative
Romanian Embassy Berlin Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und 
Investitionsanreize in Rumänien
Presentation of Economic 
Department on economic 
conditions incl. FDI in ROM
Electronic 26 German
13 Doc - Ministry of Justice 
(2005b)
State State 
representative
Ministry of Justice Action plan to implement "The national 
anti-corruption strategy for 2005-2007"
Internal document on strategy 
implementation
Electronic 20 English
14 Doc - Ministry of Justice 
(2005a)
State State 
representative
Ministry of Justice Action plan for the implementation of the 
"Strategy on the reform of the judiciary 
2005 – 2007"
Internal document on strategy 
implementation
Electronic 63 English
15 Doc - Ministry of Justice 
(2006)
State State 
representative
Ministry of Justice The public manager and public 
administration reform
Strategy paper on Young 
Professionals Scheme
Electronic 21 English
16 Doc - ARIS (2007) State State 
representative
ARIS Romania your business partner Description of reasons to invest in 
Romania (incl. CD-ROM)
Paper 23 English
17 Doc - City of Sibiu (2007) State State 
representative
City of Sibiu Development guide. The City of Sibiu. 
Where traditions shape the future
Goals and guidelines for 
development of the city
Paper 44 English
18 Doc - Local Romanian 
Authority (2007)
State State 
representative
Disguised Conferin

 de pres Detailed description of the work of 
the local authority
Paper 24 Romanian
19 Doc - GTZ (2006b) State External GTZ Das Wirtschaftsklima in Rumänien Company survey on economic 
conditions in Romania
Paper 56 German
20 Doc - KAS (2007) State External Fischer-Bollin, Peter Cooperation of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
with Political Parties in Central, Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe
Analysis of political parties 
including Romania
Paper 63 English
Source: Author's document database.
Documents - state view Romania
Figure 30: Expert documents – Romania
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Documents - company view Croatia
# Document citation Category Expert type Author Title/ description Explanation Form # of pages Language
21 Doc - Germ. MNC - 
Engineering (2001)
Company Internal Disguised Regionalentwicklungsstudie Analysis of potential investment 
location in HR
Electronic 58 German
22 Doc - Germ. MNC - Food 
Products (2007a)
Company Internal Disguised Investment in Croatia Survey on investment in Croatia Paper 3 English
23 Doc - Germ. MNC - Food 
Products II (2007b)
Company Internal Disguised Unternehmenspräsentation Company presentation including 
activities in Croatia
Paper 29 German
24 Doc - INA (2006) Company Internal INA Privatization prospectus Company presentation incl. 
analysis of market and 
privatization conditions
Paper 214 English
25 Doc - Austrian Economic 
Chamber Croatia (2006)
Company External Austrian Economic 
Chamber Croatia
Europäische Wirtschaftsumfrage in 
Kroatien der Außenhandelsstelle Zagreb 
unter Investoren aus den EU-
Mitgliedsstaaten
Company survey about investment 
conditions in Croatia
Electronic 8 German
26 Doc - German Economic 
Chamber Croatia (2007)
Company External German Economic 
Chamber Croatia
Investment conditions in Croatia 10 documents about legal 
conditions
Electronic 33 German
27 Doc - Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt (2007)
Company External Bank Austria Creditanstalt Sectors in CEE. Which are the winners? Presentation on FDI in CEE Electronic 10 English
28 Doc - National Competitiveness 
Council (2007)
State State 
representative
National Competitiveness 
Council
The analysis with integrated commentaries 
on the study “Business and investment 
climate in South-Eastern
Respone to GTZ Study Electronic 22 English
29 Doc - Government of Croatia 
(2006)
State State 
representative
Government of the 
Republic of Croatia
Strategic development framework for 2006-
2013
Long-term economic strategy incl. 
investment conditions
Paper 82 English
30 Doc - Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2007)
State State 
representative
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and European Integration
National program for the accession of 
Croatia to the EU
Road maps, strategies and 
implementation plans
Electronic 726 English
31 Doc - Croatian Privatization 
Fund (2001)
State State 
representative
Croatian Privatization Fund Privatize Croatia Overview of privatization process 
and conditions (incl. CD-ROM)
Paper 14 English
32 Doc - GTZ (2006a) State External GTZ Business and Investment Climate in South-
Eastern Europe, Central Asia and
the Caucasus
Internal Working Paper for 
Croatian authorities
Electronic 53 English
33 Doc - Ekonomski Institut 
Zagreb (2007)
State External Ekonomski Institut Zagreb Croatia’s accession to EU: expected 
economic effects
Economic study Electronic 32 English
34 Doc - European Commission 
Zagreb
State External European Commission Business environment and SME-policy, 
innovation policy
Evaluation of conditions for SMEs 
(excerpt)
Electronic 10 English
35 Doc - KAS (2007) State External Fischer-Bollin, Peter Cooperation of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
with Political Parties in Central, Eastern 
and Southeastern Europe
Analysis of political parties 
including Croatia
Paper 63 English
36 Doc - Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce (2007a)
State External Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce
Bank assets Description of share distribution Electronic 1 English
37 Doc - Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce (2006a)
State External Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce
Banking system in the Republic of Croatia Overview presentation of 
development and status
Electronic 8 English
38 Doc - OECD (2007) State External OECD Progress for investment reform for Croatia Presentation of results of 
Investment Reform Index
Paper 29 English
39 Doc - Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce (2006b)
State External Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce
Potential for investment in Croatia by 
business sector
12 documents with data, analysis 
& outlook
Paper 72 English
40 Doc - Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce Dubrovnik (2006)
State External Croatian Chamber of 
Commerce Dubrovnik
The economy guide
of Dubrovnik-Neretva County
Presentation of economic activities 
and potential areas of investment
Electronic 16 English
Source: Author's document database.
Documents - state view Croatia
Figure 31: Expert documents – Croatia
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5.3 The incorporation of the empirical data in the
analysis
The empirical data – expert interviews and documents – presented in this
chapter is used throughout the subsequent analyses of this thesis. The catego-
rization and structuring of the material was helpful to make verbal and written
statements processable for this thesis. Figure 32 shows how the established
categories and the statements are incorporated in the thesis. A few categories
are not integrated in the analyses, because no clear conclusions could be drawn
from the material (for example for intellectual property, environment policy or
combat of crime) or they were of only limited help for answering the research
questions of this thesis, for instance the statements regarding the general eco-
nomic development in Romania and Croatia. Most of the covered categories
are integrated in the core of the analysis of this thesis – the FDI determinants
that can be influenced by public policy (chapters 7 and 8). Other categories
are incorporated into the country introductions and the FDI analysis from an
NIE perspective in chapters 6 and 9.
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Figure 32: Incorporation of empirical data into analysis
6 Introduction to Romania and Croatia and
non-policy determinants
6.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analogous introduction to the two host countries of
FDI under analysis, Romania and Croatia (sections 6.2 and 6.3). First the eco-
nomic fundamentals of both countries since the early 1990s will be discussed,
followed by an investigation of those FDI determinants that cannot be influ-
enced by public policy in the short-term. Section 6.4 will provide a conclusion
to the chapter. Despite the main focus on policy factors in this thesis, the anal-
ysis of the non-policy factors is essential because it improves the understanding
of the basic conditions for FDI policy makers in both countries. Morevoer, the
existing influence of these factors on the investment decision of MNCs cannot
be neglected. This chapter embeds secondary sources, interview statements and
document insights.
6.2 Romania
This section discusses the key economic developments of Romania (section
6.2.1) and non-policy country determinants of Romania (section 6.2.2).
6.2.1 Economic fundamentals since early 1990s
This section depicts (1) the main tendencies of the Romanian economy since
the early 1990s, the development of (2) GDP, (3) inflation, (4) unemployment,
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(5) trade, and (6) FDI. It gives (7) an economic outlook and also discusses
respective expert statements, and (8) concludes the section and provides an
overall assessment. A map of Romania and the country’s key economic indica-
tors can also be found in the appendix (figures 88 and 89).
(1) In the first years after the end of communism and the dictatorship of
Ceaus¸escu (1965-1989) the Romanian economic development was marked by
a slow transition from a centrally planned state towards a market economy.
The economic upward trend was hampered by challenges specific to Romania.
Problems stemmed from a – even in communist terms – desolate economic
situation at the end of the 1980s due to outdated industrial equipment as well
as from Ceaus¸escu’s aim for economic independence and a strong focus on an
(inefficient) agricultural sector.467 Moreover, Romania’s economy recovery was
slower than that of other EECs because of internal difficulties. The alliance
between ex-communists and right-wing extremists until 1996 hindered the
implication of reforms. The end of the wars on the Balkans and the financial
crisis at the end of the 1990s contributed to an economic turning point under
the center-right government of President Constantinescu (1996-2000) and the
left-wing government of President Iliescu (2000-2004).468 During the final
period before EU accession under President Ba˘sescu (since 2004) the economy
gained further momentum and since 2006 observers have repeatedly spoken of
Romania as a boom country or “Balkan tiger”.469
(2) The economic turmoils in Romania in the mid 1990s led to a dramatic
decline in GDP dropping to only 37% (1992) compared to 1989 and did not
467 See Leiße (2006), p.11 and Bfai (2005) pp.32-33.
468 See Rabobank (2006), p.2.; Mu¨ller (2005), pp.144-145; Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001),
pp.14-15, 22; Gabanyi (2005), p.22; BA-CA (2006), p.10.
469 See Irish Independent (2006); Rompres (2007b); Financial Times (2007); Die Presse
(2007); Pfaller (2007).
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return to former levels until 2003.470 After continuously high growth rates of
8.5% (2004), 4.1% (2005) and 7.7% (2006) Romania’s GDP reached e97B in
2006 after e79B in 2005. With an average growth rate of 6.8% in these three
years Romania was among the fastest growing economies in Eastern Europe,
second only to the Baltic states.471 Main contributors to the increase in GDP
were private consumption, trade and FDI. Meanwhile the per-capita income of
the Romanians jumped from e1,500 (1999) to e4,500 (2006). The Romanian
purchasing power parity nevertheless equaled only 39% of the EU 27 average
in 2006.472
(3) One of the most striking problems of the Romanian economy in the
1990s was the (hyper-)inflation that peaked at 256% in 1993 and rebounded
after some years of lower depreciation of money to 155% in 1997. Inflation
constantly decreased in subsequent years but remained high. In fact, Romanian
price increase averaged 33.5% between 1998 and 2004, representing the third
highest inflation average of 17 EECs during that period.473 Inflation did not
drop below double digits (9.1%) until 2005 and was with 6.6% in 2006 still
higher in Romania than in all EU member states.474
(4) The economic turbulences of the 1990s also had negative effects on
employment in Romania. The restructuring of the state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), the dismantling of the public administration and limited compet-
itiveness of Romanian companies in the international markets resulted in
unemployment rates of 10.9% in 1994 which – after a short recovery – culmi-
470 See IMF website (2008); Bfai (2005), p.33; own calculations.
471 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.22; IMF (2007b); exchange rate conversion for
the whole section based on EIU (2007c); annual changes based on national currency.
472 See Eurostat (2007b); IMF (2007b); Neuhaus (2005).
473 Belarus: 97.9% and Serbia: 39.2%; see Eurostat website (2008); own calculations.
474 EU average: 2.2%, Bulgaria: 7.4%; see Eurostat website (2008); IMF (2007b).
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nated in 11.8% in 1999.475 Since 2000 Romania has seen a constant decline of
the unemployment rate. It reached 5.9% in 2005 and 5.2% in 2006 reflecting
the overall economic upward trend. Even higher unemployment and high
inflation rates were probably avoided due to a large dependence on small farm
subsistence.476 In quantitative terms 42% of the Romanian labor force worked
in the agricultural sector in 1999. While this share declined to 30.5% by 2006,
it was still significantly higher than, for example, in Bulgaria (23.8%), Hungary
(4.9%) or Slovakia (4.4%).477
(5) Looking at its trade performance Romania could hardly be considered
an open economy until the mid 1990s. Romania had an “openness indicator”478
of only 34% in 1991. Since then this ratio constantly increased to 74% in 2004
before it dropped to 69% in the following two years. On a seven-year basis
(2000-2006) Romania is ahead of Poland (57%) but behind all other Eastern
European EU members regarding its openess to trade.479
Overall, Romania’s trade volumes strongly increased in recent years, partic-
ularly between 2000 and 2006 when growth rate averaged 21% and climbed up
to e67B in 2006. Exports reached e25.9B and imports e40.8B in 2006. In this
context Romania has repeatedly been criticized for its strong dependency on
imports – contributing to the current account deficit of -15% – that has even
increased in recent years.480
Russia has clearly lost its importance for Romania’s trade statistics. Its share
declined from 24% (1991) to less than 5% (2006). Today the EU is the most
475 See ILO website (2008).
476 Another reason for moderate unemployment rates may have been a large shadow econ-
omy.
477 See ILO website (2008); own calculations.
478 (Exports + Imports)/ GDP; see Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), pp.68 and 73.
479 See Eurostat website (2008); INSSE website (2008); own calculations.
480 CAGR (2000-2006) was at 14.8% for exports and at 19.2% for imports; see Eurostat
website (2008); INSSE website (2008); DB Research (2006); own calculations.
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important trading partner and accounts for almost 65% of Romania’s overall
trade volume.481 Exports from Romania are driven by machinery products
(20% in 2006) while textile products account for 16% but have been strongly
decreasing in recent years (25% in 2002). Machinery and electric products are
the predominant import categories (24%) followed by oil products (15%).482
(6) FDI inflows to Romania remained scarce after the end of communism
with, for example, only about e80M in 1993. A massive rise of FDI inflows
did not occur until the increase of privatization sales in 1997 when inflows of
e1.1B exceeded the accumulated FDIs of 1991-1996. Inflows reached e5.2B
in 2005 and even e9.1B in 2006 while the per capita basis jumped from e48
(1997) to e419 (2006). The FDI stock increased between 1997 and 2006 at a
CAGR of 36% from e2.1B to e34.5B.483 As discussed in the methodological
part Romania also showed an impressive FDI performance in the regional com-
parison.484 FDI was the most important driver for Romania’s economic boost;
it also gained in importance relative to Romania’s GDP; while the FDI/ GDP
ratio averaged only 2.6% between 1994-2003 and rose to 9.3% in 2006.485
The number of foreign investors has considerably increased. Whereas about
91K MNCs held subscribed capital in Romania in 2002, the number rose to
about 132K by the end of 2006.486 While brownfield and greenfield investments
have about equal shares of the FDI stock in 2006, privatization has been the
dominating form of FDI inflows in recent years. Their significance becomes
481 See European Commission (2007b).
482 See INSSE (2003) INSSE (2007); NBR (2007).
483 See NBR website (2007); UNCTAD FDI website (2008); Hunya (2007); NBR (2007);
International Finance Group (2005); own calculations.
484 See section 2.2.2.
485 FDI inflows/ GDP in Bulgaria even reached 16.4% in 2006 due to a lower GDP per
capita and a relatively higher importance of FDI than in Romania; see section ibid.;
UNCTAD FDI website (2008); IMF (2007b); own calculations.
486 See The National Trade Register Office (2007a); The National Trade Register Office
(2004).
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apparent considering some large privatizations such as the oil company Petrom
that was acquired by the Austrian OVM for about e1.4B in 2004 – more than a
third to Romania’s FDIs in 2004. The formerly SOE Banca Comerciala Romana
(BCR) was acquired by Austria’s Erste Bank for e3.8B and contributed 24%
to Romania’s FDI inflows in 2006.487 Greenfield investments soared from 113
projects in 2002 to 362 projects in 2006; Romania was therefore ahead of larger
competing countries of FDI such as Ukraine (124) or Poland (323) in 2006.
Larive Romania (2007) however stresses that Romania’s greenfield projects
have reflected smaller volumes recently compared to previous years.488
The sectoral distribution of FDI has been strongly influenced by investments
in the manufacturing industry (primarily in the metal and food processing
industries) which accounted for 37% of Romania’s FDI stock in 2005. However,
the importance of this sector has significantly decline in recent years (from 51%
in 2003) while other industries such as retail trade (2003: 11% and 2005: 15%)
and financial services (2003: 9% and 2005: 15%) have gained in relevance.489 In
terms of regional distribution FDIs have concentrated on the Greater Bucharest
region which received 64% of FDI in 2006. The North-Eastern region along
Moldavian border has only sporadically attracted FDI so far.490
With respect to the home countries of FDI figure 17 already presented the
countries with the largest equity shares in Romania in 2006: Austria with 23%,
the Netherlands with 17% and Germany with 10%. Austria in particular had
gained importance, given its share of only 15% in the previous year. In sum
more than 80% of the FDI stock was held by companies from EU countries in
2006. In addition to this, it is interesting to see that Italian companies which
487 Only e2.2B of the BCR sale went to the Romanian state; the deal was closed in 2005 but
not booked until 2006; see Voinea (2002), pp. 4-5; OECD (2005d), p.18; own calculations.
488 See also UNCTAD (2007), p.210; ABN-Amro Romania (2006), p.22; NBR (2007).
489 See Hunya (2007), p.91.
490 Between 1991 and 2006 the Bucharest region received 59% of foreign subscribed capital,
the North-East region only 3.1%; see NBR (2007); The National Trade Register Office
(2007a).
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only hold 7% of the FDI stock in Romania account for 16% or more than 21K
of the registered foreign companies. Germany is also very present with SMEs
(about 14K) while Austrian and Dutch investments tend to be larger but less
numerous (2.7K and 4.2K companies).491
(7) The overall outlook for the Romanian economy for 2007-2009 is opti-
mistic. Nevertheless, five external observers492 evaluated for this thesis claim
that the peak of the current economic boost has been reached. Accordingly,
the Romanian economy is only expected to grow between 5.5% and 6.3% in
both 2007 and 2008 and to decrease to about 5% in 2009. Positive growth
drivers mentioned are private consumption fostered by booming credit and ris-
ing salaries, effects from EU accession as well as growth in the service and
construction sector. Negative effects may be caused by the turbulences on the
international financial markets that could also influence the credit demand,
negative weather effects on agricultural output (in 2007), lower privatization
sales and lower manufacturing sector growth.493
Inflation is expected to drop further to 4.3%-4.8% in 2007. The development
of the inflation rate in 2008 and 2009 is a matter of controversy among the
analysts. Expectations range between 4.0% and 7.2%.494 Some observers expect
the National Bank of Romania (NBR) to play an active role in slowing down
the devaluation of money.495 Other observers predict inflationary pressure due
to high wage pressure, particularly from the private sector and real estate
prices. Lax fiscal policy and excessive government spending (predominantly
in the election year 2008) represent further concerns in this context. There is
491 See NBR (2007).
492 Publications between October 2007 and January 2008; see Raiffeisenbank (2008); BA-
CA (2007b); DB Research website (2008); EIU (2007b); IMF (2007c).
493 See all considered analysts for details.
494 See particularly DB Research website (2008); EIU (2007b).
495 See e. g. IMF (2007c).
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uncertainty with respect to the volatile food prices and an unclear exchange
rate development.496
Observers expect unemployment to further decrease to a level below 5%
from 2007 until 2009. They base their arguments on the tight labor market in
a growing economy and the many workers who have emigrated abroad.497
With respect to the Romanian trade development observers expect imports
to rise faster than exports in 2007 (forecasts ranging from 16%to 26% ver-
sus 10% to 13%). While DB Research website (2008) and EIU (2007b) see a
shrinking trade deficit in 2008 for the first time since 2002, the overall current
account deficit is expected to remain significant and represents an increasing
threat to Romania’s economic equilibrium. The continuous high imports are
driven by private consumption, mainly as a result of the EU accession and a
strong national currency, the leu (RON). Potential softening of the deficits may
be established through generation of greater export capacities and a stronger
depreciation of the RON through a more active NBR. Yet, the exchange rate
development is uncertain in the eyes of most observers.498
The observers being analyzed anticipate decreasing FDI levels for Roma-
nia in the future. They estimate inflows between e5.8B and e7.3B in 2007
and between e5.5B and e6.8B for the two following years. Some privatization
sales and re-investments of existing MNCs are expected as well as some new
greenfield investments particularly in the real estate sector. On the downside
potential observers see the end of privatizations approaching, the dwindling
effects of EU accession and a diminishing confidence of foreign investors in the
economic stability of Romania.499
The expert interviews confirm this perspective on future FDI inflows in
Romania. Company as well as state experts estimate that the FDI demand in
496 See particularly Raiffeisenbank (2008); BA-CA (2007b); EIU (2007b).
497 See section 7.4.1.2 for details; EIU (2007b); IMF (2007c); BA-CA (2007b).
498 See section 7.3.1.2; see EIU (2007b); Raiffeisenbank (2008); BA-CA (2007b).
499 See EIU (2007b); Raiffeisenbank (2008); BA-CA (2007b); DB Research website (2008).
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Romania is still high in many areas. Since the country has been avoided for a
long time, it seems that Romania still has some catching up to do, the market is
not saturated and good business opportunities continue to exist.500 As a result
experts forecast that FDI will continue to flow to Romania even though many
experts agree that the very high rates of 2005 and 2006 will be impossible to
sustain.501 More moderate FDI levels may be caused by higher salaries, the
labor shortage, and higher real estate prices; other locations like Slovakia may
then have similar cost levels but be more productive than Romania.502 Some
experts point out however, that the largest players are already in the market,
most privatizations are completed and that the momentum of EU accession
may dry off soon.503
From the perspective of the experts the most important industries for future
FDI in Romania will be the construction and infrastructure industry for which
the current boom is expected to last for another ten years.504 Secondly, the
energy sector is believed to attract major foreign investments, including some
further privatizations and modernizations.505 On the demand side of the Roma-
nian market experts see increasing FDI inflows into services such as real estate,
500 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007);
Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv.
Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
501 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv.
Austr. Research Institute (2007).
502 See Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VI
(2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
503 See Intv. Rom. Company - Consulting (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv.
German Authority I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
504 See Intv. Rom. Company - Consulting (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv.
Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Romanian Au-
thority I (2007).
505 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007);
Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
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banking (for example due to the privatization of the CEC bank) or call cen-
ters.506 Moreover, retail and consumer goods activities (such as higher-quality
clothes and groceries) reflecting the increasing purchasing power of Romani-
ans are expected to rise.507 In the long-run experts also see potential for FDI
in the environmental sector508 and some potential in tourism (for example in
Transylvania).509 Only few experts anticipate significant inflows into agricul-
tural businesses.510 The textile industry, a former key industry for FDI, does
not seem to have any more chances in Romania due to rising labor costs.511
Most experts do not think that Romania has remained a top location for labor
intensive low-cost production which is better established in the Ukraine etc.512
By contrast, most experts being interviewed believe that greenfield investments
and re-investments in manufacturing industries will focus more on higher-added
value productions with higher skilled workers and a larger share of automation-
assisted production, for example in the car industry.513 Moreover, some experts
are skeptical that Romania will see many large industrial investments, such as
506 See Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); Intv.
Romanian Econ. Association I (2007).
507 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. Rom. Company - Consulting
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007);
Intv. German Authority I (2007).
508 See Intv. Rom. Company - Consulting (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007);
Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. German
Ministry (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
509 See Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V
(2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
510 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
511 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I
(2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007).
512 See Intv. German Authority I (2007); more optimistic with respect to low-cost produc-
tion see Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
513 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv.
German Authority IV (2007).
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the automotive industry, in the future.514 Nevertheless, the experience from
other EECs may indicate that no major shutdowns or relocations of current
MNC production are to be expected either.515
With respect to the regional differences of future FDI development the ex-
pert interviews give a mixed picture: some interviewees perceive a stagnation
or even a decrease of investment in rural areas516; whilst others assume that
rural areas will start to benefit from the urban labor shortage.517 A further
group of interviewees assume a shift between urban regions; therefore insuffi-
cient capacities to further absorb FDI in boom towns like Timis¸oara and Sibiu
may lead to a stronger focus on other cities like Cluj and Bras¸ov.518 Represen-
tatives from Sibiu are more optimistic that the end of the year as European
Capital of Culture will end the focus on cultural activities of the city and will
re-invigorate FDI inflows into industry sectors.519
Both groups of interviewees, company and state experts, share broadly a
similar perspective regarding the future development of FDI in Romania. State
representatives are however – understandably – more optimistic with respect
to the expected amount of FDI. They think that the current inflow “is just
the beginning.”520 State experts are particularly convinced of the benefits of
the expected EU funding in order to attract future FDI521 while this issue
is interpreted more controversially by company experts.522 State experts also
see opportunities for FDI as more broadly spread than company experts do.
They not only see potential in the above mentioned industries but also predict
514 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
515 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007).
516 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
517 See e. g. Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
518 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III
(2007).
519 See Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); see also Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I
(2007); Doc - City of Sibiu (2007).
520 Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
521 See Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); see also Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
522 See section 7.4.4 for details.
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“breakthroughs”523 in areas such as pharmaceuticals, telecommunication and
IT.524 They also evaluate higher potential for forestry and tourism than firms
do.525 State representatives are more optimistic that FDI in the environmental
sector will arrive quickly and that FDIs in the automotive industry will remain
at existing levels, particularly in Sibiu.526 Later sections of this thesis will
discuss the extent to which the broad approach by state representatives towards
possible industries for FDI may be a disadvantage for a successful FDI policy.
Against this prognosis, some company experts see Romania’s future potential
less as a location for foreign industrial production and more as an important
sourcing market for production elsewhere. This view is based on the increasing
prices and the rising quality of the production of Romanian companies.527
(8) In an overall assessment of its economic performance Romania has
without a doubt shown remarkable progress in all dimensions analyzed not
only because of its difficult initial conditions but also compared to other tran-
sition countries of the region. From a struggling and widely neglected country
Romania has become one of the evolving stars in Eastern Europe with high
GDP growth, decreasing inflation and unemployment and rising trade and FDI
volumes. Romania’s EU accession in 2007 can be seen as culmination of this
development. Nevertheless, it seems that Romania still has significant poten-
tial to make up leeway in many areas compared to other EECs, for example,
in terms of FDI stock per capita (figure 33).528
523 Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
524 See Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); see also Intv.
German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Supranational
Authority I (2007).
525 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
526 See Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); Intv.
Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007); see also
Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. German Ministry (2007).
527 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
528 See Hunya (2007); WIIW figures with minor deviations from author’s calculations due
to different population and currency conversion assumptions.
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Figure 33: Per capita FDI stock in Eastern Europe
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# Country 1995 2004 2005 2006**
1 Czech Republic 71 81 85 85
2 Slovenia 56 83 82 83
3 Estonia 52 84 79 81
4 Slovakia 57 74 79 81
5 Poland 48 74 77 79
6 Latvia 41 69 76 77
7 Hungary 34 71 73 75
8 Lithuania 34 71 73 74
9 Bulgaria 21 59 61 65
10 Romania 27 41 59 63
11 Croatia 45 48 54 59
12 Turkey 23 29 39 47
*100 = Western European standards; **estimate
Source: Hornung (2006); own presentation.
Deka Converging Europe Indicator (DCEI)*
Figure 34: Deka Converging Europe Indicator (DCEI)
This evaluation is also confirmed by the Deka Converging Europe Indicator
(DCEI) (figure 34). This macroeconomic scoring model measuring progress in
institutional, monetary, real economic, and fiscal convergence indicates that
Romania has reached a level of 63% (2006) of Western European standards
and is still behind all other Eastern European EU members including Bulgaria,
which was on a lower level than Romania in 1995. The DCEI also signalizes
that Romania’s convergence progress clearly picked up after 2004 outpacing all
analyzed countries.529
Similarly the analysis of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), which
is based on 32 political and economic transformation indicators, leads to the
conclusion that Romania shows an average performance among Eastern Euro-
pean transition countries between Eastern European EU members and most
SEECs (figure 35).530
529 See Hornung (2006).
530 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006a).
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Figure 35: Bertelsmann Transformation Index
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The economic future of Romania seems to be uncertain, mainly regarding
the impact of EU accession and the development of trade and FDI.531 It would
be interesting to analyze the impact of non-policy determinants (next section)
and what state actors can do – policy determinants – in order to maintain
or even increase current FDI levels (chapter 7), especially in reference to the
future FDI influence.
6.2.2 Country determinants without short-term public policy
impact
The core of the analysis of this thesis, the policy determinants, are analyzed in
chapters 7-9. As pointed out in the introduction of this section however, it is
important for policy makers to understand how an investor’s decision in favor
of a specific location can be influenced by country determinants that are largely
independent of public policies. This section discusses the most important non-
policy determinants of Romania that are (1) market size, (2) labor costs, (3)
proximity, and (4) other aspects. The last section (5) draws a conclusion on
Romania’s non-policy factors. For each determinant analyzed the procedure is
as follows:
• Brief description of the country determinant
• Discussion of the arguments of the experts interviewed and their docu-
ments
• Analysis of the differences between company and state representatives
• Overall assessment of the determinant, including the consideration of the
discussed FDI studies from section 2.2.4.2 and international comparisons
These steps of analysis correspond to the concept of analytic generaliza-
tion presented in section 3.3.5, elaborating interpretations that go beyond the
531 See for expected trade effects through EU accession Nitsch and Sturm (2004).
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individual example and matching them with hypotheses and theory (pattern-
matching).
(1) As already examined in the theoretical part market size is defined
in multiple ways but most frequently as GDP, GDP per capita, purchasing
power parity, GDP growth, and land or population size.532 The first four of
these aspects have already been discussed in the previous section. Furthermore,
Romania’s land surface of about 240, 000km2 is roughly equivalent to that of
Great Britain and is with 21.6M inhabitants the third largest Eastern European
market after Ukraine and Poland. In economic terms it is advantageous that
the population is quite evenly distributed throughout the country and that 20
cities have more than 150K inhabitants.533 However, a significant birth rate
decline and a high emigration rate have contributed to a population decline of
4.9% (1992 versus 2002) that still has not come to an end (2006: -0.3%).534
The experts interviewed regard market size as important factor for the
investment decision in general but also in favor of Romania535, for example,
compared to Bulgaria, Hungary or countries of the former Yugoslavia.536 For
many investors market size also seems to be more important than labor costs
in Romania.537
Experts agree that Romania’s increasing purchasing power and the rising
demand for many products and services in many areas in which Romania still
shows a need to catch up, makes the country particularly attractive (market-
seeking). This seems to be especially true for consumer goods such as cars
532 See section 2.2.4.2.
533 See Bfai (2005), pp.13, 47; Der Fischerweltalmanach 2007 (2006).
534 See for labor shortage effects section 7.4.1.2; see Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.25;
IMF website (2008); EBRD (2005b), p.12; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2007d).
535 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VIII
(2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv.
Romanian County Council (2007).
536 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. German
Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
537 See Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
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and supermarket products but also for construction and financial services.538
Insurance companies like the find the Romanian market attractive because of
the low insurance premium as share of GDP.539
Market size tends to be less important however, for investors who only look
for outsourcing projects or investments mainly aiming at exports (efficiency-
seeking).540 Interestingly, other experts point out that market size is an impor-
tant factor, but that because Romania is still fairly small in absolute terms, this
is not a decisive factor for them.541 Others clarify that market size alone is not
sufficient if regulations are not favorable. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
II (2007) for example, a producer of environmental technologies, intended to
sell its products to SEECs, but could not fully exploit the Romanian market
because environmental regulations in Romania were low and Romanian manu-
facturing firms did not have to use the high-quality filters of the German MNC;
this situation changed with the respective adoption and implementation of the
EU acquis.
Looking at differences between company and state experts it seems
that company experts tend to see limitations of the market size as a single
and decisive factor for the investment decision of both – market- and efficiency
seeking MNCs – and frequently refer to interdependences with other determi-
nants.542 State experts are also more convinced that a growing market (for
example in terms of GDP growth) is important per se, whilst company ex-
perts emphasize more that growth needs to reach the potential consumers.543
538 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
539 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); see also Intv. German Political
Adviser (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
540 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007).
541 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
542 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
II (2007).
543 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv.
Romanian Ministry I (2007).
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Furthermore, state experts are more aware of the importance of urban agglom-
eration and of the fact that a large population is not sufficient when many
people live in rural areas with insufficient infrastructure.544
The assessment of Romania’s economic development, the interview analysis
and the revision of the 34 analyzed FDI studies lead to several conclusions
regarding market size as country determinant for Romania. First of all, market
size is generally viewed as a very important driver since setting up and running a
business is usually more efficient in larger markets and since Romania’s specific
market size indicators seem to be favorable.545
Secondly however, the right measurement of the market size determinant is
crucial when comparing Romania with other countries such as Ukraine. Factors
such as population, geographic size, GDP, and even GDP growth are never
mentioned by neither experts nor FDI studies in such comparisons. This is
despite the fact that Ukraine has a similar or an even “larger” market size
in these categories compared to Romania.546 The measurement of the market
size determinant that is adequate for the individual MNC seems to depend on
the investors’s perception of the right reference point. Romania tends to be
compared with Bulgaria rather than with Ukraine for geographical, political
and economic reasons.547 Furthermore, the market size determinant seems to
be driven by the expected market opportunity, more than the current status
which is, for example, indicated by a rather low but fast growing purchasing
power or specific industry measures, which indicates a need for catching up.548
544 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
545 Only few studies reveal Romania-specific results; see e. g. Brada, Kutan, and Yigit
(2003); Carstensen and Toubal (2004); Pye (1998); see also Doc - BA-CA (2007).
546 Figures for Ukraine vs. Romania (2006): population: 46.6M vs. 21.6M; size: 640, 000km2
vs. 240, 000km2; GDP: e97B vs. e85B; average GDP growth (2001-2006): 7.7% vs. 6.1%;
see IMF website (2008); Eurostat website (2008); Der Fischerweltalmanach 2007 (2006).
547 Which are discussed throughout this thesis.
548 See above the example from the insurance market.
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Thirdly, there is a clear interdependence of market size with other deter-
minants that influence MNCs’ decision since market size alone cannot explain
oscillations in Romania’s FDI stock and the low inflows in the 1990s.549 Pos-
sible explanations given by FDI studies are Romania’s late privatization550 or
the lack of political and economic stability in the 1990s.551 Interviews also show
that the regulative environment is essential for entering a large market.
Finally, the analysis of the interviews shows the complex strategies of MNCs
that make the frequently used distinction between market- and efficiency seek-
ing FDI difficult – at least in the Romanian case, because companies can seldom
be clearly categorized. To give one example, the investment of Intv. Austr. MNC
- Consumer Goods (2007) primarily aims at lower production costs. However,
Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007) also chose the specific location
because it may serve as a sourcing and even end-consumer market in the fu-
ture.552 Another strategic insight is that larger markets are particularly in-
teresting when investors are able to exploit a first mover advantage in their
industry.553
Overall, external observers tend to mention market size as a key determinant
for FDI in Romania, while statistics and a closer look at the expert interviews
do not confirm this perception or at least suggest strong interlinkages with
other determinants.
549 Romania attracted, for example, five times higher FDI inflows in 1997 than in 1996
despite a decline of real GDP by 6.1%.
550 See Carstensen and Toubal (2004).
551 See Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
552 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Automo-
tive (2007).
553 See Pye (1998).
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(2) Labor costs are frequently cited as major determinant in favor of Roma-
nia.554 Romania’s hourly pay and non-pay labor costs average at e3.17 which
represent only 12% of the EU 15 average (2006).555 Romania is therefore among
the countries with the lowest labor costs in Europe (see figure 36) with only
Serbia (e2.1), Bulgaria (e1.8) and Ukraine (e1.3) at even lower levels. Fig-
ure 37 shows that Romania’s labor cost increase has drastically accelerated
since 2004 when labor costs were still below e2 per hour. This increase of 60%
(2004-2006) is particularly remarkable considering that Bulgaria’s wage level
only increased by 20% during the same period.556 Romania has an average pro-
ductivity of 39% (2006) relative to the EU-27 which is ahead of Bulgaria (35%)
and has significantly increased since 2001 (14%), the largest improvement of
the selected countries in Eastern Europe (see figure 38).557
The analysis of the expert interviews confirms that labor costs are gener-
ally an important determinant when choosing a location.558 Most experts also
agree that labor costs have been among the major reasons why investors decided
to go to Romania559, particularly in the early 2000s when labor costs were even
lower and when Western European cost pressure was particularly high in some
industries such as the metal components industry. Moreover, labor had already
become scarce in some other EECs like Czech Republic.560 Many experts also
agree that the cost of labor remains among the leading country determinants
554 See 2.2.4.2. Labor costs are defined as non-policy factor because state actors have only
limited influence on the labor costs of MNCs which are only relevant for this thesis;
the state sector influences private business wage levels and productivity only in the
longer-run and tax issues are dealt with in section 7.3.
555 See EIU (2007c); see also Financial Times (2006a); own calculations.
556 Ukraine’s labor cost even increased by 83% during this period but started on a signifi-
cantly lower level (e0.68); see again EIU (2007c); own calculations.
557 Estonia, which is not depicted in the figure even showed an increase by 16% to 64%;
see Eurostat website (2008).
558 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II
(2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
559 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services
III (2007).
560 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
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Figure 36: Labor costs in Eastern Europe
Figure 37: Labor cost development in Eastern Europe
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Figure 38: Labor productivity in Eastern Europe
for MNCs to go to Romania561; particularly for companies aiming at exporting
products562 and when countries like Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary are
the alternative options, lower labor costs can be the decisive factor in favor of
Romania.563
However, many experts are skeptical about the future advantage of Roma-
nia with respect to labor costs.564 Even though interviewees state that labor
costs in Romania will probably not reach Western European levels for several
decades565, to some experts even today “Romania is not a low labor cost coun-
561 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007);
Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Roma-
nian County Council (2007).
562 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VIII (2007).
563 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I
(2007).
564 See Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
565 See Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007);
Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
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try anymore”566 since labor costs are rising faster than labor productivity.567
Experts confirm the data that Romania is losing ground especially compared to
Bulgaria; in industries such as IT salaries in Bulgaria are only 60% of the level
in Romania.568 Some experts however assume that the main drivers for the in-
creasing labor costs are not the actual salary gains but the increase of non-wage
labor costs.569 On the other hand some experts know that those investors for
whom labor costs are extremely important go straight to the Ukraine. Asian
locations tend not to be seen as alternative options.570
The semi-structured interview approach allowed for challenging some of these
expert statements and after discussing the labor cost factor in more detail var-
ious interviewees, mainly company experts, relativized the importance of the
labor cost determinant: They describe the challenge to incorporate future labor
cost developments in their investment decision since effects like the EU acces-
sion or differences in regional developments are difficult to forecast. Investors
have admitted that they may have underestimated the labor cost increase,
particularly in urban areas and due to frequent job changes rather than to pro-
ductivity gains.571 Some even point out that production in Austria or Germany
may now be cheaper than in Romania – depending on the labor’s share of the
costs – if labor hours in the home countries and automization of production
are increased and all available subsidies are used.572
Beyond this, experts emphasize that low labor costs are not a strong enough
determinant if labor is insufficiently available which can also lead to rising labor
566 Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007).
567 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007).
568 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
569 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007).
570 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007).
571 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
III (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
572 See Disguised company expert statement; see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VIII (2007).
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costs. The example of Ukraine also shows that low labor costs are insufficient
factor if investors are worried about political and economic stability or the
reliability of political decisions. Labor costs also become less important when
other production costs such as energy costs are significantly lower elsewhere
than in Romania.573 Finally, salary increases can even be good news for market-
oriented investors such as retailers.574
No significant deviations can be found when comparing company to state
statements on labor costs. Overall both groups of interviewees agree on the
importance of the determinant but are also skeptical to what extent it will
remain a driving factor for Romania in the future and not only MNCs but also
state representatives are aware of the fact that “low labor costs are not enough
to succeed in this competitive market for FDI”575.
The assessment of the available data, the FDI studies and the conducted
expert interviews permit several conclusions: The general importance of the
labor cost factor is undeniable even though some FDI studies do not find any
significant impact on MNCs’ investment decision.576 Interviews as well as FDI
studies indicate that labor costs are interdependent on various other factors
such as the market entry strategy, the industry sector577, the availability of
(skilled) labor578, the point of the transition process579 and various policy fac-
tors discussed in chapter 7. Analogous to the market size determinant, labor
573 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
574 See Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv.
German Authority IV (2007).
575 Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
576 See for significant impact, e. g. Holland and Pain (1998); Bevan and Estrin (2000); see
for insignificant impact, e. g. Campos and Kinoshita (2003); Merlevede and Schoors
(2004).
577 See for examples from FDI studies e. g. Altomonte (1998); Resmini (2000).
578 See e. g. Janicki and Wunnava (2004).
579 See for diverging effects e. g. Merlevede and Schoors (2004); Demekas, Horva´th, Rib-
akova, and Wu (2005).
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costs alone cannot explain why Romania received only little FDI until the end
of the 1990s despite very low labor costs.580
These interdependences make it difficult to judge whether labor costs are a
more important factor overall for Romania than, for example, its market size.
The judgment also seems to be highly changeable and also depends on the an-
ticipated labor cost development. Romanian state representatives particularly
seem to be right to be skeptical about the long-term benefit of this factor,
especially considering the strong increase of salaries in recent years. The inter-
views also show that labor costs are often an important issue mainly in the first
phase of the investment decision process but seem to become less important the
more an MNC is analyzing a specific country with respect to strategic or policy
factors.581 In contrast Romanian productivity level is of only limited interest
for investors582, possibly because companies know that they have to train their
staff anyway and they can influence the productivity level that way.
The image and expectation of Romania as low labor cost location often
seems to be more important than the actual wage level. According to a survey
of the AHK, German investors were more satisfied with labor costs in Romania
than in Bulgaria even though Romania’s wage level is higher (see figure 36).583
Since interviews show however an increasing awareness of rising labor cost
deviations to Bulgaria, policy makers may need to inform about remaining
cost advantages of Romania in the future, for example in specific industries
and regions.
(3) Proximity is also an often cited non-policy country determinant.584 One
important measurement is the geographic distance in kilometers between the
580 See also Carstensen and Toubal (2004).
581 See similar Pye (1998).
582 See various interviews but also Holland and Pain (1998).
583 See AHK (2006); EIU (2007c).
584 See 2.2.4.2.
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capitals of the home and the host country. As depicted in figure 39 Bucharest is
quite far away from Berlin (1,294km) and Vienna (858km) compared to other
Eastern European cities585; from Berlin only Sofia is even 25 kilometers (km)
further away, while the air distance from Vienna to Sofia is even 37km less
than to Bucharest.586 Romania has sales potential into five neighboring states
and is close to sales regions such as Western Europe, the Balkans, some CIS
countries, the Middle East and North Africa. A geographic advantage in this
context are the water routes via the Black Sea and the Danube.587 Romania
may be attractive for investors from Austria and Germany because Romanian
is a Latin language in contrast to the large majority of countries in the region
with Hungarian or various Slavic languages which are more difficult to learn and
less frequently taught in Western European schools. As elaborated in section
3.2 Austrian and German investors may furthermore benefit from a common
cultural and historical heritage with Romania.
In line with theory, the smaller geographic distance of many locations in
Romania to Europe or other production sites in Eastern Europe compared
to many sites in Bulgaria is mentioned as an advantage in the expert inter-
views.588 Others clarify that the labor cost situation was more important than
the proximity of the location for their investment decision.589 A few experts
also mention that Romania is well located within Eastern Europe for access to
other Eastern European markets such as Ukraine and Russia and may therefore
compensate for an only limited market size.590
585 This statements neglects country-specific deviations in distance.
586 See www.mapcrow.info; www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm.
587 See EBRD (2006b), p.4.
588 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007).
589 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive
(2007).
590 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
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Figure 39: Geographic distances home vs. host country
The lower language barrier of Romania as “Latin island in a Slavic ocean”591
is repeatedly underscored as an advantage, particularly when compared to Hun-
gary and Bulgaria.592 This is either because of Latin skills of investors from
school593 or because Romanian is easier to read than, for example, the Cyrillic
letters of the Bulgarian language.594 A minority of experts believe that the lan-
guage advantage is mainly a reason for French and Italian companies but less
for German and Austrian MNCs.595 Investors also admit that they nonetheless
may have underestimated the language barrier and some language difficulties
continue to exist today even several years after the investment.596
591 Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007).
592 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
III (2007).
593 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
594 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007).
595 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
596 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007). The language skills of the Romanian
population are analyzed in section 7.4.1.2.
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Experts also agree that cultural links are important for a locational deci-
sion.597 They elaborate however, that cultural heritage is mainly a regional
issue in Romania; Germans are rather attracted by the Saxon tradition in Tran-
sylvania and particularly by the German ties to the county of Sibiu. For the
region of Timis¸oara, for example, the cultural ties have been mainly important
for Italian MNCs.598
Finally, investment decisions may be promoted by personal ties of the in-
vestors to Romania. Several employees, for example, working for a Bavarian
MNC with Romanian roots (coming to Germany in the 1980s) supported the
preparation of the investment decision and were of particular value due to their
easy access to culture and language.599 The strong personal ties of Romanians
to Western Europe are also visible by the large amount of interviewed investors
and experts who lived for longer periods in either Germany or Austria.600
Differences between state and company experts become visible with the
analysis of the advantage of locations within Romania. Both groups interviewed
agree that cultural ties, for example, between Sibiu and Germany are impor-
tant, but while state experts believe that Sibiu’s geographic location within
Romania is very attractive as well601, investors point out that Timis¸oara’s lo-
cation close to the Hungarian border and highway system gives the latter an
advantage over Sibiu.602 Moreover, state experts highlight more clearly that
597 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
598 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007);
Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
599 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); see also Intv. German Authority
IV (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007).
600 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Associ-
ation III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. German Authority IV
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
601 See Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007);
Doc - City of Sibiu (2007).
602 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
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the importance of the cultural ties particularly in Transylvania with respect
to German speaking investors is even increasing due to the growing number of
investors in the region.603
When assessing stylized facts, FDI studies and expert interviews it becomes
apparent that geographic distance represents a factor important for investors to
lower costs but with a less significant impact than, for example, market size or
labor costs.604 In the end FDI studies cannot definitely confirm trade theory’s
assumption for Romania that net FDI will increase and replace exports with
greater distance from a specific home country.605 In contrast, the interviews
indicate that geographic distance alone cannot explain evolutions in Romania’s
FDI inflows.
Besides, the actual advantage of Romania versus Bulgaria is questionable, to
say the least, as geographic differences to Germany and Austria are negligible
or even in favor of Bulgaria (figure 39). The geographic advantage seems to
depend on the perception of the individual, on the location in the home and
host country but most of all on the infrastructure situation – the major driver
for time, costs and efforts to transport goods. Trade policy may also play a role
with respect to a smooth border crossing.606
The interviews seem to confirm that lower language barriers and existing
cultural and personal ties are interesting for investors in Romania but mainly
in the first phase of their investment decision. In this phase smaller investors in
particular may be getting first experiences in the region and having an easier
personal access to Romania than, for example, to Bulgaria, Serbia or Ukraine.
While Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005) found out that cultural
distance loses its significance at higher levels of FDI, interview statements
603 See Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007).
604 See also Altomonte (1998); Disdier and Mayer (2003); Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004);
only minor impact identified by Resmini (2000).
605 See Brenton, Di Mauro, and Lu¨cke (1999); Resmini (2000).
606 Infrastructure will be discussed in detail in 7.3.2.2, trade policy in section 7.3.1.2.
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rather indicate that clusters of strong foreign communities, such as the Ger-
man one in Sibiu, may actually re-invigorate historical ties – at least in some
regions in Romania. Romanian policy makers may be advised to use more
actively existing personal ties such as to Romanian emigrants in Germany, for
example, through Chambers of Commerce or the Romanian embassy, since
employees with Romanian roots seem to have a strong influence in triggering
an initial interest in Romania among decision-makers in MNCs.
(4) Other aspects that were among the most frequently cited non-policy
determinants in section 3.2 are trade openness, agglomeration and natural re-
sources.
With respect to trade openness607 investors interviewed only occasionally
detect that higher trade volumes may indicate higher FDI volumes.608 State
experts on the other hand, note the reversed effect and point out that FDI
inflows to Romania have a positive impact on Romania’s export performance
and on the reduction of the trade deficit.609 The assumption that higher trade
flows also increase FDIs610 can therefore not be confirmed by the interviews.
This strengthens the hypothesis of the theoretical section that companies do
not necessarily use trade as first step to approach Romania.
Agglomeration effects – identified as major driver for FDI by the New Eco-
nomic Theory (section 2.2.4.1) – are generally assumed when companies follow
other domestic or foreign companies to a specific country or region because
they have imperfect information and suppose that the presence of many other
investors indicates that the location is attractive and that companies benefit
607 Trade related aspects that can be influenced by public policy are analyzed in section
7.3.1.
608 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007).
609 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007).
610 See Holland and Pain (1998); Clausing and Dorobantu (2005); Janicki and Wunnava
(2004).
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from each other, for example, as suppliers.611 By contrast, MNCs interviewed
reveal that the FDI development or the presence of other investors in Romania
was only of limited importance for their investment decision.612 Agglomeration
may however be more important for investors like Intv. Germ. MNC - Indus-
trial Goods III (2007), a spin-off, for whom the opening of a subsidiary by the
parent company half a year earlier was an important factor for the management
team since the vicinity to the parent company enabled some co-operation.613
In contrast to most company experts state experts tend to see stronger bene-
fits from agglomeration, particularly when clusters of companies from the same
home country are numerous in a specific location such as Sibiu.614 Overall, a
significant agglomeration of investors can – with the exception of Bucharest –
not be determined for Romania in the data of the National Trade Register even
though some regions like the North East and the South West of the country
have attracted only little FDI.615
Natural resources are mentioned by a few FDI studies on transition
economies as a possible country determinant.616 Romania could possibly ben-
efit from limited deposits of oil, gas, salt, gold, silver, and wood. More recent
discoveries have also identified some potential for the exhaustion of lead, zinc,
copper, iron ore and manganese. In the interviews conducted natural resources
are rarely mentioned as country determinant of Romania. An exception is an
611 See Krugman (1991); Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999); Head, Ries, and Swenson
(1999).
612 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods
(2007).
613 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
614 See Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); Intv. Rom.
Local Authority I (2007).
615 Adding up to 6.6% of the companies and 5.7% of the subscribed capital in 2006; see
The National Trade Register Office (2007b); see for diverging results but without coun-
try specific results for Romania Pusterla and Resmini (2005); European Commission
(2005b).
616 See Lankes and Venables (1996); Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001);
Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Merlevede and Schoors (2004); Kinoshita and Campos
(2006).
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Austrian investor that decided to invest in Romania because it is dependent
on the natural resources in Romania while other countries with significant re-
sources in the region like Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were politically more
insecure than Romania.617 Some experts see future opportunities for Romania
in its nature and in higher FDI in tourism even though the required infras-
tructure is not in place yet.618 The FDI studies analyzed that find significant
impact of natural resources on FDI do not show country-specific results.619 The
interview results seem to be in line withMerlevede and Schoors (2004) who find
that EECs – unlike CIS countries – do not have enough natural endowments in
order to significantly influence FDI inflows. For Romania in particular it can
be added that the requirements for the more complicated exhaustion of natural
resources have not yet been met.620
The overall assessment of these “other aspects” suggest a limited impact
on an investment decision for Romania. These aspects alone cannot explain
oscillations in FDI flows and they do not necessarily indicate why Romania has
an advantage or disadvantage versus neighboring countries like Bulgaria. The
possible positive correlation between trade and FDI flows cannot be confirmed
on an expert level, agglomeration may occur in individual cases but a common
pattern for Romania cannot be derived from the data, and finally the large
forest areas are identified as the only natural resource that can currently
materialize significant FDI inflows to Romania.
(5) In conclusion of Romania’s non-policy country determinants, this sec-
tion has confirmed most FDI theories and analyzed FDI studies that market
size, labor costs and to some extent cultural ties seem to be the most important
617 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
618 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
619 See e. g. Kinoshita and Campos (2006); Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001).
620 See also Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.24; Rabobank (2006), p.2; PI Partners (2007),
p.67.
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non-policy factors in favor of Romania. Other aspects, some of those identified
by the New Economic Geography theory, are less relevant for the investment
decision of MNCs in favor of Romania according to the experts interviewed.
This section has also shown that interdependences with policy factors need to
be further analyzed in order to understand MNCs’ decision in favor of Romania
since low inflows in the 1990s and oscillations even in recent years could not
be explained otherwise. Finally, this section indicates that deviations in the
importance of a certain country determinant are not so much driven by the
market entry strategy but rather by the moment in the investment decision
process. Therefore non-policy factors seem to lose importance the longer an
investor analyzes Romania. This aspect will be further explored in chapter 9.
6.3 Croatia
Analogous to the approach for Romania this section examines the key issues
of Croatia’s economic development since the early 1990s (section 6.3.1) before
analyzing the major non-policy country determinants of Croatia (section 6.3.2).
6.3.1 Economic fundamentals since the early 1990s
This section reviews (1) the main features of Croatia’s economic development
since the early 1990s, the evolution of (2) GDP, (3) inflation, (4) unemploy-
ment, (5) trade, and (6) FDI. The (7) economic outlook also comprises the
expert perspective and (8) provides an assessment of the issues analyzed. A
map of Croatia and its key indicators can again be found in the appending
figures 90 and 91.
(1) Croatia’s economic development in the beginning of the 1990s was
mainly driven by the overcoming of the Socialist heritage, the collapse of the
former Yugoslavia and the effects of the war. These three aspects were often
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linked to each other.621 Even though the economy in Yugoslavia – even under
Tito (1945-1980) – had not been as closed and as rigidly communist than in
other EECs, it nevertheless suffered from the breakdown of the Eastern Euro-
pean markets after 1990, the decline of industrial production and the lack of
competitiveness in the state-owned enterprises.622 More specifically, indepen-
dence from Yugoslavia in 1991 worsened the economic situation for Croatia
since production had been located by function within the former Yugoslavia
and was now unable to fully respond to Croatian needs. Despite some im-
portant existing industries (food, some industrial production) Croatia became
dependent on new industries and imports in various fields.623
Finally and most dramatically, the war of independence against Serbia (1991-
1995) had a significant impact on Croatia’s economic (and political) situation.
More than 500K Croatians, also from Bosnia, fled their homes due to the war,
and about 30% of the Croatian territory was occupied for several years in
which the internationally not recognized Republic of Serbian Krajina was es-
tablished. Some parts of Eastern Slavonia remained occupied by Serbia under
the protection of the United Nations (UN) until 1998. Beyond this, the war
generated massive economic turbulences including high government spending
and economic standstill in some regions.624
Under President Tudman (1990-1999) Croatia was able to win the war
(with the help mainly of the US), but it was led in an authoritarian style
and sometimes with the help of less capable favorites. The economic situation
started to significantly improve after the death of Tudman and the end of the
financial crisis in 1999 under the left-wing government of Prime Minister Racˇan
(2000-2003). The economic upswing continued during the further approach
to the European Union under President Sanader (since 2003, re-elected in
621 See Grupe and Kusˇic´ (2005); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b).
622 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b).
623 See Bfai (2004), p.40.
624 See Zunec and Kulenovic´ (2007); Grupe and Kusˇic´ (2005).
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2007).625
(2) Despite the above mentioned turmoils and a decrease of industry produc-
tion by about 50% in the early 1990s, the Croatian economy remained aston-
ishingly robust. GDP declined by 8.0% in 1993 but the following four years
saw average growth rates of 6.3% due to massive government spending.626 The
financial crisis in the late 1990s caused a short slump including a GDP decline
of 0.9% in 1999. Since then Croatia has shown solid growth rates of 4.8% on
average (2000-2006).627 Despite this positive evolution an analysis of 15 ana-
lyzed EECs shows that twelve of them had higher average growth rates than
Croatia’s between 2004 and 2006. Overall, Croatia’s GDP grew from e9.2B in
1993 at a CAGR of 11% to e34.2B in 2006.628
In terms of GDP per capita Croatia developed from e4,092 in 1999 to e7,696
in 2006 which equals e11,566 in purchasing power parity or 48% of the EU
average. This puts Croatia behind the Eastern European EU members but
ahead of all other SEECs.629 Furthermore, the former war zones are still lagging
behind with a GDP per capita, for example, in Vukovar of only 33% compared
to Zagreb.630
Main drivers for Croatia’s GDP growth in the 2000s were public spending
(e. g. 40% of GDP growth in 2003 and 2004), exports, private consumption,
and FDI. 631
625 See section 7.4.4 for details; see European Commission (2005a), p.35; Kasapovic´ (2007);
Ramet, Clewing, and Lukic (2006); Zunec and Kulenovic´ (2007); Bertelsmann Stiftung
(2006b), pp. 2 and 7; Grupe and Kusˇic´ (2005).
626 Croatia’s economy declined by 5.9% annually between 1985 and 1995; see World Bank
(2006b); IMF website (2008); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.2.
627 4.3% in 2004 and 2005 and 4.8% in 2006; IMF website (2008); Neuhaus (2005), p.18.
628 See IMF website (2008); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.6.
629 See IMF website (2008); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.6; European Commission
(2007a), p.66.
630 Calculated in purchasing power parity as well; see European Commission (2005a), p.36.
631 See NCC (2007), p.12.; IMF (2006a), p.8; Neuhaus (2005), p.18; CICD (2006), p.11.
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(3) Hyper-inflation peaked at more than 1,500% in 1993, which had dra-
matic effects on the population but was stopped due to a rigid monetary
policy with the end of the war. The average inflation of 3.9% was even lower
than in all other EECs between 1995 and 2000. Since then inflation has
remained at moderate levels averaging 2.6% (2001-2006) despite somewhat
higher values for 2005 (3.3%) and 2006 (3.2%). Levers to mitigate inflations
rates were restrictive loan, finance and income policies. In the same period
however five other EECs had even lower inflation rate averages than Croatia.632
(4) Unemployment figures for Croatia vary depending on the measure-
ment technique. Whichever statistics are considered however, unemployment
remains one of Croatia’s greatest problems.633 Looking at registered unem-
ployment634 Croatia has not been able to significantly decrease unemployment,
which amounted to 14.8% in 1994, peaked at 23.1% (2001) and only dimin-
ished slightly to 17.0% in 2006. Croatia has repeatedly been among the EECs
with the highest annual unemployment rate.635 The war and its consequences
(destroyed homes, refugees etc.) aggravated the situation but unemployment
seems to have more structural problems in Croatia.636 Most new jobs have
been created in the service sector in recent years while the agricultural sector
that never played a large role lost still more importance for the labor market.637
632 See IMF website (2008); Eurostat website (2008); World Bank (2006b); p.2; CNB (2007);
EBRD (2005a), p.16; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.3; European Commission (2005a),
p.35.
633 See European Commission (2005a), p.38.
634 Other data is often based on labor force surveys; see also Vidovic and Gligorov (2004),
p.3.
635 See WIIW (2008); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.2; ILO website (2008).
636 See subsequent section and chapter 7 for details.
637 See European Commission (2005a), p.45; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.9; World
Bank (2006b); APIU (2006b), p.12; OECD (2005b), p.11.
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(5) Croatia’s trade openness has constantly improved from 61% (1998) to
74% (2006) and was therefore greater than, for example, Romania’s.638 Goods
exports from Croatia have remained on a similiar level of e4B to e5.3B between
1992 and 2002 with only minor oscillations. After 2002 export volumes started
to increase to e6.6B (2004), e7.2B (2005) and even e8.4B (2006). Imports on
the other hand have grown more significantly from e4.5B (1992) at a CAGR
of 15% until 1997 and – after a moderate decrease during the financial crisis –
further grew at a CAGR of 13% since 2000 to e16.8B in 2006.639 The widening
trade deficit that reached 24% of GDP in 2006 has, as in Romania, attracted
increasing criticism from external observers, particularly since the external debt
has risen to 85% of GDP in 2006.640 Main reasons are the high private demand,
the oil price development and Croatia’s export weaknesses due to a strong
local currency (kuna), limited FDI inflows and unsatisfactory competitiveness
of domestic companies.641
Most important export categories in recent years have been transport equip-
ment, refined petroleum and chemical products. Exports of products with
high knowledge rose by about 50% between 2001 and 2004 while the share
of low-value-added exports (textiles and agricultural products) have signifi-
cantly declined. Imports are mainly driven by machinery products and con-
sumer goods.642
Trade in services is of special significance for Croatia, mainly due to the
strong tourism industry that accounted for 16% of GDP in 2006 and that has
been recovering after a strong decline due to the war (CAGR 1995-2005 of
638 See Eurostat website (2008); WIIW (2008).
639 See Eurostat website (2008); WIIW (2008); European Commission (2007a), p.66; NCC
(2004a).
640 See BA-CA (2007a); Eurostat website (2008); European Commission (2007a), p.67.
641 See more details about these aspects in chapter 7; see NCC (2007); WIIW (2001); p.3;
IMF (2006a), p.5; Grupe and Kusˇic´ (2005); p.2; European Commission (2005a), pp.5,
38 and 67; CICD (2006), p.11; Dresdner Bank (2004), p.6.
642 See NCC (2004b), p.21; Dresdner Bank (2004), p.6; European Commission (2005a),
p.46; Bfai (2004), p.40.
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-15.2%) reaching 10M guests in 2005.643 The EU is Croatia’s most important
trading partner with 64% of exports and 67% of imports. However, countries
of the former Yugoslavia as well as Russia and China have gained importance
in recent years.644
(6) Due to the war FDI inflows to Croatia remained very low until 1995,
only adding up to e298M since 1992. In 1999 inflows exceeded e1B for the
first time (e1.4B) but continued to be volatile and depended mostly on priva-
tizations. They remained under e2B until 2005 averaging e1.4B. In 2006 FDI
inflows boosted significantly by 97% to e2.8B benefiting from high privatiza-
tion sales. Croatia’s FDI stock grew at a CAGR of 37% from e1.7 (1998) to
e21.4B (2006).645 Even though FDI inflows and stock may not be very high in
absolut terms compared to other EECs, Croatia’s per capita performance has
nonetheless been remarkable. With e4,577 Croatia has the third largest FDI
per capita stock in Eastern Europe, after Hungary and Czech Republic (see
figure 33).646 In this context the strong kuna may have helped Croatia’s FDI
performance in the regional comparison.
FDI in Croatia has mainly been driven by privatization sales such as the
sale of the Hrvatske Telekomunikacije to the Deutsche Telekom (2000), the oil
company INA to the Hungarian MOL (2003) or the pharmaceutical company
Pliva to the US Baar Laboratories.647 Greenfield investments have been less
common in Croatia so far particularly when it comes to industrial manufactur-
643 See European Commission (2007a), p.17; Der Fischerweltalmanach 2006 (2005); CICD
(2006), p.11; NCC (2004a), p.20.
644 See European Commission (2007a), pp.23 and 67; European Commission (2005a), p.46.
645 See UNCTAD (2007); UNCTAD FDI website (2008); Hunya (2002), p.6; CNB (2008),
p.48; Hunya (2007), p.8; own calculations.
646 See Hunya (2007); WIIW figures with minor deviations from author’s calculations due
to different population and currency conversion assumptions.
647 See MIGA (2006), p.38; Grupe and Kusˇic´ (2005), p.2; Doc - INA (2006).
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ing.648 UNCTAD (2007) registered only between 33 and 46 annual greenfield
projects between 2002 and 2006 and an upward trend is not recognizable.
The key sector for FDI to Croatia in 2006 was the financial services sector
(43%) that even gained importance in recent years followed by the chemical
industry (22%), the food sector (7%) and wholesale activities (5%). Overall,
about 2,500 affiliates of foreign companies were registered in Croatia in 2006.649
As already shown in figure 17 Austria (28%), the Netherlands (17%) and
Germany (14%) are the greatest contributor to Croatia’s FDI stock.650 In 2006
94.5% of FDI inflows originated from the EU 15 whose share has increased
over the years while US firms have lost importance as investors.651
(7) In their economic outlook for Croatia (2007-2009) five observers an-
alyzed652 expect a continuation of the current robust trend or even a slight
improvement.
The observers expect an increase in GDP growth to 5.5%-6.0% in 2007 re-
sulting from high private demand and pre-election government spending. For
the years after the election they expect a moderate cooling off to 4.7%-5.2%
(2008) and 4.2%-5.5% (2009). Private consumption will be fueled by the ongo-
ing credit growth, rising wages, strong consumer confidence, and the prospect
of EU accession.653
Inflation is expected to drop to 2.2%-2.5% in 2007 and to moderately increase
to 2.5%-3.3% in 2008 and 2009. Reasons for moderate rates may be modest
648 Below below 8% of overall FDI in 2006; see CNB website (2008); MIGA (2006).
649 See CNB (2008), pp.53-54; CNB website (2008); Hunya (2007), p.87; Hunya (2002), p.6;
UNCTAD (2007).
650 Figures for third quarter 2007; see CNB website (2008); UNCTAD FDI website (2008).
651 Registring issues may however distort the picture, for example, since Baar Laboratories
originally a US company that bought Pliva is registered in the Netherlands; see CNB
(2008), pp.53-54; CNB website (2008); Hunya (2007), p.8.
652 Publications between October and November 2007; see EIU (2007a); IMF (2007c); BA-
CA (2007a); Raiffeisenbank (2007); European Commission (2007d).
653 See particularly European Commission (2007d); BA-CA (2007a).
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salary gains in line with productivity growth as well as a more rigid monetary
and fiscal policy. Accelerating effects could be caused by higher agricultural
and food prices.654
All observers analyzed believe that a rising GDP and productivity gains will
enable Croatia to further drop the registered unemployment rate. Estimates
range from 15.1% to 16.6% in 2007, dropping to 15-16% in 2008 and reach-
ing 14.5%-15.5% in 2009 and therefore remain comparatively high in regional
comparison.655
Croatia’s trade volumes and the trade deficit are predicted to continue ris-
ing. Observers’ assume exports to grow between 5% and 7% (2007-2009) while
their estimated growth figures for imports range between 6% and 8%. Export
acceleration is expected due to EU’s GDP growth, rising competitiveness and
a growing tourism sector while imports are fostered by private demand.656
Regarding Croatia’s FDI development the observers are rather skeptical and
no clear trend is visible. They estimate inflows of e2.3B-3B in 2007, e1.7B-
2B in 2008 and e1.9B-2.2B in 2009. Main predicted drivers for future FDI
inflows are privatizations, recapitalizations of banks and the prospect of EU
accession.657
The Croatia experts interviewed for this thesis share the moderate opti-
mism of the observers with respect to future FDI inflows. Accordingly, they do
not expect major FDI inflows in the future apart from some potential privatiza-
tions, at least not before an accession to the EU that may cause a push for FDI.
Some FDIs are expected through re-investments of existing MNCs.658 A few
654 See e. g. IMF (2007c); European Commission (2007d); BA-CA (2007a).
655 See e. g. EIU (2007a); Raiffeisenbank (2007); European Commission (2007d).
656 See EIU (2007a); European Commission (2007d).
657 These issues will be discussed in detail in chapter 7; see Raiffeisenbank (2007); European
Commission (2007d).
658 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Austr.
MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
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experts assume that domestic investments and FPI will gain more importance
for the Croatian economy than FDI.659 Reasons mentioned by the experts for
the stagnation or even slight decrease of FDI inflows in the next years are Croa-
tia’s limited market size, its high labor costs and the policy obstacles discussed
in chapter 7.660
Despite the limited optimism of the experts with respect to the amount of in-
flows they still see various industries with potential for future FDI inflows.661 In
line with the observers analyzed above, the experts interviewed see the greatest
opportunities in tourism as a huge number of hotels are still awaiting privatiza-
tion and investments have been below potential in recent years.662 With respect
to pharmaceuticals and biotechnologies the expert opinion is more biased; some
interviewees see significant future potential due to existing know-how and com-
panies such as Pliva663, while others mention that too few capacities exist in
order to speak of a sizable sector for FDI.664
The future of the Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) sector
in Croatia is a matter of even more controversy. Some experts foresee no or only
minor FDIs in the next years665 while others are convinced that this sector –
the telecommunication sector in any case and the IT sector if it is given the
659 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Croatian University (2007);
Intv. German Authority II (2007).
660 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting
(2007).
661 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services
I (2007).
662 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real
Estate (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial
Services I (2007); less optimistic Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv. Suprana-
tional Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
663 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II
(2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Doc - Croatian Chamber of Comm. (2006b).
664 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II
(2007).
665 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
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right attention by public policy – may become crucial for domestic and foreign
investments.666
Moderate potential for FDI is estimated in existing industries such as infras-
tructure (for example harbors), food processing, automotive supply, real estate
and some re-capitalizations in the banking sector.667 Some minor privatizations,
such as the finalization of the telecommunication sale and the privatization of
the logistics company as well as the further liberalization of the energy sector,
are expected.668
In the longer run the agricultural sector, not mentioned by the external
observers at all, is also expected to become an attractive field for FDI, particu-
larly after integration into the EU. This is due to the large spaces of untouched
nature since the war (for example in Slavonia), less use of pesticides and fertil-
izers, the great need for modern technology, and the rising demand in Western
Europe for healthy food.669
Large inflows into the manufacturing sector are not expected by the ex-
perts.670 The potential is mostly identified in service industries and higher
value-added products as well as R&D activities, also since the Croatian GDP
is clearly service-oriented and Croatia is developing towards a knowledge-based
666 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007);
Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
667 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv.
Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian
Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
668 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007).
669 Significant de-mining efforts would still be required; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services II (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); however, the adaptation to EU stan-
dards will also cause significant costs for Croatia; see Doc - Ekonomski Institut Zagreb
(2007).
670 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Croatian University (2007).
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society.671 In terms of company size FDIs are expected to be mainly driven by
SME investments particularly in tourism.672
In contrast to most company experts the state experts interviewed see
greater potential in greenfield investments and even in manufacturing; they
identify a greater amount of potential FDI fields even though they repeatedly
state that the state needs to focus on key industries for FDI.673 When it comes
to industries state experts tend to expect the ICT sector to attract more
and larger investors than the company experts do.674 Croatian state experts
are alone in mentioning significant potential for investments for renewable
energies.675 On the other hand state experts are more skeptical regarding great
potential for FDI in tourism.676 This may be because they are more aware
of the persisting reluctance of Croatian local politicians to sell the land to
international investors than MNCs.
(8) Coming to an overall assessment of its economic development, Croatia
has overcome the challenges outlined – especially the turbulences of war – with
amazing swiftness and is today among the most advanced and stable economies
in Eastern Europe. The Western Balkan republic has reached a high GDP per
capita on a level with Poland and clearly ahead of all other SEECs as well as
671 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian
Company - Real Estate (2007).
672 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. German Econ.
Association IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
673 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Doc -
Croatian Chamber of Comm. (2006b); see also Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007).
674 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
675 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Doc - Croatian Chamber of Comm. (2006b);
while non-Croatian experts seem more skeptical; see Intv. Supranational Authority II
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
676 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Croatian
Authority I (2007).
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an impressive FDI stock. This positive performance is also reflected in a fairly
respectful position in the BTI (see figure 35).677
Nevertheless, Croatia’s transition process “is far from being completed”678.
Croatia still shows strong dependence on private (often credit-based) demand
and a strongly subsidized tourism industry.679 Furthermore, exports and FDIs
remain below expectations and the GDP growth – hovering around 5% – is not
as dynamic as in neighboring countries. Finally, the economic improvements
have not reached the whole population, leaving a large share of Croatians un-
employed. These less favorable aspects are also reflected in the DCEI (see figure
34) in which Croatia is placed second last, only ahead of Turkey. The low con-
vergence of only 59% to Western European standards is mainly due to the low
score in the real economy driven by the large foreign debt, the high unem-
ployment rate and a fairly high share of the agriculture of the GDP (about
25%).680 Nevertheless, a strong improvement in the DCEI from 2005 to 2006
indicates some important changes in recent years. Subsequent sections analyze
to what extent these convergence factors have an effect on FDI inflows since
Croatia’s poor DCEI performance compared, for example, to Romania, does
not correspond to a significantly higher FDI stock per capita.
Despite Croatia’s positive economic development, the analyses of this section
suggest that further reforms need to be undertaken in order to set Croatia’s
growth and development path on a higher level, not because Croatia is per-
forming so badly but because other countries of the region are catching up
very fast. Much of the economic future seems to depend on the success of
future FDI flows. The many arbitrary expert interviews regarding the future
fields of FDI in Croatia indicate that public policy still lacks a clear vision of
future developments. It seems however, that Croatia still has a lot of potential
677 See also Eurostat (2007b); CICD (2006), p.11.
678 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.9.
679 See NCC (2004b), pp.12 and 20; Bfai (2004), p.7
680 See Hornung (2006).
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for tourism, particularly in the mid-range sector and on the islands. ICT also
offers a wide range of possibilities, since many Croatians are high-skilled681 and
since this sector is well suited for SMEs. By contrast, Croatia appears to have
only limited advantages in agriculture compared to other SEECs, for exam-
ple to Romania. Furthermore, the potential for large pharmaceutical activities
may be scarce considering the limited existing capacities and the specialized
know-how that is necessary for this sector.
6.3.2 Country determinants without short-term public policy
impact
In correspondence to the procedure for Romania this section analyzes the ma-
jor non-policy determinants for Croatia: (1) market size, (2) labor costs, (3)
proximity, and (4) other aspects. (5) provides a conclusion for this section.
Definitions and references to theory already given in previous sections are not
repeated here.
(1) With respect to market size Croatia’s major economic indicators have
already been discussed in the previous section. In terms of land size Croatia is
fairly small with 56, 542km2 which makes it the 11th largest of 19 EECs just
ahead of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51, 129km2). With 4.4M inhabitants Croatia
is the 10th largest Eastern European market in terms of population. Due to
the war Croatia’s population declined by 7.2% between 1991 and 2002 but has
remained stable since then. For a small country Croatia has quite a few large
cities, namely Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, and Osijek, all which have more than 100K
inhabitants.682
The experts interviewed for Croatia agree that the size of a market can
be an important determinant for an FDI decision. At a first glance it seems
apparent to many experts that its small domestic market is a disadvantage for
681 See section 7.4.
682 See Der Fischerweltalmanach 2007 (2006); Bfai (2004); EBRD (2005a), p.50.
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Croatia.683 However, experts also note some limitations to this rather nega-
tive judgment. MNCs coming from a small home country like Austria may feel
more comfortable in a comparable market like Croatia.684 Furthermore, the
market size is only of limited importance for those investors exclusively pro-
ducing for exports.685 More importantly many experts interviewed have seen
and see significant market opportunities in Croatia despite its limited market
size. Opportunities arose after the war due to the destruction and the strug-
gling domestic economy. Today the Croatian market is particularly attractive
because of its high purchasing power, the continued lack of modern consumer
products, limited domestic production, and the positive perception of foreign
products.686
Looking at the differences between state and company experts it seems
that the former are more optimistic with respect to the perception of Croatia
as part of a larger market. Particularly with respect to a potential EU ac-
cession company experts are more skeptical whether the market potential will
significantly improve.687
In conclusion the analysis of the FDI studies, the data and the expert
interviews indicate that its small market size did not hurt Croatia’s FDI
performance; in fact, Croatia has the third highest per capita FDI stock in
Eastern Europe.688 Differing from the Romanian example and somewhat in
contrast to FDI theory the market size therefore seems to play only a limited
role for Croatia. Major reasons seem to be the perception of Croatia as part
683 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv.
Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007);Intv. Austrian
Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
684 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
685 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
686 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
687 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
688 See section above; see also Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001); Brada,
Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
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of a larger market, large opportunities on the demand side and various public
policies discussed in chapter 7.
(2) According to EIU (2007c) Croatia’s pay and non-pay labor costs aver-
aged e3.49 per hour in 2006 (13% of the EU 15 average). Even though seven
EECs have higher labor costs Croatia is more expensive than all other CEECs
and than three EU members (figure 36). Being on a fairly high level for many
years, labor costs in Croatia increased rather moderately compared to other
EECs in recent years. The rate of 45% (2001-2006) is the fourth lowest rate
in Eastern Europe (figure 37).689 Croatia’s productivity reached 64% of the
EU 27 in 2006 and is fairly average amongst the EECs. However, productivity
rates’ improvements have been fairly low since 2001 (6.4%) and were outpaced
by salary rises which caused increases in real unit costs (figure 38).690
Croatia’s labor costs are perceived as fairly high by most experts inter-
viewed and as competitive disadvantage. They may discourage potential in-
vestors to Croatia since particularly countries in the region are cheaper. Serbia,
for example, has only 60% of Croatia’s labor costs.691 Experts agree that the
salary levels have always been fairly high in Croatia.692 Experts estimate that
gross wages currently amount to e750-800 and net wages to e400-600.693 From
their perspective labor-intensive and manufacturing investors prefer not to in-
vest in Croatia.694 Experts also state that labor costs per se are not as decisive
689 See EIU (2007c).
690 Third lowest rate in Eastern Europe; see EIU (2007c); see also European Commission
(2005a), p.46.
691 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Croatian University (2007); Intv. Former
Croatian Minister (2007); see also EIU (2007c).
692 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
693 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007);
see also APIU (2006b), p.23.
694 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
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as productivity but Croatia’s mediocre productivity performance cannot, from
their perspective, compensate for the fairly high labor costs.695
As stated earlier for Romania the evaluation of non-policy determinants by
MNCs strongly depends on the country of comparison: One German investor
interviewed, for example, was looking for a location with available workers and
comparable labor costs to Czech Republic which made Croatia quite attrac-
tive.696 Therefore, labor costs may become less decisive for companies that
only works within local markets.697 Moreover, compared to Western European
countries salaries are still very competitive in Croatia. They are, for example,
three to five times lower than in Austria.698
A comparison of state and company interviews reveals that both groups
are skeptical as to what extent Croatia’s labor costs are an attractive factor.
Also Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007) agrees that Croatia is “definitely not
the competing country with its cost of labor”699. It seems however, that com-
pany experts are possibly more aware of the fact that Croatia’s labor costs may
strongly differ depending on the region700 and the sector. Salaries, for example,
for the personnel of a German investor interviewed are on comparable levels in
Romania and Croatia.701
Data analysis, FDI studies and expert interviews lead to the conclusion
that Croatia has the reputation of being a high labor cost country which may
however, be somewhat unjustified; according to AHK (2006), for example,
investors already present in Croatia are less satisfied with labor costs than in
most other EECs. However, a look at pay and non-pay cost levels confirms
695 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
696 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007)
697 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
698 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
699 See similar Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
700 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
701 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007).
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the evaluation of some of the (company) experts above that Croatia’s costs
may be more competitive than expected in some regions and comparable
for high-skilled jobs.702 Overall, a correlation of labor costs and FDI seems
questionable for Croatia.703 On the contrary, this section indicates – like for
Romania – that MNCs are not primarily looking for the location with the
lowest labor costs in absolute terms but at a set of country determinants of
which labor costs appear to play only a minor role for Croatia. As a matter of
fact, labor costs seem to be even less important for MNCs deciding for Croatia
than those in other SEECs, namely for Romania.
(3) In terms of geographic proximity Croatia is one of the most attractive
locations for Austrian and German investors with Zagreb being only 274 and
771km away from Vienna and Berlin respectively.704 Croatia has five neighbor-
ing countries and over 1,000km of coastline permitting easy access to Western
European and also North African countries. A disadvantage for some forms of
investments may be the long distance within the country from Slavonia to Dal-
matia with Bosnia and Herzegovina and the mountains in between as well as
the 1,185 islands of which only 47 are inhabited.705 Croatia’s potential cultural
ties to Austria and German have already been highlighted in section 3.2.
The interview experts show that the geographical proximity for Austrian
but also German companies, for example from Bavaria, is a positive determi-
nant in favor of Croatia.706 The shorter distance may somewhat compensate for
its smaller market size in the eyes of some investors.707 Many Austrians, whose
702 See also Holland and Pain (1998).
703 See also Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005).
704 See figure 39; www.mapcrow.info; www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov/cec/java/lat-long.htm.
705 See Government of Croatia website (2007); European Commission (2005a).
706 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
707 See Intv. European Institution (2007).
6.3 Croatia 215
border is only 60km away from Croatia, perceive Croatians as neighbors.708
The county of Varazˇdin with its Free Economic Zone in Northern Croatia in
particular seems to benefit from its proximity to Austria.709
This short distance is of interest for industries like tourism710 or for those
investors for whom the transportation of goods further than 200km is too ex-
pensive.711 The short distance facilitates the steering of operations abroad and
enables MNCs to quickly react to changing market demands, for example, re-
garding retail or fashion products.712
Nevertheless, distance is not an exclusive country determinant for MNCs.
One German investor, for example, decided – among other reasons – against
an extension of the existing site in the Czech Republic because they expected
to find more available workers in Croatia. This was despite the fact that the
Croatian site was further away from the Bavarian home site than the Czech
one.713
The majority of experts describe Croatia’s geographic location as very at-
tractive since “Croatia is on the crossroads of Europe”714. More specifically,
the pan-European corridors 10 and 5 and the access from Western Europe to
the Black Sea are interesting for investors as well as Croatia’s position as bridge
to other SEECs, particularly to the former Yugoslavia.715 This fact also leads
708 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
709 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
710 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
711 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
712 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
713 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
714 Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Ser-
vices II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority
II (2007).
715 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial
Services I (2007).
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to the conclusion of several experts that the size of Croatia’s domestic market
is not as important for most investments.716
Experts evaluate the cultural ties of Croatia to Austria and Germany as
an important location determinant. A large number of experts confirm that a
common history, architecture, land registration, schools, and some language el-
ements remain in the minds of many Austrians and Croatians; these influences
especially seem to continue to exist in Vienna on the one hand where emi-
grants from former Yugoslavia represent the largest minority717 and in North-
ern Croatia on the other hand where some experts identify a certain nostalgia
with respect to the era of the Austrian empire.718 Experts also recognize con-
tinued ties with Germany. This is particularly true in the case of to Bavaria
that recently opened a representation office. Germany’s active role in Croatia’s
struggle for independence also plays an important role in this context.719
Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007) however also points out that –
despite a certain subconscious cultural and sociological consensus – cultural ties
are only of limited relevance for doing business in Croatia on a daily basis or
in public tenders.720 Like in Romania personal ties seem to play a significant
role for MNCs in their first interest for Croatia but also for later business
operations. Various experts give accounts of contacts to Croatia even before
the investment decision721 and various experts interviewed with Croatian roots
716 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. German Authority III (2007).
717 In Germany many Croatians live in Bavaria, officially more than 50K of which more
than half live in Munich, see Bayerisches Landesamt fu¨r Statistik und Datenverarbeitung
(2007).
718 See e. g. Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
719 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications
(2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007).
720 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
721 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
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lived in German-speaking countries before moving or returning to Croatia due
to business opportunities.722
These personal ties seem to be the only proximity aspect that is less recog-
nized by state experts than by company experts.
In the assessment of the proximity determinant it seems conclusive that the
short geographic distance to the analyzed home countries and its geographic
location are attractive factors in favor of Croatia. It may in fact compensate for
other potential policy and non-policy deficiencies and explain to some extent
why Croatia has accumulated a fairly high FDI stock per capita.723
It seems that the access to other markets is more important for Croatia
than, for instance, for Romania. Perhaps, tastes and demands may be more
similar in the countries of former Yugoslavia than in countries like Romania im
comparison to Ukraine.
While the importance of personal ties seem comparable for Romania and
Croatia, the general cultural ties are apparently even more important for in-
vestors considering Croatia as investment location than those interested in
Romania. One reason may be that Croatia is also popular and better known as
tourist a destination. Furthermore, cultural ties to Croatia seem to be more im-
portant for Austria than for Germany. The interviews have however generated
doubts whether these ties are not mainly important to raise a first interest of
MNCs for Croatia; in subsequent steps of their country selection other aspects
– to be discussed in subsequent sections – become more decisive for their final
investment in favor or against Croatia.
The question is furthermore how sensitive FDI reacts to proximity. As shown
in figure 39 several other locations are fairly close to Vienna and Berlin as well
but show diverging FDI performance and Resmini (2000), for example, also
722 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real
Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007).
723 See Altomonte (1998); Disdier and Mayer (2003); Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004).
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doubts that the relative advantage among closely located countries is actually
significant for Western European MNCs. Therefore, other determinants such
as infrastructure may be important interdependent factors for proximity.724
(4) Other aspects that may be potential non-policy determinants for Croa-
tia are trade openness, agglomeration and natural resources.
No clear correlation between trade openness and FDI inflows can be rec-
ognized for Croatia based on primary and secondary sources. In line with the
interviews the analyzed FDI studies either show no significant effect725 or con-
clude that it is unclear if FDI influences trade or vice versa.726 This evaluation
is also supported by the fact that statistics show that trade volumes have con-
stantly been rising since 2000, while FDI inflows to Croatia were subject to
strong oscillations. By contrast, various interviewed state experts notice that
FDI has positive effects on Croatian exports, namely in the Free Economic
Zone in Varazˇdin as the most striking example where 95% of the produced
goods are export-oriented.727 They also see a lot of potential for FDI to further
boost exports in the future.728 Yet, it is questionable if the success of Varazˇdin
is representative for the development in Croatia which will also depend on the
progress of domestic companies to benefit from FDI spillovers – as already
discussed in section 2.2.2 – by creating greater export capacities themselves.
Most investors interviewed do not see agglomeration as important for a
decision in favor of Croatia. The examples of a German who was among the
first investors in Varazˇdin, and of the acquisition of the HT by the Deutsche
Telekom show that investments neither depend on the existence nor on the
724 See section 7.3.2.3.
725 See Smarzynska (2002); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
726 See Resmini (2000).
727 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
728 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv.
Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
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anticipated future presence of other investors.729 By contrast, Croatian state
representatives are more convinced that the existence of companies attracts
further companies, for example, for add-on operations and R&D activities for
existing investors or in clusters like Varazˇdin.730
Overall, agglomeration seems more a desired goal of state representatives and
less in line with the actual investment approach of MNCs in Croatia. This also
leads to a more skeptical view of the analyzed FDI studies identifying positive
agglomeration effects, even though Croatia-specific results are scarce.731
With respect to its natural resources Croatia has limited deposits of oil,
gas, coal, bauxite, iron ores, calcium, silica, clays, and salt. It also benefits from
its access to the Adriatic Sea and about 2M hectare of forests.732
According to the experts Croatia’s most important resource is its landscape,
especially its long coast line which is the basis for the tourism industry but
also one of the reasons why foreign investors appreciate living in Croatia. Some
experts also mention that tourism has a future potential, for example in the
large untouched areas in the up-country of the coast.733 Other investors point
out that Croatia relied for too long on its attractive natural conditions without
developing comprehensive development strategies.734 Experts anticipate that
Croatia will gain more strongly from its land through agriculture in the future.
The soil is good for farming, agriculture is not yet very advanced in Croatia,
and demand in Europe is also rising.735
729 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007); see for a different perspective Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
730 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv.
Croatian Ministry II (2007).
731 See Resmini (2000); but see also Krugman (1991); Fujita, Krugman, and Venables
(1999); Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999).
732 See Bulgaria Economic Forum (2006), p.9; Bfai (2004), pp.32-34, 84.
733 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
734 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
735 See section 6.3.1; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC
- Consulting (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Doc - Croatian Chamber of Comm.
Dubrovnik (2006).
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The high amount of FDI in tourism and the expert statements support those
FDI studies that find a correlation between natural resources and FDI inflows to
Croatia.736 Nevertheless, the overall effect of natural resources on FDI inflows
– for example with regards to tourism – seems to be closely linked to public
policy actions such as investment policies, privatization policies and property
rights that will be further discussed in chapter 7.
The assessment of these “other aspects” reveals that trade and agglomer-
ation only seem to have limited effects on FDI flows to Croatia. For trade it
seems that FDIs rather tend to influence trade (exports) than the other way
round; agglomeration is desired by policy makers, for example, in Varazˇdin
but does not seem to significantly influence investors’ decision. By contrast,
the natural endowments seem to be a major asset for Croatia. However, for
all of these determinants – and analogous to the Romanian case – it becomes
apparent that they are strongly dependent on other factors such as legal,
economic and political determinants.
(5) In conclusion this section has shown that the two most frequently cited
non-policy determinants according to FDI theory, market size and labor costs,
are aspects that are likely to represent disadvantages for Croatia even though
Croatia has been among the most attractive FDI recipients in Eastern Europe.
Among non-policy determinants proximity and natural resources seem to be
more important for Croatia. In this context the image of Croatia has been iden-
tified as a major aspect for the investment decision, being a beautiful country
with strong cultural ties to Germany and Austria that is an ideal bridge to
South-Eastern Europe. It seems that this positive image, attractive business
opportunities and favorable investment conditions can easily compensate for
deficiencies of Croatia in other areas. To what extent public policies have been
736 See Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001). Most studies however do not define
tourism as part of natural resources; see Merlevede and Schoors (2004).
6.4 Conclusion for transition countries 221
able to successfully support these determinants will be analyzed in chapters 7
and 8.
6.4 Conclusion for transition countries
This section draws conclusions for transition countries regarding (1) the eco-
nomic development, (2) the major non-policy determinants, (3) differences
between the state and company perspective, and (4) the characteristics of
non-policy factors.
(1) Transition countries experienced significant economic struggles after
the end of communism, often aggravated by country-specific challenges such
as political instability in Romania or even by war in Croatia. In result many
economic indicators performed poorly in most transition countries until the
end of the 1990s. After the end of the financial crisis and the opening of their
economies, transition countries seem to have experienced an upward trend in-
cluding higher FDI inflows, with Croatia as an example for developing moder-
ately but stable and with Romania as a prototype for starting off at lower level
but catching up at high speed in recent years culminating in EU accession.
(2) Various non-policy determinants were analyzed in this section.
Market size categories such as population, geographic size, GDP and GDP
growth do not seem to be of major importance for investors in transition coun-
tries in general. More important indicators are an increasing purchasing power
parity and high demand for Western products among consumers. Differences
may occur in terms of market definition (for example, in the definition of Ro-
mania as a rather isolated market and of Croatia as part of regional market).
Labor costs seem to be – at least at first glance – a potential driver for
the investment decision in transition countries. The importance of the factor
in the eyes of MNCs may vary depending on the labor share of investments,
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the risk-aversion and the strategic approach of the investors. Other factors,
such as political stability, skill level etc. may also compensate for higher wages.
Regional and sectoral differences in the host country may also lead to labor
cost deviations. Productivity seems to receive little attention from investors.
Particularly for fast-changing economies like Romania MNCs have difficulties
to forecast labor cost developments, and unexpected salary jumps may even
deter potential investors even though cost advantages may persist for many
more years.737
The importance of geographic distance seems to depend strongly on other
issues such as infrastructure even though some transition countries like Croa-
tia seem to benefit from the short distance to Western Europe. The varying
cultural proximity of transition countries to home countries seems to be a de-
terminant which investors are well aware. It is particularly appealing for a
first approach to a potential investment location. The importance of cultural
proximity seems to decrease, however, in later stages of the investment deci-
sion process.738 Furthermore, transition countries seem to strongly benefit from
personal ties to emigrants to Western Europe, mainly in the 1980s – a factor
that may be exploited further by public policy.
A clear interdependence of trade and FDI flows is difficult to determine for
transition countries. Diverging market entry strategies of MNCs and different
effects of public policies rather seem to indicate an only weak influence of
trade on FDI. It does appear likely, nevertheless, that trade may improve the
export capacities of transition countries.739 The presence of other companies
(agglomeration) does not seem to significantly influence investment decisions;
in any case the meeting of other conditions such as an attractive infrastructure
or investment incentives seem to be necessary as well.
737 See also Holland and Pain (1998); Pye (1998).
738 See also Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005).
739 See similar e. g. Resmini (2000).
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The possible exhaustion of natural resources such as base or precious metals
only seems to play a minor role FDI in transition countries740 except in the case
of some niche industries in some countries (like wood in Romania).741 Land-
scape in a more general sense on the other hand is perceived as an important
driver for FDI. Croatia is a good example of this; its specific natural advantages
such as a long coast line, mild climate and the many islands, represent a major
asset both as investment location but also as an attractive living location for
investors. Again, public policy still seems to have a strong influence as to how
far this advantage can be materialized into FDI.
(3) Several differences between company and state experts can be
identified for transition countries in general. From the perspective of MNCs,
image, perception and expectations are very important for the evaluation of
non-policy determinants. Furthermore, the reference point of their assessment
is decisive. This can be, for example, the home country, an existing opera-
tion in another EEC or the neighboring countries of the targeted host country.
The perception of MNCs may actually be misleading from time to time, for
example, by underestimating the distance of Romania versus Bulgaria or by
over-estimating labor costs in Croatia. The existence of a certain host country
image may also explain why non-policy factors seem more important for the
initial phase in MNCs’ investment decision process when a broader knowledge
of (particularly legal) investment conditions is still limited. Fostering certain
images and perceptions of investors in favor of host countries may be an inter-
esting and rewarding task for policy makers that will be further examined in
subsequent chapters.
Compared to state experts MNCs tend more to see interdependencies with
other factors and are more aware of regional differences (e. g. in terms of labor
740 Other measures like land size seem to represent a very rough proxy for natural resources;
see Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
741 See also Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001).
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costs). Interviews also underlined the somewhat more pragmatic approach of
MNCs that easily abandon concepts of cultural ties in later steps of their in-
vestment decision when factors like the availability of labor or infrastructure
come into play.
State experts tend to be more optimistic with respect to the impact of dif-
ferent non-policy factors. This is understandable since they are also promoters
of the success of economic policy and their interview participation can in a way
be understood as investment promotion itself. Generally, state representatives
do evaluate fairly realistically the limits of the impact of country determinants,
particularly regarding the limited significance of labor cost advantages for their
country. Interestingly, deviations between state and company experts seem to
be greater in Romania than in Croatia - an evaluation that will need to be
further assessed in subsequent chapters.
(4) This chapter has shown that non-policy factors alone can neither drive
FDI nor sufficiently explain oscillations of FDI inflows to transition countries.
First of all their importance depends on different market entry strategies or
modes; many MNCs have several or evolving strategies and may be exporting
and later also market-exploiting; some companies again may enter the market
via greenfield investments but participate in privatization auctions as well.
Secondly, this section has shown that country-specific deviations regarding
non-policy factors do exist, and the complex investment decision process of
MNCs can lead to rapid changes in the evaluation of these factors.
Thirdly and most importantly, the analyzed non-policy factors can only be
understood in the light of interdependent public policies driving the overall
decision for a specific location of MNCs.742 This chapter therefore confirms
the main idea of the theory of locational competition that countries are in
constant rivalry for mobile factors such as FDI; it also supports the finding
742 See Carstensen and Toubal (2004).
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that competition for FDI has become more intense in recent years. States may
actually have significant influence in creating locational advantages – within
their given conditions like market size and natural resources – in order to
attract FDI. In line with Siebert (2005) and hypothesis #2743 of this thesis
it seems apparent that the levers of public policy are indeed manifold. It can
be added that it is difficult for countries to determine the reference point and
the perception of investors on certain country determinants apart from the
data. How governments can actively influence the perception and the actual
conditions for FDI in transition countries and how successful these actions are,
will be discussed in the following chapter.
743 See section 1.1.
7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
This chapter analyzes public policy determinants with direct or indirect influ-
ence on investment conditions in Romania, Croatia and in transition countries
in general. Section 7.1 provides an introduction, followed by the analysis of
legal, economic and political measures (sections 7.2-7.4).
7.1 Introduction and analytical approach
Figure 40 presents the public policy determinants analyzed in this chapter.
The list of 14 determinants and 29 sub-determinant is the result of the pre-
defined list of FDI determinants from the theoretical part of this thesis as well
as a first revision of this list based on the content analysis of the expert in-
terviews and documents (chapter 5). It reflects all of those determinants and
sub-determinants that are considered more in detail by investors before invest-
ing in a transition country, namely Romania and Croatia. The categorization
into legal, economic and political measures enables a systematic approach to
analysis and a good understanding of the different actors and fields of FDI pol-
icy. The determinants are analyzed in a logical order. Legal measures follow the
steps of investment; they start out with the most general pre-conditions and
become more specific. Economic measures are also categorized according to
their increasing specification. They start with more indirect FDI policies (eco-
nomic stability) to policies that focus more directly on FDIs and MNCs such
as investment promotion. Political measures are ranged in order from policies
focused on a national level to measures aiming more at an international level.
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The analysis follows similar patterns like the one for non-policy determinants
of the previous chapter:
• Definition of the determinants from the investor’s perspective
• Analogous determinant analysis for Romania and Croatia
– Analysis of the performance of the determinants and sub-
determinants based on expert statements (including documents
and the analysis of deviations between company and state perspec-
tive), secondary literature, FDI studies, and international statistics
– Analysis of the importance of the determinants and sub-
determinants on the investment decision of MNCs (based on the
same sources as above)
• Generalizations for transition countries and reflection of FDI theory
7.2 Legal measures
This section analyzes legal measures influencing conditions for FDI in transi-
tion countries, namely market access (7.2.1), property rights (7.2.2), quality of
bureaucracy (7.2.3), legal certainty (7.2.4) as well as labor law (7.2.5). Section
7.2.6 provides an overview of the results of this section.
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Figure 40: Country determinants - order of analysis
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7.2.1 Market access
7.2.1.1 Definition
Easy market access is defined by investors as ease of initiating a business in a
host country and lack of major legal or bureaucratic obstacles. More specifically,
they may expect for Romania (7.2.1.2) and Croatia (7.2.1.3) that (1) corporate
law offers sufficient possibilities, (2) company registration is straightforward
and quick, and (3) joint ventures are possible and generally seem to succeed.
For all areas MNCs will expect equal treatment compared to domestic investors.
Sub-sections (4) provide short country conclusions and section 7.2.1.4 derives
results for transition countries in general.744
7.2.1.2 Romania
(1) Expert interviews and documents, secondary sources as well as FDI studies
and international statistics reveal that Romania’s corporate law (a) has un-
dergone significant improvements, (b) is no major concern for MNCs today (c),
only leaves minor problems, and (d) is overall only of limited importance for the
investment decision of MNCs for Romania. Section (e) provides an assessment.
(a) Romania has achieved significant improvements regarding its corpo-
rate law. It was first established in 1990 based on French law and underwent
major revisions, namely in 1997 and 2003.745 Accordingly, equal treatment of
Romanian and foreign investors was established and foreigners became eligi-
ble as board members or managing directors in Romanian companies without
any restrictions.746 While the period between 2001 and 2004 saw 24 revisions
in corporate law legislation, regulations became more stable and predictable
744 See also OECD (2005a), pp.11-12; World Bank (2005), p.23; OECD (2006a), pp.31, 48.
745 See Laws no. 31/1990, 195/1997 and 359/2004.
746 Maximum share rules for foreigners were also abandoned; see European Commission
(2005c), p.46; Mu¨ller (2005), pp. 149 and 156; Tripon (2003), p.45; BA-CA (2006),
p.31; Dresdner Bank (2004), p.22; Menzer (2005).
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after 2004.747 It seems that remaining major deviations from Western Euro-
pean standards have been eliminated since EU accession. Notable improve-
ments identified by the experts interviewed since 2006 are, for example, the
introduction of supervisory boards and various amendments with respect to
stock corporations including more flexible control systems.748
(b) Expert interviews reveal that Romania’s corporate law is today no ma-
jor concern of potential investors since the possible company forms are suffi-
cient and quite similar to regulations in Austria and Germany.749 MNCs gener-
ally choose the Societatea cu raspudere limitata (S.R.L.), the Romanian limited
liability corporation, which is seen as the most convenient type of company, par-
ticularly for greenfield investments, because it is more flexible and comfortable
than, for example, a non-incorporated or a stock corporation, the Societatea
pe actiuni (S.A.).750
(c) Based on the experience of the experts, only minor problems with
corporate law remain, for instance when investors lack a clear business idea
and do not know what kind of company to establish751, or in the interpretation
of some of the new regulations such as the exact requirements of supervisory
boards. The missing possibility to establish partnerships has not been a problem
for investors so far but could be a challenge with an increasing number of
craftsmen coming to Romania.752
747 See Law no. 441/2006 and Government Emergency Ordinance no. 82/2007; see also
Pachiu & Associates (2007); The National Trade Register website (2008); Tripon (2003),
p.45.
748 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services
(2007).
749 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal
Services II (2007).
750 E. g. entrepreneurs can take more influence in an S.R.L. than in an S.A.; see Intv. Austr.
MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv.
German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007).
751 See Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
752 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
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(d) The overall importance of corporate law for the investment decision of
MNCs for Romania appears to be limited, particularly since legal deviations be-
tween Romania and other Eastern European EU members are negligible since
Romania’s EU accession. Furthermore, MNCs encounter comparable advan-
tages in most transition countries such as commonalities to Western European
law systems and disadvantages such as frequently changing legislations un-
til the early 2000s.753 Finally, interviews suggest that potential corporate law
problems can easily be outsourced to lawyers and accountants.754
(e) The assessment of primary and secondary sources likewise suggests that
Romania is performing well in terms of corporate law – despite some room for
minor improvements. Romanian public policy actors may have only limited
possibilities to use corporate law as differentiating factor to other Eastern
European EU members; they may however, elaborate differences and highlight
Romania’s advantages in this field in comparisons with non-EU locations such
as Ukraine and Serbia as part of an active locational competition.
(2) The analysis of Romania’s company registration shows that (a) con-
ditions were unsatisfying until 2004, but (b) have significantly improved since
then, even though (c) some issues remain. The (d) importance of the determi-
nant has meanwhile decreased. Section (e) assess the findings.
(a) According to the experts interviewed755 but also to external studies756,
company registration was still a substantial barrier to investment until
2004 in Romania. Procedures were very slow, complicated and required exten-
sive documentation. Deviations from ordinary registrations such as the change
of the production site were particularly time-consuming. Ordinary registration
753 See similar also CICD (2006); OECD (2006a).
754 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III
(2007).
755 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I
(2007).
756 See FIC (2002), p.8; EBRD (2005b), p.20; Mu¨ller (2005), p.156.
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of foreign companies took an average of three months and never less than one
month at that time.757
(b) Experts and external sources see significant improvements in the reg-
istration conditions since 2003/ 2004 when several breakthrough regulations
were passed that led to a simplification of registration formalities, a clearer
distinction between company registration and business operations and to the
introduction of an electronic registration system.758 The National Trade Reg-
ister Office became a public institution under the Ministry of Justice and re-
sponsible for registration procedures as a so-called one-stop shop.759 The es-
tablishment of the National Agency for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
and Co-operatives and simplifications for SME registrations were further steps
towards an easier market access.760
As a result expert interviews confirm that company registration has become
simpler, faster and cheaper with equal rights for foreigners as for domestic in-
vestors.761 Company registration is now “one of the most unbureaucratic acts
in Romania”762 requiring only six documents for a common one-man S.R.L.763
Registration time has been brought down to three to 14 days according to
experts’ experiences and averaging about one week. An austrian MNC inter-
viewed even had its company registered within one day in a Free Economic
Zone.764
757 See also Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); more positive: Intv. German
Authority IV (2007).
758 See most importantly Law no. 359/2004.
759 See Emergency Government Ordinance 129/2002; OECD (2006a), p.154.
760 See OECD (2005d), pp.13, 46; BA-CA (2006), p.33; Zu¨hlke (2006).
761 See Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007);
Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv.
Austr. Research Institute (2007).
762 Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); see also Intv. German Authority I (2007).
763 See Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
764 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal
Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal
Services I (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
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Experts also assess company registration in Romania positively because it
is not expensive. According to Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007) a
regular company set-up costs between e1,000 and e1,200 in 2007 including all
fees for lawyers.765
How unbureaucratic and fast company registration has become, is also un-
derlined in a regional comparison. Figure 41, based on World Bank’s “Ease of
Doing business” survey766, confirms by and large the figures of the interviewees
and shows that Romania has the second fastest average registration time (14
days) among 19 Eastern European states and is therefore significantly faster
than neighboring countries such as Ukraine (27 days) or Bulgaria (32 days).
Moreover, in only two Baltic states do companies fewer procedural steps than
in Romania (5 versus 6). This position is indeed remarkable considering Ro-
mania’s poor performance only two years earlier when it still took 28 days to
register a company according to the same survey767 and even longer according
to some of the experts interviewed.
(c) Experts agree however, that some problems remain. Particularly com-
pany experts mention that professional external help is a precondition for com-
pany registration to be as easy as described. Lawyers, accountants or local
specialized firms that know where to go and what documents are required are
used by all large and also most smaller MNCs.768 Company experts also find
more other remaining registration problems than state experts; for example,
registration is not possible without a residence in the country which foreign-
ers usually do not have. To circumvent this problem MNCs often take official
765 See also Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
766 See World Bank (2007a), data between April 2006 and June 2007; see also CICD (2006).
767 Figures for January 2004; see World Bank (2004b), p.249; also confirmed in OECD
(2005a).
768 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007).
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Figure 41: Company registration in Eastern Europe
residence in their lawyers’ office in the first phase until registration is com-
pleted.769 The low minimum amount for the registration of a S.R.L. of only
e65770 can also be regarded as a downside since this may attract less serious
and credible market participants which could endanger the trust of clients,
banks and external observers771 and, in the end weaken the reputation of the
entire economy.
Regarding the registration time experts also note that rural administrations
tend to be faster than urban ones and that the speed of the registration for other
769 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
III (2007).
770 See PI Partners (2007).
771 See similar Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
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company forms but S.R.L. may still be significantly slower.772 Finally, some
experts criticize a lacking transparency regarding the closure of a company.773
(d) The evaluation of the importance of the company registration pro-
cess for the MNCs investment decision appears to be controversial. A smooth
company registration is viewed by many state representatives774 and various
publications of international organizations775 as a very important FDI determi-
nant for Romania. However, company experts interviewed776 but also several
FDI studies for Romania777 and for transition countries in general778 rather
suggest that short and unbureaucratic registration procedures per se have not
been an FDI enhancing factor for Romania. Since 2004 a registration of, for
example, less than two weeks rather seems to be a “nice to have”779 but less
as something that determinedly influences the locational decision for Romania.
On the contrary however, a bad registration performance may have been an
important constraining factor for MNCs when deciding whether to invest in
Romania. An example is provided by the early 1990s when registration for one
out of three companies took longer than six months.780 It therefore seems that
Romanian public policy makers had to establish a minimum set of company
registration rules in order to reach a certain level at which company registration
turned from a negative and important factor to a positive and less important
factor.
772 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
773 See e. g. Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
774 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
775 See and OECD (2006a); World Bank (2005); OECD (2005d).
776 See Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services
I (2007).
777 See Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993).
778 See Kalotay (2000); UNCTAD (1998).
779 Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
780 The highest share of the six analyzed EECs by Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993); see
also for transition countries in general also Kalotay (2000); te Velde (2001).
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Furthermore, it seems that successful company registration rules may indeed
have significant impact on MNCs’ decision, but only in indirect terms and
with respect to the perception of Romania as investment location. It seems
that “registration time is something companies look at”781, because it gives
hints about the quality of administration in general.782 Transparent and quick
procedures may suggest – justified or not – that subsequent administrative
barriers are low as well and that doing business is easy in Romania. A good
performance at these first contacts with investors seems to help particularly
with German investors who tend to be skeptical regarding the quality of the
Romanian bureaucracy.783
(e) In conclusion this section elucidated that concise reform efforts – such
as the streamlining of processes and institutional concentration – generated
remarkable improvements even in a short period of time that have made
company registration in Romania very attractive even in regional terms. This
success is also not substantially watered down by the need for external help for
registration since foreigners will ask for assistance in most cases anyway, for
example, in order to avoid language problems. The consideration of interviews
has particularly helped to understand the mechanisms of the changing impor-
tance of company registration as FDI determinant. Public policy makers should
further analyze its indirect impact on Romania’s (still ambiguous) image and
become even more aware of the significance of the registration procedure as the
generally first encounter of MNCs with Romanian authorities and therefore as
business card of the country.784
(3) Before accessing the Romanian market, MNCs sometimes consider joint
ventures as possible form of cooperation. The analysis of primary and sec-
781 Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
782 See also Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
783 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
784 See also for the discussion of image promotion section 7.3.5.
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ondary sources discloses that (a) MNCs were rather skeptical towards joint
ventures in the past, (b) they may succeed today if certain requirements are
met, (c) but even today many problems persist; however the (d) overall impor-
tance of them is limited for MNCs. Section (d) presents an assessment.
(a) Expert interviews reveal that joint ventures have never been a predom-
inant investment form but were more frequent in the past.785 They assume
that joint ventures may have been a first step of investment to Romania for
some investors, but MNCs tended to decide in favor of greenfield investment
once their comfort level regarding the investment conditions and legal certainty
in Romania started to rise.786 FDI studies found for the early 1990s that the
“lack of managerial mentality”787 was one of the greatest problems for success-
ful joint ventures in Romania.
(b) Today joint ventures aremainly used when MNCs want to explore the
Romanian market since sourcing remains difficult without market knowledge.
MNCs often cooperate, for example, with food producers and in projects where
the state is involved such as in Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) supporting
R&D activities.788 Successful joint ventures require, according to several ex-
perts, that they focus on specific projects, that rules and inputs are clearly
defined, that foreign investors avoid becoming a minority stake holder, and
that they involve country experts who can mediate between the different par-
ties from the beginning.789
(c) Even today MNCs seem to often decide against joint ventures be-
cause they want to avoid unclear property situations790 or damage to their
785 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
786 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
787 Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993).
788 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv.
Romanian Econ. Association I (2007).
789 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv.
German Econ. Association II (2007).
790 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
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reputation due to quality issues with their Romanian partners.791 Interviews
partly confirm earlier FDI studies and indicate that German entrepreneurs in
particular seem to have problems in establishing relationships of trust with
Romanian companies because of the different (business) mentality of domestic
companies. MNCs have repeatedly made the experience that Romanian firms
do not fulfill everything or do not use money the way they agreed to. Experi-
ences of investors show that Romanians tend to want to distribute all profits
from the beginning whereas MNCs are more interested in re-investing (some
of the) profits.792 Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007) even concludes
that they “have not accompanied a single Romanian-German joint venture that
was successful so far.”
(d) Since there is no legal obligation to form joint ventures in order to access
the Romanian market, experts interviewed only see limited importance of
joint ventures as country determinant for Romania so far. They do not assess
the above mentioned problems as deterrence for FDI to Romania because other
possible market entry forms like acquisitions or greenfield investments help to
circumvent these problems and because past investments rather focused on
efficiency-seeking FDI.793
(e) In the assessment of joint ventures it becomes apparent that a good
legal framework alone is not sufficient to overcome differences in business
mentality between Romanian and Western European entrepreneurs. One ap-
proach to make joint ventures more successful could be the creation of more
rigid rules and, for example, making an external mediator compulsory. On the
other hand, additional rules may cause additional (opportunity) costs for the
791 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
792 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007);
see also Doc - DLA Piper (2006).
793 Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007) mentions China as example for often mandatory
joint ventures; see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Doc - Austr. MNC -
Industrial Goods III (2005).
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companies and make joint ventures less attractive. In any case it seems worth-
while for public policy makers in Romania – but also for academic study that
widely neglects this topic – to analyze the future potential for joint ventures,
particularly considering the increasing opportunities for MNCs to exploit the
Romanian market in cooperation with domestic partners since EU accession,
for example in retail.
(4) In conclusion Romania’s legal but also actual market access conditions
have significantly improved in recent years. The conducted interviews have
helped to interpret secondary sources and FDI studies in a more comprehensive
way and understand that market access has developed from a rather constrain-
ing determinant to a neutral or even (indirectly) enhancing determinant for
Romania.
7.2.1.3 Croatia
(1) The analysis of Croatia’s corporate law based on primary as well as
secondary sources discloses that (a) Croatia already established high standards
early in its transition, (b) investors are satisfied with the current conditions and
(c) that corporate law in Croatia has only little importance for the investment
decision of investors. Section (d) provides an assessment.
(a) Croatia’s corporate law was already largely established early in its
transition (1993) based on German and Austrian company laws.794 Most im-
portant legal forms for MNCs are the limited liability company (Drusˇtvo s
ograniˇsenom odgovornosˇc´u (d.o.o.)) and the joint stock corporation (Dionicˇko
drusˇtvo (d.d.)). In contrast to other countries of the region such as Romania,
the Croatian corporate law has already provided various possibilities of part-
nerships for many years.795 Amendments in 1999, 2004 and 2006 led to further
794 See Law no. 111/1993; see Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.7.
795 See APIU (2006b), p.29; OECD (2005a), p.18.
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harmonizations with EU law and led among others thing to a simplification
and acceleration of bankruptcy procedures.796
(b) Today, company and state experts interviewed regarding FDI in Croa-
tia do not see any important obstacles in Croatia’s corporate law for
foreign investors. MNCs seem to be satisfied with the possibilities corporate
law offers797 and particularly German and Austrian companies seem familiar
with regulations since they are to about 80% identical to their home legisla-
tion.798 Experts also point out that requirements are the same for domestic
and foreign investors for company set-ups799 with exceptions only for com-
panies from non-members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) without
reciprocal agreements.800 Overall, the European Commission also finds that
Croatian corporate law is “largely aligned with the acquis”801 and interviewed
state representatives expect the closure of the respective EU accession negoti-
ation chapter by 2008.802
(c) Experts interviewed only see limited importance of the corporate law
for MNCs’ decision to go to Croatia. First of all they only find few problems
and the remaining issues can easily be outsourced to local lawyers.803 Moreover,
corporate law is not an enhancing factor for Croatia, either; MNCs interested
in Croatia seem to expect a good performance from Croatia in this field close
to Western European level anyway and the existing conditions meet their ex-
pectations but they also do not exceed them.
796 See e. g. Intv. European Institution (2007); see also APIU (2006b), p.30; European
Commission (2005a), p.56; Dresdner Bank (2004), p.7.
797 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team
(2007).
798 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007).
799 See Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Intv. Croatian Econ. Association (2007).
800 See APIU (2006b), p.40; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003a), p.6.
801 European Commission (2007a), p.29.
802 See Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
803 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
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(d) Interviews confirm the assessment based on secondary sources that
Croatia has established a reliable corporate law framework. The goal for public
policy in Croatia will be to close the respective EU negotiation chapter as
quickly as possible in order to level out remaining gaps to competing Eastern
European EU members.
(2) With respect to company registration Croatia has (a) performed
rather poorly in the past and (b) recent reforms also seem to have generated (c)
only limited improvements. Nevertheless, (d) experts do not seem to perceive
company registration very negatively and only find (e) limited importance for
the investment decision of MNCs. Section (f) assesses this section.
(a) Various external reports804 and expert statements805 confirm that com-
pany registration in Croatia was very cumbersome only a few years ago; it
was complex, required on average 13 procedures and interaction with many
different authorities, and took on average 50 days until completion.806
(b) It is undeniable that Croatia has initiated significant reforms in re-
cent years to improve company registration procedures.807 Selective improve-
ments started in 2003 when registration simplifications for SMEs and craft
professions were launched. The introduction of a single identification number
for companies for all official matters also seems rewarding.808 Both expert809
and secondary sources810 indicate however, that the most significant step of
reform in this context has been the establishment of the service unit Hitro
as single access point for companies at FINA, Croatia’s financial agency, in
804 See Dresdner Bank (2004), p.7; Bfai (2004), p.58.
805 See e. g. Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
806 See World Bank (2004a).
807 See also World Bank (2007b); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b).
808 See European Commission (2005a), p.45; Ministry of Economy (2006), p.3; OECD
(2006a); OECD (2005a), pp.28, 56; see also Doc - EU Commission Zagreb (2007).
809 See e. g. Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Doc - EU
Commission Zagreb (2007).
810 See UNCTAD (2006); European Commission (2005a); OECD (2005a).
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2005.811 It seems that the bundling of processes in one institution has already
led to somewhat quicker processes, better communication between public and
private sectors and less possibilities for corruption.812 A major advantage for
MNCs in this context seems to be that all procedures are now dealt with by
one agency813 and that online services assist the registration process.814
A few experts interviewed conclude that Hitro has been one of the most
important reforms of Croatia in recent years and that implementation is going
well so far.815 Most experts point out however, that it is too early to evaluate
the performance of Hitro or even observe that it has only had limited impact
so far816 and that registrations directly via Hitro still seem to be less common
than through external providers.817 Looking at differences between company
and state experts it is interesting to see that both groups acknowledge the
establishment of Hitro, but some state experts are more skeptical regarding the
authority’s impact than most company experts are.818 State representatives
may be little content with a new authority such as Hitro that may weaken
existing organizations. Perhaps state representatives also anticipate that the
incorporation of Hitro as a dependent unit into FINA may obstruct drives to
increase efficiency. The financial agency is a huge apparatus with more than
5,000 employees and strongly influences the registration process.819 FINA may
be predominantly interested in concentrating administrative power but because
of its sheer size, incapable of initiating and implementing significant efficiency
gains.
811 The improvements due to Hitrorez will be discussed in section 7.2.3.
812 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real
Estate (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007); see
similar Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
813 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
814 See Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
815 See e. g. Intv. European Institution (2007).
816 See Intv. German Authority II (2007) .
817 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
818 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
819 See FINA (2006); APIU (2006b), p.31.
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(c) Despite these mentioned reforms, international statistics show that Croa-
tia’s registration performance continues to be mediocre considering its
long duration (40 days) with only three EECs behind Croatia and many pro-
cedures (eight) (figure 41).820 Studies evaluate company registration still as far
from optimal and Croatia’s goal to register companies within three days by
2008 as very challenging.821 Major reasons for the slow registration seem to
be the overloaded commercial courts and the shortage of judges822, but maybe
also the limited distinction between registering a firm and authorizing business
activities.823
Further registration problems from the experts’ experiences are that a Croa-
tian name is mandatory for the investor’s company824 and that equity transac-
tions need to be registered in only one month.825 External sources assume that
registration without a lawyer is basically impossible826 and interviews at least
confirm that external help is used most of the times in order to avoid prob-
lems with language and access to authorities.827 Last but not least, starting a
business is fairly expensive in Croatia. Total costs of starting a d.o.o. add up
to 12% of Croatia’s GDP per capita, making Croatia the 15th most expensive
of 19 EECs.828
(d) It may appear astonishing that the perception of quite a few experts
is more positive than international statistics would suggest.829 Even though
some experts evaluate registration as lengthy830 several others do not think it
820 See World Bank (2007a).
821 See also Jansson (2006a); CICD (2006), p.29; OECD (2005a), p.27.
822 See OECD (2005a), p.45.
823 The dealing with permits and licenses will be analyzed in section 7.2.3.
824 This is supposed to change in 2008; see Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
825 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
826 See OECD (2005a), p.45.
827 See Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
828 Costs include all official fees; see World Bank (2007b); see also OECD (2005a), p.45;
Bulgaria Economic Forum (2007), p.52; APIU (2006b).
829 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
IV (2007).
830 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
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is very time-consuming831 and the vast majority of experts agree that regis-
tration time and procedures have clearly improved compared to a few years
ago.832 Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007) even expresses that com-
pany registration has been a strength of Croatia. Moreover, experts generally
state registration times that tend to be below official statistics for Croatia.833
On the one hand different interpretations may depend on the experience of the
MNCs in the market. Experienced MNCs have been involved in Croatia for
many years, work with many local managers, are large in size, and may there-
fore have fewer problems with authorities.834 On the other hand, MNCs rarely
seem to attempt registering without external help in Croatia, also because of
the intensive work of some of the foreign Chambers of Commerce like the Ger-
man one that annually accompanies 15-20 registrations.835 MNCs therefore do
not necessarily experience the problems and obstacles themselves since they
outsource all related tasks.
(e) Secondary sources and the many governmental activities in this field
since 2005 would imply that company registration is of major importance
for Croatia, particularly for state actors. Most interviewees however contend
that company registration is not of great importance for investors in their
decision in deciding for or against Croatia.836 Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal
Services (2007) points out that the time to register a company is mainly a
political issue and “investors do not really care whether their company will be
831 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association
II (2007).
832 See e. g. Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); Intv. European Institution
(2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
833 With an average of 3 to 4 weeks instead of 5 to 6 weeks as suggested by World Bank
(2007a); see also Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC -
Construction (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ.
Association II (2007).
834 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
835 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering
(2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
836 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering
(2007).
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registered overnight or within one month” because their investment decision
is driven by long-term perspectives. A shorter company registration time is
therefore only one piece of an overall reform framework but not substantial
“as long as registration does not take six months”837. Intv. Austrian Econ.
Association II (2007) even assumes that the strong emphasis on Hitro may
lead to a negligence of more important areas of the business environment.
In contrast to most studies of international organizations838 and some FDI
studies839, expert interviews also generate some doubts as to whether significant
improvements in terms of registration time would lead to higher FDI inflows.
Even indirect positive effects, for example, by creating a better image of the
bureaucracy as a whole (as discussed for Romania), seem uncertain, since even
state experts are skeptical regarding the potential of Croatian authorities to
reform.
(f) In the assessment of Croatia’s company registration procedures, it
seems that the establishment of Hitro has not led to significant improvements
so far. By contrast, good self-marketing of the Croatian government and MNCs’
stronger focus on other determinants for the investment decision may be the
reasons why criticism of the mediocre performances has remained limited.
Considering the strong progress in neighboring countries public policy actors
may, nevertheless, have to further streamline respective processes in order to
avoid that company registration becomes a locational disadvantage for Croatia.
(3) This section examines joint ventures in Croatia. While (a) the legal
possibilities seem sufficient, (b) MNCs’ experiences with joint ventures and
(c) their importance for FDI tend to vary by sector. Section (d) provides an
assessment.
837 Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); similar Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); see
for a more positive assessment Intv. European Institution (2007).
838 See EBRD (2005a); OECD (2006a); World Bank (2005); UNCTAD (1998).
839 Despite the lack of explicit statements for Croatia; see e. g. Kalotay (2000).
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(a) Business partners can choose from different legal types of joint ven-
tures depending if the partners want to establish a legal entity or not.840 Expert
interviews confirm that these possibilities are generally sufficient for their ac-
tivities.841
(b) Expert interviewees reveal that MNCs’ experiences with joint ventures
depend on the business sector. While joint ventures in construction, for exam-
ple, seem to be common and to run without major difficulties842, problems in
other areas such as the banking sector or in the production of industrial goods
may be more frequent and often even lead to failures.843 Different expectations
and business mentalities seem to make establishing and implementing common
statutes challenging.844 Apart from the interaction with Croatian firms, MNCs
often seem frustrated by Croatian authorities in this context. They often per-
ceive that authorities give local companies preferential treatment; examples are
the evaluation of assets or the distribution of work shares and responsibilities
in public tenders that involve joint ventures.845 Furthermore, company experts
seem to be more aware of difficulties with joint ventures than state experts, as
suggested by the content of the interviews but also by the fact that company
experts were more likely to speak unprompted about these difficulties in the
semi-structured interviews.846
(c) The importance of joint ventures seems to be limited – similar to Roma-
nia – for the investment decision in most sectors, since other forms of market
entry such as acquisitions are possible and generally more rewarding.847 On
840 See APIU (2006b), p.29; OECD (2005a), p.18.
841 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
842 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
843 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products
(2007); Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
844 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
845 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007).
846 See e. g. Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007).
847 See e. g Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products
II (2007).
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the opposite, conditions for joint ventures are essential for the construction
industry but they generally meet the expectations of the investors.848
(d) In the assessment of this section it seems that the performance of
local authorities may be more important for the success of joint ventures in
Croatia than, for instance, in Romania. Public policy actors may thus work on
more transparent procedures whenever state actors are involved and improve
local training to increase equal treatment in the interaction with foreign and
domestic firms.
(4) In conclusion market access seems to be no major hurdle for investors
interest in the Croatian market even though deficiencies in company registra-
tion and partly regarding joint ventures leave room for further improvements.
However, interviews may have contributed to a more thorough interpretation
of the rather pessimistic picture of secondary sources. As a consequence, this
section provided numerous arguments suggesting that the importance of the
market access determinant is limited or even over-estimated for Croatia.
7.2.1.4 General insights for transition countries
This section presents generalizable results for transition countries regarding (1)
corporate law, (2) company registration, (3) joint ventures, (4) the importance
of market access as FDI determinant, and (5) the influence of state actors. This
section also discusses country-specific deviations from the analysis of Romania
and Croatia as well as misperceptions between MNCs and state actors.
(1) The analysis of Romania and Croatia as well as the evaluation of fur-
ther literature on transition countries reveals that satisfaction with corporate
law conditions seems to be present when regulations are based on Western
European standards, a harmonization with EU is at least initiated and when
848 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
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too frequent changes are avoided. Most transition countries seem to have made
serious improvements in this respect in recent years. As a result, MNCs seem
to be content with the flexibility and possibilities of corporate law in tran-
sition countries. In most cases conditions for domestic and foreign company
registration are also comparable.849
(2) Performance in company registration procedures seem to vary strongly
across transition countries with Romania and Croatia as two rather contrast-
ing examples. Benchmark indicators for good conditions in transition countries
seem to be a registration time of about two weeks, less than nine procedures
involved and costs that represent less than 6% of the host country’s GDP per
capita.850 Important drivers seem to be the establishment of legally binding
maximum response times for administrations and a distinction between the
company registration and business authorization process.851 Furthermore, on-
line registration may help facilitate the process; while their impact in transition
countries may not be fully visible so far, future positive effects can be expected
considering the successful experiences in other regions.852 Apparently the rising
number of international statistics also adds to awareness – state interviewees
frequently mentioned them –, transparency and a positive competition among
host countries for favorable investment conditions.
Even more crucial for a well functioning company registration process is
an effective organizational set-up. Many transition countries have opted for
one-stop shops that are generally interpreted as drivers for successful FDI pro-
motion.853 However, this section and various other studies show that success is
far from self-evident, especially when the establishment of the one-stop shops
849 See e. g. Sinn and Weichenrieder (1997); OECD (2005a); European Commission (2006b).
850 Figures reflect a current performance among the best of Eastern European transition
countries; see World Bank (2007a).
851 See e. g. OECD (2005a).
852 See e. g. for Asia Jacobs (2003); Japan Bank for International Cooperation (2002).
853 See e. g. UNCTAD (1998).
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does not remove underlying administrative barriers.854 The example of Croatia
also shows that a single authority can have a positive impact on a country’s
image but does not automatically lead to a reduction of required procedures
or registration time; at the worst one-stops may be an additional registration
hurdle.855 Governments may either establish a new authority or integrate the
one-stop shop in an existing authority.856 In any case, studies point out that
registration authorities need legal independence and skilled staff with a pos-
itive mindset towards entrepreneurship.857 Company registration seems quite
difficult without external help in transition countries and is usually outsourced
by MNCs. Private one-stops may often have good access to investors but seem
to lack adequate government authorities.858 By contrast in Romania, smaller
and cost-driven investors more frequently try to save money and conduct the
(fairly) easy company registration process themselves. In other countries the
need for external help may be a deterrence for smaller MNCs.
(3) For joint ventures transition countries tend to have an adequate general
legal framework in place. Nevertheless, joint ventures often seem to fail, partly
because of mentality differences as in Romania, or because of problems with
the implementation on the local administrative level as in Croatia. Due to these
experiences MNCs often prefer greenfield investments or acquisitions over joint
ventures.859 Public actors may invest in stricter rules of conducts or may even
make a mediator compulsory in order to promote this form of cooperation.
(4) The analysis of the importance of the market access for transition coun-
tries focuses on company registration and distinguishes between the general
business environment and the FDI inflows. It seems incontestable that a re-
fined registration process and low entry regulations are important for better
854 See e. g. Morisset and Neso (2002).
855 See also Rajan (2004); World Bank (2007a); UNCTAD (1999).
856 The often used investment promotion agencies will be discussed in section 7.3.5.
857 See UNCTAD (1999); OECD (2005a), p.24; OECD (2006a); OECD (2006b).
858 See Jacobs (2003); te Velde (2001).
859 See also UNIDO (2003); Lankes and Venables (1996); Ferencikova (2002).
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business conditions. Most transition countries have elaborated relevant agen-
das because they acknowledge that fast and transparent company registration
fosters private sector development and decreases corruption and grey market
economy.860
Various studies also see evidence that a smoother company registration and
the introduction of one-stop shops stimulates FDI inflows to host countries in
general861 and to transition countries in particular862 even though only few
FDI studies actually consider this factor.863
In some transition countries unfavorable registration conditions may indeed
have deterred potential investors from investing, for example in Romania in the
1990s.864 For most transition countries there seems to be a threshold of mini-
mum conditions that have to be met before the registration environment turns
from a constraining factor to a neutral or unimportant factor (as in Croatia).
Constraining factors could exist if corporate law rules provide unequal treat-
ments of domestic and foreign investors or if registration takes more than four
months.865 In some countries in transition a superior registration performance
may even have an enhancing effect, particularly in countries in which investors
are rather skeptical regarding investment conditions and the quality of adminis-
tration in general.866 Attractive conditions for MNCs may generate the expec-
tation of efficient subsequent administrative steps and even higher FDI inlows.
By contrast, in other transition countries such as Croatia a better performance
may have only limited impact since investors would probably expect fairly good
conditions there anyway. Nevertheless, a worse performance is unlikely to have
860 See e. g. OECD (2005a); UNCTAD (2002).
861 See e. g. Dunning (2002); Dunning (2005).
862 See Falcetti, Sanfey, and Taci (2003), p.21; Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer
(2001).
863 AHK (2006), for example, covers 26 factors but not market access.
864 See Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993).
865 See also te Velde (2001).
866 See also Kalotay (2000); OECD (2005a), p.11.
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a constraining effect on FDI flows, as long as Croatia’s registration conditions
does not dramatically deteriorate.867
Furthermore, registration time and costs may be important for SMEs and
those investors who want to start production as quickly as possible in order to
exploit the envisaged cost advantage.868
Overall, the direct importance of this determinant may be somewhat over-
estimated by international organizations and some state experts and – if a
certain threshold is reached – is rather a “nice to have” without decisively
influencing the investment decision of MNCs in favor of a specific transition
country.
(5) State actors have significant influence on the design of market access
to transition countries, particularly with regard to corporate law and company
registration, while they only seem to have limited possibilities to make different
forms of cooperation such as joint ventures successful. This analyses of this
section indicate that implementation is more crucial for transition countries
than the establishment of the legal environment and also requires more strategic
planning for the entire process and more and well-qualified staff than the draft
of the respective laws. Particularly the creation of a new authority as one-stop
shop may also cause rivalries among state authorities that encumber reforms.
Governments in transition countries also may not under-estimate the potential
of local authorities (as in Croatia) to actively influence market access conditions
in order to pursue their interest.869
On the other hand, state actors may not run the risk of neglecting other im-
portant fields of reform. Despite the advantages of a lean registration process it
is questionable whether laborious administrative efforts, for example, to reduce
867 E. g. with registration times longer than four months.
868 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods III (2007).
869 See also OECD (2005a), p.23.
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registration time by two days actually generate significant additional benefits
for companies.
Finally, it seems that favorable market access is an issue actively dealt with
by most transition countries in recent years regardless of their current transition
status or their integration with the EU. Romania, for example, initiated most
of the reform facilitating company registration before the reform wave aiming
at EU accession.
7.2.2 Property rights
7.2.2.1 Definition
Investors consider property rights in host countries like Romania (7.2.2.2)
and Croatia (7.2.2.3) to be favorable if (1) property laws provide satisfactory
rights for investors, (2) if land registration and (3) construction permit proce-
dures are quick and transparent. Sub-sections (4) provide country conclusions
and section 7.2.2.4 reveals findings for transition countries.870
7.2.2.2 Romania
(1) Expert interviews and documents as well as secondary sources suggest that
Romanian property law (a) was a key constraint for investors in the past,
(b) but significant reforms have been initiated since 2005 and (c) restitution
cases represent one of the few remaining obstacles. Overall, (d) the importance
of property law has decreased for MNCs’ investment decision. Sub-section (e)
comprises an assessment.
(a) Legal history shows that Romania’s property law and particularly for-
eigners’ right to purchase land has been a sensitive and very political topic since
the end of communism.871 The right to own property was originally based on
870 See for this section also OECD (2006b), p.13; World Bank (2004b), pp.1, 9, 85.
871 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.36
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Law no. 18/1991 but excluded – like the constitutional amendment of 2003 –
any equivalent rights for foreigners.872 Some state interviews suggest that prop-
erty rights were no major deterrence in the past after all, but interviews with
company experts on the contrary, reveal conclusively that sometimes MNCs
already present in Romania even warned potential investors of coming to the
country because of the worrisome property law situation.873 Accordingly, legal
access to property was still difficult for MNCs, restitution claims of property
from socialist times were frequent and the future of the legal development was
unsure until the early 2000s.874 As a consequence some investors decided to
rent instead of buying land and often chose a location in a free zone owned by
the state in order to avoid legal issues with former private owners.875
(b) According to the experts interviewed, Romania’s property law situa-
tion has significantly improved for MNCs since about 2005 when integration
towards the EU pressured Romania to liberalize its legislation. Experts recog-
nize improving conditions in property law for investors and also a decrease in
changes in regulations. Since EU accession in 2007 EU nationals and entities
with residency in Romania can acquire land in Romania under the same con-
ditions as Romanians876 and experts interviewed agree that complaints about
legal conditions for land and property purchase have become rare and no longer
represent an obstacle for investments.877 Many interviewees even perceive the
current conditions as fairly liberal.878 FDI studies and international statistics
872 Law no. 429/2003 and article 44 of the Romanian constitution.
873 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
874 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2007).
875 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see for a different approach Intv.
Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
876 See Law no. 312/2005; see also PI Partners (2007), p.65; Stalfort (2005).
877 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
VII (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
878 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
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also confirm the experts’ statements that Romania’s weak property rights per-
formance until the early 2000s879 and significantly improved by 2006 with a
BTI score of 9 out of 10 points (see figure 92 in appendix ).880
(c) According to both primary881 and secondary sources882, restitution
cases represent one of the remaining negative aspects of property law in Roma-
nia. Persisting problems in this context are the lack of consistency in jurispru-
dence and difficulties in the evaluation of land and property appreciation.883
These respective problems seem to have become somewhat less significant since
the introduction of a legal framework (Law no. 10/2001) and recent modi-
fications in accordance with EU demands. MNCs also seem less involved in
restitution disputes than in the past.884
A further remaining problem with property law is that EU citizens – unlike
companies – without residency in Romania are not permitted to purchase land
and farming land until five and seven years after EU accession respectively.885
And even after this period the purchase of land by foreigners can be limited by
Romanian authorities, for example, according to Government Ordinance (GO)
no. 92/97 that requires economic reasons for the land purchase by foreigners.886
(d) Overall, property law seems to have been quite an important constrain-
ing determinant for Romania from the expert’s view until the early 2000s,
particularly when investors wanted to start production quickly.887 This effect
879 See e. g. Pierpont (2007) for 2003 with Romania clearly trailing behind Hungary and
Poland; see also McGee (2003).
880 Only issues of outstanding implementation of the regulation regarding foreign ownership
seem to have prevented a full score; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006c).
881 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
882 See also OECD (2005d), p.49; Bfai (2005), p24; European Commission (2006e), p.4.
883 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I
(2007); see also Doc - GTZ (2006b).
884 See Law no. 247/2005; Brenscheidt (2006).
885 See PI Partners (2007), pp.65-66.
886 See BA-CA (2006), p.47; Dresdner Bank (2004), p.22.
887 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007); Doc - GTZ (2006b).
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described by company experts is also generally affirmed by UNCTAD (2004b)
and Pierpont (2007).
It seems however, that the alignment with EU law functioned as a threshold
for Romania, beyond which property law as country determinant for Romania
decreased in significance. This evaluation also casts doubts on the assertion of
some state representatives interviewed who even interpret the alignment with
EU law as a major determinant in favor of Romania.888
(e) An assessment of property law shows that Romania may have intro-
duced legal reforms too late for many risk-averse investors who decided to
rather invest in Hungary etc. in the 1990s. However, the prohibition of the
purchase of land by foreigners was probably not the greatest problem since
MNCs were able to circumvent regulatory problems fairly easily by establishing
a Romanian firm. Rather problems tended to occur after the land purchase
and involved issues that were interlinked with other determinants such as land
register and the legal system (see next sub-section and section 7.2.4). Public
policy should keep these interdependences in mind and may also focus on a fast
closure of all remaining restitution issues by setting clear dates for retroactive
claims.
(2) While the legal environment for property rights seems largely in place in
Romania, important deficiencies exist on the administrative level, namely re-
garding land registration.889 Some (a) general problems endure, even though
(b) regional differences exist and (c) some reforms have been initiated. Yet, (d)
Romania’s performance remains weak in this field which also has (e) significant
impact on land registration as determinant for FDI. An assessment is provided
in sub-section (f).
888 See Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
889 The same issues apply for property registration that also has to be executed by Roma-
nia’s Land Registry Office; see also World Bank (2007b).
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(a) Romania’s general problems with a functioning land registry and its
slow reform process were criticized from early on by external observers such as
the EU Commission.890 Experts interviewed were concerned that land registers
do not exist for every region, that entries are often ambiguous and not always
reliable.891
(b) In a regional comparison within Romania it seems that land regis-
tration is more transparent and more reliable in Transylvania, where a similar
system existed for many centuries, than in other parts of the country. These
regional differences may also stem from the fact that land registration has not
been seen as a task of central state authorities for a long time.892
(c) However, some improvements have been made recently, for example,
by introducing land registers, consistent regulations and an electronic registra-
tion system across the country.893 Furthermore, Law no. 247/2005 attempts a
further acceleration and simplification of the compilation process of the land
registers.894 As a result, experts notice that title checks are now somewhat
easier.895
(d) Nevertheless, Romania’s land registration performance remains weak.
Experts stress that trust in land registration is still limited, that legal verifica-
tion – also in Transylvania – is still necessary and that the situation is still not
comparable to Western Europe. Interviewees are also skeptical regarding the
success of the electronic land register since it is not certain that all cases and
890 See e. g. European Commission (1998), p.32; European Commission (1999), p.45; Eu-
ropean Commission (2003), p.67.
891 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail
(2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
892 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Consulting II (2007).
893 See e. g. Law no. 18/1995; Law no. 7/1996.
894 See Brenscheidt (2006); Dresdner Bank (2004).
895 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007);
Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
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communities have been covered yet.896 As for company registration, working
with internal897 or external lawyers898 seems necessary, not least to overcome
language barriers. Lawyers may also become essential when unclear ownership
status or counterfeited titles require lawsuits.899
The skepticism regarding the quality of the land registry process in Romania
by the interviewees is also reflected by international statistics. As presented in
figure 42 land or property registration takes 150 days in Romania (2006/2007)
and is a far quicker process in neighboring countries such as Bulgaria (19)
and Ukraine (93). Improvement since 2004 has been gradual (170 days).900 In
contrast, registration costs of property seem to be on the same level in Romania
as in the average of EECs (2.8% of the property value).
(e) While external studies tend to suggest that land registration is impor-
tant for FDI901, expert interviews can specify these findings for Romania.
Some interviewees, for instance, believe that the fairly good register situa-
tion is one reason for the strong focus of (German) investors on the Sibiu
region.902 The land register situation also appears to represent a key issue
for investors in Romania who frequently buy real estate or who want to start
production quickly.903 Interestingly, some investors may actually over-estimate
the importance of the land register issue. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
I (2007) reports, for instance, that German investors occasionally want too
many proofs regarding the ownership situation and occasionally even call off
896 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VI
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. German Political Adviser (2007).
897 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007).
898 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
I (2007).
899 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
900 See World Bank (2004b), p.249.
901 See e. g. for six transition countries Dale and Baldwin (2000); Pierpont (2007); Kikeri,
Kenyon, and Palmade (2006).
902 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007).
903 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
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Figure 42: Property registration in Eastern Europe
a planned investment despite fairly clear register entries. In contrast, other
investors, particularly Austrians, seem to be more willing to take risks.904
(f) In the assessment of Romania’s land registration performance it seems
unavoidable that public policy makes this field a key priority in their efforts
to establish a favorable environment for FDI in Romania. Only the creation
of a comprehensive and complete registration system will enable a more equal
distribution of FDI within Romania (see section 6.2.1). In addition to existing
studies, interviews show that public policy could pay more attention to the
specific needs of certain country groups, for example, by prioritizing reform
efforts (and maybe increasing staff) in regions of specific potential interest to
German investors.
904 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
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(3) Romania’s performance regarding construction permits905 seems to
be (a) quite satisfactory for investors, partly because (b) related procedures
are quite liberal; however, (c) regional deviations exist. Construction permits
seem to have an (d) average importance as an FDI determinant for Romania.
Sub-section (e) gives an assessment.
(a) Overall, Romania seems to perform fairly well on construction permit
procedures. Statistics indicate that it takes on average 30 days to receive a
permit. This puts Romania in a good position compared with competing EECs
such as Ukraine (30 days) and Hungary (60).906 Figures regarding building
permits should be handled with care since additional steps such as locational
permits907 may exist, which can lead to a difference in the total amount of
time necessary to complete the construction of any project, for instance, of
a plant. Nevertheless, various interviewees state that, overall, approvals seem
to be granted more quickly in Romania than, for example, in Germany or
Austria.908
(b) A further major advantage seems to be that construction regulations are
quite liberal. Experts interviewed refer to the fact that regulations have ba-
sically no restrictions regarding what may be built on the real estate.909 As a
consequence, constructions without permission seem to be rare.910 A downside
in this context is that some state decision sometimes seem arbitrary since ur-
ban development plans are often modified for short-term interests.911 Despite
flexible regulations MNCs also repeatedly run the risk of committing errors
905 Also called building permit; see World Bank (2007b).
906 Figures for 2006/2007; see World Bank (2007b).
907 E. g. locational permits are necessary in Croatia and in Ukraine; see World Bank
(2007b).
908 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007).
909 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
910 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007).
911 An example from Bucharest would be the change of designation of a park to construction
land; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
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because the provision of technical requirements differ from most Western Eu-
ropean countries. Thus many MNCs rely on external advisers or lawyers.912
(c) Particularly company experts pointed out that the speed of construction
permits in Romania seems to depend on the region or even on the community
in question.913 In some rural areas in Western Romania, for example, investors
had very positive experiences with easy processes and approval times of only six
weeks.914 In other regions construction permits still follow rather intransparent
procedures and can require up to six months. One example is in Bucharest
where delays are caused by the large work load of the administration.915
(d) FDI studies and international reports suggest that construction permit
procedures have an average importance for the FDI decision of MNCs in tran-
sition countries in general.916 Interviews confirm this evaluation for Romania,
suggesting that construction permits are seen as part of a set of permit proce-
dures that are unavoidable and laborious in most countries. Romania’s fairly
decent performance means that this aspect does not have a strongly deterring
effect on potential investors.
(e) In the assessment of its construction permit procedure Romania seems
to have attained an acceptable level in comparison with neighboring competing
countries. Furthermore, investors are generally already in the country when
they deal with these issues and will generally not pull out of the investment
anymore. Nevertheless, room for improvement remains including a further
streamlining of procedures and a better leverage of regional best practice
912 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V
(2007).
913 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
914 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
915 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007).
916 Insights for Romania are scarce; see for transition countries Coolidge (2003); De-
mekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005); Kikeri, Kenyon, and Palmade (2006); OECD
(2005a).
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experiences for cities like Bucharest.
(4) In conclusion property rights are a key determinant for the FDI deci-
sion of MNCs in Romania. The late introduction of reform measures has been
an important constraining factor, particularly for more risk-averse investors.
Earlier centralized measures to create a consistent framework would also have
helped to avoid regional disparities. The importance of the legal framework
may have decreased since Romania’s accession to the EU but related down-
stream issues such as restitution and land registration are still crucial and far
from optimal. Interviews in particular helped to elaborate home country spe-
cific differences and highlighted again the need for external help for the early
stages of investments in Romania.
Overall, Romanian public policy should put more emphasis on the role of
property rights in creating a favorable investment environment and give more
recognition to the interdependence with factors such as quality of bureaucracy
and legal certainty (see subsequent sections).
7.2.2.3 Croatia
(1) Croatia’s property law situation has been (a) relatively unsatisfactory for
investors in the past and despite some (b) recent improvements, it is (c) still a
cause for major concerns for MNCs and (d) of continuing significance to their
decision to invest. Sub-section (e) provides an assessment.
(a) Croatia’s property law situation was relatively unsatisfactory for
investors in the past. Despite the introduction of a private property regime
in 1993, the adoption of a new law of ownership and other proprietary rights
in 1996 and the guarantee to acquire and own property in Croatia’s consti-
tution (article 48)917, even state experts acknowledge in interviews that clear
917 See Law no. 91/1996; see also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b); European Commission
(2007a), p.12; European Commission (2005a), pp. 19 and 89.
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regulations and procedures regarding land and real estate purchase were often
missing even in the early 2000s.918
Furthermore, foreigners interested in Croatian property suffered from various
restrictions. Generally the acquisition of real estate by foreigners was only possi-
ble if reciprocal agreements with their home country existed.919 Until the early
2000s the acquisition of Croatian land required the approval of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.920 Moreover foreigners were discriminated in areas dominated
by the state, such as air transportation and tourism.921 FDI studies point out
that Croatia has attempted to discourage Italian investors in particular by cre-
ating legal and administrative barriers to investment at the coast. In contrast,
resentment towards German and Austrian investors seems to have been less
frequent.922 Interviews923 also confirm the reports of external sources924 which
state investors repeatedly suffered from restitution claims. Many investors were
therefore afraid to “buy something that you do not own”925.
The situation was further aggravated by many illegitimate seizures of land
and property during as well as after the war. The large number of cases and
weaknesses in the court system led to a significant backlog of untreated cases
(section 7.2.4).926 An FDI survey from 2003 reveals Croatia’s fairly weak prop-
erty rights performance, which is on the same level as Serbia and Romania and
behind that of Moldova and Bulgaria.927
918 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
919 See APIU (2006b), p.40; see also Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
920 See European Commission (2005a), p.90.
921 See European Commission (2005a), pp.52-53; European Commission (2006a), p.27.
922 See e. g. Sinn and Weichenrieder (1997).
923 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities
(2007).
924 See European Commission (2005a), p.14.
925 Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
926 See European Commission (2005a), p.28.; European Commission (2006a), p.10; Euro-
pean Commission (2007a), p.12; FIAS (2002), p.41.
927 See McGee (2003).
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(b) Both external sources and interviews stress that important progress
has been made in terms of reforming Croatia’s property law in the last couple
of years.928 Amendments of the Property Act in 2005 and 2006 appear to be a
step in the right direction.929 The newly established right of EU nationals (legal
persons and individuals) to purchase land and real estate in Croatia is seen not
only as an important improvement for Croatia’s investment environment but
also as an important step towards EU accession.930 External studies conclude
that general property rights are well defined by now and their enforcement is
beginning to cause less problems.931 Croatian interviewees also emphasize, as
was the case for Romania, that some problems and restrictions can be avoided
when MNCs establish a Croatian company.932 An Austrian retail company, for
instance, has not had any major legal problems with property purchased since
2005.933
(c) Nevertheless, both primary934 and secondary935 sources show that Croa-
tia’s property law continues to present significant challenges. The fairly high
BTI score of 9 out of 10 points (which gives Croatia the same score as Romania
and an even better one than neighboring non-EU countries like Bosnia and Ser-
bia) may be misleading in this context (see figure 92). European Commission
(2007a), for example, emphasizes that Croatia’s legal framework may be well
advanced, but difficulties in exercising property rights are still prevalent. Some
state experts interviewed even mention property regulations as the area with
928 See e.g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
929 See European Commission (2006a), p.29.
930 See Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv.
Germ. Research Institute II (2007); European Commission (2007a), pp.6, 28; Ministry
of Economy (2006).
931 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.8.
932 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
933 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); he does admit that they decided not to purchase
several pieces of land, when they were not sure of the ownership situation.
934 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting
(2007).
935 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.8.
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the greatest problems for investors.936 Property regulations still lack trans-
parency in many cases and are often seen as contradictory.937 Interviewees also
call for better coordination between state and regional authorities and a swifter
implementation.938
Moreover, certain limitations on foreign ownership (even for EU nationals)
continue to exist, including restrictions for the purchase of agricultural land,
forests and protected parts of landscape.939 This problem is also confirmed
by state representatives.940 Company interviewees are particularly irritated by
continued resentment towards MNCs at the coast, where both legal and admin-
istrative means are used in order to prevent foreign investors from buying land
or houses.941 As interviewees point out, the paradoxical situation is especially
clear in tourism. On the one hand, a large number of hotels awaits privatiza-
tion and Croatia needs foreign investors and hotel chains to stimulate economic
growth.942 On the other hand, the legal situation of many hotels and of the
land on which they stand is not always clear. In addition to this, foreigners are
frequently given only limited property rights (such as hereditary construction
titles) which are not very attractive for investors.943 Furthermore, it seems that
specific problems regarding restitution claims of Serbs remain.944
Finally, interviewees and external sources stress that MNCs remain reluctant
to go to court to implement their rights because of the continued long duration
of trials945 and because they may be worried about biased verdicts.946
936 See Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007); Intv. Croatian
Authority II (2007).
937 See EBRD (2005a), pp.23 and 59.
938 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
939 See European Commission (2005a), p.19; European Commission (2006a), p.29.
940 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
941 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
942 See Intv. European Institution (2007).
943 See Intv. German Authority II (2007).
944 See Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007).
945 Despite a reduction of the case backlog; see European Commission (2005a), pp.15 and
85.
946 See Intv. European Institution (2007); see also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.8.
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(d) Both external studies947 and most interviews – company and state – con-
clude that the difficult property law situation was and still is a very important
and discouraging factor for the investment decision of MNCs interested in
Croatia. Property rights therefore belong to the weakest points of Croatia’s
investment environment.948
Experts agree that a clear ownership situation is absolutely necessary for any
investment in Croatia.949 The unsatisfactory situation has been quite a signif-
icant deterrence for Croatia so far950 and for one German investor interviewed
was even the main reason for their decision not to invest in Croatia.951 More
specifically, Intv. European Institution (2007) points out that FDI in tourism
could have been a lot higher if all existing property law problems had been
resolved years ago. It also seems that sporadic efforts at the coast to keep
some groups of foreigners away with questionable methods tend to discourage
investors overall.952 In this context it is interesting to see that state experts
are very aware of the legal problems and confirm that investors look at the
property rights situation first when making their investment decision.953
(e) An assessment of Croatia’s property law performance makes its
mediocre performance apparent. Interviews are particularly useful for showing
why the legal reality is still worrisome despite some recent legal changes. In
this context, it is striking that even state representatives interviewed admit
that property rights are still among the greatest problems for investors. It
seems that (unlike in Romania) Croatia’s authorities have specific problems in
enforcing equal and unbiased treatment of foreigners on the local level. Finally,
947 See e. g. FIAS (2002); McGee (2003); European Commission (2007a), p.20.
948 See also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), pp.1-3; UniCredit Group (2006), p.8.
949 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications
(2007).
950 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
951 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
952 See Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007).
953 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
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this sub-section implied that Croatia’s property law situation is – even more
than in Romania – interrelated with other determinants, namely privatization,
the court system and natural resources. A comprehensive strategy, most no-
tably for tourism, will have to be a priority for public policy that covers all
related aspects.
(2) Land and property registration are a further reason for Croatia’s
weak performance with respect to property rights. The situation (a) has been
intransparent for many years and (b) recent reforms have had (c) only limited
impact so far. Land registration (d) remains an important constraint for MNCs’
investment decision for Croatia. An assessment is presented in sub-section (e).
(a) Croatia’s intransparent land registers represented a significant prob-
lem in the early stage of transition.954 Croatia had a land registration and
cadaster office that was established during the period of Austrian governance.
However, people did not register their property during socialist times, the land
registration was outdated by 1990955 and a legal basis was not established until
1996.956 Interviews957 and external958 sources confirm that (even in the early
2000s) regulations were far from consistent, registers did not necessarily show
the actual ownership status and entries were far from complete. Problems were
caused during privatization when buildings were registered but not the land on
which they were built.959 These difficulties seem to have been similar every-
where across the country. State representatives claim that Croatia had to cope
with more important issues such as the war and the economic stabilization and
954 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.3; OECD (2003a), p.9; FIAS (2002).
955 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007);Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
956 See Law no. 91/1996.
957 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007).
958 See e. g. FIAS (2002); OECD (2003a), p.18; Dresdner Bank (2004), p.7.
959 See also Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv.
Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
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therefore had to postpone decisive reforms for many years.960 They also assert
that central authorities like the Ministry of Justice had only limited possibil-
ities for improving the register situation. Owners are encouraged to register
their property themselves without external pressure.961
(b) Some improvements have been noted in external sources962 and inter-
views.963 Reforms started in 2000 and were partly supported and co-financed
by the World Bank and the EU’s Community Program for Assistance, Re-
construction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS).964 Significant progress
was achieved by the digitalization of the land registers and the possibility for
potential buyers to access the central database of cadastral records online.965
Digitalization also shortens the time needed for administrative procedures and
avoids arbitrary decisions.966 Prime Minister Sanader claimed in 2006 that the
electronic register was complete.967 Interviewees acknowledge that the owner-
ship situation has become more reliable than it was three to five years ago and
that internet queries are possible and helpful.968 Progress is also achieved by
the simplification of registration procedures and the replacement of judges with
land registry clerks.969
(c) Representatively for many interviewees but also for external sources970
Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007) describes the current situation:
960 See Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007).
961 See Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
962 See OECD (2003a); European Commission (2005a).
963 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007);
Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
964 See Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
965 See Ministry of Economy (2006); see also Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
966 See Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007).
967 See Sanader (2006).
968 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv.
Croatian Ministry I (2007).
969 See European Commission (2005a), p.42; World Bank (2005), p.38.
970 See OECD (2003a), p.44.
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“Land registration has strongly improved but is still not very good.”971 Even
though a large amount of the data seems, entries in the cadaster offices of-
ten remain unclear or outdated and have to be verified by other authorities.972
Furthermore and in contrast to the statement of Prime Minister Sanader, inter-
viewees explain that digitalization is not yet completed in all regions (Slavonia,
for example), and may take another couple of years.973 Electronic excerpts
may in some cases not represent the actual ownership status either and are not
legally binding.974
Registration time for property has strongly improved from a long 956 days
in 2004 to 174 days in 2006/2007.975 Despite this improvement registration
still takes longer in Croatia than in 15 other EECs including Romania. Inter-
viewees specify that the length of time depends on the location and may be
faster in smaller cities “but cannot happen anywhere in 15 days.”976 Further
problems and delays occur when a number of people – which may be as large
as ten – claims ownership for the same piece of land. This may lead to delays
of three or five years.977 Legal advice is therefore indispensable for land reg-
istration.978 These technical and time-related problems also seem to increase
the vulnerability of authorities to corruption.979
(d) Interestingly, external studies assume that land registration has only been
of minor importance for investors in Croatia.980 By contrast, interviewees con-
firm for Croatia some conclusions found for Romania, that land registration has
971 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommu-
nications (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
972 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007).
973 See Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007).
974 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
975 See World Bank (2004b), p.249; World Bank (2007a).
976 Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007).
977 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007);
see similar CICD (2006), p.11; Doc - GTZ (2006a).
978 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007).
979 See Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007).
980 See OECD (2003a), p.59.
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significant importance for investors in the country in question. However, the
quality of the entries and registration procedures represent a more significant
obstacle for FDI in Croatia than in Romania.981 This is also affirmed by state
representatives interviewed.982 In this context, Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecom-
munications (2007) clarifies that the digitalization is of little importance since
it does not solve the actual problems such as the reliability of the entries.
(e) In the assessment of this sub-section it becomes apparent that Croatia
had better starting conditions than Romania in terms of land registration
since land registers were largely in place across the country in 1990. How-
ever, the unclear legal situation, the disadvantageous institutional set up and
late reform efforts have made land registration a critical factor for Croatia’s
investment climate. To some extent, the efforts to digitalize entries covered
problems without solving them. It is a promising sign that interviews show
little attempts of state representatives to sugarcoat these issues. These mostly
younger interviewees seem often eager to establish a public administration
based on meritocracy and will hopefully contribute to more successful prop-
erty rights reforms. They may help, for example, to uncouple weak points in
the land registration process, for example by further reducing the influence of
the judiciary and combating corruption more forcefully.
(3) The analysis of the conditions for obtaining a construction permit
in Croatia shows that (a) major complications existed in the past, (b) some
important reforms have been initiated, (c) although the current situation is
still problematic. However, (d) the direct importance of construction permits
for the investment decision seems limited for Croatia. Sub-section (e) provides
an assessment.
981 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunica-
tions (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
982 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
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(a) Primary983 and secondary984 sources show that investors experienced
major difficulties in obtaining a construction permit in Croatia even in the
early 2000s. The greatest problem was the complex procedure that actually
required three permits, the location985, building986 and operation permit.987
Overlaps among the required permits but also with land registration procedures
as well as the involvement of different authorities led to long waiting times and
intransparent decisions.988 According to a World Bank study989, conditions in
Zagreb were particularly difficult and processes in smaller cities like Rijeka were
described as more efficient. Interviewees add that until recently many buildings
were erected in Croatia without official permission since specific permits were
difficult to obtain.990
(b) All interviewees appreciate some recent reforms, especially the merger
of construction and location permits initiated in 2007.991 Experts interviewed
see further simplification on the way; amongst other improvements, smaller
buildings not longer require a specific permit.992 Positive results are also ex-
pected from the fact that licenses are now issued on a sub-national level.993
Company interviewees also confirm that the number of constructions without
permits has fallen significantly, following a couple of prominent lawsuits five to
983 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services
(2007).
984 See e. g. FIAS (2002).
985 See Law no. 30/1994, 68/1998, 32/2002 and 100/2004
986 See Law no. 175/2003 and 100/2004
987 See FIAS (2002); Ministry of Economy (2006); APIU (2007).
988 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
IV (2007); see also FIAS (2002).
989 See FIAS (2002), p.55.
990 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services
(2007).
991 See Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv.
Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007).
992 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); see also Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal
Services (2007).
993 See Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007).
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seven years ago as well as the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in
coastal areas in 2006.994
(c) Interviews confirm the observation of external studies that some prob-
lems regarding construction permits continue to exist in Croatia. Impor-
tantly, the process is still very slow. According to the World Bank, it took an
average of 65 days to obtain a construction permit and an additional 45 days
for a location permit in 2006/ 2007.995 Company experts know that obtaining
a construction permit may even take up to 1.5 years996 or about four years
if neighbors challenge the permits.997 Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007)
also points out that problems may actually occur because of the merger of the
two types of permit; accordingly, no proceedings have been defined for situa-
tions when, for example, a location permit is based on the old system and the
construction permit is based on the new one. Apart from these legal issues,
interviews indicate that the majority of remaining problems occur on the local
level and mainly at coastal areas.998 Important issues are that a comprehensive
space planning is missing for the coast999, local authorities sometimes attempt
to prevent foreigners from building at the coast (see previous section)1000 and
corruption is still an imminent problem whenever dealing with construction
permits.1001
(d) As in Romania, the process for acquiring construction permits seems to
be of limited importance for Croatia’s investment climate despite a mediocre
performance. Interviewees acknowledge that investors are aware that similar
problems exist, even in South European EU members.1002 Neither do inter-
994 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
995 See World Bank (2007b).
996 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007).
997 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007).
998 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
999 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1000 See Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007).
1001 See Intv. European Institution (2007)
1002 See Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007).
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viewees see any negative effects from this Croatia’s efforts towards EU inte-
gration.1003 However, more important than, for example, in Romania, interde-
pendences with other deficient areas such as property rights in general, local
bureaucracy etc. come into play and may have an indirect negative effect on
MNCs’ perception of Croatia.
(e) The assessment of Croatia’s provisions for acquiring construction per-
mit shows that the state has taken some important measures to overcome
earlier drawbacks and that investors have become more careful. The next
months and years will show to what extent these legal improvements will lead
to a faster and more transparent implementation by local authorities. In this
context, public policy will need to improve the coordination among different
local authorities and the equal treatment of foreign investors.
(4) In conclusion, property rights have been, according to various sources,
among Croatia’s greatest problems in the past. Many interviews even define
the weak property rights situation as the most important constraining factor
for Croatia in the past. Other problems, such as economic stability, may have
been reasonable priority areas of public policy in the past. However, interviews
suggest that the little attention paid to any dimension of property rights in
public policy led to significant lower inflows of FDI in Croatia, particularly
in tourism. It seems that FDI studies and those of international organizations
may underestimate these aspects for Croatia.
Recent reforms and the awareness of these problems shown by state rep-
resentatives in interviews are promising. Nevertheless, the state of Croatia’s
property rights remains unsatisfactory. Public policy will have to promote a
better cooperation between local and central levels. Most importantly, public
actors should recognize their own possibilities and responsibilities. For example,
1003 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
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local authorities can improve the property law situation by a more consistent
and transparent implementation of regulations and even central authorities can
improve land registration, for example, through better technical support for the
digitalization of the registry entries. More generally, authorities should over-
come remaining nationalist sentiments and reduce bottlenecks in procedures,
mainly in the court system (section 7.2.4).
7.2.2.4 General insights for transition countries
This section discusses general findings with respect to property rights for transi-
tion countries. It concludes that (1) property rights have been a very important
FDI determinant for transition countries, (2) some key problems can be identi-
fied, (3) recent improvements across all dimensions can be recognized, and (4)
that some tools for public policy makers can be derived.
(1) North (1993) already points out the general importance of property
rights for a well functioning market economy. Secondary sources confirm the
insights of the interviews that well defined and enforced property rights are a
key dimension for transition countries when seeking to improve the investment
environment.1004 Various FDI studies show that, particularly in the early 1990s,
the lack of property rights was an important reason for fairly low FDI inflows to
Eastern Europe.1005 This positive correlation between property rights and FDI
inflows appears to be stronger in Eastern Europe than in other regions of the
world.1006 This seems to be particularly true for capital-intensive industries.1007
However, the interview with one German MNC shows that unclear property
rights can even be the decisive reason not to invest in the service sector.1008
1004 See OECD (2006a), p.50.
1005 See e. g. Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (2001); Be´nassy-Que´re´, Coupet, and
Mayer (2005); Li and Resnick (2003).
1006 See Pierpont (2007).
1007 See for the Czech Republic Benacek and Visek (1999); for various countries Barrell and
Holland (2000); Tondel (2001).
1008 In fact in the Croatian tourism sector; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
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Interviews even provide significant evidence that a certain minimum level of
property rights is a precondition for FDI to flow to transition countries at all
(even if other conditions may be favorable).
Interviews also indicate that property rights are generally a more important
country determinant than non-policy determinants or market access, maybe
because the latter are not decisive for all sectors and problems can be circum-
vented more easily. Holland and Pain (1998) also assume that the protection
of property rights influences the perception of the business environment in
general. This seems particularly true due to the even stronger interdependence
between property rights and legal certainty, for example but also privatization
issues, combat of corruption and access to natural resources. FDI studies1009
assume that economic and political stability is even more important for MNCs’
investment decision than property rights. These are analyzed in later sections.
(2) Investors may face some key problems in reference to property rights
in transition countries. Generally, transition countries have only recently es-
tablished consistent legal frameworks to deal with property rights questions,
since this area of reform was not among the priorities of governments for a long
time.1010 Some sensitive aspects such as the treatment of foreigners seem to
require external pressure, for example from the EU, in order to trigger effective
reforms.1011 However, legal compliance as suggested, for example, by the BTI
or other international studies, may not necessarily imply actual satisfaction of
investors. Difficulties in exercising property rights, restitution cases and the ac-
cumulated backlog of cases (as in Croatia) may be related problems. Interviews
have shown that too many different licenses, for example regarding construc-
tion procedures, create time-consuming overlaps, controversial responsibilities
1009 See Hauser (2005); Tondel (2001).
1010 See also Pierpont (2007); OECD (2006a).
1011 See e. g. OECD (2005a); Doc - DLA Piper (2006).
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and may in the end promote corruption. The analysis of land registration pro-
cedures shows that the lack of cadasters in the early transition phase (as in
some regions in Romania) does not necessarily represent a discriminating fac-
tor, since an existing and consistent system did not help Croatia to overcome
problems more quickly than other transition countries.1012
The vast majority of transition countries continues to show a mediocre per-
formance regarding registration time with only three countries faster than three
weeks (figure 42).1013 Long procedures may be particularly difficult for MNCs
with a specific focus on cost-saving investments, for example in countries with
a large amount of cost-sensitive MNCs like in Romania.
In comparison to state representatives, company experts seem to be more
aware of regional differences regarding property rights with rural areas fre-
quently offering faster and easier procedures. However, authorities of smaller
communities may sometimes be more biased than in larger cities (as discussed
for Croatia).
Finally, interviews show (unlike statistics) that problems with property rights
may depend on the home country of the MNCs in question. Governments may,
for instance, treat country groups differently (for example regarding their
rights to access coastal areas) but the behavior and concerns of the MNC may
also vary depending on its home country (as shown for Romania regarding the
risk-aversion of German investors).
(3) Interviews confirm the findings from various external studies that tran-
sition countries have initiated significant reforms since the early 2000s,
including the legal harmonization with EU regulations in countries most inter-
ested in further EU integration, the updating of land registries, an increasing
1012 See also World Bank (2007b).
1013 See World Bank (2007a).
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digitalization and a reduction of pending legal cases.1014 Again it seems that
EU pressure was helpful in encouraging countries to stimulate reforms and
to enable a simplification and reduction of procedure times.1015 On the other
hand, permit procedures, such as merger of construction and location permit
in Croatia, seem to be driven by internal reform pressure more than by EU
influence.1016
(4) The analysis of property rights in transition countries helps to draft some
potential tools for future reform efforts of public policy actors. First of all,
governments should not underestimate (as identified for some state experts in-
terviewed) their influence in designing a favorable property rights regime for
both domestic and foreign investors.1017 A minimum level of complete and
consistent rules is necessary, even early in transition, in order to avoid legal
loopholes and a paralysis of the administration and the legal system.1018 The
Croatian experience furthermore shows that a strong involvement of (tradi-
tionally rather slow) court systems in administrative procedures of property
rights (such as land registration) should be avoided in order to reduce proce-
dural times. Whether timing of the reform can be seen as right may depend
on the industry sector. From the perspective of those MNCs of the manufac-
turing sector that were interested in low-cost production sites, property rights
reforms (such as those implemented in Romania) may have been initiated too
late, as many large investors had already decided to locate elsewhere. For other
industries, such as tourism in Croatia, future property rights reforms can still
have significant positive impact, since these investments are generally possible
in multiple locations.
1014 See e. g. Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004); OECD (2006a); Pierpont (2007).
1015 See also World Bank (2004b); World Bank (2007b).
1016 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
1017 See also Cho (2003); World Bank (2004b), pp.1-2, 9.
1018 See also Jacobs (2003); Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007).
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Governments should set clear deadlines for the registration of property, but
also for possible restitution claims in order to reduce the number of pending
trials and to increase legal certainty. Interviews also suggest that public policy
should prioritize among different reform areas of property rights; the quality
of the land registry entries, for example, seems to be more urgent and complex
than their digitalization. Governments should work on an equal treatment of
foreign and domestic firms both in legal and actual terms. This may be difficult
to enforce comprehensively on the local level; however, it may be less impor-
tant to give foreigners rights and access to all areas of the host country, but
governments may want to define some attractive priority areas with access for
foreigners in which full rights are guaranteed and actually enforced.
Finally, governments should increase their interaction with MNCs in oder
to better understand their needs and to benefit from their specific knowledge,
for example regarding regional differences of property rights conditions in host
countries (as shown with the interviews above).
7.2.3 Quality of bureaucracy
7.2.3.1 Definition
After entering the market and settling property issues MNCs frequently come
into contact with host countries’ bureaucracies in the course of their invest-
ment operations. Interactions include permits, licenses, inspections, customs
etc. In this context investors expect (1) a general good quality of bureaucracy,
(2) an effective implementation of laws and (3) equally satisfactory adminis-
trations across the country.1019 The following sections analyze the conditions
in Romania (7.2.3.2), Croatia (7.2.3.3) and in transition countries in general
(7.2.3.4).
1019 See also World Bank (2004b); OECD (2006a).
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7.2.3.2 Romania
(1) The general quality of Romania’s bureaucracy was (a) a major con-
cern of investors in the past. However, (b) improvements are visible, but (c)
some problems remain. Apparently, (d) the interaction between MNCs and
authorities decreases over time. The quality of the administration is (e) impor-
tant for MNCs but has only an indirect impact on their investment decision.
Sub-section (f) provides an assessment.
(a) In line with the statements analyzed in earlier sections interviewees agree
that bureaucracy was still very slow and unpredictable in the late 1990s.1020
External sources also criticize the lack of reliability of administrative decisions
at that time. They explain this with reference to the limited professional com-
petence of the administrative staff and a susceptibility to manipulation of ad-
ministrative decisions.1021 Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007) also agrees that
“it is true that there used to be a lot of bureaucracy in Romania.” External
reports1022 and interviewees in particular report on problems with tax author-
ities and, for example, on arbitrary punishments in the context of tax controls
during this period.1023 Furthermore, it seems that Romania used to have signif-
icant problems in establishing well-functioning institutions and administrative
procedures in order to cope with EU matters.1024 Nevertheless, Genco, Tau-
relli, and Viezzoli (1993) show in their survey analysis that bureaucratic delays
and problems with local authorities were significant in the early 1990s but less
so in comparison with, for example, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. It seems
that MNCs have been able from early on to find workarounds and to outsource
existing problems to external advisers.
1020 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1021 See e. g. FIC (2002), p.9; OECD (2003c).
1022 See European Commission (1998).
1023 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
I (2007).
1024 See Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); see also European Commission (1998); European
Commission (2004a).
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(b) Both primary1025 and secondary1026 sources find significant improve-
ments in Romania’s general quality of bureaucracy in recent years, particularly
since 2004. Due to the increasing integration with the EU, administrations and
their procedures seem to have become simpler, more transparent and more re-
liable.1027 Further improvements have been noted by the interviewees since the
accession to the EU including a simpler reimbursement of the value-added tax
(VAT)1028 or invoicing procedures.1029
An important measure to improve the quality of Romania’s public admin-
istration was the reform of the public administration that was launched in
the early 2000s.1030 In the following years an increasing number of trainings
was introduced for public servants and a public manager program was initi-
ated in order to make public administration more attractive for highly skilled
young graduates.1031 State representatives interviewees add that twinning pro-
grams1032 with EU members have also been very helpful in increasing the (tech-
nical) know-how in the Romanian administration.1033 Correspondingly, experts
note a strong and increasing willingness in the Romanian bureaucracy to re-
solve problems, particularly among young officials.1034 Investors also acknowl-
edge improvements in the often criticized financial administration (see below);
bribery seems to be less of an issue since inspectors rotate more frequently and
1025 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007);
Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
1026 See OECD (2006a); European Commission (2005c).
1027 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting
I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I
(2007).
1028 See Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
1029 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
1030 See most importantly Law 699/2004.
1031 See OECD (2005d); European Commission (2005c); see also Intv. Romanian Ministry
III (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority II (2007); Doc - Min. of Justice (2006).
1032 Institution building program of Western European EU members and EU accession can-
didate based on bilateral partnerships; see European Commission website (2008).
1033 See Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry III (2007).
1034 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
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top level officials show more integrity in their treatment of MNCs in the course
of preparation of EU accession than previously.1035
Summarizing these reforms, experts interviewed perceive that Romania’s ad-
ministrative requirements are generally fairly liberal today1036, in many ways
comparable to Western European standards1037 and do not represent an obsta-
cle for foreign investors.1038 Compared to Bulgaria in particular, administrative
decision processes such as contracts, permits, registrations as well as financial
services seem to be faster in Romania.1039 In direct contrast to this positive
evaluation by the interviewees, some FDI studies compare Romania’s bureau-
cracy unfavorably with that of Bulgaria.1040 The reason for this difference may
be that these studies were completed in 2005 without taking into account the
latest reform efforts that raised the quality of Romania’s bureaucracy to a level
that was comparable, if not better, than that of Bulgaria.
(c) Nevertheless, experts interviewed identify remaining problems in Ro-
mania’s bureaucracy. Due to the many reforms in recent years (particularly
since 2004) and the many new regulations, administrations have sometimes
been uncertain as to which legislation they should follow; the Romanian or the
European one or actually both.1041
More skeptical company experts assert that Romania’s administration is –
despite some improvements – still very bureaucratic, badly organized, quite
unpredictable, and often frustrating for investors.1042 Company experts in par-
ticular complain that too many stamps are required for daily business oper-
1035 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
1036 See e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); see similar Intv. German Authority I
(2007).
1037 See Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
1038 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
1039 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
1040 See Hannula (2005); see also Mu¨ller (2005).
1041 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
1042 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007);
Intv. German Political Adviser (2007).
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ations1043, many permit procedures are still too slow and intransparent1044
and that conditions in some areas are very strict, for example regarding safety
requirements.1045
In general, the work of the local financial authorities remains problematic
considering the many and detailed inspections.1046 Finally, the recently in-
troduced computer-aided tax declaration is not working well so far1047 and
actually creates extra work since a paper declaration still has to be submitted
as well.1048
With regard to Romania’s bureaucracy in general, state representatives also
recognize that a large geographic distance between authorities even within cities
can make procedures more complex and time-consuming.1049 State experts also
note some resistance of Romanian bureaucracy to external advice1050 and to
the delegation of work; therefore, even decisions concerning daily operations
are dealt with on a very high level.1051 Finally, state experts are also concerned
about a high employee turnover, a lack of experienced personnel and too few
lawyers in Romanian administrations. Without a continuity in administration,
which makes use of the extensive (practical) experiences of the personnel and
specialized knowledge, the quality of the law-making and the reliability of ad-
1043 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
1044 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2007).
1045 For instance, supermarkets have to have security at night; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail
(2007).
1046 See e. g. VAT payments. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC
- Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC -
Utilities (2007); Doc - Austrian Econ. Chamber Romania (2007b).
1047 Apparently because it had not been tested well enough ahead of time; see Intv. Germ.
MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
1048 It seems that administrations are reluctant to use online declarations alone because they
think they are unsafe; see Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
1049 See e. g. Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1050 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
1051 One effect is that officials from foreign ministries generally deal with Romanian coun-
terparts that are at least one position higher; see Intv. German Ministry (2007).
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ministrative and discretionary decisions may be at risk.1052 The main reason
for the high labor mobility and the shortage of highly skilled officials seems to
be that jobs in the business sector offer quicker promotions and much higher
salaries.1053 The interview with a local financial authority revealed, for exam-
ple, that an official of the authority with a university degree and eight years
of work experience earns 2,000 RON per month (about e550) which is lower
than the initial salary of a comparable business job for a graduate.1054
These remaining problems in building up a more professional public ad-
ministration are also reflected in Romania’s BTI score regarding the efficient
deployment of administrative resources (figure 93 of the appendix ). Therefore,
Romania reached only an average position among Eastern European states with
7 out of 10 possible points.1055 In accordance with the interviews, Bertelsmann
Stiftung (2006c) states that Romania’s administration still suffers from politi-
cization, limited strategic visions and inconsistency in decision-making.
(d) The need for interaction between MNCs and state authorities seems
to decrease over time. Several interviewees state that the work with the Ro-
manian administration can be more intense in the early investment phase than
in Western Europe (up to 50% of the working time)1056 but may reduce once
operations are running smoothly. Some MNCs outsource most of the interac-
tion with the administration from the beginning.1057 Relationships and net-
works then gain importance in order to overcome administrative obstacles in
1052 See Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007); Intv. German Ministry (2007).
1053 The salary gap between business and public sector is generally greater than in Western
Europe; see Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association
I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
1054 See Intv. Rom. Local Authority II (2007); Doc - Local Romanian Authority (2007).
1055 Whereas 10 would be a perfectly efficient use of financial and human resources.
1056 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
1057 See Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. German Political Adviser
(2007); by contrast, Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007) sees thorough need
for interaction.
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daily operations.1058 If MNCs work in the market together with a local part-
ner (for example, for distribution services) the latter usually deals with the
authorities.1059 Nevertheless, some direct contacts are generally unavoidable,
for example to labor inspection or custom authorities.1060 Investors are gen-
erally welcomed with open arms by the local administration1061, even though
some investors may wonder in later stages as to what extent private interests
motivate the negotiation behavior of some local politicians and authorities.1062
(e) The general quality of bureaucracy seems to be an important factor for
Romania’s overall business climate, but less so for the initial investment decision
of MNCs interested in Romania than previously. FDI studies and interviews
suggest that problems with bureaucracy in general were a major reason for
low FDI inflows to Romania in the past.1063 However, it seems that recent
reforms have decreased investors’ focus on that topic and it may not be as
important for the initial investment decision anymore – compared to property
rights for example – because MNCs only deal with the bureaucratic aspects
covered above in a second phase of the investment process. Today, the quality
of bureaucracy may mainly have an indirect impact on an investor’s choice
of FDI. Deficiencies in administrative reforms impact many other areas such
as combat of corruption, legal system and EU integration.1064 Furthermore,
company experts in particular suggest that MNCs that are already present in
Romania are important mediators of the image of the bureaucracy and can
influence FDI through their communication with potential investors.1065
1058 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
1059 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007).
1060 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007).
1061 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
1062 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007).
1063 See Hannula (2005); see also Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1064 See sections below; see also Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
1065 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods III (2007).
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(f) This section has shown positive and negative aspects of Romania’s gen-
eral quality of bureaucracy. In an assessment, it seems that the encouraging
signs outweigh the constraining factors. Apparently, Romania has caught
up with other countries of the region, notably Bulgaria. Without a doubt
significant deficiencies remain, especially compared with Western European
standards. Interviews with state experts give especially good insights into some
of the problems of the internal functioning of the administration. However,
interviews also suggest (helping to better understand external sources’ critical
evaluations) that many hold-ups were caused through the EU accession and
seem to decrease over time. Interviews with company experts also reveal that
an experience with bureaucracies may differ among MNCs. Possible explana-
tions are that improvements seem to have been implemented very rapidly in
recent years and that experiences in the same location in 2004 may have been
quite different from the one a couple of years later. Furthermore, it seems that
smaller investors who tried to deal with administrative issues themselves were
particularly frustrated. However, interviews do not reveal industry-specific
differences in this context. Regional differences may exist as well and are dis-
cussed below. Public policy should try to overcome EU related obstruction as
quickly as possibly, should better understand the differences in the experiences
of MNCs and make the work in authorities more attractive for skilled labor.
(2) The implementation of laws (a) was a major problem for investors in
the past, (b) still is a problem and (c) an important but rather indirect concern
of Romania’s investment environment. Sub-section (d) provides an assessment.
(a) Interviews1066 and secondary1067 sources show that the implementation
of laws was a larger problem for Romania than the actual law-making in the
past. Even in the early 2000s decisions were often adopted by politicians, while
1066 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
1067 See e. g. European Commission (2004a); Mu¨ller (2005); OECD (2005a).
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central and local administrations had not heard about them when confronted
by investors. This insecurity also led to a greater need for MNCs to contact
administrations in that period.1068 Moreover, problems were often solved on
a local level without a legal basis (including bribery).1069 FDI studies also
show that the application of nation-wide legislation was rarely consistent or
predictable across the country.1070
(b) Even today various problems regarding the implementation of laws con-
tinue to exist. Interviewees confirm the observations of external studies1071
that planning and implementation is – despite some improvements – often more
problematic in Romania than the legislation which is largely based on laws of
the EU and other Western countries.1072 It seems that problems occur on both
central and local level.
On the central level, company experts in particular mention that implemen-
tation regulations are often scarce, late or imprecise and thus open to further
interpretation.1073 Local levels also sometimes complain that central author-
ities do not communicate their policy goals, do not consult them sufficiently
ahead of time and therefore some laws have nothing to do with reality.1074
Furthermore, interviewees assume that the high degree of centralization of Ro-
mania also leads to some of the problems.1075 Intv. Romanian County Council
(2007) as representative of the local level also points out that regional and
decentralized projects are often quicker and more effective than central ones
1068 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I
(2007).
1069 See ibid.
1070 See Cluse (1999), pp.301-302; Mu¨ller (2005).
1071 See Hannula (2005).
1072 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting
I (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); Doc - Rom.
Emb. Berlin (2007b).
1073 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
1074 See also Intv. Romanian NGO (2007).
1075 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
7.2 Legal measures 287
because the decision-making is closer to the actual problems and officials can
more easily focus on single projects.1076
On the other hand, state experts assume that implementation sometimes
exceeds the capabilities of local authorities. They may not always be well in-
formed regarding the current legislation and are sometimes less than eager to
change existing rules.1077 According to many interviewees1078 but also to ex-
ternal reports1079, problems with financial authorities are the most prominent
ones on the local level. A major concern are in this context tax related regu-
lations. Some old fiscal laws were not abandoned despite new EU regulations
and tax inspectors still sometimes refer to these old laws. External studies also
confirm that lower levels of other administrative bodies, for example in Roma-
nia, are sometimes unwilling to implement political projects.1080 Furthermore,
experts mention cases in which institutions were not set up in time or lacked
sufficient resources in order to implement new regulations, for example in the
agricultural sector.1081
However, others experts interviewed point out that the performance of the
bureaucracy often depends less on whether local or central authorities are in-
volved than on the individual and personal relationships.1082
(c) The importance of Romania’s performance regarding the implemen-
tation of laws as FDI determinant seems to be comparable to the gen-
eral quality of bureaucracy. FDI studies already showed for various tran-
sition countries that the enforceability of laws is an important country deter-
minant.1083 Furthermore, company experts agree for Romania that the local
1076 He mentions the extension of the Sibiu airport as an example.
1077 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
1078 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007).
1079 See e. g. European Commission (2006e); OECD (2005d).
1080 See Carter, Sader, and Holtedahl (1996).
1081 E. g. the direct payments system; see Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
1082 See Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007).
1083 See Altomonte (1998); see similar Smarzynska (2002).
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handling of legal parameters is important for the investment process.1084 How-
ever, state experts emphasize the importance more than company experts. State
experts assume that the implementation of laws is something looked at closely
by investors.1085 and that this field is one of the largest problems of Romania’s
investment environment.1086 By contrast, MNCs point out that this aspect
cannot usually be assessed until the investment has actually been made1087
and that investors usually find ways to avoid implementation complications,
for example by receiving temporary permits etc.1088
(d) In the assessment, interviews and external sources suggest that Ro-
mania still has more deficiencies in the implementation of new laws than, for
example, in other aspects of its bureaucracy. Existing problems may not be as
crucial for MNCs’ investment decision as often assumed by external studies
and state experts. However, they have a significant indirect impact on the
investment conditions and also influence related fields, such as a higher num-
ber of court trials, more problems regarding political stability and a greater
tendency to corruption. It is difficult to assess what level – central or local – is
more responsible for the problems mentioned. In any case the lack of lawyers
seems worrisome on both levels. Public policy should thus focus on establishing
better know-how on both central and local level, lowering the labor mobility
of officials and improving the communication between central and local level
and among local authorities.
(3) The quality of bureaucracy in Romania seems to vary greatly across
regions. The analysis of interviews and secondary sources suggests some (a)
general insights. Positive examples are seen particularly in (b) Sibiu and (c) to
1084 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007).
1085 See Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1086 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
1087 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
1088 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
7.2 Legal measures 289
some extent in Timis¸oara. This aspect (d) can be very important for MNCs.
Sub-section (e) provides an assessment.
(a) Generally, all interviewees are aware that the quality of bureaucracy
differs from region to region in Romania.1089 Company experts have learnt
by experience that administrations in the western part of Romania are espe-
cially efficient.1090 The evaluation of the work of specific municipalities varies
but all interview statements on Sibiu were positive, and administrations in
Timis¸oara and Arad1091 also received positive assessments in general. Com-
pany experts know of mixed experiences in Bras¸ov, Cluj and Ias¸i. However,
in many communities there seems to be an effort to improve administrative
conditions for MNCs.1092 It seems that investors have had increasingly positive
experiences in smaller cities with smaller bureaucracies and more direct access
to decision-makers.1093
(b) The administration of Sibiu is frequently cited as a positive exam-
ple for a well-functioning and business-friendly administration.1094 Intervie-
wees believe that mayor Klaus Johannis (since 2000), who belongs to the Ger-
man minority, has created an administration with motivated, skilled and often
German-speaking officials who have a positive attitude towards MNCs and are
allowed to take far-reaching decisions themselves.1095 Furthermore, city offi-
cials often meet with the business community, for example with the German
1089 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. German Ministry (2007);
Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1090 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
1091 See also Doc - Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2005); Doc - City of Sibiu (2007).
1092 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VIII (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007).
1093 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1094 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Ministry (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VIII (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007);
see also Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1095 See Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
III (2007).
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Business Club.1096 In addition to this, the cooperation and distribution of work
with the county council and the trade register is apparently working well.1097
It is also worth mentioning that state representatives are well aware of remain-
ing room for improvement in lengths of procedures etc.1098 A key advantage of
Sibiu seems to be the early establishment of an investment promotion unit that
makes active investment policies and in which interested MNCs have one con-
tact person who deals with all related issues.1099 The importance of this unit is
also shown by its physical location: right next to the mayor’s office; in contrast,
other and even larger cities do not have a stand-alone investment promotion
unit at all. The most prominent example for Sibiu’s successful investment pol-
icy is the opening of the industrial park close to the airport (2002). Experts
are particularly complementary about the quick provision of infrastructure,
including access to roads, gas and electricity.1100
Interviews1101 and external sources1102 conclude that administrative barriers
seem to be lower in Sibiu than in other parts of the country and particularly
German companies prefer to come to the county. The administration actually
seems to work more efficiently than the central government.1103
(c) Interviews suggest a positive evaluation of the administration in
Timis¸oara overall.1104 However, experiences seem to vary depending on the
level of the administration investors have been dealing with. Investors seem to
1096 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); see also Intv. Romanian County Council
(2007).
1097 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); see also Intv. Romanian County Council
(2007).
1098 See Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
1099 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
I (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); see also Doc - City of Sibiu (2007).
1100 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007); see also Intv. Int’l Research Institute I
(2007); see also Bulgaria Economic Forum (2006).
1101 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007).
1102 See e. g. Pfaller (2007); Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (2007).
1103 See Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
1104 See Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VIII (2007).
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be quite satisfied with the work of top officials including the mayor and the
county council.1105 In contrast, some company experts indicate that Timis¸oara
has been less successful compared to Sibiu in recent years due to more internal
political difficulties between local authorities and sometimes limited openness
to foreign investment in the lower levels of the administration. Furthermore,
officials seem to have less interest in direct contact to investors, such as to the
German-Speaking Business Club in Timis¸oara.1106
(d) The performance of local administrations seems to be very important
for investors once MNCs have decided on Romania and are then choosing a
location within the country. Company experts confirm that investors quickly
spread the good news of reforming municipalities.1107 Hilber and Voicu (2006)
also suggest in their FDI study a correlation between FDI inflows and bureau-
cratic reforms in Western Romania.
(e) In the assessment, it seems that MNCs are well aware of regional
differences regarding administrative reforms. An administration’s performance
may in part depend on the effort of individuals, but Transylvanian counties
seem to have created particularly successful bureaucracies. Investors may al-
ready have come to the region before due to the cultural proximity but recent
reforms have created a basis for a longer-lasting FDI boost. However, despite
the overwhelmingly positive statements of the interviewees some doubts are
worth mentioning. Interviews were conducted mainly with experts on German
and Austrian investments and Sibiu in particular actually represents a German
island in Romania. Other regions and administrations that may be successful
as well such as Constant¸a are not mentioned by German and Austrian investors
at all, maybe also because of the larger geographical distance. In contrast,
1105 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
1106 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I
(2007).
1107 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
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FDI statistics suggest that both regions attract similar levels of FDI.1108
Regional policy actors, for example of Eastern and Southern Romania, may
therefore promote more strongly their success stories of administrative reforms
to investor groups from home countries that have traditionally located in other
regions but that may be worried about rising costs and labor shortage in Sibiu
and elsewhere.
(4) In conclusion, this section has given encouraging signs that the quality
of Romania’s bureaucracy is slowly but surely approaching Western European
levels. State interviews have been helpful for clarifying some deficiencies in the
functioning within administrations. The general quality and the implementa-
tion of laws may – this is suggested by company interviews and specifies earlier
findings of academic research – only have indirect importance as FDI country
determinant for Romania, since MNCs usually face related problems not un-
til a later stage of their investments; however, these aspects have a significant
impact on the overall image of the investment location and are interdependent
with other factors such as combat of corruption, legal system, EU integra-
tion etc. Furthermore, interviews with company experts showed that existing
regional differences in the performance of local bureaucracies may have a de-
cisive impact on MNCs’ investment decision within Romania which explains
why German-speaking investors are particularly satisfied with the performance
of some of the Transylvanian counties. Public policy should attempt to over-
come remaining administrative obstacles following EU accession and level out
regional disparities. It will be essential in this context to improve consultation
and cooperation among authorities but also with MNCs.
1108 Both regions have attracted about e1,000 per capita in terms of FDI stock; see NBR
(2007).
7.2 Legal measures 293
7.2.3.3 Croatia
(1) The general quality of Croatia’s bureaucracy was (a) strongly criti-
cized in the past. Some (b) recent reforms have led to improvements; however,
(c) problems seem to remain significant, (e) even though MNCs generally find
solutions in the interaction with authorities. Overall, the general performance
of authorities is (d) one of the greatest obstacles for higher FDI in Croatia.
The findings are assessed in sub-section (f).
(a) According to external sources1109 and interviewees MNCs encountered
significant problems with bureaucracy in Croatia in the past, apart from
the aspects covered in previous sections. Company experts give examples of
sluggish and intransparent administrations both on the central and local level
in the early 2000s.1110 Apparently, potential investors were often deterred by
the hierarchical structures1111 and the unprofessional treatment of applicants
that are reminiscent of socialist times.1112 External reports also criticize that
administration reform has not been made a priority by Croatian governments
in the past.1113
(b) External sources and interviewees see some improvements in the per-
formance of Croatia’s bureaucracy since about 2002 .1114 Several new laws
paired down the administrative requirements for businesses1115 and some ini-
tiatives were introduced to automatize procedures.1116 Furthermore, a Civil
1109 See e. g. FIAS (2002); European Commission (2005a); World Bank (2003).
1110 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services II (2007).
1111 See Intv. German Authority III (2007).
1112 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate
(2007).
1113 See European Commission (2005a), p.13; World Bank (2003).
1114 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
1115 See also European Commission (2004c) for examples.
1116 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team
(2007).
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Service Training Center was founded in Zagreb in 2003 and EU training pro-
grams were also launched.1117
While little mentioned by company experts, state experts evaluate the es-
tablishment of Hitrorez (“regulatory guillotine”) in 2006 as a key reform in
improving the quality of bureaucracy in Croatia.1118 It scanned about 2,000
regulations related to doing business in Croatia and came up with 800 (non-
binding) recommendations.1119 They aim at the simplification of existing pro-
cedures (for example invoicing), the disclosure of contradictory regulations (for
example with still valid Yugoslavian laws or newly introduced EU regulations)
and the transfer of competences on the sub-national level (for example licens-
ing).1120 Experts interviewed assess that Hitrorez represents a “good”1121 or
even a “decisive”1122 reform effort of Croatia in order to improve the investment
climate and to cut administrations business costs.
Further improvements are expected from the repositioning of the assistant
ministers from a politician to a civil servant. This change is expected to de-
politicize administrative work and facilitate the elaboration of long-term strate-
gies.1123 More generally, interviewees point out that EU accession, the initiated
public administration reforms and additional twinning efforts will help to fur-
ther decrease administrative barriers, build up capacities and accelerate the
transfer of know-how.1124 On the other hand experts warn that an accession
to the EU will not bring any instant improvements in the administration since
these procedures take a very long time.1125
1117 See European Commission (2005a), p.13; European Commission (2007a), p.8.
1118 See e. g. also Doc - NCC (2007).
1119 See Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
1120 Adoption of 125 recommendations by November 2007; see Intv. Croatian Ministry I
(2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1121 Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007).
1122 Intv. European Institution (2007); see also Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007).
1123 Adoption expected after November 2007; Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
1124 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications
(2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
1125 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007).
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Interviewees also state that Croatia’s bureaucracy may be difficult but that
dealing with licenses in some industries (a brick production plant for example)
is not easy in Western Europe either.1126 Furthermore, experts agree that most
problems can be solved when MNCs find competent help in and outside of the
administration.1127
(c) Nevertheless, not only external sources1128 but also state and company
experts1129 see significant remaining problems with respect to Croatia’s
bureaucracy and a need for a comprehensive reform. Problems most frequently
cited are the great number of permits, documents and stamps that are required
for business operations.1130 Furthermore, experts confirm the criticism of ex-
ternal sources1131 that the decision-making process is in many cases slow1132,
intransparent, unreliable, and arbitrary.1133
Problems may also occur when the state is a contractor or a partner; MNCs
then frequently do not know who is responsible (central government, counties,
communities) and who is for or against the project. As a result MNCs project
implementations may be pending for several years.1134 As in Romania problems
with financial authorities are very common, mainly due to the frequent inspec-
1126 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
1127 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
1128 See NCC (2004a); European Commission (2005a); EBRD (2005a); UniCredit Group
(2006); European Commission (2007a).
1129 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Croatian
Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia
(2006), p.29; Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Soft-
ware (2007).
1130 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); see also Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007).
1131 See e. g. EBRD (2005a), p.23; Wirtschaftsblatt (2007).
1132 Apparently, it would take about two years to start a business when all procedures
required were followed; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
1133 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv.
European Institution (2007); Intv. Croatian University (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor
(2007).
1134 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007).
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tions (particularly for MNCs).1135 However, company interviews also indicate
that bribery is less frequent in this context than in Romania.1136
Company and state experts point out that Croatia’s administration is too
large1137 and continues to grow.1138 Interviewees see more clearly than exter-
nal sources1139 that Croatia’s administration is still very hierarchically orga-
nized and strongly politicized and that many issues are decided on too high a
level.1140 Furthermore, old officials from the middle level are often still in the
same position as during socialist times, not always well educated and sometimes
actively or passively blocking reforms.1141 Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007)
believes that a young generation of state officials will be necessary in order to
overcome these problems. As in Romania, experts also see in Croatia an in-
creasing salary gap between jobs in private companies and administration.1142
Furthermore, they see problems in an intransparent promotion system of state
officials, with few possibilities of motivating them.1143 Nevertheless, experts
think that Croatia’s administrations have only limited recruiting problems be-
cause junior staff is largely attracted by existing securities.1144
Finally, some experts state that the impact of the regulations modified by
Hitrorez is not visible so far.1145 Various recommendations may not be imple-
mented because authorities do not have enough capacities, are afraid of legal
1135 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products
(2007).
1136 See e. g. Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007).
1137 See Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
1138 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
1139 See World Bank (2003), p.18.
1140 Sometime the decision on location of an event or a logo is decided by a secretary of state;
see Intv. German Authority III (2007); see also a disguised state expert statement.
1141 See Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007);
Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); see also World Bank (2003), p.17.
1142 See Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007).
1143 See Intv. German Authority III (2007).
1144 See Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1145 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
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gaps with respect to other regulations or worry about redundant work due to
EU integration.1146
International statistics confirm this overall critical tone of the interviews.
According to AHK (2006) Croatia is second last among 14 EECs in a measure-
ment of the satisfaction of MNCs with the general quality of bureaucracy.1147
Furthermore, the BTI score 7 out of 10 measuring the efficient use of adminis-
trative resources also suggests that significant room for improvements remains
(figure 93).
(d) Company experts confirm that a cooperative interaction of MNCs
with Croatian authorities is important, especially in the first investment
phase.1148 Large investors in particular need good ties to bureaucracy since they
are frequently dealing with customs, work permits etc.1149 Experts have noticed
(as in Romania) that MNCs need more staff to deal with bureaucracies than
in their home countries when they decide to deal directly with authorities.1150
Several company experts assume that communication between authorities and
investors could still be improved, for example regarding the timeframe of their
decision-making process.1151 Interviews suggest that MNCs have – besides the
financial authorities – the most frequent interactions with the veterinarian,
foodstuff and custom authority.1152 Once investors are more experienced an
interaction seems to be become less relevant.1153 Furthermore, it seems that
1146 See Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007).
1147 MNCs are more dissatisfied only in Macedonia; even though some company experts
interviewed believe that Croatia’s performance is not as worrisome as in other countries
of the region; see Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Doc - Germ. MNC -
Food Products (2007).
1148 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
1149 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); see also World Bank (2003),
p.4.
1150 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
1151 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007).
1152 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007).
1153 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
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Croatian authorities have learnt a lot from dealing with MNCs and have become
more professional.1154 Investors interviewed also acknowledge that problems
with local administration are usually minimized when issues are handled by the
local management directly which is ideally staffed with domestic managers.1155
(e) The general quality of bureaucracy is, according to the interviewees,
amongst themost important FDI determinants for Croatia (in contrast to
Romania) and is on a comparable level with property rights. Several company
experts1156, but interestingly even state representatives1157, call the inefficient
bureaucracy one of the greatest obstacles for higher FDI inflows and the area
with greatest need for further reform in Croatia. Intv. German Authority II
(2007) even believes that the reform of the administration “is the task of the
century” for Croatia.
Interview results therefore confirm external reports and FDI studies.1158 The
findings are also well in line with AHK (2006) that reports that bureaucracy
is generally only of average importance in transition countries (15th of 25 de-
terminants) but the fifth most important determinant in Croatia.
Interviews suggest that administrative problems have represented a con-
straining factor for FDI inflows for many years, particularly in areas with a
traditionally strong need for state interaction, for example in the exploitation
of natural resources1159 or in newly privatized areas.1160 Investors may even-
tually decide to make their investment, but may delay decisions or reduce the
1154 See Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
1155 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products II
(2007).
1156 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007);
similar: Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Doc - Austrian Econ. Chamber
Croatia (2006), p.7; different: Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); maybe because
their investment did not take place and the contact with authorities remained scarce.
1157 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Croatian
Government Team (2007); see also Intv. German Authority III (2007).
1158 See e. g. McGee (2003); NCC (2004b); Pommer (2007), p.145; Moore and Vamvakidis
(2007).
1159 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
1160 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
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initially targeted investment sum. However, interviewees also underline that
recent improvements in public administration may lead to higher FDI.1161
(f) The assessment of Croatia’s general bureaucracy shows that its quality
has been fairly poor. Without a doubt administrative procedures in Western
Europe are somewhat cumbersome as well and may be even worse in other
countries of the region; however, MNCs generally expect a better performance
in Croatia, also considering its drive for EU accession, and may then be
disappointed. Thus, in various cases bureaucracy seems to be a constraining
factor for FDI in Croatia. Interviews show that Croatia’s specific starting
conditions – that were more difficult than those in Romania, for example –
including the overcoming of socialism, Yugoslavia and war, led to fundamental
and structural problems. These will not be overcome quickly and require a
sensitive approach to reform. On the one hand top officials show impressive
self-criticism of Croatia’s administrative deficiencies in interviews. On the other
hand some of those officials who had already been part of the bureaucracy in
the 1980s and 1990s, seem reluctant to participate in further reforms. Public
policy makers need to find the right mixture of pressure and benefits needed to
achieve reforms without internal blockades. Authorities may also want to use
more external advice if they realize that some tasks and issues go beyond their
capabilities. Hitrorez seems to be a very good approach for solving some of
the existing problems. Public policy actors should increase efforts so that the
recommendations are fully implemented and enhance the awareness of these
successes among investors who seem to know only little about these reforms.
(2) The implementation of laws represented (a) a substantial concern of
investors in Croatia in earlier years and (b) despite some improvements (c)
1161 See e. g. Intv. Croatian University (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007).
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major deficiencies remain. It is (d) important but not essential for the decision
of MNCs to invest in Croatia. Sub-section (e) provides an assessment.
(a) External sources1162 and interviews 1163 suggest that the enforcement of
laws has been troublesome for investors in the past. Administrations were
often confronted with outdated regulations from Yugoslavian times that were
not abandoned when new laws were introduced. The situation was aggravated
when contradicting new laws on the basis of the EU acquis were passed and
administrations – similar to Romania – did not know which rules to follow.1164
(b) Despite this, it seems that the harmonization with EU law and more re-
cent legal reforms1165 have led to some improvements and a more consistent
legal framework that creates a more stable basis for administrative actions.1166
Hitrorez (see above) will most likely play an important role in this context.1167
Experts also assume that the implementation of laws is still more reliable and
consistent than in neighboring countries including Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia.1168 Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007) also doubts that recently acceded
EU members like Romania and Bulgaria are fully implementing the acquis.
(c) Nevertheless, external sources1169 and the vast majority of interviewees
hint that Croatia may have good laws – generally copied from the EU or West-
ern Europe – on paper, but that implementing and enforcing them remains a
major problem.1170 Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007) concludes that “many
times the legal framework is more developed than the administrative proce-
1162 See World Bank (2003); European Commission (2005a), p.13; FIAS (2002).
1163 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II
(2007).
1164 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007).
1165 See section below and for examples European Commission (2006a).
1166 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
1167 See also Intv. German Authority III (2007).
1168 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I
(2007).
1169 See NCC (2004a); World Bank (2003); European Commission (2007a).
1170 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal
Services (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007).
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dures.” More specifically interviewees state that the implementation of laws is
are often lacking1171 or slow1172 and administration is too large to effectively
deal with new regulations.1173 Interviews also indicate that the implementation
problems are closely related to difficulties in the court system; thus judges often
do not know which laws have to be applied by administrations.1174
Some external sources1175 and several interviewees1176 see the majority of
problems on the central level, for instance, due to the high degree of insti-
tutional centralization, the frequently used enforcement of liability by central
authorities and the limited legal possibilities of municipalities to take over more
responsibility.1177 Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007) also knows from his own expe-
rience that the frequent change of strategies on the central level increases the
problem of implementation. Other sources assume that local communities sim-
ply do not receive sufficient money in order to adequately implement laws.1178
In addition to this – rather than in contradiction to the insights above – experts
interviewed assume that decisions are sometimes hampered by local authorities
who have their own interests and often try to keep their actions and decisions
intransparent, even when dealing with Zagreb.1179 Finally, the expansion of lo-
cal bureaucracies, from 104 to 560 sub-national governments during the 1990s
alone, caused highly fragmented local entities and additional costs for the co-
ordination and implementation of regulations.1180
1171 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
1172 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
1173 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
1174 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007) who cites an example in which
a judge gave a false statement that TRIPs rules regarding pharmaceuticals were not
applicable in Croatia.
1175 See e. g. NCC (2004a); World Bank (2003).
1176 See Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007).
1177 See Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); see also European Commission (2005a),
p.13; European Commission (2007a), p.8.
1178 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); see also FIAS (2002), p.66.
1179 See Intv. European Institution (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services
II (2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007).
1180 See World Bank (2003).
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(d) The analysis of primary1181 and secondary sources1182 suggests that the
ability to implement existing laws is important for Croatia as investment
location. From a lawyer’s point of view the unsatisfactory enforcement of ex-
isting laws may even be the biggest problem in Croatia.1183 It seems, however,
that investors are less deterred by potential implementation problems than, for
example, by Croatia’s property rights situation or general performance of its
bureaucracy. One reason for this may be that it is more difficult for investors
to estimate the actual performance of a state in this field.1184 Investors may
also assume that the performance of other competing countries is not signif-
icantly better than Croatia’s.1185 Finally, they may expect that the situation
will further improve with progressing integration with the EU in the years to
come.
(e) The assessment of the performance of Croatia’s bureaucracy in im-
plementing laws suggests that the problems discussed above continue to be
of significance. Reasons could be identified on both central and local level.
They seem to be strongly interlinked with the overall deficiencies of Croatian
public administration but also with the court system discussed below. Public
policy makers may keep in mind that the accession criteria for Croatia are
stricter than they used to be for Romania and Bulgaria. A comparison with
the performance of neighboring or other EU countries may sugarcoat Croatia’s
problems. Nevertheless, company interviews also show that the importance of
improving implementation is essential for Croatia to enter the European Union
but less decisive for the attraction of FDI.
1181 See e. g. Intv. German Authority III (2007).
1182 See European Commission (2005a), p.45; World Bank (2003), p.3.
1183 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007).
1184 International statistics also seem to be scarce.
1185 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
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(3) Some regional differences exist in Croatia regarding the quality of bu-
reaucracy. An analysis reveals (a) some general insights, (b) a positive example
in Varazˇdin and (c) less favorable experiences in Slavonia. The (d) importance
of these differences seems to be significant. An assessment is presented in sub-
section (e).
(a) Experts interviewed generally recognize some significant regional differ-
ences in the quality of bureaucracy in Croatia. The county of Varazˇdin and its
free economic zone are frequently cited as the most positive example.1186 In-
vestors also seem to have had fairly good experiences in medium-sized cities like
Karlovac. Experiences in Zagreb are mixed; authorities are generally open to
foreign investors and digitalization is quite advanced in many areas but proce-
dures seem to take a long time. Most problems of investors have been reported
– according to the interviewees – in small towns, namely in Slavonia1187 but
also in coastal areas in Southern Croatia.1188
(b) Not only external sources1189 but also company experts interviewed eval-
uate the bureaucracy of Varazˇdin very positively.1190 Intv. Germ. MNC -
Industrial Goods I (2007) praises the good and quick support as well as the
high commitment of all authorities involved from the beginning, including the
mayor, the president of the local Chamber of Commerce and Mr. Mikac.1191
Even today Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007) deals with author-
ities regarding customs, permits etc. on a daily basis and no problems have
1186 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1187 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods
I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); but see also Intv. Croatian Mayor
(2007).
1188 See e. g. Doc - Germ. MNC - Engineering (2001), p.55; see also OECD (2003a), p.35.
1189 See e. g. Simeunovic´ (2006).
1190 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
1191 The mastermind of the zone and Managing Director of APIU; see Intv. Croatian Au-
thority II (2007).
304 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
occurred so far. This positive assessment is also confirmed by various other
company experts.1192
(c) The quality of the bureaucracy in Slavonia seems to be below the coun-
try’s average. According to the interviewees procedures are longer-lasting, less
transparent and less automatized than elsewhere.1193 Furthermore, authorities
are often very passive, and according to reports it is often difficult to find out
who is responsible for a certain matter. Administrative decisions apparently
tend to lack reliability and are often politically motivated.1194 The use of local
networks therefore seems to be a key for successful investments.1195 Potential
investors have also discovered that Slavonian administrations did not have ad-
equate structures in place in order to successfully handle larger projects with
EU involvement.1196
(d) The performance of regional bureaucracy seems relatively important
for the FDI decision of MNCs. To some extent investors seem to be aware of
regional differences as discussed above; interviews also reveal examples in which
investors actually decided not to invest in Slavonia because of difficulties with
the local bureaucracy.1197 However, in contrast to Romania, for instance, the
general quality of bureaucracy detached from regional issues seems to be more
important for investors interested in Croatia, also because of the strong influ-
ence of central authorities and the limited country size which makes regional
differences less prominent.
1192 See e. g. Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
1193 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007); sees no signifi-
cant differences to other regions, for example, Istria: Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products
(2007).
1194 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007).
1195 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products
(2007).
1196 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1197 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
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(e) In the assessment of Croatia’s deviations in regional differences it seems
that bureaucracy seems to be functioning very well in Varazˇdin; however,
the county may not be representative for Croatia, since it has been strongly
supported by the central government. It also seems that – in comparison to
Sibiu for example – its success was significantly based on a few individuals
and less on a comprehensive administrative reform effort. It also has to be
acknowledged that problems of some Croatian regions are partly caused by
war damages, particularly in Vukovar, and that reforms of public administra-
tion and investment policy is understandably somewhat behind other regions.
Nevertheless, interviewees suggest (as in Romania), that local actors should
not underestimate their influence despite a high degree of centralization. Most
importantly local public policy makers should try to make administrative deci-
sion more transparent and less influenced by personal and short-term interests.
(4) In conclusion, this section has shown that Croatia’s administrative re-
forms are still in an early stage and that a better bureaucracy may lead to
higher FDI inflows to Croatia, particularly in rural areas like Slavonia. The
analysis of interviews and external sources revealed that positive efforts exist
but that their full impact remains to be seen. Interviews with state experts in
particular have clarified that key decision makers are well aware of many of the
problems but that a sense of urgency is still lacking in many cases. Recent im-
provements in Romania, for example, show that external pressure, as provided
in the further course of EU accession negotiation, may lead to somewhat more
dynamic and thorough reform efforts.
7.2.3.4 General insights for transition countries
The analyses of this section and a further look at relevant FDI studies offer
important insights into the quality of bureaucracy as FDI determinant for
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transition countries. The (1) weak performance of bureaucracy has been a
key problem for all transition countries and (2) has had an significant impact
on FDI flows. This section enables the (3) establishment of some key success
factors for public policy actors.
(1) The weak performance of bureaucracy and problems in implementing
regulations have been a key problem for transition countries on central as well
as local levels. Dunning (2005) even finds that it has been the second great-
est weakness of transition countries; out of 19 determinants only corruption
was deemed to have had a more negative effect. In most EECs related issues
were only superficially considered in the early phase of transition, also because
more severe problems such as hyper-inflation (as in Romania) or even war
(as in Croatia) demanded more political attention.1198 For later development
phases external studies find, in line with the conclusions of this section, that
transition countries often elaborated a modern and adequate legal framework
but bureaucracies frequently failed to provide adequate implementation. Jacobs
(2003) therefore sees “an implementation gap between increasingly liberalized
policies and legislation and the day to day reality faced by investors dealing
with the many arms of bureaucracy.”1199 In this context regional differences
as to how they handle these gaps within host countries have become more
important, sometimes creating successful communities decoupled from the cen-
tral development (as Sibiu in Romania)1200 or even promoted by the central
government (as Varazˇdin in Croatia).
The interaction with financial authorities seems to be the most cumbersome
aspect of bureaucracy in most transition countries.1201 Company interviews
have been particularly helpful in showing that problems with bureaucracy –
1198 See also Murrell (2002).
1199 See also Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
1200 See also Kikeri, Kenyon, and Palmade (2006).
1201 See also Lejour (2007).
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often called “red tape”1202 – tend to affect those (often smaller) MNCs who
cannot outsource related problems. On the other hand, the need for interac-
tion seems to decrease over time for most investors once all required permits
etc. have been issued. Investors that continuously expand (for example retail-
ers) or that are active in highly regulated sectors (such as telecommunication)
will continue to have significant interaction with authorities and will need to
establish well-functioning relations from early on.1203
Nevertheless, all transition countries have shown improvements in recent
years.1204 Efforts to decrease the size of administration generally already
started in the late 1990s, but more thorough attempts to make bureaucracy
more efficient and to increase the performance of the officials1205 were launched
only recently and generally in the course of EU accession preparations (as in
Romania).
(2) Even though difficult to measure1206, recent FDI literature has identi-
fied good administration as an important determinant to attract FDI.1207
Baniak, Cukrowski, and Herczynski (2005) conclude that time requirements,
transparency and complexity of bureaucratic procedures are among key de-
terminants for FDI to transition countries. Therefore, a poor quality of bu-
reaucracy causes transaction costs, confusion and uncertainty for investors.1208
Jacobs and Coolidge (2006) calculate that the reduction of bureaucracy costs
for MNCs will increase FDI flows by 5%.
1202 See e. g. Jacobs and Coolidge (2006); Merlevede and Schoors (2004).
1203 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications
(2007).
1204 See also Dunning (2005).
1205 See also Kikeri, Kenyon, and Palmade (2006).
1206 See Hanson (2001).
1207 See Murrell (2002); Campos and Kinoshita (2003); Be´nassy-Que´re´, Coupet, and Mayer
(2005).
1208 See Kinoshita and Campos (2006); Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000).
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The analyses of this section share the assumption of a positive correlation
between good quality of bureaucracy and FDI inflows in general. It seems likely
that Eastern Europe would have attracted more FDI inflows in the 1990s, if
authorities had been more professional and more open to investors. However, it
also seems apparent that the importance is less significant than, for example,
property rights since MNCs are usually confronted with many of the problems
discussed not until they have already decided in favor of a specific host country.
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) also indicate that the standard of bureaucracy
may be less important than other factors. Furthermore, company interviews
show that the quality of the implementation of laws is especially difficult to
measure for investors and they generally assume that all transition countries
have similar problems even after entering the EU (as in Romania). In contrast,
regional differences may have a very important impact on the investment
decision of MNCs within a country. They can be enhancing (as in Sibiu in
Romania and Varazˇdin in Croatia) or constraining (as in Slavonia in Croatia).
Finally, the importance of this factor is strongly interlinked to other factors
such as market access, property regulations, corruption, and court system.1209
(3) This section showed that state representatives interviewed are well aware
of most of the existing deficiencies in transition countries; however, they also
need to recognize their own possibilities and to make use of their own powers to
contribute to the reform process both on the central and local level. From the
analyses above several key success factors can be derived for a high qual-
ity bureaucracy in transition countries. Good administrations contain quick
bureaucratic procedures and reliable decisions free from personal interests. Ad-
ministrations should have an open approach to service and be helpful towards
domestic and foreign investors. Successful administrations should have a lean
1209 See also EBRD (2004); Wei (2000a).
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structure, employ sufficient lawyers and aim at compensation comparable to the
business sector, for example through more effective incentives schemes.1210 Ad-
ministrations’ leaders need to give up some of their control and delegate work
in order to avoid the backlog of work.1211 The influence of local authorities
may differ among transition countries1212, but governments everywhere should
further decentralize administrative procedures in order to enable the adjust-
ment of investment conditions according to local needs. On the local level a
clear distribution of responsibilities between the Chamber of Commerce, the
city as well as the country administration seems to be essential.1213 Finally, the
example of Hitrorez also shows that all improvements have to be accompanied
by appropriate public relations measures in order to increase the awareness of
investors.1214
7.2.4 Legal certainty
7.2.4.1 Definition
Once MNCs have begun their investment and are running their operations in
the host country, they expect that full legal certainty to be given in an ideal
investment environment. They demand (1) a consistent and unmistakable legal
basis (the legal side of legal certainty), a well-functioning implementation of
laws by bureaucracy (as discussed in the previous section) and (2) a reliable
court system that helps them to enforce contracts etc (the juridical side of legal
certainty).1215 Section (3) provides country-specific conclusions.
1210 See also Jacobs and Coolidge (2006), p.12; Kikeri, Kenyon, and Palmade (2006).
1211 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croat.
Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. German Authority
II (2007).
1212 They seem to be more independent, for example in Romania than in Croatia.
1213 See also Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2007).
1214 See also the example of Macedonia; Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
1215 See also Dresdner Bank (2004), p.22; OECD (2005d), p.43; Leiße (2006), p.9.
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7.2.4.2 Romania
(1) Romania’s law-making side of legal certainty drew (a) significant crit-
icism in earlier years of transition, but has undergone (b) fundamental reforms
since the early 2000s. Some (c) minor problems remain, but for now legal cer-
tainty has (d) become an enhancing factor for FDI in Romania. Section (e)
presents an assessment.
(a) In the early years of transition external observers identified substan-
tial problems in Romania’s law-making process, marked by contradicting
laws and legal gaps which led to the adoption of several hundred emergency
ordinances annually.1216 Interviewees also remember that Romania passed a
large number of new laws in many areas in the 1990s1217 that were not always
thought through, were frequently modified, many times ad-hoc, and sometimes
even ex-post.1218 External sources agree that long-term planning was therefore
difficult for MNCs, for example, because tax bases and rates were frequently
changed.1219 Overall, a solid legal basis was not given in most areas until the
early 2000s.1220
(b) External sources1221 and the great majority of interviewees1222 agree that
the law-making process and legal certainty have significantly improved in
Romania since the early 2000s. Interviewees point out that laws now change
less frequently. Furthermore, the law-making process has become more reliable,
transparent and predictable as well as less contradictory.1223 One important
1216 See European Commission (1999), p.64; IMF (2001), p.56; European Commission
(2005c), p.11.
1217 See already previous sections for examples.
1218 See e. g. Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007).
1219 See Mu¨ller (2005), p.194; FIC (2002), pp. 16, 25.
1220 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1221 See e. g. EBRD (2005b), p.5; European Commission (2005c); OECD (2005d).
1222 See e. g. Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007).
1223 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
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reason for this is that all ministries and interest groups concerned (such as
industry associations) now have to be consulted before a law is passed.1224
Apparently, most of the relevant improvements were initiated during the
EU accession process. Interestingly, this is mainly acknowledged by external
company and state expert interviewees than by investors interviewed, maybe
because the latter tend to have less legal expertise.1225 Yet, investors now seem
to be quite satisfied with the law-making side of the legal certainty, also because
rights could now be enforced via European courts.1226 They evaluate Romania’s
situation comparable to other EECs1227 or even better than, for example, in
Ukraine.1228
(c) Nevertheless, some problems remain with respect to Romania’s leg-
islative dimension of legal certainty. Interviewees1229 and external sources1230
still see some examples of consistency gaps, often because old laws are not elim-
inated, yet. Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007) also states that existing
laws are still not fully established and subject to more updates than, for in-
stance, in Western Europe. Some experts interviewed even make the criticism
that legal certainty is still not given in many cases and has not improved signif-
icantly in recent years.1231 However, the examples they cite, such as arbitrary
decisions, lacking distribution of powers and enforcement of rights, tend to con-
1224 The so-called sunshine-law; Law no. 52/2003; see also European Commission (2005c),
p.11.; OECD (2005d), p.41; Intv. Romanian NGO (2007).
1225 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv. Suprana-
tional Authority I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
1226 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
1227 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association
II (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
1228 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
1229 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
1230 See Mihai (2005); European Commission (2005c), p.12; Mu¨ller (2005), pp.209-210.; FIC
(2005), p.11; European Commission (2006d), p.51; DB Research (2006).
1231 See Intv. German Political Adviser (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007).
312 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
cern the court system and are discussed in the following section. A survey of
the German Economic Chamber also shows that legal certainty was among the
worst performing determinants of Romania’s investment conditions (22nd out
of 26) in 2006.1232 This evaluation may, however, not reflect the most recent
improvements due to EU accession and may also be driven by the fact that
the survey also does not distinguish between the legal and the juridical side of
legal certainty.
(d) Legal certainty represents an important motivation for the investment
decision of MNCs.1233 Investors generally examine the legal environment thor-
oughly before deciding on an investment.1234 Consistency and transparency in
the administrative law seem to be most relevant in this context.1235 Both pri-
mary1236 and secondary sources1237 give evidence that law-making deficiencies
led to legal uncertainty until the early 2000s and contributed to lower FDI flows
to Romania – at least in the early 1990s. External sources however also find
that MNCs worried less about intransparent legislation in Romania than, for
example, in Bulgaria or Poland.1238
Interviews and FDI studies suggest that Romania’s accession to the EU has
transformed the legal aspect of legal certainty from a constraining to an enhanc-
ing factor.1239 Company experts interviewed have heard of various MNCs who
waited for Romania to enter the EU in 2007 before initiating their investment.
State representatives are even convinced that the increasing legal certainty will
1232 See AHK (2006).
1233 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007).
1234 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1235 More important than e. g. civil law, criminal law or human rights; see Intv. Germ. Legal
Expert (2007).
1236 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1237 See Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993); Dresdner Bank (2004), p.22.
1238 See Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993).
1239 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007);
more skeptical: Intv. German Political Adviser (2007).
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help to enhance Romania’s credibility and FDI inflows in the future.1240 In
contrast, interviews with company experts tend to indicate that this positive
effect may cease in the coming years.1241 This interpretation is also supported
by the survey of AHK (2006) in which a decrease of the importance of legal
certainty can be noted from 2006 to 2007.1242 According to the survey, legal
certainty was the most important determinant for investors in 2006, maybe
because only German investors participated in the survey who are – as shown
for property rights above – particularly eager to minimize risks.
(e) The assessment makes it apparent that the poor quality of Romania’s
legislation may have deterred some investors in the early years of transition.
However, the legislative dimension of legal certainty underwent significant
improvements in recent years, mostly under the pressure of the EU in the
accession process. However, it seems that some external studies and public
policy makers may sometimes overestimate the impact of this factor. In fact,
investors interviewed often knew only little about details in legal harmoniza-
tion in Romania – for example regarding the changes due to EU pressure –
and generally more regarding administrative procedures. EU accession may
have increased the awareness of Romania’s legally codified legal certainty,
but most of the laws relevant for investors had already been adjusted to EU
standards in the previous years.1243 Public policy makers should therefore be
aware that the positive, FDI-enhancing effect will vanish soon – investors may
just have delayed investments that they had been planning anyway. Public
policy should nevertheless increase efforts to provide rewarding information to
investors about the legal framework in Romania in order to overcome existing
1240 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
1241 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III
(2007).
1242 See also Doc - German Econ. Chamber Romania (2007) for 2007 figures.
1243 Even though the enforcement of rights in European courts was impossible until EU
accession.
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knowledge gaps and continued worries of risk-averse investors.
(2) Romania’s judiciary side of legal certainty, the court system, has (a)
performed fairly poorly in the past, (b) reforms are ongoing, but (c) significant
problems persist, d) even though the factor may only have average importance
on the investment decision of investors. An assessment for Romania is presented
in sub-section (e).
(a) The work of Romania’s courts was frequently criticized in the past.
According to interviewees1244 and external sources1245, existing laws were not
always sufficiently enforced. Decisions were often intransparent or even arbi-
trary and white-collar crimes were rarely brought to court. Reasons for these
shortcomings mentioned in external studies include the low number of judges
and their often deficient education, strong political pressure on judges and the
fears of some judges of physical threats at that time.1246 In addition to this,
company experts remember that trials were inefficient and lengthy, even in the
early 2000s, and could take several years. Sometimes investors had to wait for
7-8 years for a decision in trials, also because even small issues could be brought
all the way up to the highest court.1247
(b) Both primary1248 and secondary sources1249 see some progress as well
as signs of modernization and europeanization of Romania’s court system. Re-
forms were initiated to strengthen the independence of the jurisprudence which
was codified in the constitution. The establishment of the Superior Council of
1244 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association
(2007).
1245 See European Commission (2001), p.20; FIC (2002), p.9; Leiße (2006), p.9; Menzer
(2006).
1246 See also European Commission (1999); p.64; European Commission (2002a), pp.24-26.
1247 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1248 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); see also Doc - Min. of Justice (2005a).
1249 See European Commission (2005c); OECD (2005d); IMF (2006b).
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Magistracy (2003) seems to be a major achievement in this context.1250 The
council comprises judges, public prosecutors and the minister of justice and
aims at the increase of judicial independence from political influence, for ex-
ample through the exclusive supervision of appointments, transfer and actions
of judges.1251 External sources1252 and interviewees1253 acknowledge that the
council has helped state attorneys and judges to act more independently of pol-
itics and to become more open to reforms. Furthermore, the number of judges
was increased from 1,513 (1990) to 3,671 (2005).1254 The law of practice was
reformed and since 2004 extraordinary revisions are not possible anymore. An
electronic archive of claims was established and thus also increases legal cer-
tainty for investors. In 2005 Romania signed the OECD Declaration on Inter-
national Investment and Multinational Enterprises.1255 Interviewees add that
the duration of lawsuits has decreased, also because limitations of levels of ju-
risdiction were introduced1256, court decisions have become more reliable1257
and seem little biased towards foreigners today.1258
In particular state experts interviewed point out that most of these improve-
ments were initiated under the pressure of accession preparations to the EU.1259
1250 Laws no. 317/2004 and 247/2005; see Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007); Intv. Germ.
Research Institute I (2007).
1251 See Superior Council of Magistracy website (2008); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal
Services (2007).
1252 See e. g. European Commission (2006e), p.6.
1253 See Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv.
Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
1254 See National Institute of Statistics (2007).
1255 See OECD (2006c), p.18; OECD (2005d), pp.43-44; European Commission (2005c),
p.14.
1256 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1257 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); see also Intv. German Authority IV
(2007).
1258 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007).
1259 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); even though
some reforms were already initiated before the actual EU accession process under Min-
ister of Justice Diaconescu (until 2004); see also Intv. Romanian County Council (2007);
Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
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While foreign external sources1260 generally give much credit to Minister of Jus-
tice Macovei (2004-2007), interviewees are more skeptical. Critics state that she
quickly became a speaker of President Ba˘sescu in his quarrel with Prime Min-
ister Popescu-Ta˘riceanu.1261 Furthermore, some experts criticize that “the EU
has made Ms. Macovei a hero of legal reform without seeing that some of the
laws actually reduce the independence of the justice system.”1262 These aspects
are further analyzed in the following section.
(c) Various essential problems in the Romanian court system remain.
Court decisions as well as their implementation still take too long in the per-
ception of the experts (up to 4-5 years)1263, even though they may be lengthy
in other SEECs as well.1264 Even state representatives complain that the long
duration of trials can be an obstacle for them, for example, for the progress of
local projects such as public tenders.1265 International statistics confirm this
mediocre evaluation of the interviewees regarding the time required to settle
legal issues. According to World Bank (2007b), the enforcement of contracts,
for example, takes on average 537 days in Romania and is faster in nine of 19
EECs (figure 43).
Reasons given for this long duration are an insufficient number of judges
and supporting staff1266, deficiencies in the general and specific training of
1260 See e. g. BA-CA (2007b); The International Herald Tribune (2008).
1261 See section 7.4.2 for further details; see Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); see also
Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
1262 Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
1263 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007);
Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Doc - Min. of
Justice (2005a); less critical Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
1264 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I
(2007).
1265 See Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1266 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
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Figure 43: Contract enforcement
judges1267, low salaries that affect motivation1268, the lack of specialized courts
(for example for labor law)1269, and the high turnover of judges.1270 Interviews
do not give a clear evaluation regarding judges who are still in place from
socialist times – maybe because of diverging personal experiences. Some experts
think that they are willing to execute reforms and are often better educated
than younger ones1271, while others believe that the court system would initiate
reforms more quickly if more of the former judges from socialist times had been
replaced.1272
1267 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007);
Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); Doc - Min. of Justice (2005a); see also OECD
(2003c).
1268 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
1269 See Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
1270 Some become lawyers, other may be promoted etc.; see Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Ser-
vices (2007).
1271 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
1272 See Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007).
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Procedural problems mentioned by interviewees are that gaps between ses-
sions are too long, and too many hearings are possible1273, an attorney is not
required1274, too many possibilities exist to delay a final decisions including
the quick transfer to the next higher level.1275 Moreover, attorneys are paid by
session and number of written submissions and therefore have an interest in
prolonging cases.1276
Furthermore, jurisdiction is still not always consistent and depends on the
individual judge.1277 One reason may be Romania’s large number of courts –
187 local courts and 15 courts of appeal1278 – which makes consistent decisions
difficult.1279
External1280 and primary sources1281 also see continued dangers to the in-
dependence of the justice system from politics, for instance with regard to the
combat of corruption in politics.1282 The modifications of the statute of judges
and prosecutors1283 mean that leading judges and state attorneys are only ap-
pointed for three years and can only be selected after very positive evaluations
through their peers. Experts may wonder if sufficient positions can be filled
and if political pressure, for example regarding evaluations can be avoided.
Further recent legal changes require judges to pay compensations for errors in
procedures and substantive law and may also endanger the independence of
1273 See Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
1274 As a result cases may be prolonged when some Romanians defend themselves.
1275 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
1276 In German, for example, attorneys’ renumeration is based on the value of the claim; see
Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
1277 See Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv.
Germ. Legal Expert (2007); see also European Commission (2006d), p.34.
1278 E. g. North Rhine-Westphalia has only 3 courts of appeal and 16M inhabitants (vs.
22M).
1279 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
1280 See e. g. Financial Times (2006a); European Commission (2006d), p.51.
1281 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007);
Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Doc - Min. of Justice (2005b).
1282 See section 7.4.3.
1283 Law no. 303/2004 republished.
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judges.1284 In sum, (mainly legal) experts wonder if some of the recent legal
reforms (mostly under Minister Macovei) may have increased transparency and
humans rights but also weakened the independence of the justice system.1285
Some problems may have been aggravated by the EU.1286 The EU asked for
comprehensive concepts and reforms but did not always detail clearly enough
her demands nor provide enough time and resources in order to give useful
advice.1287
Interviewees’ perception of the integrity of judges is mixed. While some are
certain that briberies do not occur1288, others assume that decisions are still
bought occasionally even though less frequently than ten years ago.1289 In any
case it seems that judges are quickly replaced in the course of trials even when
there are little proofs that they could be biased. This again may prolong cases
and undermine the independence of the magistracy.1290
The justice system remains one of the areas which is most heavily monitored
and criticized by the EU even after accession.1291 Some interviewees even con-
clude that the juridical aspects of legal certainty have not much improved in
the last five years at all1292, even though they may ignore too much the reform
efforts discussed above.
(d) Interviews with state representatives suggest Romania’s court system
is a question of fundamental significance for the locational decision of in-
1284 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
1285 See Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007).
1286 See Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007); see also Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
1287 See Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
1288 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
1289 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
1290 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007).
1291 E. g. regarding administrative capacities for the superior council of magistracy; see Intv.
Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); see also European
Commission (2007e).
1292 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv.
German Political Adviser (2007).
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vestors.1293 However, and despite the various problems discussed, company
interviews rather suggest that MNCs are not greatly deterred by the judiciary
part of legal certainty. It seems that (particularly smaller) investors do not
necessarily expect to get much in contact with courts in the first place and
that many of them indeed have not.1294 Interviews further suggest that expe-
riences in Romania do not greatly vary from those in other Eastern European
markets.1295
Therefore, it seems that legal harmonization has been rather important for
investors’ perception of legal certainty and as a country determinant for Ro-
mania, at least in the course of accession to the EU. This evaluation is also
somewhat reflected in comparative international surveys; according to CICD
(2006) 20% of investors see the work of courts in Romania as essential barrier in
2005 and therefore on a similar level as in Bulgaria (17%) but less problematic
than, for example, in Macedonia (31%).
(e) When assessing the judicial dimension of legal certainty it becomes
apparent that Romania’s court system has not progressed as much as its law-
making in recent years. To some extent this is understandable because changes
in the court system such as education, jurisdiction etc. take longer than the
adoption of new laws. Interviews with legal experts were particularly helpful
for identifying remaining problems. In contrast, most investors generally feel
that the work of courts is improving but only slowly and that they should
try to avoid going to court, not because they worry about bias but because
of the cumbersome procedures. Therefore, the independence of judges seems
less relevant for their FDI decision. Another reason for the limited importance
of the court system as a FDI determinant may be that some MNCs are also
1293 See Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Germ.
Legal Expert (2007).
1294 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
1295 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
7.2 Legal measures 321
somewhat naive to expect they will have not contact with the courts at all.
On the other hand, state representatives may occasionally overestimate the
importance of these aspects, perhaps because they have experienced constant
pressure from the EU for improvements in this field.
Romanian public policy makers will need to work more thoroughly on
finding an adequate balance between the independence of the court system
and the achievement of political goals, such as the fight against corruption.
In this context, a thorough analysis of the status – for example regarding
the required number of staff – and a single and comprehensive concept are
needed to overcome remaining problems. Public policy should also increase the
knowledge about Romania’s court system in authorities that are in frequent
contact with investors, such as the Romanian Agency for Foreign Investments
(ARIS), to be able to quickly answer all relevant questions. Overall, the further
strengthening of the court system may not have so much direct influence on
FDI inflows to Romania but it will help to fulfill the remaining demands of
the EU and improve the rights of citizens and businesses.
(3) In conclusion, this section has shown that the legal and judicial dimen-
sion of legal certainty were important constraining factors for FDI to Romania
in earlier years. Improvements on the legal side were substantial, while the
court system still shows significant room for improvements. After EU accession
it seems that legal certainty will lose some of its importance and interviews
reveal that state experts may even somewhat overestimate the impact of this
determinant while company experts know often less about the specifics of legal
certainty than, for example, regarding administrative procedures; they gener-
ally assume that conditions regarding legal certainty are similar in all Eastern
European EU members. Finally, this section indicates interdependences of le-
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gal certainty mainly with corruption, EU accession and political stability (see
sections below).
7.2.4.3 Croatia
(1) The analysis of Croatia’s law-making dimension of legal certainty shows
that (a) investors were very concerned in the course of the 1990s, but (b)
laws have been significantly harmonized in recent years. Even though (c) many
problems remain, (d) the importance of the factor as a country determinant is
decreasing for Croatia. Sub-section (e) presents an assessment.
(a) For the 1990s and even the early 2000s, primary1296 and secondary1297
sources find substantial deficiencies in the consistency and comprehensive-
ness of Croatia’s legal framework. Company experts interviewed remember that
investors were skeptical in that period whether legal certainty was given.1298 As
for administrative procedures most legal problems occurred in the real estate
sector in which legislative gaps and the lack of rule of law made investments
very risky.1299
(b) Croatia has made – according to interviews1300 and secondary1301 sources
– significant improvements in reforming its legal framework and strength-
ening its rule of law in recent years, particularly since 2002. “The law making
process is functioning in Croatia”1302 and seems to be less of a problem than im-
plementation (as discussed above). Most Croatian laws are based on German
and Austrian models and are increasingly influenced by the EU acquis.1303
1296 See e. g. Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineer-
ing (2007).
1297 See e. g. NCC (2004b); European Commission (2005a).
1298 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications
(2007).
1299 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007).
1300 See e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007).
1301 See e. g. European Commission (2007a); Moore and Vamvakidis (2007).
1302 Intv. German Authority III (2007).
1303 See also sections above; see APIU (2006b), p.40; Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services
I (2007).
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Already now most Croatian laws seem to be in compliance with European
standards or even superior to Western European laws.1304
To most interviewees Croatian laws seem to provide sufficient legal certainty
for investors today in order to enforce their claims.1305 State representatives
also emphasize that the Croatian legal framework does not distinguish between
domestic and foreign investors.1306 In terms of legal certainty Croatia is seen
as the second safest country of former Yugoslavia after Slovenia.1307 Intervie-
wees expect that the legal side of legal certainty including the removal of old
Yugoslavian laws will further continue in the course of EU integration.1308
(c) However, some problems with regard to Croatia’s law-making remain.
Interviewees criticize some continued legal gaps, overlaps due to the differ-
ent origins of legislation and the still frequent changes of legislation.1309 State
representatives also assume that laws are sometimes drafted and adopted too
quickly and require more reflection and coordination.1310 Furthermore, com-
pany experts express that MNCs do not always feel completely legally on par
with domestic firms.1311
1304 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007).
1305 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007).
1306 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Econ. Association (2007).
1307 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1308 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007).
1309 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007);
Intv. Croatian University (2007); with respect to tax legislation: Intv. Germ. MNC -
Financial Services II (2007).
1310 See Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007).
1311 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
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Overall both primary1312 and secondary sources1313 raise doubts that legal
certainty has been fully established. Various interviewees point out that the
legal harmonization and legal certainty remain a main area of future reform
in Croatia1314 which will be challenging in the context of EU integration in
particular since requirements of the EU are higher for Croatia than, for example
for Romania.1315 Main areas of concern remain real estate issues1316, but also
cross-border services.1317
(d) Investors interested in Croatia generally seem to regard legal certainty as
an important factor for their investment decision1318, particularly in sectors
with frequently changing legislation such as real estate.1319 Legal certainty ap-
parently remained a constraining factor for Croatia until recently. Intv. Germ.
MNC - Engineering (2007) explains that legal certainty was one of the most
important reasons behind the decision not to invest in Croatia in the early
2000s (together with property rights). According to other investors, legal cer-
tainty was in doubt in that period but was seen as an acceptable risk, at least
for larger investors .1320 The problems discussed above were often the reason
why Croatia was only the second choice of investors in the region after Slove-
nia.1321 Interviewees state that these issues also explain why there is so little
Greenfield investment in Croatia and why many investors preferred FDI in pri-
vatizations, re-capitalizations and acquisitions in order to avoid as many legal
1312 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommu-
nications (2007).
1313 See European Commission (2005a); European Commission (2006a); Intv. Supranational
Authority II (2007).
1314 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Croatian
Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
1315 See section 7.4.4; see Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007).
1316 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007).
1317 See European Commission (2006a).
1318 See for external sources e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
1319 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007);
see also Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
1320 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
1321 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
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problems as possible.1322 Lack of legal certainty functioning as a deterrent in
FDI apparently started to lose its importance after 2002 when many Western
investors were already present in Slovenia and law-making started to become
more stable in Croatia.1323
(e) In the assessment of the legal dimension of legal certainty, this section
has shown that Croatia has made significant improvements in recent years.
Remaining deficiencies, compared to Romania for example, seem understand-
able since EU accession negotiations created an additional push in reforming
the existing legal framework. It seems that (comparable to the Romanian
situation) the legal side of legal certainty is turning from a constraining into
an enhancing factor for FDI with increasing integration towards the EU. Even
though interviewees do not seem to recognize a breakthrough in this direction
so far, public policy may be able to learn from the Romanian example and
use the momentum of approaching legal certainty more actively for investment
promotions before the effect ceases. The improvements with respect to law-
making and legal harmonization should be used to differentiate Croatia from
other countries of former Yugoslavia that may be more competitive in other
areas such as labor costs or GDP per capita growth.
(2) This section gives insights regarding (a) problems in Croatia’s court sys-
tem in the early phase of transition, (b) some gradual improvements since the
early 2000s and (c) substantial continued problems today. The (d) importance
of the court system seems to be significant as FDI determinant for Croatia. An
assessment is provided in sub-section (e).
(a) Investors apparently had major concerns in the past that legal cer-
tainty could not be guaranteed by Croatia’s courts. Criticism from experts in-
1322 See Intv. European Institution (2007).
1323 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
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terviewed1324 and secondary sources1325 include that lawsuits often took many
years, foreigners frequently felt discriminated (particularly by local courts),
bribery was repeatedly necessary in order to be successful in court, and the
enforcement of laws was very cumbersome. A major problem at that time was
the large backlog of 1.1M pending cases in Croatian courts (2001)1326 which
was significantly higher than, for example, in Romania with 340K cases.1327 An
important reason for this seems to have been the procedural law that enabled
sending cases back to the first instances for an unlimited time before a final
decision was taken. Furthermore, interviewees and external sources criticize the
shortage of judges and the lack of practical education at that time.1328 In this
context, interviews in particular suggest that war time incorporated additional
challenges to Croatia’s court system. Many judges were dismissed during that
period, not because of incompetence or lack of integrity but due to political
pressure. They were often succeeded by young, inexperienced and sometimes
incompetent judges.1329
(b) Improvement and modernization of the judicial system were a top
priority for Croatian governments since 20011330 and five reforms and the sup-
port of World Bank and CARDS programs helped to make the Croatian courts
system gradually more efficient.1331 However, substantial actual reforms did not
commence until 2005 when a more comprehensive strategy was established, in-
cluding various actions plans and when the annual budget of the judicial system
1324 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
1325 See e. g. FIAS (2002); OECD (2003c).
1326 See OECD (2003c); see also FIAS (2002), p.48; McGee (2003).
1327 Romanian figures for 1999. Croatia with 1 case per 4 inhabitants and Romania with 1
per 50 inhabitants; see also European Commission (1999), p.12; own calculations.
1328 See FIAS (2002); European Commission (2005a), p.15; Intv. Croatian Ministry IV
(2007).
1329 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007);
see also Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1330 See EBRD (2005a), p.49; see also OECD (2006a).
1331 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); see also Bertelsmann Stiftung
(2006b), pp.1, 5.
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was increased by 16%.1332 Independent appeal procedures were established1333,
the number of hearings and the time between hearings were reduced.1334 State
representatives point out that further measures are about to be adopted in
order to cut off possibilities for extending and prolonging lawsuits.1335
After a rise in the backlog to 1.4M cases in 2004 the Enforcement Act (2005)
and an order of the constitutional court (that decided to deal with old cases
first, before starting to work off new ones) helped to reduce the number of
backlog cases to about 1M cases in 2007, mainly driven by a reduction of en-
forcement cases.1336 The government also tackled the duration of trials and
introduced an obligation for judges to finish a case within a reasonable amount
of time.1337 Interviewees also point out that commercial courts (which do not
even exist in Romania) generally function well in Croatia1338 and have some
well-educated and motivated judges nowadays who finish cases within an aver-
age of two months.1339 In fact, education of court staff in general has apparently
improved in recent years – for example, due to the establishment of education
centers for judges in several Croatian cities – and may be even better than in
other SEECs including Romania.1340
1332 See Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Intv.
Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); see also European Commission (2005a), pp.11 and
84.
1333 See OECD (2006a).
1334 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007).
1335 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007).
1336 See Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Intv.
Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007) see also Intv. German Authority II (2007); Ber-
telsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.1; European Commission (2005a), p.85; European Com-
mission (2007a), p.49.
1337 Depending on the type of case; see Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croatian
Ministry III (2007).
1338 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
1339 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007).
1340 See Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv.
Croatian Ministry IV (2007); see also European Commission (2005a), p.84.
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(c) Both primary1341 and secondary sources1342 report significant and
complex remaining problems regarding Croatia’s court system. According
to both interviewees1343 and external sources1344, the long duration of trials re-
mains a key problem of the judiciary dimension of legal certainty for investors.
World Bank (2007a) finds that contract enforcements take on average 561 days
and are thus even 24 days longer than in Romania (figure 43). Experts inter-
viewed even speak of an average time of six years for general lawsuits1345, but
a complete litigation can also take up to ten years. MNCs are sometimes actu-
ally uncertain if the case is going to be completed at all.1346 Therefore, experts
state that “you cannot speak of legal certainty”1347. An example often cited is
the acquisition of shares of the Tvornica Duhana Zadar by British American
Tobacco in the late 1990s. The purchase was challenged by the domestic mo-
nopolist Tvornica Duhana Rovinj based on competition issues and a lengthy
lawsuit followed. When courts eventually decided in favor of the MNC eight
years later, British American Tobacco had already determined to divest.1348
Furthermore, interviewees clarify that the reduction of the backlog is still
neither significant nor sufficient. Experts interviewed assume that a substan-
tial reduction will take ten years when the current amount of staff and speed
1341 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
1342 See e. g. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b); European Commission (2007a).
1343 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1344 See European Commission (2005a); European Commission (2007a), p.49.
1345 See e. g. Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); only slightly more optimistic: Intv.
German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian
Ministry III (2007).
1346 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal
Services (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); see similar European
Commission (2005a), p.42.
1347 Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); even though lawsuits seem to take
less time in smaller cities than in Zagreb or Split; See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate
(2007).
1348 See Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); see also Jansson (2006b).
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are maintained.1349 Most problems are seen in property rights, land registra-
tion and other civil cases.1350 State authorities also contribute to the backlog
by taking legal actions even when the case seems to have little chance to suc-
ceed.1351
Despite recent initiatives most experts interviewed still criticize the large
number of judges (Croatia has one of the highest number of judges per capita
in Europe)1352, deficiencies in their education (particularly with respect to EU
law) and their low salaries.1353 Judges also seem to make only little use of their
right to reduce the number of hearings and length of procedures.1354 Exter-
nal sources demand a better use of modern information and communication
technologies and a more equal distribution of work, since main courts seem to
be overwhelmed with work, while smaller and local courts are often not fully
used.1355 Croatia still has very many courts overall (253 in 2007)1356, whereas
interviewees point out the need for more specialized courts, including fast track
courts for petty claims and additional administrative courts.1357
Lawyers may also contribute to some of the problems; they tend to prolong
court trials because they are paid (as in Romania) by written submission and
1349 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007);
Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007).
1350 Especially regarding financial obligations of debtors and mortgage claims; see Intv.
Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Croatian
Authority I (2007); see also European Commission (2005a), p.15.
1351 See European Commission (2007a), p.49.
1352 See Doc - NCC (2007), p.11.; Doc - GTZ (2006a); see also Intv. Germ. Political Foun-
dation I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007)
.
1353 See Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv.
Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); see also European
Commission (2005a), p.15.; EBRD (2005a), p.49; more positive: Intv. Croat. Company
I - Legal Services (2007).
1354 See European Commission (2007a), p.49; EBRD (2005a), p.49; see also Intv. Croatian
Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007).
1355 See European Commission (2007a), p.49; see also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b).
1356 In April 2007 a plan was adopted to reduce the number of courts reduced to 130;
European Commission (2007a), p.49.
1357 Croatia has only one administrative court now; see Intv. Croatian Government Team
(2007).
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not on the basis of the amount in dispute (as in Germany).1358 The Croatian
Chamber of Lawyers is apparently very powerful and effectively lobbies against
any changes that reduce the fees or powers of lawyers. Therefore, foreign law
firms are not allowed to open a branch in Croatia. This is unlikely to change
until EU accession.1359
Investors point out more strongly than external sources that court deci-
sions, particularly on the local level, frequently seem to be influenced by politi-
cians.1360 and are also today sometimes biased against foreigners.1361 Various
interviewees assume that the legal system remains one of the most corrupt areas
in Croatia.1362 The European Commission may thus overestimate the perfor-
mance of Croatia in this context when stating that “the Croatian judiciary is
formally independent and also appears to act independently in practice.”1363
In sum and despite the reforms discussed above, some investors do not see
significantly improvements in recent years.1364 Legal experts also believe that
the performance of Croatia’s court system is still unsatisfactory and worse
than the one of the administration.1365 Some investors interviewed speak of
“mixed”1366, others of “only negative experiences”1367 with the Croatian court
system so far. Entrepreneurs are therefore often reluctant to go to court –
particularly on the local level – to implement their rights.1368
1358 See Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Intv.
German Authority II (2007); see also European Commission (2005a), p.15.
1359 See Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); see also Doc - DLA Piper (2006).
1360 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services II (2007).
1361 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods I (2007).
1362 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); see similar Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services
II (2007).
1363 European Commission (2005a), p.90.
1364 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1365 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal
Services (2007); see similar Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
1366 Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
1367 Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
1368 See Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
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(d) Croatia’s problems with reference to the court system are substantial
and significantly deteriorate legal certainty for both citizens and investors.1369
In contrast to Romania, the problems seem to be so important that they
represent a considerable deterring factor for FDI inflows to Croatia even today.
As in Romania various MNCs in Croatia have hardly been in contact with
courts so far1370 and as in Romania Croatian state experts are a lot better
informed regarding the details of the deficiencies of the courts. Nevertheless,
most interviews reveal that the general distrust in the work of courts is even
greater in Croatia than, for example in Romania. The vague knowledge and
Croatia’s negative reputation, also promoted through prominent cases such as
British American Tobacco, therefore seem sufficient in order to deter investors
interested in Croatia. This seems to be particularly true for smaller investors
who can hardly handle or afford intransparent and long court trials.1371 As a
result this section also indicates a greater importance of the court system on
FDI than assumed in some FDI studies that only find a general but not decisive
impact of the quality of courts on FDI.1372
(e) In the assessment of Croatia’s court system it becomes apparent that
recent reform efforts have not been sufficient to overcome a certain quality
threshold and to abolish existing worries of investors regarding the judiciary
side of legal certainty. In this context the speed and effectiveness of court
decision seem most crucial, while the independence of judges only represents a
secondary factor. International organizations have provided detailed analyses
of Croatia’s court system, whereas FDI studies seem to have focused (too)
little on related aspects so far. For public policy makers it will be essential to
understand that judiciary reforms are indispensable not only for Croatia’s EU
1369 See e. g. Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007).
1370 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food
Products (2007).
1371 See Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1372 See Murtha and Lenway (1994).
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aspirations but also for its investment climate. They will need to reduce the
number of pending cases as quickly as possible and decrease possibilities of
procedural law to prolong cases even before EU accession despite the pressure
of lobbying groups. This should include the concentration of hearings and a
modification of the renumeration system of lawyers. Croatia can learn from
the Romanian experience, especially when it comes to the improvement of
the land registration processes that lead to most of the backlogged cases, a
better distribution of work among courts and a reduction of political influence
and bias towards foreigner in local courts. Finally, Croatian public policy
actors should better involve companies in judiciary reforms in order to quickly
identify pain points.
(3) In conclusion, this section on Croatia’s legal certainty has illustrated
that reforms have been initiated but are progressing slowly. However, ongoing
reforms may help Croatia to turn the legal dimension from a constraining
to an enhancing factor. Improvements seem to materialize a lot slower on the
judiciary side of reform and interviews have helped to understand that Croatia’s
weak performance has significant negative impact on Croatia as investment
location, particularly on the local level.
7.2.4.4 General insights for transition countries
The analysis of Romania and Croatia as well as the consideration of further
FDI studies reveal (1) some general insights regarding the importance of legal
certainty in transition countries, (2) some common problems in this area and
several (3) implications for public policy actors.
(1) The importance of legal certainty for the investment decision of MNCs
– as shown for Romania and Croatia – is also strongly confirmed by various
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FDI studies for transition countries in general. Studies identify some1373 or
even significant impact1374 of legal certainty for host countries’ investment en-
vironment. According to McGee (2003), transition countries “that do not have
a rule of law or that have unclear legislation or legislation that is not applied
uniformly by an efficient and fair judicial system are at a competitive disad-
vantage when competing for FDI.” Many studies do not distinguish between
the legal and the judicial dimension of legal certainty1375, but some separate
insights do exist.
Various studies point out that a weak legal system is an obstacle to FDI
in transition countries.1376 For the early 1990s Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli
(1993) even find that the lack of clearly defined legislation was the most im-
portant concern for investors in transition countries, even more important than
property rights. However, a clear legislation seems to be mainly important for
larger firms1377 and in areas with strong state interaction (for example for li-
censes or privatizations). Furthermore, the analyses of this section indicate that
law-making even has the potential to become an enhancing factor for FDI in
transition countries, for example in the course of EU accession (as Romania).
The effect may, however, depend on the situation in the surrounding coun-
tries. When all neighbors are EU members (for example in the case of Czech
Republic) the relative advantage of the legal dimension of legal certainty may
be limited. Yet, these countries have to establish good law-making conditions
because they are pressured by the EU and they would otherwise risk legal
certainty becoming a constraining factor for FDI in the locational competition.
1373 See e. g. Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005);
Cho (2003).
1374 See UNCTAD (2007).
1375 See e. g. Be´nassy-Que´re´, Coupet, and Mayer (2005); Bevan and Estrin (2000).
1376 See Campos and Kinoshita (2003); Kinoshita and Campos (2006); FIAS (2007); Pierpont
(2007).
1377 See also Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993).
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On the other hand, several studies confirm – in line with the findings of this
section – the general importance of independence and efficiency of court sys-
tems for transition countries in general.1378 Smaller firms in particular may be
deterred by a weak performance of courts since they face significant challenges
to cope with lengthy and costly trials. The examples of Romania and Croatia
suggest that the court system has little chance to become an enhancing factor
for transition countries and only one – in the best case – that is neglected by
investors, since MNCs generally want to avoid contact with courts anyway.
(2) Transition countries seem to face similar problems regarding legal cer-
tainty. Major problems for the law-making of transition countries in the 1990s
were apparently the (too) frequent legal changes that also increased the danger
of legal gaps and the demand for emergency ordinances (as shown for Roma-
nia). It seems that EU pressure helps to improve the quality and consistency
of the legal framework of transition countries.1379
Judiciary reforms seem to take an even longer time than the improvement
of the legal framework. Interviews suggest that the long duration of trials is
probably the most negative aspect of the court system for potential investors.
This is crucial, for example, when MNCs sue a financially weak company for not
having paid a bill that goes bankrupt during a long court trial.1380 Companies
also have to worry that receivables are written off after a certain period.1381
Finally, slow court decisions may also delay privatizations.1382
It seems that courts in larger cities are often slower, while local courts may
be more strongly influenced by local interests and tend to be more biased
against foreigners (as in Croatia). The example of Croatia also showed that
1378 See Jacobs and Coolidge (2006); Cho (2003); Murrell (2002).
1379 See also Bevan and Estrin (2004).
1380 See Intv. European Institution (2007); see also Doc - DLA Piper (2006).
1381 See Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007).
1382 See Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007).
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the institutional set up alone is not sufficient to reduce substantial concerns of
investors, since the existence of commercial and administrative courts did nei-
ther lead to more efficient courts nor to a better evaluation through investors.
In this context, it may also be problematic from an investor’s perspective that
judiciary reform is mainly perceived by state representatives (as interviews
suggest) as part of the reforms on their path towards EU accession and not
as an important reform per se. Finally, those reforms initiated under the
pressure of the EU may somewhat overemphasize issues such as independence
and institutional arrangements while key concerns of investors (regarding legal
certainty) such as the speed and consistency of decisions possibly do not receive
as much attention by the EU and policy makers.
(3) The analyses of this section allow for some recommendation for public
policy makers in order to enhance legal certainty in transition countries. Re-
garding the law-making process, public policy actors need to strengthen public
institutions1383, through measures such as the provision of better legal advice to
members of parliaments and an increase of continuity in the staff of ministries
who prepare most of the laws. Public policy makers should use the window of
opportunity when a good legal framework establishes formal legal certainty and
turns into an FDI-enhancing determinant for a limited time. In this period, for
example right before and after EU accession, public policy should extensively
increase the awareness of these legal benefits among MNCs (regarding legal
certainty), since the positive effect seizes after a short period with increasing
normality as EU member and with continued reforms of neighboring non-EU
countries.
Reforms in the judiciary require more in-depth analysis upfront (for exam-
ple regarding the required number of courts, judges, state attorneys etc.) as
1383 See also World Economic Forum (2006b), p.23.
336 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
well as more comprehensive strategic long-term planning as often determined
for transition countries. Within the court system judges may need to learn to
feel less like civil servants but as independent powers of democracy and use
their powers more effectively to make proceedings more efficient.1384 In judi-
cial reforms public policy makers may also keep in mind that simplifications
(for example of procedural laws) may cause citizens to fear that they will be
deprived of their rights of litigation.1385
Finally, public policy actors in non-EU transition countries should under-
stand that strengthening legal certainty is not only an important factor for EU
accession, but is also essential for their business climate. Substantial reforms
should therefore not be delayed until EU accession negotiations (as happened in
Romania and Croatia). In this context, it will also be the task of governments
(as well as of other players like Chambers of Commerce etc.) to give better guid-
ance for MNCs how to successfully reach legal certainty in their host country
in order to decrease the great mistrust of many present and potential investors.
7.2.5 Labor law
7.2.5.1 Definition
From the perspective of MNCs, favorable labor law conditions exist in host
countries of FDI when requirements regarding hiring and dismissing employees
are liberal and daily operations with labor issues cause little legal or adminis-
trative obstacles for MNCs.1386 The subsequent sections analyze these issues
for Romania (7.2.5.2), Croatia (7.2.5.3) and transition countries in general
(7.2.5.4).
1384 See Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1385 See Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007).
1386 See also UNCTAD (1999), p.264; World Bank (2007b).
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7.2.5.2 Romania
The analysis of Romania’s labor law conditions reveals that (1) employing
domestic and foreign staff is fairly easy, while (2) official procedures for dis-
missals are rather cumbersome and (3) some issues in daily operations persist.
The labor law performance seems to have (4) only limited impact on FDI in
Romania. Sub-section (5) presents an assessment. Most relevant labor regula-
tions were unified in the labor code Law no. 53/2003 with a major amendment
in 2005.1387
(1) Investors generally seem to be quite satisfied with the possibilities for
employing domestic and foreign staff in Romania. Company experts state
that hiring domestic staff is fairly easy and does not provide any major
legal or bureaucratic obstacles.1388 Potential areas of improvements are the
further reduction of paperwork.1389 In contrast to this positive evaluation, the
difficulty of hiring index of the World Bank suggests that employing is nowhere
in Eastern Europe more difficult than in Romania.1390 Reasons listed are the
fairly long time to register the employee’s work place at the Trade Register
Office (14-180 days) and fairly low maximum duration of fixed-term contracts
(24 months).1391 However, interviews help to explain that these aspect may
only have limited impact on their operations. Investors suggest that, in practice,
workers can start working even without a registered work place and that the
length of fixed-term contracts is currently less of a problem than finding and
keeping staff that long in one work place.1392
1387 See EBRD (2005b); OECD (2006c).
1388 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
1389 See e. g. Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); see also OECD (2005d), p.42.
1390 Out of 19 countries; see World Bank (2007a).
1391 See World Bank (2007b); see also OECD (2006c).
1392 See section 6.2.1; see Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC
- Financial Services I (2007).
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Romania has elaborated principal secondment regulations for the entry, stay
and exit of foreign staff, the so-called expats.1393 Apparently regulations have
improved compared to the early 2000s when MNCs had to prove that no Ro-
manian was able to do the job.1394 Most interviewees indicate that no legal or
administrative obstacles exist for the registering of expats today; some limited
bureaucratic procedures are unavoidable but are generally conducted by the
human resources department of the MNCs and do not represent a problem for
investors.1395 Furthermore, authorities have apparently been fairly lax, even if
investors from Western Europe did not have a valid working permit.1396 Since
Romania’s accession to the Union working permits are not necessary for expats
from EU countries anymore.1397
Primary and secondary sources still find aspects of minor criticism: regu-
lations regarding residency permits seem to be quite confusing1398, too many
documents are needed to obtain a work permit for expats1399 and the replace-
ment of a country manager can be quite complicated procedure, which even
has to be confirmed in court.1400
(2) Dismissing staff does not seem to be very easy in Romania from a legal
perspective. Company1401 but also state interviewees1402 as well as external
1393 See Law No. 203/1999, amended by Ordinance No. 32/2003; see Emergency Ordinance
No. 194/2002; see also Bulgaria Economic Forum (2005), p.107.
1394 This was generally given because of language requirements; see Intv. Germ. MNC -
Legal Services I (2007).
1395 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
1396 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
1397 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007)
1398 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
1399 13 documents according to OECD (2006c).
1400 For EU expats only until 2006; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
1401 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting
I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2007).
1402 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
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sources1403 agree that the current labor law is fairly rigid and well in favor of
the employee.
In order to be able to dismiss employees, companies have to specifically define
work places and establish a complex evaluation system. Only after three con-
secutive poor evaluations can an employee be finally dismissed.1404 According
to the interviewees, many smaller companies do not comply with the respec-
tive rules and often do not have the capacities to introduce and operate an
evaluation system. Employees may therefore easily bring forward formal objec-
tions regarding a dismissal.1405 According to the dismissal index of the World
Bank’s ’Ease of doing business’ survey, only three EECs have more rigid regu-
lations for dismissing employees.1406 Despite this, interviews show in constrast
to international statistics that dismissals cause little problems for investors in
reality. Most importantly, MNCs currently have more problems finding suffi-
cient employees than dismissing them due to the increasing labor shortage in
some regions and due to the high labor turnover (see section 6.2.1).1407 In this
context the short cancellation period of work contracts of only 14 days may be
problematic for MNCs.1408 Furthermore, companies always seem to find ways to
dismiss low-performing employees. These employees are either dismissed during
the probationary period1409 or – even though ethical concerns may exist – will
eventually resign themselves, for instance when firms put strong pressure on
them.1410 Finally, larger investors generally have the required system in place
1403 See e. g. OECD (2006c); EBRD (2005b).
1404 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Romanian Company -
Advertising (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal
Services I (2007); see also OECD (2005d), p.42.
1405 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007).
1406 Slovenia, Croatia and Estonia; see World Bank (2007a).
1407 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive
(2007).
1408 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
1409 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
1410 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods II (2007).
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and have little problems with labor regulations.1411 As a result investors seem
to have (currently) only little problems regarding the dismissal of staff.1412
The practical context is also the reason why experts point out that in effect
conditions to dismiss employees are not more protective in Romania than in
Western Europe, for example, in France.1413 This interpretation – the relatively
slight relevance of quite rigid formal rules in practice – is also underlined by
the survey in AHK (2006), according to which MNCs are quite satisfied with
the flexibility of labor law ranking Romania third out of 14 EECs (only behind
Estonia and Latvia).
(3) In daily operations the conditions of labor law seem to be satisfactory
for investors in Romania overall. The collection of the various labor laws in the
labor code seems to have been helpful in making the decisions of authorities
more transparent and reliable.1414 While inspections of the labor authority
may be cumbersome1415, interviewees acknowledge that foreign companies do
not seem to face any different treatment to that of Romanian companies in
these inspections.1416 The degree of unionization is only low among employees
in Romania1417, maybe also because the protection of workers’ rights is less
urgent in times of economic upswing.1418 Most investors interviewed point out
that the record books of Romanian employees – in which all important steps of
the work history are documented including change of jobs, positions and even
salaries – are a very bureaucratic and outdated tool. These hand-written entries
are often made several times a year and represent a significant bureaucratic
1411 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
1412 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
1413 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
1414 See Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); see also OECD (2006c).
1415 See section 7.2.3; see also Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007).
1416 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
1417 With only about 2M formal trade union members; see ILO website (2008).
1418 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
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effort for companies.1419 With increasing IT capacities experts expect record
books to vanish within the next years.1420 Finally, external sources suggest that
Romania’s labor law requires some further improvements regarding the equal
treatment of women and men.1421
(4) Labor law regulations seem to be of only limited importance for in-
vestors interested in Romania at the moment but may increase in future. Inter-
views indicate that MNCs do consider the responsibilities and risks regarding
labor law before investing in the Romanian market.1422 However, and although
some factors may be constraining1423, interviews suggest that investors are
aware from the beginning that most problems can be circumvented and that
rigid or cumbersome legal and bureaucratic elements of labor law do not sig-
nificantly endanger the investment of MNCs.1424 Even for MNCs using a high
share of labor, the labor conditions seem to have only average importance.1425
This evaluation of the interviewees is also confirmed by external studies ac-
cording to which the flexibility of labor law is only the 20th most important
determinant for Romania of 26 determinants analyzed.1426 Only the increased
efforts of the Romanian government to significantly raise the minimum wages
may become more critical when cost advantages of Romania start to diminish
significantly.1427
(5) In the assessment of this section, it becomes apparent that Romania’s
rules are still fairly rigid, particularly regarding the dismissal of employees.
1419 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007);
see also Intv. Rom. Local Authority II (2007).
1420 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
1421 See European Commission (2006d), p.49.
1422 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1423 See also CICD (2006).
1424 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I
(2007).
1425 For example with 25% of labor share of production cost: Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007).
1426 It is the 17th most important determinant in Eastern European; see AHK (2006).
1427 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
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However, interviews contributed to a better understanding of international
statistics and showed that formal problems may be of only limited practical
relevance since MNCs can find ways to avoid problems, especially in the cur-
rent economic upswing. This section also showed the interdependence of labor
law with the economic development, the quality of bureaucracy and labor costs.
Nevertheless, public policy should reduce the over-regulation of labor in some
areas. Most importantly, the steps to dismiss employees should be simplified
and then consistently supervised by labor authorities in order to make a com-
pliance by all companies realistic. State representatives should also carefully
listen to the concerns of investors regarding the raise of minimum wages and
may rely more on market forces to determine fair salaries.
7.2.5.3 Croatia
With respect to Croatia’s labor law investors seem to face (1) only limited ob-
stacles when employing domestic or foreign staff. Possibilities for (2) dismissing
staff are acceptable and labor conditions (3) do not seem to cause any major
problems in daily operations either. (4) The importance of this factor seems to
be limited for the investment decision of MNCs. Section (5) assesses the results
for Croatia. Most labor-related regulations are comprised in the Labor Code
from 2003, which has since undergone some amendments. Labor laws are often
based on German laws and have largely been aligned with European legislation
in recent years.1428
(1) As in the case of Romania, the conditions for employing staff in Croatia
seem to be more complicated in formal terms than in reality. According to the
World Bank, hiring is fairly difficult in Croatia, which ranks 14th out of 19
EECs.1429 Main reasons for this negative evaluation are the maximum duration
1428 Law no. 137/2004; see Doc - Germ. MNC - Engineering (2001), p.54; European Com-
mission (2005a), pp.39 and 77; APIU (2006b), p.41; European Commission (2007a),
p.44; Doc - German Econ. Chamber Croatia (2007).
1429 61 points; 100 points represent the worst possible score; see World Bank (2007b).
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of fixed-term contracts of only 36 months (which is, however, twelve months
longer than in Romania) and high minimum wages.1430 In sharp contrast to
this negative assessment of external studies, investors interviewed emphasize
that they have not experienced any significant problems when hiring domestic
staff at all until now.1431 Reasons for this discrepancy may be that these
formal issues rather concern domestic firms. MNCs, on the other hand, often
have a long-term vision, are therefore mainly interested in permanent contracts,
generally pay quite high salaries compared to domestic companies, and are not
affected by regulations regarding the minimum wage (so far).
Some problems may occur when investors send expats to Croatia. Intv.
Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007) recalls that procedures were very
complicated and time-consuming in the late 1990s and early 2000s and even
today many human resources departments complain about the long waiting
times for working permits. Problems regarding the tax eligibility of expats may
also arise1432, partly because of the limitation of foreign workers through annual
quotas.1433 Nevertheless, it seems that working conditions have improved for
expats in recent years, especially for those from EU countries.1434 Quotas are
more favorable and key staff in companies from EU member states are not
required to obtain a work permit at all.1435
(2) Analogous to employing staff, international statistics give a more skep-
tical image of Croatia’s labor law conditions for dismissing employees than
expert interviews suggest. External studies repeatedly point out that Croa-
tian labor rules make dismissals difficult1436 and are supposedly more rigid
1430 In fact temporary contracts were only rarely allowed until 2003; see IMF (2004), p.31;
see World Bank (2007b); see also Doc - German Econ. Chamber Croatia (2007).
1431 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommuni-
cations (2007).
1432 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
1433 See APIU (2006b), p.41; Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006), p.136.
1434 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
1435 Check articles 87 and 95 of the Aliens Act; see Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006), p.136.
1436 See e. g. IMF (2004), p.31; EBRD (2005a), p.21; European Commission (2005a), p.78.
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than in any other EEC (except in Estonia).1437 Reasons for this evaluation are
that employers must notify the labor authorities before dismissing an employee
and dismissals are only possible when the employee cannot be reassigned or
retrained.1438 Furthermore, lay-offs seem to be very expensive for companies,
equaling on average 39 weeks compared to an average of 27 weeks in Eastern
Europe.1439
On the contrary, investors interviewed do not see any major problems for
dismissing poorly performing staff in Croatia.1440 They agree that labor is in
general well protected, but informal agreements to find a mutual consensus (for
example including a generous compensation) seem to be common and investors
rarely face legal charges in labor matters.1441 The dismissal of employees may
even be somewhat easier than, for example, in Romania, since the establishment
of a complex evaluation system is not compulsory.1442 MNCs may also have
less problems with low-performing employees than domestic firms, since they
often offer better working conditions, more attractive salaries etc. and therefore
attract more skilled members of the labor force. Finally, MNCs may need to
dismiss employees less frequently than domestic firms, since they generally
perform better in economic terms.1443
(3) In daily operations investors seem to find labor conditions satisfactory.
According to interviews as well as to secondary sources, general regulations
such as job descriptions and safety rules do not seem to differ much from
other EECs1444 and variances in the benefit system in Croatia compared to
1437 Out of 19 countries; see World Bank (2007b); similar: AHK (2006).
1438 See World Bank (2007b).
1439 Dismissals are therefore more expensive only in Slovenia and Albania out of 19 EECs;
See IMF (2004), p.31; see also World Bank (2007a).
1440 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications
(2007).
1441 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
1442 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
1443 See also for the characteristics of MNCs versus domestic companies section 2.2.2.
1444 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007), see also European Commission (2007a).
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Western Europe do not seem to be a problem, either.1445 Larger companies
generally seem to experience less difficulties with labor conditions than smaller
MNCs.1446 Further adjustments are expected in the course of EU integration
including the loosening of working restrictions for women and more formal rules
for work places.1447 In this context, external sources praise that the Croatian
government has started a broad consultation process involving economic and
social partners in order to successfully implement EU regulations.1448
Employees’ record books also exist in Croatia (as in Romania) that contain
(only on paper) entries regarding education, employers, trainings etc. MNCs
in Croatia also consider these record books a largely unnecessary bureaucratic
obligation, even though they seem less detailed than in Romania.1449
The interaction with trade unions seems to be more relevant and occasionally
more unwieldy for MNCs in Croatia than in other EECs, notably in Romania.
64% of Croatian workers were union members in 2005.1450 While strikes are
allowed and numerous, they generally do not last long1451, maybe because sev-
eral labor unions are generally represented within one company whose quarrels
often prevent a long-lasting common approach.1452 The experiences of investors
interviewed with unions have been mixed. Some have had only little interac-
tion so far1453, while others have dealt extensively with them, for example,
regarding complaints of excessive overtime work.1454
1445 See IMF (2004), p.30.
1446 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
1447 See European Commission (2005a), p.78; see also Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006), p.51;
Doc - Ekonomski Institut Zagreb (2007).
1448 See European Commission (2006a), p.44.
1449 E. g. salaries are not documented; see e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
1450 See EBRD (2005a), p.50.
1451 See European Commission (2005a), p.50; Doc - GTZ (2006a).
1452 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products
(2007).
1453 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
1454 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
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(4) Interviews indicate that labor law regulations are of only limited impor-
tance for the investment decision of investors interested in Croatia.1455 Appar-
ently, investors do not rely much on international statistics in this context and
anticipate that employing and dismissing staff in Croatia is of a comparable
level with other countries of the region. Furthermore, MNCs also often invest
in sectors like tourism, in which high labor demand and high salaries make
labor rules less relevant.1456 Several comparative surveys confirm this inter-
pretation of the interviews. According to CICD (2006), only 3% of managers
interviewed identified labor regulations as major constraint for investments in
Croatia. German investors also perceive the flexibility of Croatia’s labor law
rules as only the 16th most important of 26 determinants in terms of importance
according to AHK (2006). These findings make a strong argument to refute the
statement of the IMF that “strict employment protection is also likely to have
discouraged entry or expansion of new businesses in Croatia”1457. It also seems
unlikely that rigid labor rules (alone) significantly contribute to Croatia’s high
unemployment as suggested by some studies1458 since, for example, Romania
has even more rigid labor markets but a substantially lower unemployment at
the same time.
(5) In the assessment of Croatia’s labor regulations, this section has shown
that formal rigidities exist but only have limited impact on the fairly positive
experiences and evaluations of MNCs. Interviews (mainly those with company
experts) and external surveys confirmed the results for Romania also for Croatia
that international statistics may draw a picture of the country’s labor market
that is somewhat too pessimistic and may to some extent ignore the investment
reality of MNCs.
1455 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
1456 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); see also Doc - Germ. MNC - Engineering
(2001).
1457 IMF (2004), p.31.
1458 See e. g. Vidovic and Gligorov (2004); IMF (2004), pp.28 and 32; see also Hina (2006).
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However, in the further course of EU integration the regulations of Croatia’s
labor law may gain importance for investors when rules become more formalized
and MNCs lose some of the possibilities for using informal agreements for labor
issues. Public policy actors in Croatia will, therefore, be confronted with the
challenge to comply with EU regulations on the one hand and to maintain
favorable conditions for MNCs on the other hand.
7.2.5.4 General insights for transition countries
The analysis of the country cases as well as the consideration of further relevant
studies allows for some general insights regarding labor law as FDI determinant
for transition countries. The (1) performance of transition countries may be
better than international statistics suggest, (2) the importance seems to be only
limited for FDI flows and (3) some public policy implications can be derived.
(1) With respect to the labor law performance, transition countries have
undertaken significant reforms in the 1990s1459 and those on their way towards
the EU further adjusted their legal framework in the course of preparations to
EU accession.1460 A stronger codification of labor rules has, however, also led
to (or confirmed existing) inflexibilities. As a result, international statistics and
reports indicate that rules for employing and dismissing staff are quite strict
in most transition countries.1461
On the contrary, interviews and external surveys suggest that the labor law
conditions of transition countries are probably more satisfactory for MNCs
than formal analyses may indicate. It seems that the informal way to deal with
labor issues is well established in transition countries – probably better than
in Western Europe – and employers and employees generally find a solution
without insisting on their formal rights. Even for the early 1990s, Genco,
1459 See e. g. Altomonte (1998).
1460 See e. g. OECD (2006a).
1461 See World Bank (2007a); see also IMD (2006).
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Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993) already found that labor market rigidities were
only a minor weakness of transition countries and less disturbing than, for
example, permit procedures, legal certainty and taxation. Literature assumes
that larger firms are generally more affected by labor regulations1462, while
interviews rather suggest that larger firms have less problems in dealing with
many of the existing barriers such as evaluation systems (as in Romania)1463
or the secondment of expats (as in Croatia in the past)1464. Further potential
problems, which may also differ across transition countries, are high minimum
wages and sometimes also the work of unions.
(2) Regarding the importance of labor law, external studies indicate that
more liberal regulations may foster GDP growth and employment in transition
countries.1465 Some studies also suggest that a less flexible labor market will
lead to lower FDI inflows.1466 Interviews and external surveys rather suggest
that rigid labor laws have an only very limited (negative) impact on FDI in-
flows.1467 Most importantly, the strict formal rules only seem to have little
relevance for MNCs. Reasons are that MNCs generally pay wages above the
minimum wage, frequently get the more skilled members of the labor market,
restrictions for expats from EU countries are often fairly low, and the (cur-
rent) economic environment produces more concerns regarding labor shortage
in many EECs than dismissing staff. Furthermore, informal possibilities to dis-
pute resolution of labor issues seem to be sufficient and can compensate for
stricter formal rules. In addition to this, investors seem to expect actual labor
conditions to be similar in most EECs.
1462 See Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993); World Bank (2004b), p.148.
1463 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007).
1464 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
1465 See e. g. World Bank (2007b), p.20; Kikeri, Kenyon, and Palmade (2006); Moore and
Vamvakidis (2007).
1466 See e. g. van den Berghe, Douglas A. F. (2003).
1467 See also CICD (2006); AHK (2006); see also World Bank (2004b), p.148.
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Interviews confirm FDI studies of transition countries that state that regional
differences of labor conditions within host countries appear to be insignificant
for FDI1468; furthermore, unionization does not seem to have much influence on
FDI1469, as long as the number of labor conflicts does not become excessive.1470
However, this overall limited importance of labor rules on FDI may increase
in economic downturns and when governments of transition countries introduce
high minimum wages that deteriorate the business calculations of MNCs and
investment, particularly in labor-intensive industries, no longer pay off.1471
The effect of stricter labor rules in the course of EU integrations seems to be
limited as well. Even though Belke, Go¨cke, and Hebler (2005) confirm that EU
accession may lead to greater labor market rigidities and higher unemployment,
external studies and interviews do not indicate any significant negative effects
on FDI due to changing labor rules in transition countries. They seem to accept
that labor regulations in all EECs are approaching EU standards, since all of
them are in principal aiming at EU accession – albeit at different speed.1472
From the perspective of investors, converging labor law regulations do therefore
neither seem to deter the interest in a specific country nor in investing in
Eastern Europe in general.
Interestingly, econometric FDI studies give little insights regarding the ef-
fects of labor policies on FDI flows in transition countries. In fact, none of the
34 studies on transition countries analyzed1473 integrated labor standards in
their econometric analysis. This may be a future field of research, particularly
in order to get a better understanding of effects of minimum wages and EU
integration on FDI.
1468 See Hilber and Voicu (2006).
1469 See Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999).
1470 See Hilber and Voicu (2006).
1471 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1472 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); World Bank (2007a).
1473 See section 2.2.4.2.
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(3) Some public policy implications can be derived from this section.
Public policy actors in transition countries should rely more on the business
perspective regarding labor market regulations than on international statistics
in order to create or maintain a favorable environment for FDI. Neverthe-
less, they need to comply with international norms and conventions which is
particularly challenging in the process of EU integration.1474 The options of
public policy makers for improving formal labor rules are indeed manifold as
suggested by Bellak and Leibrecht (2005).1475 However, the analyses of this sec-
tion suggest that public policy should tackle – even more importantly – some
of the greatest worries of investors in transition countries which usually refer
to the bureaucratic efforts of labor regulations. These include the abolishment
of work books, the simplification of evaluation systems (as in Romania) and
the reduction of documents needed for various labor-related procedures.
7.2.6 Overview of findings on legal measures
This section provides an overview of the findings of legal determinants. These
findings reflect the summary of the previous sub-sections and indicate qualita-
tive tendencies rather than quantitative statistically relevant results.
Figure 44 presents a summary of the performance of Romania’s and Croa-
tia’s legal determinants including their sub-determinants. It focuses on the most
recent developments in the two countries in question since the early 2000s. The
qualitative evaluations are denoted using (+) and negative (-) signs. The eval-
uations are based on key words in the interview analysis such as “very satisfac-
tory conditions” or “rather disappointing performance” and are transfered into
qualitative evaluations.1476 A positive evaluation means that positive aspects
1474 See also UNCTAD (2007), p.173; Moran (2003), p.1.
1475 They suggest, amongst other things, re-training, shortening of unemployment periods,
wage subsidies and incentive schemes for employment.
1476 In the cases mentioned “rather satisfactory conditions” would be transferred into (+)
and “disappointing performance” into (–).
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of the evaluation outweigh the negative ones, while a neutral evaluation (0) is
defined by a balance between positive and negative aspects. Insights from the
primary documents, data and external studies further strengthen the evalua-
tion. The procedure is exemplified in the following for company registration in
Romania:
Analyses in section 7.2.1.2 have shown that company registration was a weak
point in Romania’s investment environment for many years but that significant
reforms have been initiated since 2003. Interviewees describe company registra-
tion as “one of the most unbureaucratic acts in Romania”1477, “major reform
success”1478 and “not a problem for investors”1479 today. The consideration of
international statistics (i. e. the registration time in World Bank (2007a)) fur-
ther strengthens this positive evaluation. However, some remaining concerns,
such as the continued need for external help and the requirement of Romanian
residency for registration leads to the evaluation that Romania’s current per-
formance in company registration is “good” equaling (++). This methodology
is repeated for all legal sub-determinants for Romania as well as for Croatia
and the results are presented in figure 44.
Figure 45 summarizes the findings of this section in relation to the impor-
tance of legal determinants on FDI and focuses on the insights for transition
countries in general that were given at the end of the analysis of each deter-
minant. Possible impact categories are very low, low, medium, high, and very
high. The evaluation of the respective importance follows a similar methodol-
ogy as presented for the determinant performance above. Key statements of
interviewees that are generalizable for transition countries are assessed. The
evaluation is then checked against expert documents and further FDI studies.
Figure 45 represents the summary of the more detailed database of the author
1477 Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); see also Intv. German Authority I (2007).
1478 Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
1479 Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
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that contains a comprehensive analysis of the factor importance that lists all
corresponding expert statements and study findings.
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Figure 44: Overview legal determinants – performance
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Figure 45: Overview legal determinants – importance
7.3 Economic measures 355
7.3 Economic measures
This section analyzes economic measures that host country governments may
use in order to influence the investment conditions in transition countries in-
cluding economic stability (7.3.1), infrastructure (7.3.2), investment climate
(7.3.3), privatization (7.3.4), and investment promotion (7.3.5). An overview
of the findings on economic measures is presented in section 7.3.6.
7.3.1 Economic stability
7.3.1.1 Definition
Governments’ options for influencing the economic stability in transition coun-
tries are numerous. Factors that are most frequently cited by external stud-
ies1480 and interviewees with a possible impact on FDI are (1) a sound financial
system, including the banking- and the non-banking sector, (2) a predictable
monetary policy that leads to moderate and consistent inflation and exchange
rates as well as (3) a liberal trade regime including low custom barriers. Section
(4) provides conclusions for Romania and Croatia respectively.1481
7.3.1.2 Romania
(1) The Romanian financial system seems to be (a) fairly satisfactory for
investors, despite (b) some problems. However, (c) the quality of the finan-
cial system is only of little importance for MNCs in Romania. Sub-section (d)
provides an assessment.
1480 See section 2.2.4.2.
1481 See also Loewendahl (2001); Bevan and Estrin (2004); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
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(a) According to external sources1482 and experts interviewed1483 the qual-
ity of the Romanian financial system is generally satisfactory overall and
reaches fairly high standards today. After the end of the financial crisis in
the late 1990s, significant reforms of the banking sector were initiated and
enhanced after 2004. This caused a comprehensive transformation of the Roma-
nian banking sector. Reforms included large-scale banking privatizations after
1997 (namely of the BCR1484) and the liberalization of market entry rules un-
der the pressure of the EU in the course of accession preparations, but also
institutional improvements such as the establishment of an agency to moni-
tor the credit risk of consumer loans. As a result, banking assets in domestic
ownership decreased from 88% (1997) to 47% (2000) and reached less than
10% (2007). Therefore, 26 out of 31 banks operating in Romania in 2006 were
foreign-owned. The most important remaining domestic banks are the state-
owned CEC and the private Transylvania Bank. In addition to this, the share
of non-performing loans could be reduced from 59% in 1998 to less than 2%
since 2003.1485
From the investors’ point of view these improvements and the large pres-
ence of foreign banks (including Erste Bank and Raiffeisenbank from Austria)
have helped to make Romania’s banking sector healthier, more liquid and re-
liable.1486 Furthermore, experts interviewed acknowledge that a wide range of
products is now available to private and business clients and access to credit
1482 See e. g . Keren and Ofer (2003); Barisitz (2004); Roland Berger Strategy Consultants
(2007).
1483 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority
I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
1484 See section 7.3.4.
1485 See Intv. German Political Adviser (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv.
German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. German
Authority I (2007); see also Keren and Ofer (2003); Barisitz (2004); OECD (2005d);
EBRD (2007b).
1486 See Doc - Economic Chamber Vienna (2007); Roland Berger Strategy Consultants
(2007); Keren and Ofer (2003); Eller, Haiss, and Steiner (2006); Bertelsmann Stiftung
(2006c).
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is generally fairly easy (at least for private households).1487 External experts
project a strong growth of the Romanian banking market outperforming all
other countries of the region.1488
International statistics also reflect these positive developments. According
to the BTI, Romania’s banking sector scored 8 (out of 10 points) in 2006.
This does not take the latest legislative improvements due to Romania’s EU
accession in 2007 into account.1489 Moreover, Romania climbed in the banking
reform index of the EBRD from 2.33 in 1998 up to 3.33 in 2007.1490
Finally, experts interviewed evaluate rather positively that the non-banking
sector is expanding. Even though starting on a low level, the stock-market
capitalization and trading volumes are growing and the leasing and insurance
sectors are prospering fostered by the entrance of large foreign players.1491
(b) Nevertheless, primary1492 and secondary1493 sources identify some re-
maining weaknesses in Romania’s financial system. Company experts in
particular notice that banks do not always offer the same services as they do in
mature markets.1494 Conditions for customers are still not optimal, including
fairly restrictive credit rules for small companies such as high guarantees and
interest rates.1495 According to the Global Competitiveness Report access to
1487 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I
(2007); World Bank (2007a).
1488 Expected annual growth rate of 27% versus 17%; see Mu¨hlberger (2007).
1489 10 being the best possible score; see Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006a).
1490 Out of 5 whereas 5 represents the highest possible score; see EBRD (2007b).
1491 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007).
1492 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
1493 See e. g. CICD (2006).
1494 See Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services
III (2007).
1495 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VI
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I
(2007); CICD (2006).
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finance is still the fifth most problematic factor for doing business in Romania
in 2007.1496
A few experts also wonder if there are too many banks in Romania to guar-
antee a fully efficient market, even though the increasing competition may lead
to mergers and a normalization of the status.1497
Furthermore, rules in the non-banking sector are not always well established;
for example, there is a clear lack of rules in civil or tax law with respect to
operating leasing.1498 External sources also see a significant need for better
regulations in the securities markets.1499 Thus, according to EBRD’s index on
securities markets and the non-banking sector, significant room for improve-
ments remains (2.67 of 5).1500
(c) According to the interviewees the financial system does not have a
significant impact on the investment decision of MNCs that are interested in
Romania. None of the state or company experts interviewed mention – neither
unprompted nor prompted – the financial system as important factor.
On the contrary, FDI studies find – for several transition countries includ-
ing Romania – that the state of the banking system has a significant impact
on FDIs for transition countries including Romania.1501 According to these
studies, the importance is driven by the demand for easy access to finance,
a well-functioning payment system and the worry about a potential banking
crisis.1502 However, the analyses above show that the last two aspects may
simply have become less significant for MNCs as the stability of the Romanian
banking system increases, particularly since EU accession. Besides, interviews
1496 Even though a slight improvement can be noted in recent years; World Economic Forum
(2007); World Economic Forum (2006a); World Economic Forum (2006b).
1497 See Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
1498 See Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
1499 Romania only ranked 91th in this category of the Global Competitiveness Report; see
World Economic Forum (2007).
1500 Figure for 2007; see EBRD (2007b).
1501 See e. g. Bevan and Estrin (2004); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
1502 See also Falcetti, Sanfey, and Taci (2003).
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show that access to finance is of little importance for MNCs, because they
generally receive financing from their parent company or from a bank in their
home country.1503 Therefore, the importance of the banking sector as an FDI
determinant may be somewhat overestimated by the FDI studies analyzed. On
the other hand, FDI studies are in line with the results of the interviews stating
that the quality of the non-banking sector has apparently had little relevance
for MNCs.1504
Both interviews1505 and external sources1506 show that the financial sector
itself has been attractive for FDI. By the end of 2006 financial intermediation
and insurance represented the second largest sector in terms of FDI stock with
e7.7B or 22.2%.1507 The privatization efforts and the increasing purchasing
power parity apparently made the financial sector attractive for FDI, partic-
ularly in the last three or four years.1508 Nevertheless, it seems that FDI in
banking will deteriorate after the end of the major privatizations in the next
couple of years.1509
(d) The assessment of this section shows that Romania has been develop-
ing a solid banking system in the last ten years mainly driven by the sale of
SOEs to foreign banks and the harmonization of legislation in accordance to
the EU acquis. On the other hand, Romania’s banking and non-banking sectors
are still fairly small and far from mature and will undergo further evolutions
in terms of size, market structure and product offer in the future. In contrast
to several FDI studies, interviews have shown that the quality of the financial
system has little impact on MNCs’ investment decision. However, the recent
1503 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1504 See e. g. Bevan and Estrin (2004); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Genco, Taurelli, and
Viezzoli (1993).
1505 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007);
Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007).
1506 See e. g. NBR (2007); The National Trade Register Office (2007a).
1507 After manufacturing; see NBR (2007).
1508 See also Doc - Rom. Emb. Berlin (2007a).
1509 See 6.2.1; see also Intv. German Authority I (2007).
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banking privatizations may have brought Romania into the spotlight as attrac-
tive investment location and may therefore have a positive indirect effect on
FDI in Romania in general.
The possibilities for public policy actors may seem limited today due to the
adoption of EU rules; nevertheless, rules to access finance for smaller foreign
firms should be improved, since they may have less possibilities to lend money
at home.
(2) This section analyzes Romania’s monetary policy. After (a) a very
problematic development until the mid-1990s, (b) some major improvements
can be identified since 1996, even though (c) some problems and threats remain.
Today, Romania’s monetary policy seems to be of (d) only limited importance
for the investment decision of MNCs. An assessment is presented in sub-section
(e).
(a) Romania’s monetary policy faced some major problems in the early
1990s. The most severe challenge was – as already touched upon in section
6.2.1 – the very high inflation with rates above 30% throughout the decade.1510
Major reasons were the wage increase exceeding productivity growth, the lack
of financial discipline of Romanian governments and their weak commitment
to reforms until 1996.1511 As a consequence monetary policy was challenging
for the central bank, the NBR. It had “quasi-fiscal functions”1512 in order to
finance excessive government spending and thus contributed to higher inflation
by accelerating money growth (seigniorage).1513
Furthermore, exchange rate policy often remained erratic until the mid-
1990s.1514 Even though the leu was officially free-floating, the NBR frequently
1510 See Eurostat website (2008); see also figure 89 in the appendix.
1511 See European Commission (1998); IMF (2001), pp.7, 15, 26.
1512 See European Commission (2002a).
1513 E. g. in 1994 for the financing of the agricultural program; see IMF (2001); Radulescu
(2003).
1514 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001).
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Figure 46: Exchange rate development of the leu
intervened, for instance by raising interest rates in order to lower inflation and
to bolster domestic companies (appreciation) or by selling its foreign reserves
in order to pay its external obligations (depreciation).1515 The exchange rate
was also affected in the early 1990s by restrictions on purchases of domestic
and foreign currencies as well as by price controls that were introduced to pro-
tect local markets and limit inflation.1516 In sum, the nominal exchange rate
of the leu depreciated strongly throughout the 1990s (figure 46), while the real
effective exchange rate remained highly volatile.
Furthermore, exchange rate policy did little to reduce inflation, interest rates
stayed too low in order to stimulate savings and reserves only reached (in 1997)
the generally targeted reserve minimum of three months.1517
1515 See IMF (1997); European Commission (1998); IMF (2001); Mu¨ller (2005), pp.168-169.
1516 See European Commission (1998); IMF (2001), pp.11-12; Mu¨ller (2005), p.167.
1517 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); IMF (2001).
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Moreover, monetary policy lacked a clear vision and a well-defined role for
the NBR.1518 The independence of the NBR was therefore still limited through-
out the 1990s. Maliszewski (2000) shows that Romania’s central bank had the
second lowest independence of 20 transition countries due to limitations in the
legal framework but also to the frequent interventions of public policy.1519
The monetary turbulences peaked in 1996, when a widening current account
deficit led to a further reduction of foreign exchange reserves and forced the
Romanian government to introduce foreign exchange controls in 1996. This
again caused the establishment of a gray economy in which companies started
to trade foreign currency amongst one another.1520
(b) Monetary policy underwent radical reforms after 1996 when the gov-
ernment under President Constantinescu took office. The exchange rate was
unified, foreign exchange restrictions were partly lifted and the full convert-
ibility of currency was achieved (by 1998).1521 The leu depreciated strongly in
real terms in early 1997 and again in 1998/1999 (figure 47) and thus increased
Romania’s competitiveness. However, a further (short) period hyperinflation
that peaked at 155% in (1997) showed that monetary stability was still at
risk.1522 Nevertheless, monetary policy became more predictable when Roma-
nia adopted a managed float regime in 1999 and with the help of (speculative)
foreign capital inflows and decreasing inflation rates, the NBR was able to sta-
bilize the real effective exchange rate within a small corridor until 2004. The
moderate appreciation as well as a more cautious reserves policy helped to
build up foreign currency reserves since the early 2000s.1523
At the same time the NBR gradually changed the goals of monetary policy
from managed floating to inflation targeting and flexible exchange rates which
1518 See also Figuet and Nenovsky (2006).
1519 See also European Commission (1999).
1520 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001).
1521 See IMF (2001); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); Mu¨ller (2005), p.167.
1522 See European Commission (1998); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001).
1523 See European Commission (2002a); Mu¨ller (2005), pp.168-169; IMF (2007a).
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Figure 47: Real effective exchange rate development
came fully in effect in 2004. In July 2005 Romania eliminated four zeros of the
leu and introduced the “new leu”.1524 The role of the NBR also was gradually
strengthened. Firstly, the control of the NBR over commercial banks was en-
hanced, for example, regarding lending conditions.1525 Secondly, primary and
secondary sources confirm that the independence of the NBR from political
influence was increased, for example by the prohibition of the NBR to finance
governments’ budget gaps.1526 The legal framework concerning the NBR are in
line with the EU acquis since 2004 and its financial and human resources seem
sufficient.1527
1524 Law no. 312/2004; Regulation no. 4/2005; see Figuet and Nenovsky (2006); Bulgaria
Economic Forum (2007); Doc - ARIS (2007); EIU (2007b).
1525 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003b); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006c).
1526 Law on the Statute of the National Bank of Romania of May 26, 1998, amended as of
June 28, 2004; see e. g. European Commission (1998); Intv. Supranational Authority I
(2007).
1527 See European Commission (1999); Dvorsky (2004); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006c).
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The currency reform (2004/2005), NATO accession in 2004 and the prospect
of EU accession led to a significant appreciation of the leu (2004-2007), both in
nominal (18%) and in real terms (49 points).1528 Despite this strong apprecia-
tion, various interviewees perceive the leu as quite stable and on a satisfactory
level today.1529 In 2006 the leu was awarded the title of European currency
of the year by Bloomberg.1530 External surveys also confirm the evaluation
of some interviewees that the introduction of the euro would be welcome but
would have no significant impact on monetary stability.1531
Finally, currency and monetary reforms are generally interpreted as the end
of hyper-inflation.1532 Therefore, the NBR contributed to bringing down in-
flation to 6.6% in 2006 as discussed in section 6.2.1. For the following years
the NBR has formulated inflation targets of 4% (2007), 3.8% (2008) and 3.5%
(2009).1533
(c) However, primary and secondary sources also reveal some remaining
problems regarding Romania’s monetary policy since the late 1990s. First of
all, the strong depreciations of the real effective exchange rate in early 1997
and in 1998/1999 (figure 47) may have helped to increase the competitiveness
of Romania in the short-term, but Romania also suffered from a temporary
decline of output at that time (with decreasing GDP from 1997-1999) and
rising unemployment from 6.6% in 1996 to 11.8% in 1999.1534
1528 See EIU (2007c); Bank of International Settlements website (2008); own calculations.
1529 See e. g . Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority
I (2007).
1530 See IMF (2007a); Doc - Austrian Econ. Chamber Romania (2007a), p.3; Intv. German
Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007).
1531 See Doc - German Econ. Chamber Romania (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods
II (2007).
1532 See e. g. BA-CA (2006).
1533 NBR (year-end) targets are therefore more ambitious than the inflation rates expected
by externaly observers analyzed; see section 6.2.1; EIU (2007b).
1534 See European Commission (1998); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); see figure 89.
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Some interviewees (as well as many external sources) are also concerned
regarding the appreciation pressure of the leu after 2004.1535 They worry that
a strong leu hurts the competitiveness of export-oriented MNCs. They also
assume that bad news could quickly deter the monetary equilibrium since the
appreciation was primarily driven by optimism towards the future and not
backed by productivity gains.1536
In fact, the recent sharp real depreciation since mid-2007 can also be under-
stood as a more realistic evaluation of the potential of the Romanian economy
and as a reaction to the large amount of private debts.1537 However, it may
also bolster pundits who worry that the leu remains highly volatile after all –
also in comparison to other countries of the regions (figure 47) – with negative
effects on the credibility of Romania’s monetary policy.1538
Finally, external observers worry that the NBR is making only moderate
progress in combating inflation, since Romania’s inflation remains the highest
in the EU.1539 They also wonder if the fairly moderate disinflation targets of
the NBR suggest that its capabilities to steer inflation are (still) limited. 1540
IMD (2006) also assesses the impact of the NBR on the economy skeptically
ranking Romania 42nd out of 61 countries and 6th out of 8 EECs.
(d) Interviews reveal – in line with FDI literature1541 – that investors do
observe monetary stability including inflation and exchange rate developments
before making an investment in Romania.1542 However, the importance of
1535 See Bank of International Settlements website (2008); EIU (2007b); CICD (2006).
1536 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2007) EIU (2007b); Doc - Austrian Econ. Chamber Romania (2007a), p.3.
1537 The global financial market turbulences may play a role as well; see EIU (2007b); Intv.
Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
1538 See e. g. Financial Times (2006a).
1539 EU average: 2.2%; see section 6.2.1; see Eurostat website (2008); IMF (2007b).
1540 See European Commission (2006e); EIU (2007b).
1541 See e. g. Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
1542 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also Doc - Austr. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2005).
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monetary policy on the investment decision has apparently been decreasing
and is limited today.
External sources in particular assume that the great monetary imbalances
such as high inflation rates and real exchange rate volatility were important
factors for low FDI inflows to Romania during the 1990s and this is confirmed
by the relevant data.1543 A direct correlation between monetary indicators and
FDI is difficult to determine, however, due to the low levels of FDI. FDI in-
creased, for example, despite high inflation rates in 1997, but also at decreasing
rates in the early 2000s.1544
For the period since the early 2000s, interviews reveal that the currency and
legal reforms and the greater economic stability transformed monetary policy
from a constraining factor to one of little importance for investors interested
in Romania.1545 Interviews and data suggest – in contrast to most FDI stud-
ies1546 – that the level of the exchange rate seems to have little impact on FDI.
Despite the theoretical assumption that MNCs are deterred by appreciating
exchange rates1547, Romania’s greatest FDI surge started in a phase of strong
real exchange rate appreciation.1548
Interviewees rather indicate that (positive) political and economic expec-
tations since the early 2000s fostered FDI inflows to Romania and the real
exchange rate appreciation in equal terms.1549
Interviews deny that an increasing exchange rate volatility significantly influ-
ences investments in Romania as long as it does not return to the levels of the
1990s, even though frequent adaptations of business calculations may be nec-
essary when inputs and salaries are calculated in different currencies. Investors
1543 See e. g. Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); Mu¨ller (2005), p.164.
1544 See figure 89 in the appendix.
1545 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Doc - GTZ (2006b).
1546 See for references Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003); Blonigen (2005).
1547 See Brewer (1993) for further references.
1548 See 6.2.1; see Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Blonigen (2005).
1549 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
7.3 Economic measures 367
will generally not delay a follow-up investment because of exchange rate swings
either, since investments usually take several months and the opportunity costs
of waiting would be higher than those of potential exchange rate deviations.1550
Foreign currency regulations and inflation seem to be of very little importance
for investors in Romania and have been negligible issues for doing business in
Romania in the last years.1551 Interviews do not disclose any suggestion that
the role and strength of the NBR has any effect on their investment decision,
either.
Finally, interviewees do not expect an increase of importance of monetary
policy on the investment decision of MNCs for Romania in the near future. In
contrast, it seems that monetary policy would further lose its importance for
FDI with the adoption of the euro and the full integration into the European
Monetary Union.1552
(e) The assessment of this section reveals that monetary policy has been
crucial for Romania’s transition. In the 1990s monetary imbalances apparently
contributed to a greater political and economic instability which probably had
a negative impact on FDI inflows. Policy makers clearly waited too long to
take decisive counter measures. However, reform efforts since the late 1990s
seem to have been thorough, sustainable and credible; in fact, all experts in-
terviewed were optimistic that the times of hyper-inflation and high exchange
rate volatility are now over, even though the economic turbulences did not end
in Romania until recently.
This section, however, also showed that monetary policy is difficult to eval-
uate and predict for MNCs. As shown in the analysis of the economic trends,
interpretations strongly varies, for example with respect to the current level
1550 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
1551 Both factors have been considered as problematic for Romania by less than 5% of re-
spondents in surveys since 2003; see World Economic Forum (2007) and earlier editions.
1552 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
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and future trend of the leu. This may also be one reason why investors tend
to analyze the monetary development only very generally before an investment
decision. Furthermore, those MNCs that are already in the country seem little
affected by monetary developments, maybe also because they do not expect
situations to strongly differ in Romania from other SEECs. Furthermore, in-
vestors interested in Romania seem to be less concerned about the level of the
exchange rate but rather focus on exchange rate volatility, probably because it
effects their daily business operations in a stronger way. In sum, the direct im-
pact of monetary policy on FDI in Romania may be lower than often assumed
by external studies. This section rather suggests that monetary policy only has
a very indirect and long-term impact on FDI, primarily by contributing to a
predictable investment environment and to economic stability.
Romanian monetary policy should focus on price stability and the avoidance
of any large exchange rate volatility. In this regard, the quick integration of
Romania into the European Monetary Union may have a further stabilizing
impact.
A field for future research that has been little explored by external studies so
far is the extent to which the recent real exchange rate appreciation contributed
to an increase in market-oriented FDI, for example in order to anticipate an
expected or actual purchasing power growth in Romania.
(3) From the perspective of MNCs, Romania’s trade policy was (a) gradu-
ally liberalized since the mid 1990s and (b) regulations and procedures appar-
ently cause little problems since EU accession. Trade policy tends to have (c)
a positive impact for MNCs’ decision in favor of Romania, particularly versus
non-EU countries. Sub-section (d) presents an assessment.
(a) Romania gradually opened its economy for foreign trade in the
1990s. Despite its membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
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(GATT) since 1971, interviews1553 and secondary sources1554 show that Roma-
nia’s trade policy remained fairly protectionist in the early years of transition.
Trade regulations were restrictive and custom duties quite high in the early
1990s in order to promote infant industries against external competition. Fur-
thermore, Romanian governments caused uncertainty among investors because
of continual deviations from formal tariffs. In 1993 Romania only had free trade
agreements with half a dozen countries including the U.S.
With the adoption of the Association Agreement with the EU (1993), the
application for EU membership (1995) and the new government (1996), Roma-
nia turned towards a more liberal trade policy. In a first step custom tariffs on
imports of high tech products were eliminated and other industrial as well as IT
products followed until the end of the 1990s.1555 In a second step customs duties
on textile, food products and agriculture were lifted. This liberalization as well
as the adoption of various new trade agreements lowered or even eliminated
custom duties for many countries, most notably from the EU.1556 However,
interviewees emphasize that industry-specific differences remained and not all
MNCs benefited from custom liberalization before EU accession.1557 FDI sur-
veys also suggest that – despite the improvements observed – trade policy
remained one of Romania’s weak spots even in the early 2000s with only two
out of eleven EECs having a weaker performance than Romania.1558
1553 See Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001).
1554 See Freedom House (1998); Dragulin and Radulescu (1999).
1555 In 1997 Romania joined the ITA agreement of the WTO; Law 332/2001; see also IMF
(2001); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); European Commission (2002a), p.119.
1556 See Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); see also Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); Eu-
ropean Commission (2004a), p.134.
1557 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also Intv. Austr. MNC -
Primary Goods II (2007).
1558 That were Albania and Macedonia; see McGee (2003).
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Apart from the trade regime, the majority of interviewees1559 and external
sources1560 confirm the insights of section 7.2.3.2 on the quality of bureaucracy,
also with respect to daily custom procedures. The tariff payment system was
highly complex before EU accession and required a lot of paper work; further-
more, custom clearance at the border was cumbersome and prone to bribery. As
a result IMD (2006) ranks Romania 57th out of 61 countries analyzed regarding
the ability of customs authorities to facilitate transit of goods.
(b) With the accession to the EU all remaining trade barriers, affecting
EU countries were removed, and the responsibility for Romania’s trade pol-
icy was transferred to the EU. Interviews reflect a very positive evaluation of
trade conditions for MNCs today.1561 Overall, the elimination of customs pro-
ceeded without any major problems in Romania and with less delays than many
professionals had expected. The abolishment of customs has apparently made
trading goods very straightforward.1562 Since trucks do not have to wait at the
border to other EU countries anymore, logistics have improved, transportation
times are shortened and costs are lowered.1563 As a result, the volume of goods
transported from and to Romania have increased since 2007.1564 International
statistics also show that the trade regime is quite liberal today1565 and that
the trading of goods has become significantly cheaper and faster. The length of
time necessary to complete all formalities for imports has fallen from 38 days
1559 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods
II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Gabanyi (2005).
1560 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); see also European Commission (2005c), pp.88-
89.
1561 See Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
1562 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007).
1563 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
1564 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); see also BA-CA (2007b).
1565 Romania scores 4.3 out of 5 points of the foreign exchange and trade liberalization index
of the EBRD since 1998; see EBRD (2007b); see also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006c).
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(2006) to 13 days (2007).1566 Procedures are therefore among the four fastest
in Romania of 19 EECs.1567
However, interviews and external sources still see some room for further im-
provements, for example regarding the speed and transparency of the work of
custom authorities.1568 Finally, the adoption of the EU’s trading rules by Ro-
mania has also caused the situation for those MNCs that are mainly exporting
to non-EU countries to deteriorate, since countries like Ukraine and Russia
have import customs for the EU but did not previously have any for specific
goods from Romania.1569 However, this aspect seems to be relevant only for a
minority of MNCs in Romania.
(c) Primary and secondary sources show that trade policy in general has
been important for the investment decision of MNCs. This seems to be true in
particular for export-oriented MNCs and is also in line with the general findings
of FDI literature.1570 Thus McGee (2003) seems to be right when stating that
the weak trade conditions represented a competitive disadvantage for Romania;
however this finding needs to be interpreted primarily in an administrative
rather than in a legal sense.
Interviews help to understand that procedural barriers and the time needed
at the border are more essential for MNCs than the trade regime itself or the
level of custom duties as long as they are not excessive.1571 Therefore, it seems
that the gradual decrease of custom duties since the late 1990s was hardly
noticed by foreign investors and therefore had only limited effect on FDI to
Romania since administrative barriers continued to exist.1572
1566 Average figures including imports from non-EU countries; see World Bank (2007b).
1567 See World Bank (2007a).
1568 In the ranking of the burden of customs procedures of World Economic Forum (2007)
Romania takes 66th of 131 countries; see also Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
1569 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
1570 See Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford (1996); Holland and Pain (1998); Holland,
Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000).
1571 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
1572 See also Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
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In contrast, various MNCs interviewed agree that the complete elimination of
custom barriers at the borders in 2007 was very beneficial and some even saw it
as one of the most important consequences of EU accession.1573 In the context of
locational competition the recent improvements are especially advantageous for
Romania versus non-EU members such as Ukraine, where investors frequently
complain about cumbersome custom procedures and are an important step
for Romania to close competitiveness gaps to existing EU members (such as
Hungary).1574
(d) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that trade pol-
icy has developed in a positive way, whereas the biggest step represented the
accession to the EU. Perhaps Romania should have started decisive liberaliza-
tion efforts earlier since there is little evidence to show that the protection of
domestic firms in the early 1990s had a positive effect on Romania’s economy.
Furthermore, it seems that the belated opening to global markets promoted
monetary imbalances, deterred (at least to some extent) FDI and thus con-
tributed to a slowdown of Romania’s transition.
This section reveals that state expert interviewees primarily affiliate improve-
ments in trade conditions with the gradual legal liberalization of trade to and
from Romania, while company experts have been even more worried about daily
bureaucratic obstacles of the trade regime, namely caused by customs authori-
ties at the borders of Romania. This is particularly interesting since the actual
costs of customs may be higher than those caused by dealing with customs au-
thorities. Reasons may be that modifications and exceptions of the tariff system
were confusing for MNCs and made a calculation of the actual costs difficult
in the past. Furthermore, it seems that MNCs were strongly interested in the
1573 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007);
Doc - Rom. Emb. Berlin (2007b); different for those MNCs mainly exporting to non-EU
countries: Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
1574 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007);
see also Doc - Economic Chamber Vienna (2007).
7.3 Economic measures 373
reliability of sending goods and were deterred by constant worries if goods will
reach their destination in times, if graft will be necessary etc. Therefore, the
perceived (opportunity) costs of the administrative barriers of trade policy were
(until EU accession) apparently higher for quite a few MNCs than the actual
legal ones. Even those investors who are aware of these interrelations may be
willing to accept higher actual costs when they can avoid laborious endeavors
at the same time.
Possible implications from this section for Romania are that public policy
should quickly tackle remaining problems with custom authorities and think
of ways how to support those companies that primarily trade with non-EU
countries, for example by searching for political support from other new
EU members in order to achieve a further reduction of reciprocal tariffs of
the EU and neighboring third countries by the relevant institutions in Brussels.
(4) In conclusion, this section has shown that there was little sustainable
economic stability in Romania throughout the 1990s. Despite initial reform ef-
forts that were launched in the mid 1990s, investors have only recently begun
to conditions as reliable. This applies to the financial and monetary systems as
well as to the trade policy. Only within the next couple of years, will Romania
have the opportunity to clearly benefit from the recent achievements; precon-
ditions are that remaining obstacles for investors are removed and Romania’s
locational advantages – particularly versus non-EU members – are actively pro-
moted. In contrast, with the increasing integration towards the EU, the chances
for Romanian public policy to influence economic stability have deteriorated,
as has the importance of this factor as a determinant for FDI.
Finally, this section has shown that the different dimensions of economic sta-
bility are often interdependent with other determinants including corruption,
privatization and bureaucracy, whereas interviews in particular have clarified
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that – at least the perception of – administrative barriers are often more im-
portant for MNCs than legal obstacles.
7.3.1.3 Croatia
(1) Croatia’s financial system is (a) well advanced today and (b) problems are
limited. Yet, (c) its impact on FDI is low. Section (d) provides an assessment.
(a) The analysis of primary1575 and secondary sources1576 show that Croa-
tia’s financial system including the banking and the non-banking sector clearly
come up to the expectations of MNCs. The Croatian banking sector had
already been fairly advanced during socialist times.1577 The most important
measure to reform the banking sector in the 1990s was privatization that al-
ready started in the early 1990s. The listing of the Zagrebacˇka Banka at the
stock exchanges in Zagreb and London (1995 and 1996) represented a further
milestone in this context.1578 The bulk of banking privatization was completed
fairly early compared to other EECs.1579 By 2000 only 5.7% of Croatian bank-
ing assets were left in state ownership, while the Romanian governmment, for
instance, still owned more than 50% of the banking assets in that year. The
fairly quick sale of the state banks may also have contributed to the low rate
of non-performing loans (5.9% in 2006).1580 Today, banking privatization is al-
most completed and further sales of state-owned banks, such as the Croatian
post, are currently not expected by experts.1581
1575 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial
Services I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
1576 See e. g. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), pp.1, 7; EBRD (2007b); European Commission
(2007a), p.21; Mu¨hlberger (2007).
1577 See Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
1578 See Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
1579 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
1580 See EBRD (2007b).
1581 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. European Institution
(2007); see also Dresdner Bank (2004), p.6; European Commission (2005a), p.42.
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In addition to these structural developments that have increased stability
in the eyes of investors, experts interviewed praise the legal framework of the
Croatian banking sector that is already largely harmonized with the EU acquis
including the equal treatment of domestic and foreign banks.1582
As in Romania, foreign banks in Croatia also benefited the most from bank-
ing reforms and privatization. By the end of 2006 foreign banks held 90.8%
of banking assets, mainly from Italy (44%) and Austria (35%). In contrast,
domestic private banks particularly suffered from the banking crisis in the late
1990s, which led to bankruptcies, take-overs and thus to a decrease in number
from 54 (1997) to 18 (2006).1583
Interviews also indicate that the high quality of the Croatian banking sector
is underlined by a broad and complex portfolio of products offered that often
reach Western European standards and are more advanced than those in other
countries such as Romania. These include investments in commodity products
by pension funds, currency hedging and a high degree of mortgage lending.1584
Overall, experts interviewed acknowledge that the banking sector belongs
to the most successful areas of reform of Croatia in recent years; today it is
apparently very stable, healthy, solvent, and shows high turnovers; in many
ways the banking system seems to be more advanced in Croatia than in most
other SEECs.1585 This is also confirmed by a high BTI banking system score of
Croatia (9 out of 10 points) and by Croatia’s good performance in the EBRD
1582 See Banks Act 84/2002; see Intv. Croatian Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Mu¨hlberger
(2007).
1583 See EBRD (2007b); Doc - Croatian Chamber of Comm. (2006a); Doc - Croatian Cham-
ber of Comm. (2007); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC
- Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Croatian Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC
- Financial Services II (2007).
1584 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate
(2007); Mu¨hlberger (2007).
1585 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); see also Doc - EU Commission
Zagreb (2007).
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banking reform index (4 out of 5 points) representing the best score of 19
EECs.1586
Experts interviewed also see very positive developments in the non-banking
sector. For example, a new leasing law (2007) has established stricter, more
transparent and more concise rules for the leasing market. Markets for leasing
and insurance products are also expanding quickly. Furthermore, the market
capitalization has strongly increased to more than e50B which also seems to
be driven by the merger of the two Croatian stock exchanges in 2007.1587
(b) Despite this favorable development some problems with the Croat-
ian financial system remain. With respect to the banking sector, primary1588
and secondary sources1589 see some obstacles to access finance. Procedures
for receiving credits in particular remain complex for SMEs. Therefore, Croa-
tia shows only an average performance in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing
Business statistics in comparison to other EECs.1590 However, problems seem
to decrease, for example since the establishment of the Croatian Registry of
Credit Obligations (HROK) in 2007.1591
On the other hand, Croatia’s private credits have significantly grown lately
from 63% of GDP in 2005 to 72% in 2006, which may harm Croatia’s future
economic equilibrium. Nevertheless, annual private credit growth was still lower
in Croatia with 18% between 2000 and 2006 than the Eastern European average
of 21%.1592
1586 Score shared with four other countries; see EBRD (2007b); Bertelsmann Stiftung
(2006b).
1587 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007); Doc - EU Commission Zagreb (2007); see also EBRD (2007a), p.20.
1588 See e. g. Doc - Germ. MNC - Engineering (2001); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunica-
tions (2007); Doc - GTZ (2006a).
1589 See e. g. EBRD (2005a), p.22; European Commission (2007a), p.45.
1590 See World Bank (2007a).
1591 See Doc - NCC (2007).
1592 Based on eight countries; see Egert and Mihaljek (2007); European Commission (2007a),
p.21; EBRD (2005a); European Commission (2005a), p.39; Intv. Austr. Research Insti-
tute (2007).
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Some problems also remain with respect to the non-banking sector. Pri-
mary1593 and secondary sources1594 see room for improvement, for example,
regarding the legal framework of capital markets (including limitations for
short-term capital flows and investments abroad) but also regarding the liq-
uidity of the share market. International statistics give Croatia only mediocre
grades for its non-banking and securities sector, for example 3 out of 5 points
from the EBRD and a 70th rank of 131 countries analyzed by the World Eco-
nomic Forum.1595 However, these statistics possibly do not take the most recent
developments discussed above into account.
(c) In line with the findings for Romania, interviews do not reveal that
the soundness of the financial system has had any major impact on the in-
vestment decision of MNCs interested in non-financial investments in Croatia.
At most, the good performance of the financial system may have had an indi-
rect positive effect on FDI, by fostering economic stability in Croatia. Single
investors interviewed indicate that difficult financing conditions for SMEs may
have deterred some investors in the late 1990s and early 2000s.1596 However,
the World Competitiveness Report records that access to finance has been los-
ing its importance as constraining factor for doing business in Croatia (from
3rd (2005) to 7th most problematic factor (2007)).1597 The survey presented in
CICD (2006) also confirms that financing conditions are of little importance
for MNCs interested in Croatia today and less of a constraint for doing business
than in any other SEEC.
By contrast, the financial sector itself has been very attractive for FDI in-
flows to Croatia since the early 2000s.1598 FDI in financial intermediation has
1593 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Doc - EU Commission Zagreb
(2007); Doc - Ekonomski Institut Zagreb (2007).
1594 See e. g. World Economic Forum (2006b).
1595 See EBRD (2007b); World Economic Forum (2007).
1596 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
1597 See World Economic Forum (2007).
1598 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
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also gained in importance relatively to other sectors; therefore, its share of the
FDI stock rose from 19% in 2001 (as third most important sector for FDI) to
49% in 2006 becoming the most important sector for FDI. As a result, finan-
cial intermediation does not play a greater role in any other EEC today.1599
Privatization opportunities, the high market sophistication and the high pur-
chasing power of Croatians have made investments in the banking but also in
non-banking sectors like insurance and leasing very attractive.1600
However, it is questionable to what extent this high level of FDI inflows into
the financial sector can be maintained since various indicators (such as banking
assets1601) show that the Croatian financial market is already quite mature and
the need for catching up is less than in other EECs.1602
(d) In the assessment of this section, it becomes apparent that Croatia’s
financial system has been performing on very high standards for several years
already (except in some areas of the non-banking sector) and seems to be more
mature than in most other SEECs including EU members like Romania. The
favorable starting conditions (including well-educated staff), the early intro-
duction of privatization in the banking sector and the open attitude towards
foreign investments in this sector have helped to create an advanced financial
system in Croatia. EU integration, therefore, did not seem to be a prerequisite
for reforms in this area for Croatia. This is particularly interesting given that
the pressure from the EU seemed to be essential for most legal determinants
(as discussed above) in order to initiate substantial improvements in Croatia.
Nevertheless, interviews with both company and state experts confirm the
results for Romania that the importance of the financial system for FDI, that
are not focused on the financial sector, is limited. The great importance of the
1599 See Hunya (2002); Hunya (2007).
1600 See also section 6.3.1.
1601 With a level over 120% in 2006 Croatia already reached a level higher than all other
EECs; see Mu¨hlberger (2007).
1602 See ibid.; see also section 6.3.1.
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Croatian financial sector itself for FDI may deteriorate faster than in other
SEECs, since the market is already quite mature and a likely EU accession
may not generate an additional boost. Yet, public policy should focus its
reforms on the non-banking sectors in order to further enhance possibilities for
sector-specific FDI.
(2)Monetary policy in Croatia has been an important factor for economic
stability. After (a) difficult years during the first years of war, (b) the monetary
situation significantly stabilized after 1994 and (c) only subordinate problems
remain today. The determinant has a (d) slightly positive effect on FDI in
Croatia. An assessment is presented in sub-section (e).
(a) Political and economic transition as well as the beginning of the war
led to a short but significant instability of Croatia’s monetary policy in
the early 1990s. The Croatian dinar that replaced the Yugoslavian dinar in
December 1991 quickly devaluated, peaking at monthly rates of over 30% in
1993.1603 Inflation was apparently beyond the control of the young Croatian
National Bank (CNB) until 1994.1604 Due to the war turbulences the CNB
also had significant difficulties to control the exchange rate of the kuna that
was offically fixed to the German mark (figure 48). In this context, the CNB
had only limited steering possiblities since it started its work without any
international reserves.1605
Furthermore, the independence of the CNB was still fragile in this period
and weaker than in the majority of transition countries.1606 Political influence
was apparent, for example, when the first governor of the CNB, Ante Cicin-
1603 See section 6.3.1 and figure 91 in the appendix; see also European Commission (2004c),
p.40; IMF (2006a), p.40.
1604 The CNB was established in December 1990.
1605 All reserves were held by the National Bank of Yugoslavia; see Kraft (2003); Daviddi
and Uvalic (2003).
1606 See Maliszewski (2000).
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Figure 48: Exchange rate development of the kuna
Sain, was pressured to resign in 1992 as a result of his opposition to direct
government financing.1607
(b) Some deliberate reform efforts, already initiated during the war, led
to significant improvements of Croatia’s macroeconomic environment and
monetary policy contributed to a continued stable development since then. The
stabilization program, launched in late 1993, partly liberalized the foreign ex-
change market and interest rates; the convertibility of the current account was
established and this increased the confidence of citizens that they could convert
domestic currency to foreign exchange in times of crisis. Direct credits of the
CNB to subsidized sectors such as agriculture were eliminated.1608 In a currency
reform in 1994, the kuna (HRK) was introduced, managed floating (without a
pre-determined path) was adopted as exchange rate regime and price stability
1607 See Dvorsky (2004).
1608 Capital accounts restrictions were not eased until 2001; see Daviddi and Uvalic (2003);
Kraft (2003); European Commission (2004c), p.40.
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was formulated as most important goal of monetary policy. These measures as
well as the end of the war (increase in confidence) resulted in a brief nominal
appreciation of the kuna which also fostered the sharp decline of inflation to
only 1.9% in 1995. In the subsequent years the CNB successfully kept inflation
at levels below 6%, averaging 2.4% (2002-2006).1609
In this context, the exchange rate policy has been the CNB’s most important
stabilizer, anchoring the kuna versus the German mark and later versus the
euro. Exchange rate swings have mostly been driven by seasonal tourism. The
CNB usually uses interventions on the exchange market such as auctions but
also indirect open market tools such as the modification of reserve requirements
and refinancing credits. As a result the exchange rate has remained in a narrow
corridor, generally oscillating not more than ±6% versus the euro in nominal
terms. 1610 With respect to the real effective exchange rate (figure 47), only
Slovenia showed less currency volatility of eleven EECs analyzed.1611 At the
same time foreign exchange reserves strongly accumulated already reaching
over e1B in 1994 and over e9B in 2007.1612
The personal and functional independence of the CNB was strengthened with
a respective Act in 20011613 that largely aligned the legal framework with the
EU acquis and even enabled the CNB to propose legal acts regarding monetary
policy.1614 Finally, the amendment of the National Bank Act in 2006 abolished
the possibility – which had been often criticized by external sources – that
1609 See European Commission (2004c), pp.40, 82; European Commission (2005a), p.39; IMF
(2006a), p.40; European Commission (2007a); section 6.3.1.
1610 See European Commission (2004c), pp.40, 45; European Commission (2005a), p.39;
EBRD (2005a), p.17; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), pp.8-9; European Commission
(2007a), p.18.
1611 Deviation of value scaled to 2000: 12.6 in Croatia, 11.9 points in Slovenia, 49 points
in Eastern European (average), see EIU (2007c); Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006); own
calcuations.
1612 See Daviddi and Uvalic (2003); Schweigert (2004); European Commission (2007a).
1613 See Law no. 36/2001; see also Doc - Croatian Chamber of Comm. (2006a).
1614 See European Commission (2004c); Dvorsky (2004); European Commission (2005a),
p.74.
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losses of the CNB are financed by the government.1615 Interviewees confirm
that the CNB can largely act without political interference nowadays.1616
Overall, primary and external sources judge that “a sound monetary policy
framework”1617 is in place in Croatia and that the CNB has built up cred-
ibility and contributed to stable exchange and low inflation rates since the
mid-1990s.1618
(c) Regarding Croatia’s monetary policy, primary and secondary sources
identify only few remaining problems. Interviewees in particular empha-
size that the strength of the kuna has been artificial and does not fully reflect
the competitiveness of the Croatian economy. As a result most goods are quite
expensive in Croatia compared to other SEECs.1619 Various sources also worry
that the slight appreciation pressure of the recent years in the course of grow-
ing FDI inflows and EU expectations will rise further, particularly following
accession to the EU.1620
Primary and secondary sources also agree that the role of the CNB in coun-
tering appreciation is challenging. First of all, the CNB’s room for maneuver
is limited since the kuna is not fixed and a large proportion of the economy
has already substituted the kuna for the euro. Furthermore, the possibilities
for a devaluation are limited since the CNB has to cope with large and grow-
ing amounts of private and public credit.1621 Further issues for reform are the
1615 See Law no. 135/2006; Dvorsky (2004); European Commission (2004c), p.82; Doc -
Gov’t. of Croatia (2006); European Commission (2006a), p.42; CNB (2007).
1616 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
1617 European Commission (2007a), p.18.
1618 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); see also IMF (2006a),
p.16; European Commission (2006a), pp.20, 22; UniCredit Group (2006), p.3.
1619 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
1620 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Bfai (2004), p.28; Doc - Gov’t. of
Croatia (2006); European Commission (2006a), p.19.
1621 See Daviddi and Uvalic (2003); IMF (2004), p.4; Bfai (2004), p.28; IMF (2006a), p.17;
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
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completion of formal independence of the CNB and the full liberalization of
short-term financial credit flows.1622
(d) The analysis of the importance of monetary policy suggests that this
determinant has a slight positive effect on FDI in Croatia. Company experts
in particular praise the fact that the long-term stability of the kuna for many
years has been supportive for the planning of investments but also of the daily
operations and risk calculations of the investors who are already present in
Croatia. In this context Croatia seems to have an advantage compared to other
countries in Eastern Europe under increasing real appreciation pressures such
as the Czech Republic.1623
In contrast to claims made by various FDI studies1624, the (low) volatil-
ity of the domestic currency seems to be more important for the investment
environment in Croatia than the level of the (real) exchange rate. Interest-
ingly, this evaluation is mainly brought forward by company experts and even
export-oriented MNCs interviewed do not mention the high level of currency
as deterrent. Thus they seem to worry little about a deterioration of the com-
petitiveness level. One reason may be that the cost level is (as shown for labor
costs in the ICT sector in section 6.3.21625) lower than often assumed at least in
some sectors; in contrast, state experts are more critical of the strong kuna and
its possible negative effects, for example on greenfield investments. This may be
because they tend to overestimate the cost disadvantage of Croatia compared
to other SEECs and possibly overlooks the fact that managers of MNCs tend
to aim at stable cost developments rather than at the lowest possible cost level.
Interviews and international statistics further suggest that other aspects of
monetary policy such as inflation, foreign currency restrictions or the role of
1622 See European Commission (2007a), p.41; CNB (2007); Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006).
1623 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services
I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); see also APIU (2007), p.2; Intv. Germ. MNC
- Financial Services I (2007).
1624 See Blonigen (2005); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
1625 See also Doc - BA-CA (2007).
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the CNB are of very limited importance for the investment decision of MNCs
that are interested in Croatia. Banks may sometimes complain about credit
restrictions that the CNB tries to impose but this does not seem to deter FDI
in financial intermediation (as data and the sub-section above have shown),
maybe because business opportunities have nonetheless been significant in re-
cent years.1626
(e) The analyses of this section result in the assessment that Croatia reacted
more quickly and thoroughly than many other SEECs including Romania to
the monetary challenges of the 1990s. In order to achieve long-lasting stability
and low inflation rates Croatia accepted that the kuna has been high (maybe
even overvalued) with some harm to its competitiveness.
In this context state interviewees may somewhat overestimate the negative
effects of the strong kuna on greenfield investments in the past. It seems that
other determinants including those involving legal issues (as shown above) are
more responsible for lower inflows of efficiency-seeking MNCs. In contrast, inter-
views show that monetary policy was successful from the perspective of MNCs
interested in Croatia since they prefer stability to a low-valued but erratically
developing exchange rate. Furthermore, Croatia is likely to benefit from this
stability approach once it has entered the European Monetary Union. However,
these effects are still little investigated by existing FDI literature and may be
a rewarding field for future research.
This goal of stability and the strong dependence on the tourism sector
leaves the CNB little room for discrete decisions – room which will completely
disappear with the entrance into the European Central Bank System after
accession to the EU – and may cause future problems in containing growing
credits. Nevertheless, the CNB should maintain its focus on stability factors
since they represent the cornerstones of Croatia’s monetary and economic
1626 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); World Economic Forum (2007) and earlier
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stability.
(3) Trade policy in Croatia has (a) progressed somewhat in the 1990s, (b)
led to significant liberalizations since 2000 and (c) leaves only limited problems
today. Findings on the (d) importance of this determinant are mixed and are
assessed in sub-section (e).
(a) In the 1990s Croatian trade policy was somewhat deterred by war
and the protectionist attitude under President Tudman. Furthermore, the EU
stopped the first negotiations about a trade agreement after Croatia’s military
operations “flash” and “storm” in Serbia in 1995.1627 Until the end of the
decade Croatia only had one bilateral trade agreement, with Macedonia (since
1997). The simple rate for imports still averaged 12.1% in 1998 and duties of
at least 15% had to be paid for every fourth tariff item.1628 At the same time
various agreements were in preparation in the ministries including the accession
to the WTO and a potential free trade agreement with the EU.1629
(b) Under the new government of Prime Minister Racˇan (2000-2003) signifi-
cant reforms were initiated.1630 Croatia joined the WTO in 2000 which led
to a continued reduction of tariffs for other member states.1631 In 2001 Croatia
signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. The
trade-related part of the SAA entered into force in 2002 and resulted in the
abolishment of most custom barriers between the EU and Croatia.1632
Croatia also liberalized trade with other economies in the early 2000s. For
example, Croatia signed 35 bilateral free trade agreements between 2001 and
1627 “Bljesak” and “Oluja”; see McGee (2003); Pommer (2007), pp.154-155; BA-CA (2007a),
p.15.
1628 See World Trade Organization (2000), p.14; own calculation.
1629 See Bulgaria Economic Forum (2007).
1630 See Uvalic (2005).
1631 See European Commission (2005a), p.104; Doc - NCC (2007).
1632 The full SAA came into effect in 2005; see Doc - NCC (2007); Doc - German Econ.
Chamber Croatia (2007).
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2006 alone, including one with the members of the European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA).1633 Also of interest is the free trade agreement with the old
opponent, Serbia, that was signed in 2002 (only seven years after the end of
the war) and entered into force in 2004.1634 In 2005 the Central European Free
Trade Agreement (CEFTA) under the patronage of the stability pact and the
EU Commission came into force in Croatia; it replaces about 30 existing bi-
lateral free trade agreements among SEECs and will establish a market free of
customs by 2010.1635 In sum, Croatia receives very good grades in international
statistics for its commitment to multilateral and regional trade agreements.1636
As a consequence of these agreements, custom regulations including institu-
tional obligations have been aligned step by step with EU standards.1637 The
majority of customs duties and quantitative restrictions to and from the EU
were abolished by 2004 and most of the remaining ones (mainly for agricul-
tural products) were eliminated by 2007.1638 Average custom tariffs for both
industrial and agricultural products for the trade with other WTO members
are evaluated as very competitive in comparison to other SEECs by external
studies.1639
Overall, Croatia opened up towards the global economy in the early 2000s,
extensively liberalized its trade policy and largely reaches, in the perception
of various external sources, Western European standards today.1640 According
to OECD (2006a) Croatia’s trade policy is therefore as advanced as those of
1633 See APIU (2006b), p.16; Doc - NCC (2007).
1634 See section 6.3.1; European Commission (2005a), p.31.
1635 See World Bank (2003); European Commission (2005a), p.30 Bulgaria Economic Forum
(2007); European Commission (2007a), p.15; Dow Jones (2007).
1636 See OECD (2006a), p.145; see also Doc - OECD (2007).
1637 See for legal references Doc - German Econ. Chamber Croatia (2007); see also Dresdner
Bank (2004), p.8.
1638 See OECD (2006a), p.132; Bulgaria Economic Forum (2007); Doc - German Econ.
Chamber Croatia (2007); BA-CA (2007a), p.11.
1639 See OECD (2006a), p.131.
1640 See World Bank (2003); European Commission (2005a), p.46; Bertelsmann Stiftung
(2006b).
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the EU member states Romania and Bulgaria and more liberalized than in any
other SEEC. This positive evaluation is also reflected in the score of 4.3 out of
5 points in the EBRD foreign exchange and trade liberalization index which
Croatia has been holding since 2000.1641
(c) Despite this positive evolution, primary and secondary sources identify
some remaining problems regarding Croatia’s trade policy. Most impor-
tantly (and well in line with the findings for Romania), some interviewees com-
plain about the administrative trading barriers. Experts know about laborious
procedures to cross Croatia’s border.1642 FDI studies and international statis-
tics confirm that trading is still cumbersome and exporting, for example, takes
on average 22 days including all formalities required. It is therefore significantly
longer than, for example, in the same process in Serbia which takes 12 days. Es-
pecially the preparation of documents and customs clearing take longer than in
Serbia.1643 IMD (2006) confirms the mediocre performance of Croatian custom
authorities ranking Croatia 53rd out of 61 countries.1644 Several interviewees
agree that they generally do not have to pay any duties but that registration
and documentation may be slow and fairly expensive.1645 A few MNCs inter-
viewed also point out that some of the remaining custom duties are very high
and – for example adding up to 30% including 10% punitive tariff for importing
butter – may lead to prices that are hardly competitive in the host market.1646
In contrast, statistics also show that administrative trade conditions in par-
ticular are improving. Times required for exporting and importing were reduced
by 37% and 57% respectively since 2005.1647 Interviewees in economic zones
1641 In line with the Eastern European EU members; see EBRD (2007b).
1642 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
1643 8 vs. 2 days an 4 vs. 2 days; see World Bank (2007a); see also McGee (2003).
1644 With Romania being the only out of 9 EECs scoring lower.
1645 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1646 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products
(2007).
1647 See OECD (2006a), p.140 ; own calculations.
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also point out that they deal with Croatian customs authority every two days
without any problems (in contrast, for example to the Czech Republic) or the
need for bribery.1648
Finally, interviewees and external sources criticize that the Croatian gov-
ernment still lacks clear visions with regards to trade policy. State experts
in particular see that the Croatian government does not always fully use its
possibilities in trade policy, for example, regarding a pro-active promotion of
export-oriented production (as seen by the limited export focus of APIU1649)
or that the outlined policy goals remain vague and do not receive sufficient
capacities for a successful implementation, for example regarding the recent
export offensive.1650
(d) The evidence from the interviews regarding the importance of trade pol-
icy suggests a slight positive effect on FDI in Croatia. For greenfield
investors trade conditions seem to have a limited or moderately positive im-
pact on their investment decision overall, particularly when they are familiar
with conditions in other EECs. The low tariffs for most goods and the expected
accession to the EU therefore seem to compensate for remaining technical and
bureaucratic procedures for MNCs interested in vertical FDI in Croatia.1651
Furthermore, potential investors who are interested in FDI in sectors that are
still partly protected (such as agriculture) consider the full abolishment of trade
barriers after an accession to the EU as an important step for improving in-
vestment conditions. On the contrary, the number of MNCs that are operating
in protected sectors and that wish to maintain their exclusive position due to
higher market entry barriers is limited.1652
1648 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1649 See also section 7.3.5.3 on investment promotion.
1650 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv.
Supranational Authority II (2007); see also OECD (2006a), p.143.
1651 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services
I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
1652 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
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In contrast, service-oriented MNCs, for example those focused on tourism,
indicate that trade conditions were not important for their investment decision,
neither constraining nor enhancing.1653
Overall, FDI studies with specific results for Croatia are scarce, but existing
company surveys seem to confirm the findings of the interviews that customs
regulations and duties seem to be only a minor obstacle (only 9th most deter-
ring of 11 determinants) and less deterring than, for example, bureaucracy, the
justice system or land register.1654 The findings of FDI studies that suggest
that FDI inflows to Croatia remained limited because of remaining trade bar-
riers are therefore questionable; FDI inflows remained on a similar level until
2005 (figure 83.), although trade had been intensively liberalized since 2000
(as shown above).1655 Interviews suggest that FDI was not replaced by trade
in Croatia; instead, other FDI determinants (discussed throughout the thesis)
may simply have been more decisive than trade policy in influencing FDI flows
and keeping them on the same level for many years.
(e) In the assessment, this section has shown that Croatia’s trade liber-
alization was carried out quite late (after 2000) but that the measures taken
were thorough and generally well implemented. This is interesting, as the liber-
alization was mainly initiated by a left-wing government. Overall, interviewees
confirm the positive evaluation of most external sources that Croatia’s favor-
able aspects of trade conditions clearly outweigh the disadvantages and that the
expected reform in the course of the preparation of EU accession will contribute
to a further easing of remaining tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Interviews also show that the effects of trade policy depend strongly on the
sector, the business model of the MNC, but also on the location of the invest-
ment, since trade issues seem to be handled more swiftly in free economic zones.
1653 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
1654 See Doc - Austrian Econ. Chamber Croatia (2006); more skeptical: Doc - GTZ (2006a).
1655 Trade volumes significantly increased after 1999 with a trade openness growing from
53% to 74% (1999-2004); see section 6.3.1; see figure 91; see McGee (2003).
390 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
Overall, it appears that trade conditions have become a slightly enhancing fac-
tor for most MNCs in Croatia and that conditions are a little more favorable
here than in the majority of SEECs.
The analyses show that trade policy developed well despite the fact that
Croatia is not in the EU yet, even though a further surge of investments may
occur after accession because of the further abolishment of existing barriers.
As in Romania it seems that some state experts as well as several FDI studies
may somewhat overemphasize the legal barriers and underestimate remaining
administrative barriers.
Public policy should carefully evaluate the benefits of remaining entry barri-
ers. In the agricultural sector in particular, the complete abolishment of trade
barriers, also for MNCs from non-EU countries, may contribute to a significant
rise in FDI inflows in related sourcing industries (see section 6.3.1); this may
also justify a corresponding weakening of the domestic firms.
(4) In conclusion, this section has shown that Croatia’s significant improve-
ments in all sub-determinants analyzed – financial system, monetary policy as
well as trade policy – have contributed to a very stable economy overall. Inter-
estingly, these respective reform efforts were less triggered by EU pressure (as
shown for various legal determinants) but rather by a genuine thrive for reform
by public policy actors.
On the other hand, interviewees have helped to understand some of the re-
maining issues, mainly regarding the implementation of the legal environment
and in the daily interactions with MNCs and state authorities. Furthermore,
this section has emphasized that determinants of economic stability are impor-
tant for Croatia’s investment environment and may have a slight enhancing
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impact may be less significant than often assumed by state representatives and
may even deteriorate with increasing integration towards the EU.
7.3.1.4 General insights for transition countries
Based on the analyses of this section but also under consideration of further
secondary FDI literature, several prerequisites for a satisfactory economic sta-
bility as well as findings regarding their importance for FDI can be derived
with respect to (1) the financial system, (2) monetary policy and (3) trade pol-
icy. The options of public policy makers in transition countries for influencing
economic stability are analyzed in section (4).
(1) With respect to the financial system, interviews have revealed that
MNCs seem to be in favor of a large part of the banking assets (greater than
50%1656) being in foreign hands, as this seems to indicate credibility and liq-
uidity of the banking sector. The nationality of these banks is generally not
decisive; however, some smaller MNCs may find access to finance easier when
these foreign banks come from their home countries. In this case Austrian (and
Italian) companies seem to have a particular advantage since banks from their
home countries are among the leading banks in most SEECs.1657
The examples of Romania and Croatia suggest that an early privatization of
the banking sector helps to stabilize the banking sector, increases the solvency
of the financial intermediaries, accelerates the establishment of a wide product
range, and attracts more domestic and foreign investors that are credible and
interested in long-term investments.
The findings of various FDI studies that identify a positive impact of banking
sector reforms on FDI flows1658 can generally be confirmed by the analyses of
this section. However, the importance may be limited and seems to decrease
1656 Which is not given, e. g. in Belarus, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine; see EBRD (2007b).
1657 Together with those from Italy; see Altzinger (1999); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial
Services I (2007).
1658 See Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Dunning (2005); Dunning (2006).
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with growing reform efforts.1659 Moreover, the worries of a banking crisis as
identified in earlier studies may currently not be a major obstacle for FDI in
transition countries.1660 Furthermore, analyses of this section show that good
financing conditions are important for foreign SMEs – which are often a weak
point in the legislation of transition countries (as in Romania). They may be
less relevant for larger MNCs (as suggested by some studies1661) since these
are able to get financing abroad.
The combination of these indicators presented – the share of foreign bank
assets, timing of privatization and financing conditions – may be helpful to
econometrically determine the impact of the banking system on FDI in future
research. They may represent somewhat more realistic indicators than those
often used by FDI studies including the country risk of international rating
agencies, the lending-deposit spread, banking assets in % of GDP or even the
money supply (which would rather indicate the impact of monetary policy).1662
With respect to the non-banking sector interviews are in line with various
FDI studies that this sector has less impact on FDI than the banking sector.1663
However, advanced non-banking markets, such as capital markets, seem to gain
in importance for MNCs when higher levels of FDI are reached and the purchas-
ing power of the citizens in the transition country has attained a considerable
level. The speed of development and the current level of maturity of the non-
banking sector however, seem to strongly differ among transition countries,
with Croatia as a particularly positive example.1664
1659 See Kalotay (2000).
1660 See Bevan and Estrin (2004).
1661 See e. g. Falcetti, Sanfey, and Taci (2003).
1662 See Janicki and Wunnava (2004); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Galego, Vieira, and
Vieira (2004).
1663 See Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993); Bevan and Estrin (2004); Dunning (2005);
Dunning (2006).
1664 See also Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
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Nevertheless, both interviews as well as secondary sources show that the
financial sector itself has been important for the attraction of FDI in tran-
sition countries in the banking sector (particularly in the 1990s) and in the
non-banking sector (more recently).1665
(2) With respect to monetary policy, investors seem to be indifferent to
the inflation level as long as it stays below an annual growth rate of 10% (as in
Romania since 2005 and in Croatia since 1995). Most external studies confirm
that the inflation rate generally has only limited impact on the investment
decision of MNCs in transition countries.1666
The findings of FDI literature regarding the impact of the exchange rate
on FDI are mixed. The theoretical foundation seems to be stronger than the
empirical work, even though this aspect has been intensively analyzed for many
years.1667 Various studies find that FDI is driven by the level of exchange
rates. For example, a real depreciation supposedly attracts FDI in EECs.1668
This result is not supported by the findings of this thesis which suggest that
the actual level of the exchange rate seems to play a minor role for MNCs in
transition countries. Likewise, MNCs appear indifferent towards the exchange
rate regime.1669
In contrast, interviews show that the exchange rate may indeed become a
deterring factor when it is highly volatile and breaks out of a corridor of ±10%
of its real effective exchange rate (as it happened in Romania in the late 1990s).
This finding is also backed by an important strand of FDI literature.1670 How-
1665 See Galego, Vieira, and Vieira (2004); Doc - BA-CA (2007).
1666 See e. g. World Economic Forum (2007).
1667 See Aliber (1970); Reker (2003); Blonigen (2005).
1668 See Be´nassy-Que´re´ and Lahre`che-Re´vil (2005); see also Froot and Stein (1991); Blonigen
(1997); Bevan and Estrin (2004); Antras and Desai (2007).
1669 Different findings: Toubal (2004), pp.103.
1670 See Toubal (2004), pp.88-89; Siebert (2005); Baniak, Cukrowski, and Herczynski (2005);
more critical: Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Disdier and Mayer (2003).
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ever, this thesis suggests that a greater volatility of the exchange rate will
increase uncertainty and thus deter FDI (as shown for Romania), while several
FDI studies seem to predict the contrary effect.1671
Furthermore, analyses indicate that the work of the central bank has only
an indirect effect on the investment decision of MNCs in transition countries.
Economic stability increases when the central bank of the host country has
a strong position from early on in the transition process that focuses on the
stability of prices and the exchange rate. In this context the actual control
of the central bank of the monetary policy is more important than the legal
protection of its independence or the alignment with international standards.
A high amount of foreign reserves apparently increases the confidence of
MNCs and creates greater leeway of the central bank in transition countries
(as shown for Croatia). The abolishment of foreign currency restrictions seem
to be helpful but not essential for a favorable monetary environment.
(3) Regarding trade policy, interviews show that MNCs generally assess a
potential host country more positively when it is a member of the WTO. The
closure of the SAA also seems to have a slight positive effect on FDI. However
this section has also shown – in line with several FDI studies – that trade
regulations tend to lose their importance once transition countries accede to
the EU.1672
Governments need to calculate the overall benefits of trade liberalization, but
even though host countries may be affected by the loss of some trade advan-
tages versus non-EU countries (as in Romania) or of advantages for companies
operating in protected areas (as in Croatia), the overall effects for transition
countries seem to outweigh the disadvantages.
1671 See for examples Blonigen (2005).
1672 See similar Holland and Pain (1998); Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002); Resmini (2006).
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Interviews do not reveal any insights regarding a specific order in which the
elimination of custom duties should proceed, but interviewees clearly indicate
that the introduction of exceptional tariff changes (as in Romania) and punitive
tariffs (as in Croatia) have a negative effect on the predictability of the trade
policy and are evaluated as a disadvantage for FDI in potential host countries.
The most important insight in this context for transition countries from the
interviews is, however, that the level of the tariffs and the costs for trading per
se are not decisive for MNCs – as long as the total costs allow to set prices that
are still competitive in the sales market (as problematized for Croatia). The
avoidance of cumbersome administrative efforts tends to be more important
for an investment environment than the minimization of actual costs. MNCs
expect that waiting times are limited. Interviews and international statistics
suggest that 14 days represent a satisfactory performance for all export-related
requirements and 17 days for importing.1673 In this context, statistics show that
EU accession does not necessarily lead to a better performance since Greece
and Slovakia only score 90th and 100th regarding average trading times.
Therefore, the analyses of trade policy in this section confirm the multitude
of FDI studies that find that trade policy is an important driver for FDI in
transition countries in general and not a substitute for trade.1674 The findings
question those studies concluding that the trade regime is one of the most
important factors of FDI1675 and reveal that it is less the legal than the ad-
ministrative environment that drives the importance of this determinant.1676
It may be little surprising that an increasing number of studies focusing on
trade versus FDI effects reach apparently contradictory conclusions. Besides
1673 Representing a performance among the best 20% of 179 countries; see World Bank
(2007a).
1674 See Lankes and Venables (1996); Estrin, Hughes, and Todd (1997); Blomstro¨m and
Kokko (2003); Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004); Kobrin (2005).
1675 See Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005).
1676 Also skeptical regarding the effects of trade policy on FDI: Globerman and Shapiro
(1999).
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different definitions of trade policy1677 the different forms of FDI seem to
play an important role in this context. However, the often identified pattern
according to which low trade barriers lead to higher vertical and decreasing
horizontal FDI inflows1678, cannot be confirmed by the interviews. The analy-
ses of this section rather suggest that low trade barriers lead to higher vertical
FDI, but have little impact on horizontal FDI in transition countries and may
decrease investments of those MNCs that are already active in protected areas
of the host country.1679
(4) Public policy makers have significant influence in establishing the
fundamentals of economic stability and can decisively determine the speed and
thoroughness of all sub-dimensions discussed above. The examples of Romania
and Croatia have shown that deliberate reforms can be made by any political
party without endangering credibility. However, governments seem to lose – as
suggested by both interviews and more general FDI studies – some of their
possibilities in steering economic policy once a certain threshold of economic
stability is reached, most state-owned banks are sold and competences in mon-
etary and trade policy are transfered to supranational organizations such as
the WTO and the EU.1680
It is not surprising that external sources as well as theory emphasize that
this loss of leeway is a positive sign and that conditions are best for both do-
mestic and foreign firms if they are left to the market.1681 However, this section
has shown that public policy makers need to understand that their work in the
1677 See Resmini (2000).
1678 See for details Protsenko (2003), pp.17-19; see also Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Saps-
ford (1996); Brainard (1997); Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000); Demekas,
Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005).
1679 See similar Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005).
1680 See also Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003); Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005);
Resmini (2006).
1681 See e. g. Be´nassy-Que´re´ and Lahre`che-Re´vil (2005).
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early transition phase is decisive and that they should deploy their competences
cautiously in order to establish a sustainable and well-founded framework for
economic stability before their influence vanishes. Furthermore, public policy
can and should work on the remaining levers in more advanced phases of the
transition process, mainly regarding the improvement and shortening of ad-
ministrative procedures, particularly since these are one of the few occasions
in which MNCs are in direct contact with state authorities.
Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002) confirm the findings of this thesis that pub-
lic policy action relating to economic stability is strongly interdependent with
other determinants, most notably privatization, bureaucracy, market entry, and
trade openness. The right timing of liberalization, privatization and the inte-
gration into supranational organization is crucial in this context in order to
reach a maximum effect. Future FDI research could, for example, explore to
what extent the quick approaching of WTO and EU may generate a positive
short-term effect (as in Croatia) but may lose its impact more quickly than in
cases when these two events are further apart from each other.
The central bank of transition countries is probably the institution facing
the greatest challenges in the early transition process. First of all, its work
generally starts out with staff that has little experience, low reserves and under
high government pressures. Secondly, central bankers, particularly in transi-
tion countries, usually have to cope with the dilemma that they would need to
combat inflation by increasing interest rates, which again fuels foreign capital
inflows resulting in an appreciation of the domestic currency and thus in a
lower competitiveness of domestic companies which is particularly harmful in
the beginning of transition.1682 Governments can be supportive in this early
phase by providing sufficient staff, financial resources and training, but also by
providing a legal framework that targets price stability as primary goal, guar-
1682 See similar Sorsa, Bakker, and Duenewald (2007); Mu¨ller (2005), p.164.
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antees far-reaching independence of the central bank and enables the extensive
supervision of all financial intermediaries by the central bank in order to early
react to erroneous trends (such as bad loans etc.).
7.3.2 Infrastructure
7.3.2.1 Definition
From an investor’s point of view, the provision of a good infrastructure is
essential for transition economies in order to enable efficient and effective busi-
ness activities in the host country. Furthermore, the infrastructure sector itself
is often attractive for investments, because of its great need for capital and
know-how, particularly in transition countries.1683 This section analyzes two
infrastructure areas on which investors in transition countries focus most heav-
ily, (1) roads and (2) real estate. Section (3) provides conclusions for Romania
and Croatia respectively.1684
7.3.2.2 Romania
(1) The quality of roads in Romania (a) was very poor in the past, (b) only
limited improvements took place in recent years and (c) today’s standards are
still very low. Overall, (d) the impact of road infrastructure on FDI seems to
increase, also because of rising opportunities for FDI in this sector. Section (e)
provides an assessment.
(a) Various interviewees1685 and external sources1686 confirm that the quality
of Romania’s roads was very poor in the 1990s, particularly in rural areas.
A major problem was the lack of financing for the upgrade and extension of the
1683 See Mu¨ller (2005), pp.131-133 and 205-206.
1684 See for a similar selection Nicoletti, Golub, Hajkova, Mirza, and Yoo (2003), p.40.
1685 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
1686 See e. g. Carter, Sader, and Holtedahl (1996); EBRD (2007b).
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road system in the early 1990s. As part of Ceaus¸escu’s isolation policy (section
6.2.1), Romania had paid back all its foreign debt at the end of the 1980s,
which led to a lack of financial resources in the early 1990s to invest in state
projects like Romania’s infrastructure.1687 The National Road Administration
in particular suffered from this shortage. Its budget in 1992, for example, did
not allow for more than 500km of maintenance (out of 70,000km of roads).1688
(b) Some improvements were initiated in the early 2000s. The upgrade and
especially the extension of the road network were high on the list of government
priorities in Romania since 2001.1689 Due to government spending, support
from international organizations (such as EBRD and World Bank) as well as
higher sector-specific FDI, 2,300km of national roads were renewed and 100km
of highways were completed between 2000 and 2005.1690 Interviewees agree that
some of these improvements are visible today1691, particularly in Bucharest
and in other areas with high movement of goods such as Timis¸oara.1692 In fact,
investors who are located in the western part of Romania and mainly focus
on exporting to Western Europe seem to have only limited problems with the
current state of Romania’s infrastructure and acknowledge that basic needs of
investors are met.1693 These increasing efforts are also reflected in the transition
reform index of the EBRD for road infrastructure according to which Romania
only made minimum progress until the mid-1990s (1 out of 5 points), but has
captured with increasing efforts a decent level of 3 points since 2000.1694
1687 See also Zu¨hlke (2006).
1688 See Carter, Sader, and Holtedahl (1996).
1689 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.64; see also Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
1690 See Rabobank (2006); Larive Romania (2007); Bfai (2005), pp.72-73 and 175; see also
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007).
1691 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
1692 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
1693 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007).
1694 Bulgaria with 2.7 and Ukraine with 2 points in 2007; see EBRD (2007b).
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State representatives interviewed emphasize that infrastructure will remain
a centerpiece of Romania’s investment strategy both on the central and local
level, including the completion of highways from Bucharest to Constant¸a and
from Bras¸ov to the Western border within the next five to six years.1695 Ac-
cording to interviewees the relative share of road infrastructure to FDI will also
rise, primarily driven by the increasing inflows of EU financing that is expected
to amount to e5.7B until 2013.1696 Overall, state experts seem more optimistic
than company experts that the expected EU funding will significantly improve
Romania’s road infrastructure.
(c) However, remaining problems regarding Romania’s roads seem to be
overwhelming and progress only slow and quite limited overall. Interviewees1697
as well as external sources1698 stress that “the quality of many Romanian roads
is still very poor”1699 and experts believe that European standards will not be
reached for another 10 to 20 years.1700 This evaluation is also reflected in a
German survey, according to which investors in Romania placed infrastructure
third on a list of factors deemed by them to be unsatisfactory.1701 Moreover, in
an international survey presented in FIAS (2007), 29% of respondents called
1695 See Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); see
also Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007).
1696 For transport infrastructure; Bfai (2007b); Doc - Rom. Ministry V (2007); see Intv.
Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Doc - German Econ.
Chamber Romania (2007).
1697 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Doc -
Austrian Econ. Chamber Romania (2007b).
1698 See e. g. European Commission (2004a), p.11; Mu¨ller (2005); Socol and Socol (2007).
1699 Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); driving on Romanian highways can be
dangerous due to the different types of vehicles including tractors and horses; see Intv.
Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
1700 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr.
Research Institute (2007); see also Rabobank (2006).
1701 See AHK (2006).
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transportation networks the most important future work for Romanian govern-
ments.1702
The most significant deficiency from the perspective of investors seems to
be the low extension of the highway network, with only about 200km com-
pleted from Bucharest to Constant¸a and from Bucharest to Pitesti.1703 Ex-
perts point out that a car journey takes longer from Bucharest to the border
(12 hours for about 420km) than from the border to Germany (10 hours for
about 760km).1704 Highway networks in the smaller neighboring countries Bul-
garia and Hungary are more extensive1705 and also better in quality according
to experts interviewed.1706 Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007) assumes
that 1,800km of highway would be required for a sufficient infrastructure net-
work in Romania.
Furthermore, the state of the non-highway roads seems to remain very poor
which slows down transportation to a speed of about 30-40km per hour com-
pared to 50 to 70 in Germany.1707 In fact and despite recent efforts, only 26%
of all roads were renewed in Romania since 1990 by 2005.1708 According to
the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (figure 94
in the appendix ), the quality of Romania’s roads was ranked 123rd out of 131
countries (2007).1709
1702 Therefore, the classification of Romania’s infrastructure as “highly developed” seems
too euphemistic; see Doc - Rom. Emb. Berlin (2007b).
1703 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007);
Intv. German Authority I (2007).
1704 Travel distances from Bucharest to Arad and from Arad to Munich; see Intv.
Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); see also
www.mapcrow.info.
1705 Bulgaria with 290km and Hungary with 350km; see Socol and Socol (2007).
1706 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr.
Research Institute (2007).
1707 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
1708 See Bfai (2005), pp.72-73 and 175.
1709 See World Economic Forum (2007).
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For the regional level interviewees point out that by-passes are often miss-
ing and actually should be built before highways.1710 Furthermore, both state
and company experts agree that road infrastructure in the mountain area as
well as in the Eastern part of Romania seem to be poor in particular. Some
experts, however, also point out that regional politicians have only little power
to accelerate constructions since highways and by-pass roads are generally in
the hands of the central government.1711
Interviews and external sources help to identify some major factors for these
shortcomings described. First of all, clear plans and time schedules often seem
to be missing in Romania’s infrastructure policy, and strategies often do not
reflect the increasing number of vehicles.1712 Others point out that plans and
EU funds may be available, but Romania has not provided its contribution
to the financing so far.1713 Even state representatives admit that no great
projects in the infrastructure sector have been initiated until the inflow of EU
subsidies.1714
Furthermore, infrastructure policy seems to be influenced by political quar-
rels in Romania. For example, works at several highways were stopped after the
change of government in 2004 following complaints about inflating costs; never-
theless constructions at a different highway were started at the same time.1715
Delays also seem to be caused by long-lasting tenders and maybe even by cor-
ruption.1716 Interviews with foreign experts suggest that domestic companies
are sometimes given preference in tenders. Furthermore, domestic construction
1710 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
1711 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007);
Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1712 See Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII
(2007).
1713 See Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007).
1714 See Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
1715 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); see also Bfai (2005), p.70-71.
1716 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007).
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companies do not always provide high quality work or keep the quality of work
intentionally low in order to receive subsequent service contracts.1717
(d) On the basis of primary and secondary sources three time periods in the
importance of the quality of roads can be evaluated for Romania as invest-
ment location. In the early 1990s the poor quality of roads was – according to
Carter, Sader, and Holtedahl (1996) – a major impediment to operations of
investors in Romania. In fact, investors’ concerns regarding road infrastructure
were greater only in Croatia (out of ten countries) at that time. With in-
creasing improvements (see above) the importance of transport infrastructure
apparently decreased for FDI in Romania; according to Falcetti, Sanfey, and
Taci (2003) infrastructure was the least important of seven factors analyzed
as investment barriers in Romania in 2002 with only less than 10%.1718 Since
the last couple of years – the third phase – road infrastructure has regained
its importance as major deterrent factor for investing in Romania. This is also
confirmed by external surveys.1719 Basically all companies as well as state in-
terviewees confirm that the lack of sufficient and high quality roads is one of
the most important reasons why FDI in Romania are lower than they could be.
It seems to be a major obstacle for investors interested in Romania but also for
MNCs that are already present in Romania and that consider an extension of
their business.1720 Company experts state that infrastructure deficiencies have
a negative impact on FDI in almost all areas, efficiency- and market-seeking,
industry and services as well as greenfield and acquisitions.1721
1717 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007).
1718 Less important than taxation, financing, corruption, regulation, judiciary and crime.
1719 See World Economic Forum (2006a); World Economic Forum (2007).
1720 See Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007);
Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Austr. Re-
search Institute (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Legal Services I (2007).
1721 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); see also Doc - Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2005).
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Furthermore, experts point out that effects of Romania’s poor road infras-
tructure are particularly visible on a regional level. First of all, many produc-
tions sites are often selected close to the Hungarian border and highway system,
particularly by automotive suppliers, since just-in-time deliveries are hardly
possible from other parts of the countries. Therefore, FDI in other regions such
as Eastern Romania suffer the most from the weak infrastructure.1722 Finally, a
weak infrastructure also aggravates investors’ current difficulties in finding suf-
ficient labor, since available workers often live in rural areas who have problems
reaching potential jobs in cities due to the weak infrastructure.1723
Interviewees and external sources identify the road construction sector as
one of the most attractive sectors of FDI for the future, because of the great
demand, the EU support and expected increase in transparency of contract
awards.1724
(e) In the assessment, this section reveals that road infrastructure was a
weakness for Romania because of financing problems but also because govern-
ments waited too long for external support (in the 1990s). Good conditions in
Western Romania were less a success of Romanian infrastructure policy but
a result of the proximity to the (better) Hungarian road network. Investors
perceived the poor road infrastructure as a weakness in the past but other
problems such as property rights and political issues seem to have been more
important for their investment decision. While many of the legal and polit-
ical aspects have been losing their importance in recent years, infrastructure
seems to capture an increasing amount of attention from both state representa-
tives and investors. The remaining deficiencies seem to keep MNCs away from
expanding their investments, particularly regarding increasing market exploita-
1722 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
1723 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1724 See 6.2.1; Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council
(2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Uni-
Credit Group (2007).
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tion activities following the growth of purchasing power.1725 Therefore, only if
Romania solves its infrastructure problems can it benefit from its good access
to other markets and its fairly large market size.
State representatives do not lack awareness of these issues, even though they
may be somewhat too optimistic regarding positive effects of the incoming EU
funding.
Road infrastructure has many interdependences with other FDI determi-
nants, including political stability and corruption but also with non-policy
determinants such as market size and proximity. Public policy should transfer
more road construction responsibilities to regional and local authorities, im-
prove the access of foreign companies to the construction sector and increase
Romania’s capabilities to successfully absorb the respective EU funds. Further-
more, construction works should be based on economic priorities, for example,
by focusing on by-pass roads rather than on roads across cities.
(2) Regarding the real estate situation in Romania, this section identifies
(a) major concerns regarding rising prices, even though some evidence exists
that (b) the situation is not as bad popularly perceived. Nevertheless, the real
estate situation is of (c) increasing importance for MNCs, also as field of FDI.
An assessment is presented in sub-section (d).
(a) Primary sources and experts interviewed confirm that prices in Roma-
nia’s real estate market have drastically increased in recent years.1726 This
seems to be true for land as well as for apartments, offices, and plants. Similar
developments seem to be valid for rented as well as purchased real estate.
1725 E. g. The need for a good road network for the delivery of products to supermarket
chains.
1726 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
VII (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007);
Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); see also Bfai (2007a); The Housing Unit
(2004).
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According to the experts, real estate is sometimes more expensive in
Bucharest than in Munich or Vienna and prices in other Romanian cities like
Cluj and Sibiu are also significantly higher than in Bulgaria and also compara-
ble to Western European levels.1727 External sources confirm that price increase
in Romania is one of the fastest in Europe.1728 While one square meter (sqm)
of (purchased) office space used to cost about e200 in Bucharest in the late
1990s, prices now go up to e3,500.1729 Land is expensive particularly for retail
companies that generally acquire buildings that are only one-story high. Intv.
Germ. MNC - Retail (2007) calculates about e5M just for the piece of land
for a store of about 4-5,000 sqm in urban areas. For renting office space experts
calculate between e20 and 25 per sqm in larger business buildings.1730
Some key reasons for this evolution can be identified. First of all, there seems
to be a significant shortage of supply of modern offices, plants and private build-
ings due to outdated structures from communist times and the recent economic
boom that has increased the demand of firms and the competition among new
market entrants.1731 Apparently, local governments have done too little to ex-
pand the supply of land and offices in cities; furthermore, local authorities’
willingness to sell real estate are limited.1732 Various experts also assume that
the price increase is partly driven by speculations that have been fueled by
Romania’s accession to the EU.1733
1727 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv.
German Political Adviser (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv.
Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
1728 See Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (2007); Bfai (2007a).
1729 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II
(2007).
1730 See Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); see also Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (2007).
1731 See 6.2.1; see also Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail
(2007); Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007).
1732 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1733 See Intv. Rom. Company - Consulting (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services III (2007).
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As a result, experts are skeptical that real estate prices actually reflect the
purchasing power of Romanians.1734 However, several interviewees and external
sources expect that prices will continue to rise (especially for the upper price
segment) as long as demand continues to heavily exceed supply and the banks
are willing and able to give out credits1735, even though the largest price growth
may be over by now.1736
(b) Nevertheless, interviews also give some hints that the price situation in
Romania’s real estate market may be not as bad as sometimes suggested.
In most parts of the country, aside from the boom regions, for example in
Taˆrgu Mures¸ (Transylvania), land is still cheaper than in Western Europe.1737
Furthermore, MNCs often have the possibility to go to industrial parks where
prices are significantly lower than in urban areas (section 7.3.3).1738 Further-
more, agricultural land is still fairly cheap, even though prices increased by a
factor of five since the early 2000s as well.1739 Finally, prices may be high in
some Romanian regions due to the shortage of office space, but the supply of
space still seems to be higher than, for example, in Ukraine.1740
Interviews and some external sources also indicate that real estate prices
will slow down or even deteriorate in the medium-term, particularly for apart-
ments.1741 This is suggested by a respective development in other EECs after
EU accession and the currently significant construction activities.1742
1734 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1735 This is not expected to happen until another three to five years; see Intv. German Econ.
Association VII (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal
Services II (2007); Raiffeisenbank (2008); BA-CA (2007b); Ernst & Young (2008).
1736 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); see also Bfai (2007b).
1737 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
1738 E.g . the rent of land in the park of Timis¸oara only costs e0.10 per sqm per year; seee
Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
1739 See Intv. German Political Adviser (2007).
1740 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
1741 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007);
Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); see also Bfai
(2007a); Bfai (2007b).
1742 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
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(c) In the last couple of years, real estate prices have apparently been
gaining importance for FDI in Romania. Several interviews indicate that
they are becoming a substantial obstacle for higher FDI.1743 Some investors
may have decided, for example, against investing in Sibiu because prices were
possibly too high for apartments, production sites etc.1744 Foreign SMEs have
difficulties in finding affordable office space in cities like Bucharest since offers
usually start at 1,500 sqm. Large investors often have problems finding afford-
able pieces of land for greenfield investments.1745 Some investors may also ask
why they should pay e3 per sqm of rent for a production hall in bad shape in
Romania, while the rent for a new one, for instance in Leipzig, would only be
e1.50.1746
Rising costs for real estate seem to be one of many disadvantageous cost
developments including rising labor and energy costs.1747 Some MNCs inter-
ested in Romania may actually hesitate to invest because of these, while in-
terviews show that those investors who are already present are likely to invest
and expand anyway, since a stagnation would contradict their market-oriented
business model.1748 Efficiency-oriented MNCs know the market conditions well
and invest in rural areas in which they will be less affected by the price devel-
opment.1749 The lack of space or land may be especially crucial for investors
who want to start production quickly and would be willing to pay a higher pur-
chasing price in order to benefit from the lower production costs quickly.1750
1743 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority
I (2007).
1744 See Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
1745 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
II (2007).
1746 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
1747 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII
(2007).
1748 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007).
1749 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
1750 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
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Individual expert statements asserting that investments are currently not ad-
visable due to the high real estate prices at all1751 seem, however, somewhat
too pessimistic considering the possibilities for circumventing existing problems
described above.
There seems to be good reason why a few investors interviewed assume that
rental (particularly from the state) will become more important than purchas-
ing real estate, since production sites tend to be outdated quickly anyway
and renting may also help to avoid legal issues regarding property (section
7.2.2).1752
Primary1753 and secondary1754 sources confirm that the real estate sector
provides significant potential for foreign investors, partly because of the need
for capital, know-how in projects and civil engineering, and because foreigners
seem to experience little discrimination in this sector.
(d) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that rising real
estate prices become an increasing concern of investors, particularly because
they are coupled with other inflating costs. As a result, it is generally more
difficult for MNCs to find an adequate piece of real estate than it is to set up
a company in Romania. However, for the most part this development does not
seem to be crucial so far, also because investors still have various possibilities
to circumvent these problems. Nevertheless, interviews indicate that state rep-
resentatives are not always sufficiently aware of the downside potential of this
development and tend rather to see the opportunities for FDI in real estate.
They also tend to underestimate their influence to steer real estate prices.
1751 See Intv. German Political Adviser (2007).
1752 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services
III (2007).
1753 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Associa-
tion VIII (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1754 See e. g. Hannula (2005); UniCredit Group (2007); Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (2007); Raif-
feisenbank (2008).
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In order to decrease price pressures and to avoid the real estate situation
becoming a more significant deterring effect on FDI, public policy should
invest more actively in urban and rural real estate developments, particularly
on the local level. Legal possibilities for public and private actors to acquire
and sell real estate should be increased. These efforts should also be strongly
interlinked with Romania’s other infrastructure reforms. Public policy thus
needs to provide not only land but also make it accessible for investments
including roads, electricity etc. Finally, an adequate monetary policy (see
above) will be needed to preclude possible imbalances on the financial markets
and prevent an overheating of the real estate market.
(3) In conclusion, infrastructure issues, such as road infrastructure and the
real estate situation, were not the focus of investors and public policy actors in
Romania for a long time, because other problems were more urgent, the num-
ber of investors was still limited, and because little FDI was oriented towards
expansion and market exploitation. This section suggested that infrastructure
did not significantly hinder FDI in early investments periods but affected the
increase of inflows and expansions later, once a higher level of FDI was reached
in the mid 2000s. Due to economic growth and EU accession the demand for
infrastructure goods has increasingly outpaced the existing supply. Infrastruc-
ture deficiencies may not only obstruct higher FDI inflows but also increase
development gaps within Romania. Overall, the potential negative impact of
infrastructure deficiencies seems to be more crucial than existing opportunities
for FDI in infrastructure (also because only a limited number of companies can
benefit from the sectoral growth in infrastructure).
In this context it seems that public policy actors are more aware of road
infrastructure problems than of those that are related to the real estate situa-
tion. In reference to both dimensions discussed local responsibility needs to be
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enhanced, legally and actually. Local actors may also rather have an interest
in finishing infrastructure projects quickly because results are more visible and
beneficial for them.
7.3.2.3 Croatia
(1) The quality of Croatia’s road infrastructure was (a) poor throughout the
1990s, but (b) significant improvements have led to a very satisfactory state for
MNCs today and (c) only minor problems remain. Yet, (d) road infrastructure
seems to have only limited impact on FDI in Croatia. Sub-section (e) assesses
the findings.
(a) Both primary and secondary sources confirm that Croatia had signifi-
cant problems with its road infrastructure in the 1990s. In the course of
the war of independence, Croatia’s infrastructure was severely affected and the
connections between Zagreb an the southeastern and southwestern regions were
disrupted and partly destroyed.1755 Destruction, different government priori-
ties, a difficult geography, lack of money, and the little know-how of domestic
construction companies effectuated that only few major constructions actually
took place throughout the 1990s and that traveling, for example, to and at
the coast was tedious.1756 Carter, Sader, and Holtedahl (1996) conclude that
Croatia had the worst performance in terms of road quality out of 10 EECs in
the 1990s.
(b) Since the late 1990s significant construction efforts generated substan-
tial improvements of Croatia’s road infrastructure. Interviews1757 and exter-
1755 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.2.
1756 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
1757 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II
(2007).
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nal sources1758 indicate that large infrastructure projects were already launched
under President Tudman and then intensified under Prime Ministers Racˇan
and Sanader. As a consequence, the highway system expanded from 300km to
about 1,000km (1995-2006).1759 The connection between Zagreb and Split was
completed in 2004 and Varazˇdin was hooked up to the highway system in the
following year.1760
Interviews reveal several reasons for the success of the upgrade and exten-
sion of road infrastructure in Croatia. President Tudman presented the Croa-
tian highway system as a national project of prestige that would also help to
better defend Croatia against potential (Serbian) aggressions. His successors
gained support by focusing on the economic impact of the highway extension,
notably on the construction and tourism industries. In this context, the high
visibility of the projects guaranteed the support of top politicians and helped
to convey the importance to stakeholders, financiers and voters compared to
other large projects.1761 Other success factors include the increasing number of
public tenders and the positive development in the construction sector (mainly
due to tourism) including the enhanced involvement of foreign players.1762 Fur-
thermore and in contrast, for instance, to Romania, Croatia did not wait for a
co-financing from the EU but started constructions on its own.1763 As a result,
investors seem very satisfied with the extension and quality of the highway
network in Croatia, particularly with the north-south highway to the coast
1758 See e. g. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.8 ; NCC (2004b); European Commission
(2007a), p.22.
1759 See World Bank (2003); European Commission (2007a), p.68; APIU (2007); see also
Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
1760 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also NCC (2004b).
1761 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007);
Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); see also
European Commission (2004c), p.51.
1762 See Bfai (2004), pp.57-58; European Commission (2004c), p.92; see also Intv. Austr.
MNC - Construction (2007).
1763 See Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
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and they acknowledge that Croatian highways reach Western European stan-
dards.1764
In addition to this, investors interviewed also see progress in the quality of
non-highway roads in recent years that add up to about 29,000km today.1765
The high standard of Croatia’s road infrastructure is also reflected in in-
ternational statistics. In the Global Competitiveness Report (figure 94 in the
appendix ) Croatia ranks 36th out of 131 countries in terms of road quality
in 2007 and is therefore the second best EEC after Lithuania.1766 External
surveys also show that transportation is only regarded as a minor problem in
Croatia today.1767 Other international statistics that assess a merely mediocre
performance of Croatia1768 do not seem to be representative, since they analyze
infrastructure in general (including energy, ports etc.) and do not give specific
results for roads.
(c) Nevertheless, interviews and external sources also hint at some minor
problems regarding Croatia’s road infrastructure. Interviewees mention some
missing parts of the highway system such as the route from Zagreb to the
airport and even more importantly a 30km stretch through Slovenia is required
to connect Croatia to Western Europe’s highway system – apparently a political
issue between the Slovenian and Croatian governments.1769 External sources
also state that some maintenance problems of the highway system exist.1770
1764 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software
(2007).
1765 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); see
also APIU (2007).
1766 Out of 18 EECs analyzed, Lithuania ranks 32nd; Croatia apparently reaches 85% of
EU standards in terms of road quality; see World Economic Forum (2007); Doc - NCC
(2007).
1767 See FIAS (2007).
1768 See e. g. AHK (2006); IMD (2006).
1769 Slovenia may expect some co-financing from Croatia; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007); see also Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
1770 See European Commission (2007a), p.22.
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Furthermore, the quality of non-highway roads still varies greatly from region
to region. In Slavonia, quite a few roads have still not been renewed since the
end of the war.1771 Some interviewees also point out that conditions are difficult
for any nation-wide distribution departing from the main roads, particularly
in the hinterland of the coast and on the many islands.1772 Some of these
problems seem to originate on the local level. The high degree of centralization
apparently decreases the options available to local public policy actors.1773
On the other hand, local infrastructure projects may sometimes be based on
arbitrary decisions and more affected by interests of individuals and networks
than those originating from central level.1774
Some interviewees as well as external sources also criticize that too much
money and efforts were invested into the extension and upgrade of highways,
while urban infrastructure, railroads and port infrastructure received less atten-
tion.1775 Experts and external sources also warn that infrastructure expendi-
tures may further increase Croatia’s foreign debt.1776 Finally, some of the public
tenders, including the award of contract for the Zagreb-Split highway to Bech-
tel, have also brought criticism. Even today the construction business seems to
be quite political and does not always follow fully transparent rules.1777
(d) Despite this, in an evaluation of Croatia’s road infrastructure the positive
aspects clearly outweigh the complaints. Nevertheless, road quality only seems
to be an average enhancing factor in favor of Croatia as investment loca-
tion so far. Primary and secondary sources admit that good roads are generally
1771 See Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007).
1772 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
1773 See Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007).
1774 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
1775 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); see also EBRD (2005a),
p.20; NCC (2004b), p.31; European Commission (2004c), p.51.
1776 See CICD (2006), p.11.
1777 See also Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007).
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an advantage, because they strengthen Croatia’s reliability as business-friendly
location1778, facilitate connection to other markets and may represent the fu-
ture backbone of a new transit route from Asia (via Turkey) to the EU.1779
Further market potential may also exist for MNCs in the construction sector
in the completion of the highway network, the development of local roads and
through a further consolidation of the construction industry following stricter
licensing rules expected for spring 2008.1780
However, these advantages seem to have only limited direct impact on FDI
(besides in tourism and construction) so far. Interviews do not indicate that
investment decisions are substantially driven by Croatia’s good roads.1781 Ex-
ternal surveys also confirm that the relative importance of infrastructure versus
other determinants is fairly low (19th on a list of 26 determinants).1782
(e) In the assessment of this section the analyses show that Croatia has
made remarkable progress in recent years regarding the modernization and
extension of its road infrastructure. Starting with very difficult geographic and
political conditions Croatia has clearly performed better than other SEECs
including Romania. It seems reasonable that governments did not wait for
EU financing to arrive (as did Romania) but accepted rising debts; Croatia
was therefore able to reach a competitive locational advantage compared to
other SEECs and to drive employment. It was also prudent to concentrate
construction efforts on highways since other projects may not have received
the same support and a focus on the modernization of regional road networks
1778 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
1779 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); see also NCC (2004b), p.14.
1780 This is expected to reduce the number of domestic firms; see Intv. Austrian Econ.
Association II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); UniCredit Group (2006),
p.8.
1781 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I
(2007).
1782 See AHK (2006).
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may have exceeded the capabilities of local governments as analyses of earlier
sections suggest.
It may be somewhat disappointing that the good road infrastructure has
not materialized in significant FDI so far. It has, however, helped to foster
growth in the tourism sector overall (see section 6.3.1). More importantly, and
looking at the Romanian example, it seems likely that infrastructure will gain
in importance in the years to come once EU accession has been achieved (and
customs barriers are lifted completely) and higher levels of FDI are reached.
Both issues will lead to greater opportunities for Croatia as a market in itself
and as attractive transit country.
Nevertheless, public policy will need to establish some further preconditions,
in order for Croatia to actually benefit from its earlier construction efforts in
terms of FDI inflow. These include the overcoming of some of the legal obsta-
cles analyzed above (most of all regarding property rights and bureaucracy).
Croatian public policy should also develop a more regional perspective, since a
better road infrastructure in other SEECs (notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina)
will be essential even for market-seeking MNCs in Croatia. Public policy will
also need to cooperate more closely with Slovenian leaders in order to close the
remaining highway gap which would also represent a symbolic completion of
the connection to Western Europe.
Moreover, Croatia should now delegate more of the responsibilities of road
infrastructure to local levels since the maintenance of the highway system and
the modernization of other roads will be most effectively conducted by local
actors.
Finally, it is worth noting that company experts emphasize achievements
in terms of road infrastructure more than state representatives do. This may
be because company experts are more aware of the fact that the speed of the
modernization and the high quality of the network is exceptional in the regional
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comparison. Public policy actors should therefore emphasize these aspects more
actively when promoting Croatia as an attractive investment location.
Overall, interdependences with other determinants are apparently even more
important for Croatia’s road infrastructure than for Romania’s. They include
regional cooperation, EU funds, corruption, proximity, market size, and trade
policy.
(2) With respect to Croatia’s real estate situation, investors seem to have
(a) some concerns regarding the price development, but (b) quality and bu-
reaucratic issues seem to be more worrisome. The (c) importance of this deter-
minant is apparently minor for FDI in Croatia. This section concludes with an
assessment (d).
(a) Interviews1783 and external sources1784 show a complex picture regarding
Croatia’s real estate prices. Housing prices are apparently quite high and on
a comparable level to Western Europe cities.1785 The purchase of office space
is also expensive and can cost between e1,000 and e3,500 per sqm in Croatia,
while rental prices range from e5 to e17.1786 On the other hand, purchasing
prices seem to be fairly low for industrial sites in Croatia with e28 per sqm,
also in comparison to neighboring countries such as Hungary (e39), Bosnia
and Herzegovina (e41), and Serbia (e141).1787
Sources analyzed confirm that real estate prices (most notably land prices
and office rents) have been rising in Croatia, particularly in the period up
until 2005. However, prices in Croatia’s real estate market did not develop
as dramatically as in other Eastern European markets and may even start to
decrease. House prices, for example, only grew moderately at 2.7% annually
1783 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
1784 See e. g. EBRD (2007a); IMF (2004); CNB (2007).
1785 See Egert and Mihaljek (2007).
1786 See APIU (2007).
1787 Including ancillary expenses; see MIGA (2006); own calculations.
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(1997-2001)1788 and in the following years still less than in most other EECs
with 8.7% (2002-2006).1789
Reasons for this fairly moderate development may be that prices were already
quite high even in the 1990s and attractive objects for foreign investors are
more spread out (especially at the coast) than, for example in Romania, where
investments seem quite concentrated on a few boom centers. Therefore, price
gaps within the country seem to be less dramatic in Croatia. Furthermore, the
construction of apartment and office buildings after 2000 increased the supply
and eased the price pressure as well (e. g. from about e20 in 2005 to an average
of e13 per sqm for office rent).1790
Findings regarding the future development of real estate prices in Croatia are
mixed. Some sources assume that prices will increase more slowly1791 or even
decrease (for example for office space to about e10 per sqm)1792, while others
expect that an increasing demand and an accession to the EU will lead to an
enhanced price surge, taking a similar experience in other Eastern European
economies into account.1793
(b) Overall, prices seem to be less of a problem for investors interested
in real estate in Croatia than the quality of buildings offered and bu-
reaucratic hurdles. Interviewees confirm that the supply of modern office
space and production sites in Croatia is still limited and that investors of-
ten encounter infrastructure problems at old sites, particularly regarding gas
and electrification.1794 Even more importantly and as already touched upon
in sections 7.2.2.3 and 7.2.3.3, investors frequently experience arbitrary and
1788 2.9% in Hungary, 6.3% in Slovenia and 15.4% in Czech Rep.; see Egert and Mihaljek
(2007).
1789 Czech Republic with 10.9%, Hungary with 13.4% and Estonia with 35.7%; see ibid.
1790 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II
(2007); see also European Commission (2004c), p.43; Egert and Mihaljek (2007).
1791 See Global Property Guide (2006).
1792 See e. g. Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
1793 See Doc - Ekonomski Institut Zagreb (2007); Hina (2007).
1794 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
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sometimes biased decisions of authorities when selling and renting land etc.
Primary1795 and secondary1796 sources also criticize the fact that foreigners
tend to have more problems acquiring real estate than Croatian firms and that
the need for good networks is more troublesome than the price or quality of
the real estate.
(c) Nevertheless, interviews with investors suggest that the real estate situ-
ation has hardly any influence on the investment decision of most MNCs
for or against Croatia.1797 Some investors may consider that higher real estate
prices today make an investment, particularly in tourism, less attractive than
in the early 2000s1798, but most investors acknowledge that Croatia has been
on a fairly high price level anyway and that real estate prices are still moderate
versus the overall price level compared to other EECs. Furthermore, the poor
quality of some objects, for example of old production sites, seems to be less
relevant for FDI in Croatia, since MNCs’ interest in greenfield investments is
limited, anyway (see section 6.3.1) and because they generally rather set up
new state-of-the art production sites in order to fully leverage their technolog-
ical advantages versus their competitors.1799 Real estate has only played an a
limited role as a target sector for FDI. Inflows in real estate accounted for only
1% between 1993 and 2003 and for 4% between 2003 and 2006 of FDI inflows
to Croatia overall.1800 With an FDI stock of 2% (2005) real estate was there-
fore clearly less relevant for Croatia than for Romania (6%), Bulgaria (9%) or
Serbia (12%).1801 Nevertheless, some future potential may exist, especially in
tourism as identified in section 6.3.1.
1795 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
1796 See e. g. OECD (2006a), p.48; European Commission (2004c); UniCredit Group (2006),
p.8.
1797 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
1798 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
1799 See also Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
1800 See Sohinger (2004); Doc - NCC (2007).
1801 See Sorsa, Bakker, and Duenewald (2007); see also European Commission (2007a), p.68.
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(d) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that the real
estate situation in Croatia is less problematic than that in Romania. Despite
a currently similar price level at least for housing and office spaces, the price
increase in Croatia has been less drastic in recent years than in other EECs due
to a lower demand. Moreover, real estate prices may be more in line with the
generally high price level in Croatia than in other EECs. Fairly low inflation
rates may also have contributed to this moderate development.
It also seems that investors have less reason to fear significant increases of
higher real estate prices in the years to come. Apparently earlier price surges
and the strong kuna anticipated the current development in other CEECs and
SEECs. Furthermore, it seems that recent construction efforts are well-suited
in order to ease price pressures, at least in the cities. Tourism may be the
only sector for increasing speculations particularly when real estate markets
are actually opening fully to foreign investors.
Nevertheless, Croatia’s public policy should work on giving MNCs better
access to the real estate market and on dismantling bureaucratic hurdles and
establishing more transparent rules of tenders. Public policy actors need to
become more aware of this interdependence of the real estate situation with
the existing bureaucratic obstacles (as particularly mentioned by company
experts interviewed) in order to foster FDI growth, particularly in the tourism
sector.
(3) In conclusion, this section has shown that Croatia is performing quite
well regarding those dimensions of infrastructure that are most crucial to in-
vestors in general. The analyses with respect to road infrastructure in partic-
ular have shown how concentrated reforms can lead to visible successes, even
though direct benefits are not yet clearly visible. Infrastructure may, therefore,
be of only limited importance for FDI in Croatia for now, but this section gave
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substantial evidence that it may gain in importance as locational determinant
with higher levels of FDI and EU accession. However, interviews with company
experts in particular have shown that capitalizing on these benefits requires
an increased awareness on the part of Croatia’s state actors of the country’s
strengths and weaknesses. Bottlenecks in local bureaucracies also need to be
overcome as quickly as possible.
7.3.2.4 General insights for transition countries
Based on the analyses above and on further external studies several conclusions
can be derived for infrastructure as FDI determinant for transition countries:
The (1) importance of infrastructure seems to depend on various factors, while
the (2) performance differs significantly across transition countries. Some public
policy implications are presented in section (3).
(1) More than for other FDI determinants analyzed before, the importance
of infrastructure depends on a multitude of factors. External sources con-
firm for transition countries what has been shown for Romania and Croatia in
particular that a good infrastructure (including roads and real estate) is gen-
erally important for investors and their investment decision.1802 In line with
the theory of locational competition, empirical studies show that a better in-
frastructure and a greater liberalization of infrastructure policy may reduce
opportunity costs for production, transportation and communication.1803
On the other hand, interviews show that infrastructure is generally not a
decisive determinant for FDI flows to transition countries, and FDI studies
confirm that infrastructure is of only limited importance relative to other de-
1802 See Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); see
also Dunning (2005); Caldero´n and Serve´n (2004).
1803 See Baniak, Cukrowski, and Herczynski (2005); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Boren-
sztein, de Gregorio, and Lee (1995); see also Siebert (2000); Siebert (2005); Intv. Austr.
MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
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terminants.1804 Interviews show that investors – particularly those from Ger-
many – are more willing to renounce a good infrastructure than, for example,
clear property rights and political stability. These findings are also backed by
the OLI paradigm that sees an interdependence of infrastructure to other lo-
cational factors in order to materialize into FDI including labor costs, access
to natural resources, bureaucracy, trade regulations etc.1805 The importance of
the relative performance of related factors also becomes apparent in the analy-
sis of the real estate situation. High real estate prices in Romania, for example,
may rather have a deterring effect because they are in sharp contrast to the
(still) fairly low labor costs. By contrast, a high price level does not seem to
surprise investors too much in Croatia, since MNCs expect fairly high price
levels there, anyway.
Therefore,Wheeler and Mody (1992) may somewhat overestimate the impor-
tance of infrastructure when they conclude that tax and short-term incentives
are not necessary in the competition for FDI if a good infrastructure is in
place. The theory of locational competition seems to strike a more accurate
tone when it calls for the right balance between government expenditures and
low taxes.1806
These aspects also lead to a connection of infrastructure to the develop-
ment stage and level of FDI in the host country. In line with the findings of
the sections above, Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005) assume that
infrastructure becomes more important once a country has reached a certain
amount of FDI. This section suggests that basic requirements are met by then
and more MNCs, that are interested in the exploration of the market or the co-
operation with local suppliers, thoroughly assess the infrastructure situation of
transition countries. This may also be one reason why some FDI studies iden-
1804 See e. g. Lankes and Venables (1996); ; Kalotay (2000); AHK (2006) according to which
infrastructure is only the 19th of 26 determinants in terms of importance.
1805 See Dunning (1988); see also section 2.2.3.2.
1806 See Siebert (2000); Siebert (2005).
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tify only a minor impact of infrastructure on FDI in transition countries in the
early 1990s when FDI inflows were still scarce.1807 Therefore, the importance
of infrastructure may further increase with the accession of transition countries
to the EU when basic investment conditions are met and market-exploitation
opportunities increase.1808 Before a minimum of basic requirements is fulfilled,
a good infrastructure is mainly important for manufacturing companies that
need good access to their export markets.1809
Finally, the speed of change in infrastructure may indirectly influence the
importance of this determinant. Thus the rapid and highly visible change in
road infrastructure, as in Croatia in recent years, may create the perception
that the host country is reform-oriented in general. In contrast, sharp increases
in real estate prices, as recently in Romania, may cause investors to worry that
public policy lacks the (macroeconomic) ability to smooth sudden changes in
costs and prices in general.
(2) The performance of transition countries in terms of infrastructure
strongly differs from country to country. Overall, EECs only provided a weak
infrastructure in the 1990s, particularly with regards to roads.1810 In the early
1990s the density of road networks was 60% lower in transition countries than
in Western countries and only 62% of roads were paved in EECs in 1993 com-
pared to 92% in Western Europe.1811 However, this thesis has already shown
that transition countries had – understandably – other short-term priorities at
that time, including the overcoming of war as well as economic and political
turbulences.
While improvements were implemented at different speeds across transition
countries Croatia remained one of the countries most dedicated to road con-
1807 See e. g. Lankes and Venables (1996); Dunning (2005).
1808 E. g. through the complete abolishment of customs barriers.
1809 See European Commission (2005b).
1810 See Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000).
1811 See Carter, Sader, and Holtedahl (1996).
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struction for a long time. Dunning (2005) perceives a significant momentum
after 2002 when various EECs were given a clear path towards EU accession
that provided political and financial incentives in order to speed up reforms.
EU accession also helped to expand real estate markets by lifting the last
barriers to ownership by EU citizens. As a consequence, average real estate
prices in the new member states increased significantly - by an average of 30%
on the national level and 40% in the capitals.1812 Regional differences for real
estate development may, however, exist. Depending on the price history of
the country, but possibly also on the size of the market, significant regional
differences in the rate of real estate development may exist. Developments in
smaller countries like Hungary and Slovakia are rather expected to slow down
than in a large country like in Poland.1813
FDI in the construction and real estate sectors depend on country specifics
such as the strength of a certain sector (as tourism in Croatia), the extensive
need for foreign know-how (as in real estate in Romania) or the legal and
actual barriers for MNCs. However, it seems that FDI rises with the growth of
the respective sectors. While infrastructure was only of limited importance as
industry attracting FDI in Eastern Europe throughout the 1990, FDI projects
grew by 57% between 1997 and 2006 in line with the domestic sectoral growth
in transition countries.1814
(3) Some implications for public policy can be drawn from this section.
Public policy may not be able to overcome all existing obstacles in terms of
infrastructure. However, it seems that public policy makers have more options
to orient infrastructure policy towards attracting FDI than realized by some
state representatives especially on the local level. At the same time, public
policy has to be aware that infrastructure is more difficult to steer than other
1812 See Doc - Ekonomski Institut Zagreb (2007).
1813 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
1814 See Kalotay (2000); Hunya (2002); FIAS (2007).
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determinants because supply and demand (for example of real estate) oscillate
strongly and depend on factors like prices, capital markets etc. that are difficult
to influence or predict by governments. Potential measures for public policy
actors to actively influence real estate developments that can be derived from
the interviews are a tight monetary policy, state-driven construction efforts
and transparent bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, the Croatian case of
highway construction has shown that compact and decisive efforts can lead to
far-reaching successes even in a fairly short period of time. Public policy makers
in transition countries should be aware that there is no single way to an ideal
infrastructure for MNCs. While Croatia was probably right to focus on the
highway system, other priorities (for example the modernization of harbors or
railroad networks) may be more reasonable in other countries. Nevertheless, all
dimensions of infrastructure should meet some minimum requirements in order
to enable the inflow of some FDI at all.
Another important insight from the experience of Romania and Croatia is
that transition countries should not wait for EU funding (in case they are
not yet EU members) to start comprehensive construction projects since they
are apparently fairly easy to fund (for example through debt, tolls and other
international donors) and generally get the broad support of the public.
While central governments seem to be best suited in the early years of transi-
tion to conducting effective infrastructure policy, they should be aware of when
the moment has come to delegate operational and financial responsibility. First
of all they can decrease their dependence on public investments and extend
PPPs, particularly for various types of infrastructure projects. Furthermore,
a well-planned delegation from the central to the local level can increase an
effective implementation, particularly regarding the maintenance of existing
projects.
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Finally, public policy should increase the promotion of success of infrastruc-
ture reforms. As in the case of Croatia’s highways system, state representatives
often seem to be little aware of their achievements in a regional context. They
can also use successful projects more actively as examples for an effective and
reform-oriented government that aims for a business-friendly environment.
7.3.3 Investment climate
7.3.3.1 Definition
Interviews conducted1815 as well as external studies1816 suggest that MNCs
generally define an ideal investment climate as (1) a coherent investment policy
that provides national treatment of MNCs and a positive atmosphere towards
foreign investors. Furthermore, MNCs tend to appreciate host countries with
(2) a simple tax system and low tax rates. Finally, many studies believe that
MNCs are attracted by (3) investment incentives that follow transparent rules
without many restrictions and that reflect the different needs of MNCs. Sections
(4) provide conclusions for Romania and Croatia respectively.
7.3.3.2 Romania
(1) Primary and secondary sources show that (a) there was hardly any in-
vestment policy or strategy in place in Romania until the late 1990s. Since
then (b) investment policy has fundamentally improved, even though (c) fur-
ther room for improvements remains. The (d) importance of this determinant
seems to be fairly significant for FDI in Romania. An assessment is provided
in sub-section (e).
1815 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
1816 See e. g. Dunning (1993); Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003); Mu¨ller (2005), pp.174, 190;
OECD (2006a).
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(a) Interviews as well secondary sources suggest that Romania’s investment
policy was poorly developed, badly structured and partly even “chaotic”1817
in the early 1990s. The legal framework was incomplete, changed several
times and contained several restrictions for foreigners. Law no. 35/1991 foresaw
an equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors and guaranteed a compen-
sation in the case of “nationalization, expropriation, requisition, and measures
with similar effect”. However, the law contained various limitations for FDI in
strategic areas as well as ceilings for the repatriation of profits.1818 Subsequent
laws tended to serve short-term policy needs rather than follow a comprehen-
sive strategy. One example is Law no. 71/1994, the so-called “Daewoo Law”,
that mainly regulated investment conditions that had been negotiated in the
course of the acquisition of the Craiova plant by Daewoo.1819
Policy actors seemed to lack a clear vision of the benefits of FDI both on
the central and local level. Interviews show that policy actors were skeptical
towards MNCs in the early transition phase, less because of nationalistic re-
sentments than fears of negative impacts on the economy due to (expected)
restructuring, lays-offs etc.1820 Some critics were apparently worried that FDI
would undermine the government’s strategy of gradual reforms that was sup-
posed to ease negative economic effects of transition.1821 Other pundits of FDI
feared that foreign investors would aggravate Romania’s property problems by
buying real estate before the difficult ownership situation of Romanian land
was clarified.1822 More generally, many policy actors simply did not see the
1817 Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); see similar Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001).
1818 See Tripon (2003), p.39; UNCTAD (2003a), p.14; Bulgaria Economic Forum (2007).
1819 See Chiritoiu (1998); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); Tripon (2003); Mu¨ller (2005),
p.189.
1820 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
1821 With limited success as shown in section 6.2.1.
1822 See section 7.2.2.2; Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), pp.36, 41; Chiritoiu (1998), p.3.
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need for Romania to have an investment policy and key decision makers made
little efforts to understand the problems and needs of investors.1823
(b) Romania visibly opened its economy for FDI since the late 1990s.1824
The Government Emergency Ordinance no. 31/1997 regulated the stimulation
of FDI for the first time1825 and Law no. 332/2001 aimed at the promotion
of FDI with significant impact on the economy. Apart from the regulation of
incentives (discussed below), these two laws also strengthened the rights of
foreign investors in general. Accordingly, MNCs now receive full national treat-
ment, can repatriate all capital and profits, may invest in all sectors (with
the exception of air traffic), and do not face any performance requirements or
limitations in equity stakes.1826 Overall, Romania receives good grades from
both interviewees and external studies for its non-discriminatory (legal) treat-
ment of foreigners and its open and liberal FDI regime, also compared to other
SEECs.1827
This active investment policy of Romania is furthermore observable in the
many Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) that Romania had concluded since
the mid-1990s. BITs have been used to increase confidence in Romania as an
investment location. Even though they contain few obligations and rights, they
signalize Romania’s willingness to promote a favorable investment climate with
reliable conditions. Romania is the country with the largest number of BITs
(84) in Eastern Europe (see figure 95 in the appendix ) ahead of Bulgaria (67)
and Hungary (58).1828
1823 See Intv. German Econ. Association VIII (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V
(2007).
1824 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007);
see Zu¨hlke (2006).
1825 Several modifications followed.
1826 See Tripon (2003), p.40; Mu¨ller (2005), p.191; Bulgaria Economic Forum (2007).
1827 See OECD (2005d); OECD (2006a), p.50; Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
1828 See UNCTAD BIT website (2008); own calculations.
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Interviews help to understand that the change in attitude of political de-
cision makers towards FDI is even more important than the ameliorations in
the legal environment with regards to investment policy. Politicians and bu-
reaucracies seem to be more aware of the benefits of FDI for Romania and
employees generally like working for companies from Western Europe or the
U.S.1829 Interviewees also notice that foreign business associations have been
experiencing stronger support from authorities since the early 2000s. This more
positive attitude towards FDI as well as a more active investment policy were
first noted in some local communities, such as Sibiu, where a comprehensive
development strategy was established at that time.1830
(c) Nevertheless, primary and secondary sources reveal some shortcomings
of Romania’s current investment policy. External sources as well as interviewees
note that the majority of remaining problems are related to property rights1831,
which were already discussed in section 7.2.2.2.
Moreover, interviewees criticize that a comprehensive long-term strategy for
FDI (of at least three to five years) is still missing for Romania.1832 It seems
that state authorities are not always eager to give up control and are therefore
sometimes skeptical regarding the sale of state assets to MNCs. Some inter-
viewees point out that authorities are often primarily looking for short-term
profits when doing business with investors without considering long-term con-
sequences.1833 Furthermore, many investment strategies seem to fail because
human and financial resources are missing in central authorities and the coordi-
nation of projects with locals levels remains weak. Company experts therefore
1829 See Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); Intv.
Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007).
1830 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007);
Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007).
1831 See OECD (2006a), p.53; Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Legal Services II (2007).
1832 See Intv. German Econ. Association VIII (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007);
Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
1833 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
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conclude that the central government is well-suited to provide information but
not to conduct a complex investment policy in Romania.1834 Interviewees also
accentuate that the quality of local investment policies strongly varies across
Romania and that some communities are still skeptical regarding foreign in-
vestment in general.1835
From a legal point of view, external sources show that FDI rules are spread
out over numerous regulations, but no comprehensive law on FDI exists so
far.1836 Finally, the accession to the EU has also contributed to a retrenchment
of Romania’s leeway in investment policy. Firstly, the possibilities for BITs are
reduced because they do not wholly comply with EU competition policy.1837 In
fact, ten of Romania’s BITs had to be canceled since 2002 and several others
had to be re-negotiated.1838 Secondly, the current investment promotion law
(332/2001) lost its validity with accession to the EU (even though the general
regulations on the legal status of MNCs are still binding) and the Romanian
government is in the preparation of passing a new investment law.1839
(d) With respect to the importance of investment policy, international stud-
ies, FDI literature as well as interviews suggest a positive correlation with FDI
flows to transition countries including Romania. Hence, the legal weaknesses of
the investment framework have probably contributed to lower inflows to FDI
in the 1990s.1840
However, interviews suggest that the attitude of authorities towards FDI –
especially on the local level – is even more important than the legal framework
1834 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007).
1835 See Intv. German Political Adviser (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2007).
1836 See e. g. OECD (2005d), p.14.
1837 E. g. when more freedoms are acknowledged to third countries than designated in the
EU regulations on the freedom of capital.
1838 See European Commission (2001), p.92; UNCTAD BIT website (2008); see also Intv.
Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry II (2007).
1839 See Brenscheidt (2006), p.1; UniCredit Group (2007), p.10.
1840 See e. g. Lankes and Venables (1996); Pye (1998); Campos and Kinoshita (2003); Intv.
Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
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for their investment decision of MNCs. Again experts point out a strong in-
terdependence with the quality of bureaucracy since authorities are generally
the mouthpiece for the ideas and positions of the politicians. In the end, ex-
pert interviews suggest that the reduction of administrative barriers is more
important for FDI in Romania than investment policy.1841
Nevertheless, it seems that Romania benefits from an improving investment
policy. The subsequent sub-sections will analyze the extent to which these ef-
forts are sufficient to differentiate Romania from other SEECs in the long-run.
(e) In the assessment of investment policy in Romania this section has
shown that the legal and political conditions have improved. State experts
in particular helped to understand that earlier resentments were driven less
by nationalistic than economic worries. Romania started late in its transition
to conduct an active investment policy. Initial successes in privatization and
the macroeconomic stabilization may have also contributed to a more open
approach towards FDI.
In fact, it is worth noting that interviewees indicate a later turning point
towards a better investment policy than most external studies do. Even though
much of the legal environment was already in place in the late 1990s, company
experts interviewed did not see significant improvements until 2001, when a
new government was in place, or even not until 2004/ 2005 when the course
toward the EU became irrevocable. It seems that these ’softer’ factors require
some time in order to reach the awareness of MNCs.
Possibly, MNCs will continue to come to Romania even without a decisive
investment strategy, but public policy should be aware that a long-term vision
on both a central and a local level will help to steer FDI and smooth regional
imbalances considering the inflow of FDI. A more active approach may also
become necessary, because Romania is losing comparative advantages to other
1841 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
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SEECs due to the rising salaries in recent years.
(2) Tax policy was (a) a major constraint for MNCs in Romania for a
very long time. Despite (b) significant improvements since the early 2000s, (c)
various problems remain. Tax policy seems to have (d) a slight positive impact
on FDI in Romania. An assessment is presented in sub-section (e).
(a) Primary1842 and secondary sources1843 show that the tax system com-
prised various problems and pitfalls for companies for many years of Romania’s
transition process. Experts interviewed state that the frequent changes in the
tax system were probably the greatest challenge and led to investor insecu-
rity. Modifications pertained many parameters including new taxes, change of
tax rates, tax base, and depreciation possibilities. The decision process was
often less than transparent without a distinctive strategy and appeared to be
based on quarterly ad-hoc decisions.1844 Tax rates were little competitive with
a corporate tax rate of 38% since 1995 and a VAT rate of 22% since 1998.
Administrative barriers of the financial bureaucracies – that were already dis-
cussed in section 7.2.3.2 – also contributed to the bad image of the Romania’s
tax system for many years.1845
(b) The Romanian tax policy underwent significant reforms in recent
years. In a first step the corporate tax rate was reduced to 25% and the VAT
rate to 19% in 1999. However, the first substantial improvement of Romanian
tax policy represented – in the eyes of the experts interviewed1846 – the estab-
lishment of the fiscal code that entered into force in 2004. Most importantly,
1842 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007).
1843 See e. g. European Commission (1998), pp.62-63; FIC (2002), p.8.
1844 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); see also Dresdner Bank (2004), p.22.
1845 See also FIC (2002).
1846 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
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it unified most of the fiscal-related laws into one body of laws. Furthermore, it
aligned the fiscal principles with EU law and codified the appeal procedures.1847
Even more visible was the comprehensive tax reform in 2005, also called
“big-bang tax reform”1848 in which the progressive income tax (18% to 40%)
was replaced by a flat tax of 16% and the corporate tax rate was reduced from
25% to 16%.1849 The large majority of experts interviewed agree (in line with
external surveys1850) that the introduction of the flat tax was “a very good
idea of the Romanian government”1851 or even “one of the best ideas of the
Romanian government ever”1852. They concur that tax payment obligations
have become lower and Romania’s tax system simpler and more predictable
overall.1853 As a result experts report that tax compliance of investors has
improved, offshore-payments for managers in order to avoid high income taxes
have decreased and government revenues have grown.1854
(c) However, interviewees and external sources identify various remaining
problems of Romania’s tax policy. First of all, the tax system is still com-
plicated, mainly because a multitude of taxes exists – despite the flat tax.1855
According to World Bank (2007a) companies have to pay 15 types of taxes
in Romania of which many are due several times per year, adding up to 96
1847 See European Commission (2003), p.72; OECD (2005d), p.64; BA-CA (2006); PI Part-
ners (2007).
1848 See HVB Bank (2006), p.18.
1849 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv.
Rom. Local Authority II (2007); Haarmann Hemmelrath (2005).
1850 See Walther (2006); AHK (2006).
1851 Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); see also Intv. Supranational Authority I
(2007); Doc - GTZ (2006b).
1852 Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I
(2007).
1853 See also section 7.2.3.2; see Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); European Commission
(2005c), pp.61-62.
1854 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007).
1855 See e. g. Intv. Rom. Local Authority II (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007);
see also Doc - GTZ (2006b); Doc - Local Romanian Authority (2007).
434 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
tax payments per year. Only in Ukraine and Belarus are more payments nec-
essary, while companies in Latvia only have to pay taxes 7 times per year.1856
Interviewees agree that companies generally need good accountants in order to
manage the payments successfully in Romania and MNCs still try to shift tax
obligations internally instead of paying taxes in Romania in order to circum-
vent the complicated procedures. As already touched upon in section 7.2.3.2 on
bureaucracy , the simplification of the tax declaration has made little progress
so far.1857
More importantly, international statistics in particular show that the level
of taxation is fairly high despite the flat tax. Figure 49 shows that Romania
captures a good position among Eastern European countries regarding the
statutory corporate tax rate of 16% which is also signficantly lower than in
the home countries analyzed, Austria (25%) and Germany (38%). However,
when adding up all taxes companies have to pay per year, the total tax rate
(without VAT) adds up to 47% of profits. Mainly due to high payments for
social security, health and unemployment insurance, Romania’s tax position is
less competitive than originally assumed (11th out of 19 EECs) and only little
more favorable than in Austria (55%) and Germany (51%).1858 In fact, when
tax revenues decreased after the introduction of the flat tax, several indirect
tax rates were raised including those for dividends, alcohol etc.1859
It is therefore not surprising that international surveys with managers still
identify the overall tax burden as well as the tax regulations in Romania as
problematic factors for doing business in Romania in 2007.1860 Several company
experts interviewed agree that taxation is inflated by additional costs; never-
1856 16 payments are due in Germany and 22 in Austria.
1857 See Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007);
Intv. Rom. Local Authority II (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
1858 See World Bank (2007a); Eurostat website (2008); KPMG (2007); own calculations.
1859 See Larive Romania (2007), p.45; Haarmann Hemmelrath (2005); BA-CA (2007b), p.46.
1860 See World Economic Forum (2007); see also AHK (2006).
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Figure 49: Corporate tax in Eastern Europe
theless, interviews rather suggest that investors do not evaluate Romania’s tax
policy as negatively as surveys do, because they appreciate the improvements
that Romania has made in recent years.1861 The difference between the state-
ments made in interviews and findings of the surveys may be due to the fact
that the former also consider the perceptions of those MNCs that have not
invested in Romania yet and are consequently less aware of the actual taxation
reality in Romania, including the problems described above.
(d) The evidence regarding the importance of tax policy for FDI inflows
to Romania is mixed. Some experts interviewed – both company and state –
indicate that the introduction of the flat tax represents a locational advantage
for Romania, had a positive impact on the investment decision of MNCs and
may therefore play a significant role in explaining the FDI boom in Romania in
1861 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007);
Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007).
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recent years. Smaller investors in particular may be attracted by the prospect
of a lower corporate tax.1862 Other experts as well as several external and FDI
studies, indicate that the positive effect of the flat tax may exist but that it
was less driven by its low rate than by the simplifications of the tax system
and administrative procedures that it caused.1863
However, some interviewees also raise doubts regarding the impact of the
flat tax on FDI in Romania. They believe (as did some of the companies inter-
viewed) that investors would probably have come anyway and that most MNCs
would not rely on the prospect of low tax rates since they can be changed
quickly, for example following a change of government. Larger companies can
easily shift their tax obligations to the location with the lowest tax rate. Fur-
thermore, many MNCs tend to have little profits in the early years of the in-
vestment anyway; therefore taxation is only a long-term issue for MNCs. Other
investors interviewed assert that state aids may be more beneficial overall than
a low tax rate. Surveys also suggest that the tax burden is only of mediocre
importance for (German) investors in Romania.1864
In sum, it seems that the introduction of the flat tax and the recent reforms
of the tax system have had a slightly positive but rather indirect effect on
FDI in Romania. Reforms showed potential investors that the government is
working on improving the investment climate. Therefore, the positive signs
were more significant than the actual outcome regarding the various remaining
shortcomings of tax policy including the high total tax rate, the complicated
1862 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
1863 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); see
also AHK (2006); European Commission (1998), pp.62-63; Bellak and Leibrecht (2005).
1864 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007); see also AHK (2006).
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tax system and the various countries of the region with still lower corporate
tax rates.1865
This analysis therefore shows the importance of the perceived performance
of tax policy for FDI in Romania. This may in fact be a more plausible driver
than those of many FDI studies which are generally based on actual tax rates,
industry-specifics or different types of FDI1866 but often come up with findings
that reflect little significance1867 or are even ambiguous.1868
(e) In the assessment of this section, the analyses suggest that Romania
has significantly improved its tax policy in recent years. Potential investors
in particular without personal experiences in Romania seem to acknowledge
the financial benefits of the flat tax. Those companies that have already been
present in Romania for several years also welcome the improvements but tend
to focus more on the administrative dimension of the tax system.
It seems that the timing of the Romanian government was favorable. With
the tax reform concurring with the decisive steps towards EU accession (section
7.4.4.2 below), the awareness of Romania has significantly increased among
potential investors. Public policy has therefore been able to use tax policy as
an active locational instrument and to suggest that Romania is a dynamic
reform country. However, public policy makers should not rely on this success
because the positive impact may decrease after a while; furthermore, other
countries of the region have been reducing their corporate taxes as well and
MNCs seem to remain skeptical that tax laws can quickly be changed by a new
government. Public policy makers should therefore rather work on long-term
strategies, including the unification of taxes and contributions, the reduction
of the administrative obstacles and the stabilization of the law-making process.
1865 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute
(2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
1866 See Blonigen (2005), p.9.
1867 See e. g. Carstensen and Toubal (2004).
1868 See Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Li (2006), p.2; de Mooij and Ederveen (2003).
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Other determinants such as infrastructure may be more important factors
in the long-run for Romania because they promise to generate longer lasting
benefits.
(3) Romania’s investment incentives have been focused (a) on different
company sizes and (b) regional needs. However, primary and secondary sources
identify (c) significant problems, (d) particularly since Romania’s accession to
the EU. The (e) importance of investment incentives seems limited for the
investment decision of most MNCs. Section (f) provides an assessment.
(a) Romania’s investment laws distinguish between different company
sizes; the most frequently discussed incentives refer to large and micro-
enterprises.1869
According to Law no. 332/2001 large MNCs with investments over USD1M
are allowed to import capital goods such as machines and software without
paying duty. They also benefit from a reduced profit tax and accelerated depre-
ciation models.1870 These incentives were decreased step by step in the course
of the tax reform in 2004 but also as a prerequisite for EU accession since
EU competition policy sets strict guidelines with regards to investment incen-
tives.1871
Furthermore, micro-enterprises with less than ten employees and revenues up
to e100K do not have to pay tax on profits but only 2% of their revenues.1872
According to the revision of the fiscal code that entered into force in 2007,
the promotion of micro-enterprises was extended even after the EU accession
1869 See Larive Romania (2007).
1870 Exceptions exist for MNCs from the financial sector; furthermore, certain environment
and safety requirements have to be met; see UNCTAD (2003a), p.14; Dresdner Bank
(2004), p.23.
1871 See Brenscheidt (2006).
1872 See Bfai (2005), p.141; PI Partners (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
I (2007).
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of Romania. However, the tax rate was raised to 2.5% in 2008 and 3% in
2009.1873
Interviewees appreciate this promotion of micro-enterprises because it makes
accounting easier and tends to promote entrepreneurship. One problem may be
that companies also have to pay taxes when they make losses.1874 Furthermore,
it seems that large companies sometimes use workarounds in order to benefit
from the lower tax burden for micro-enterprises as well, for example by making
their staff self-employed and therefore artificially decreasing revenues. However,
the government has tried to encounter some of these problems, for example by
better defining the type of companies that are eligible for these incentives.1875
(b) Various regional incentives were designed in Romania, of which the
most important are the introduction of free zones and industrial parks.1876
The legal framework for free zones was already established in 1992 and re-
vised several times.1877 Accordingly, investors were able to use land and build-
ings for up to 50 years; further benefits included the exemption of the profit
tax, the VAT and customs. In July 2006 159 enterprises were operating in six
free zones throughout Romania.1878 With EU accession the exemption of profit
tax and VAT payments expired by mid-2007 while the reduction of the royalty
was extended until 2011.1879
Experts interviewed give a mixed picture of the free zones. On the one hand,
it seems that the financial advantages through of the free zones are limited,
partly because investors have to pay for services provided by the free zone
that may sometimes even be more expensive than on the free market (such as
1873 See Brenscheidt (2006); PWC (2007), pp.13, 40.
1874 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); see also Brenscheidt (2006).
1875 See PWC (2007), p.40; see also Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007).
1876 See also Bfai (2005), p.43; OECD (2005d), pp.67-69.
1877 Law no. 84/1992, see also Law no. 244/2004 and Ministry Order 1431/2002.
1878 See OECD (2005d), p.47; BA-CA (2007b); p48; Sheane (2006); Brenscheidt (2006);
Bulgaria Economic Forum (2007).
1879 See Dresdner Bank (2004); p.23; OECD (2005d), p.68; see also Intv. Germ. MNC -
Consulting I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry II (2007).
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electricity) and many of the advantages seize after a few years. Interviewees
also complain that many zones are still little used and that MNCs are afraid
of losing contact to other businesses outside the zones.1880 On the other hand,
interviewees point out that the contacts in the free zones were very helpful
when dealing with administrative problems. Apparently, investors have made
good experiences, for example in the Curtici-Arad free zone.1881
Industrial parks are generally developed and financed by local communities
based on GO no. 65/2001.1882 They can only be run by Romanian companies.
The main benefits are the provision of infrastructure and the reduction of
several taxes including those for property and land. By 2007 about 50 parks
were in place. 1883
Interviews reflect mixed experiences with industrial parks in Romania.1884
In many cases industrial parks only consist of a street sign, only a minority of
parks is actually in operation and parks for specific industries (such as environ-
mental parks) are scarce.1885 In many industrial parks in operation, investors
complained about insufficient infrastructure such as gas, electricity and roads
(for example in S¸ura Mica˘). Apparently, Romanian politicians sometimes as-
sumed that providing land was incentive enough and expected investors to
invest in the necessary infrastructure themselves.1886 On the other hand, state
experts point out that Romania still needs more industrial parks in order to
fulfill the needs of a growing economy and to ease the price pressure on the real
estate market.1887
1880 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
II (2007).
1881 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer
Goods (2007).
1882 See also Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1883 See PWC (2007) p.47; UNCTAD (2003a), p.23.
1884 See Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
1885 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
II (2007).
1886 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
1887 See Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
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An example for a successful industrial park often cited by experts in inter-
views seems to be that in Sibiu. Investors are satisfied with the proximity to
the airport, the fairly low prices of land and that most utilities were in place
from the beginning. It helped that the local administration integrated investors
in the planning of the park from early on.1888 State experts interviewed also
agree that the establishment of the industrial park has been a major advantage
for the economic development of Sibiu in recent years.1889
(c) Some general problems can also be identified with regards to invest-
ment incentives in Romania. One of the greatest problem refers to the many
changes in legislation and the limited predictability. For example, potential
investors experienced a drawback in 1999 when Romania suspended all tax in-
centives and custom exemptions of Law no. 241/1998 (even though it had been
valid for five years) in order to consolidate the government budget.1890
In sum, according to the interviewees, investors have received few incentives
in Romania in recent years. Direct incentives such as tax breaks are no longer
being offered.1891 It is therefore not surprising that surveys describe incentives
as the least satisfactory determinant (out of 26) in Romania.1892 According to
IMD (2006) investment incentives are only less attractive in six out of 61 coun-
tries analyzed. This dissatisfaction may, however, also be driven by problems
in the distribution of EU subsidies (section 7.4.4.2).
(d) A further reason for the critical evaluation of Romania’s investment in-
centives may be the legal uncertainty of MNCs due to the expiration of many
1888 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); see also Intv. Rom. Local Authority I
(2007).
1889 See Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007);
Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
1890 See Mu¨ller (2005), p.192.
1891 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
1892 See AHK (2006).
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incentives in 2007 and because no specific investment scheme currently exists
in Romania.1893
For the interim period until the adoption of a new investment law, the gov-
ernment has passed a law facilitating grants for investments above e30M that
create more than 300 jobs.1894 However, few investors seem to know about
this.1895
At the same time a new specific investment law is being drafted by the Roma-
nian government.1896 The new law establishes three categories corresponding
to the amount of the investment.1897 Investments have to be conducted in pre-
defined areas including rural areas, environmental and R&D projects and have
to be initiated within three years after the approval and for at least 15 years
(for large projects). Incentives comprise grants, support for infrastructure and
tax breaks.1898
Primary and secondary sources criticize that incentives of the current draft
are limited, that the minimum investment time is too long and that the legisla-
tion does not provide them with any advantage compared to domestic investors
who have comparative advantages such as market knowledge, supplier contacts
etc.1899
(e) FDI studies1900 as well as external surveys show that investment incen-
tives are of little importance for the investment decision of MNCs for Ro-
mania, ranking only 25th out of 26 determinants in terms of importance.1901
Interviews help to substantiate these findings. Experts agree that investment
1893 Status November 2007; see also Brenscheidt (2006); PWC (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Consulting I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods II (2007).
1894 See Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
1895 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
1896 See PWC (2007); see also Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
1897 1st: investments over e75M, 2nd: between e25M and e75M, 3rd: below e25M.
1898 See also Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
1899 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Stalfort & Partner (2006).
1900 See e. g. Lankes and Venables (1996); Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000).
1901 See AHK (2006).
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incentives are generally not very important for investors interested in Romania.
Most MNCs interviewed invested in Romania even though incentives were rare
and those MNCs that did receive financial incentives would probably have de-
cided in favor of Romania anyway, even though they knew that most financial
benefits would expire with Romania’s accession to the EU.1902
In contrast, non-financial investment incentives may play an important role
for the investment decision of MNCs. Good administrative support, the provi-
sion of infrastructure and an investor-friendly environment in some free zones
and industrial parks were apparently an important factor in the decision for
Romania in general and for specific locations within the country. This seems
especially true for foreign investors who are risk-averse and have little previous
experience in Romania, and who expect the staff of these zones and parks to
overcome legal and administrative barriers in the early phase of the investment
process.1903
(f) In the assessment of this section it seems that the Romanian govern-
ment made the right-trade off by initiating the tax reform but eliminating
exceptions and incentives at the same time. First of all, many of the incentives
had not been in compliance with EU law anyway and most custom duties had
already been eliminated years ago. Furthermore, it seems that the government
realized that it had initiated its investment scheme too late in order to distin-
guish Romania from other locations since, for example, Poland and Hungary
had already successfully established free zones in the mid-1990s.1904 Incentive
policy thus had only limited effect and the elimination of the incentives was an
1902 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
1903 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services
I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
I (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
1904 See also OECD (2003c), p.180.
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adequate way of increasing tax revenues and to foster the good ideas behind
the tax reform and the flat tax.
Public policy should focus more strongly on the non-financial aspects of
investment incentives. The positive experiences of some investors show that
Romania still has a lot of potential in leveraging the investor-friendly environ-
ment and the administrative know-how in industrial parks – even though some
state interviewees may somewhat overestimate the potential of industrial parks
in Romania.
Finally, investment incentive policy seems to suffer from significant informa-
tion gaps. Not only did companies know little about possibilities for receiving
benefits for incentives that remain, but also the local Chambers of Commerce
interviewed were not informed about investment schemes for investors and
referred to the local and central government for further information.
(4) In conclusion, the determinants of the investment climate discussed in
this section were identified only recently by Romanian public policy makers
as a tool for promoting FDI and economic growth. However, the awareness of
investment, tax and incentive policy of Romanian politicians has significantly
increased in recent years, particularly since the signature of the EU accession
treaty in 2005. Romania’s efforts in reforming its tax system are widely seen
as one of the most successful reforms in Romania’s transition. In contrast,
financial investment incentives were less successful and will continue to lose
their importance in the following years. The analyses of company interviews in
particular suggest that actual financial benefits have been less important for
the attraction of FDI than the perceived investment climate (through investor-
friendly bureaucracy and reform-oriented policy makers).
7.3 Economic measures 445
7.3.3.3 Croatia
(1) Croatia (a) did not follow a specific investment policy in the 1990s, but
(b) some important initiatives have been launched since the early 2000s, (c)
although some problems remain. The (d) investment policy seems to have little
impact on FDI in Croatia. The findings are assessed in sub-section (e).
(a) Primary1905 and secondary sources1906 show (as for other determinants
such as the land register previously) that domestic issues, primarily the war and
its consequences, had a greater priority for Croatian public policy actors in
the 1990s than investment policy. Since some investors were already com-
ing to Croatia, mainly to the coast and to the Zagreb region, many politicians
did not (as they did in Romania) see the need for an active investment strategy.
Experts interviewed also agree that Croatia focused too much on brownfield in-
vestments and neglected the positive effects of greenfield investments, including
the strengthening of exports.
Furthermore, parts of the government and the population still showed a neg-
ative attitude towards foreign investors at that time. Some unpopular measures
by some early MNCs in 1990s such as restructuring, a de-investment after a
short time or environmental issues (as in the case of Rockwall in Istria) in-
creased political pressure against FDI in Croatia. Domestic companies with a
strong lobby were often afraid of greater competitive pressure and of losing
control.1907 Nationalistic resentment against foreign investments, that arose as
a result of the young statehood and the war experience, also played a role, for
example, against potential investments Serbia and Italy.1908
1905 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
1906 See FIAS (2002); World Bank (2003); Hunya and Sˇkudar (2006).
1907 See e. g. Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
1908 Several disguised expert statements.
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Despite this limited openness towards FDI, equal treatment of domestic and
foreign investors was largely ensured by Croatian law even in the 1990s. As
pointed out in section 7.2.1.3, Croatia’s corporate laws from 1993 stipulates
that domestic and foreign companies could conduct their business activities
under equal conditions.1909 In addition, the Croatian constitution guaranteed
the free repatriation of profits and capital invested from Croatia. However,
Croatian law foresaw a restriction for both domestic and foreign investors in
some designated areas, mainly regarding land directly located at the coast and
in national parks.1910
(b) After 2000 Croatia introduced a more active foreign investment
strategy with the Investment Promotion Act being the most visible tool.1911
In the following years Croatia also adopted further regulations in order to pro-
mote investments from both foreign and domestic companies; the government
under Prime Minister Sanader continued the work of its predecessor after 2003.
The legal status and rights of foreign investors were confirmed and the number
of restricted areas for investments was reduced. Furthermore, some key indus-
tries for FDI were identified by the Croatian government and APIU including
the ICT, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals as well as the business services and lo-
gistics sector. In 2007 a new Investment Promotion Act came into force. Details
are discussed below.1912
Croatia has concluded a large number of investment treaties (58 BITs). This
is well above the average figure of 49 among EECs whilst still significantly less
than Romania’s 84 (see figure 95 in the appendix ).1913
1909 See Law no. 111/1993; see also APIU (2007).
1910 See APIU (2006b); Dresdner Bank (2004), p.7; Croatian Chamber of Commerce (2007).
1911 Law no 73/2000; see also Dresdner Bank (2004), p.7.
1912 See Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); BA-CA (2005),
p.23; Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
1913 See UNCTAD BIT website (2008); OECD (2006a); own calculations.
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Experts interviewed confirm that authorities have become more open towards
FDI and MNCs since the early 2000s.1914 From the investors’ point of view
Croatia’s key politicians are more aware of the importance of FDI in general
and “the government generally says the things investors want to hear”1915.
Some communities in particular such as Varazˇdin seem to be very open to
FDI.1916 Most investors interviewed do not know of any significant aversion
towards foreign investors in recent years. The attitude towards German and
Austrian investors in particular seems to be very positive.1917
Overall, international surveys confirm that Croatia has reached a fairly good
position in terms of non-discrimination and international investment coopera-
tion with 4.25 out of 5 points behind Romania and Bulgaria but ahead of six
other SEECs.1918
(c) Remaining problems of Croatia’s investment policy refer to legal as
well as to attitude issues. Primary and external sources see the need for some
further legal adjustments of the investment policy framework since it is not cur-
rently aligned with the EU acquis such as the VAT reduction in tourism and
regulations of the new Investment Promotion Act. Restrictions for investors in
sectors such as energy, air, rail, maritime, and agriculture continue to exist.1919
Property rights issues and the problems of the court system make experts inter-
viewed skeptical as to what extent the national treatment of foreign investors
can actually be enforced, particularly because of local interests discussed in
earlier sections.1920
1914 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); see also Intv. Former Croatian Minister
(2007).
1915 Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); see also Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007);
Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
1916 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1917 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
1918 See OECD (2006a), p.50.
1919 See European Commission (2005a), p.72; Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006); OECD (2006a),
p.48; Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); European Commission (2007a), pp.27-28.
1920 See several disguised expert statements.
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Worries about economic disadvantages for the Croatian job market and about
the sellout of land to foreigners remain as well. However, skepticism towards
MNCs seems to be prevalent only in some visible areas such as tourism, while
the presence of foreign banks, for example, was hardly contested in recent
years.1921 In contrast, Serbian investment remains a sensitive topic. While the
government calls for a positive attitude towards FDI from Serbia, more hos-
tile statements were heard in the election campaign in fall 20071922 and from
many local authorities: “It would be highly sensitive for a Serbian company to
purchase a Croatian company”1923.
Not only company and state experts interviewed but also external sources
still see deficiencies regarding a clear strategy and commitment to FDI among
many Croatian politicians, not to mention implementation plans for the target
areas of FDI discussed above. Sometimes politicians seem to want FDI only in
areas where domestic companies are not successful or where the state has no
interests of its own.1924 Some problems may also originate on the local level
where authorities occasionally block (good) ideas of the central government
and rarely develop investment strategies on their own.1925
(d) Interviews reveal that investment policy may have had a slight negative
impact on FDI in Croatia in the past and is of little importance today.
FDI appears to have been negatively affected – as was also shown for Ro-
mania — by a sometimes hostile attitude towards FDI in Croatia in the 1990s,
1921 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007);
Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007).
1922 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); see also European Commission (2007a),
p.l3; OECD (2006a).
1923 Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
1924 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007);
Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Croat.
Company II - Legal Services (2007); Hunya and Sˇkudar (2006); Gallagher and Bozic
(2006).
1925 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. European Institution
(2007).
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while the lack of a legal framework and a vision of investment policy was less
important for MNCs. The more nationalistic tone, particularly in the years di-
rectly after the war and the stronger lobby of domestic firms than, for example,
in Romania may have resulted in a deterrence of some investors, especially at
coastal areas. Some interviewees believe that deficiencies of investment policy
were among the reasons why Croatia failed to attract many large investors
throughout the 1990s.1926
The increasing amount of positive experiences as well as the stronger political
and legal support by the central government in recent years seem to have
contributed to a change in the impact of this determinant in Croatia – despite
the remaining problems. Investment policy may therefore be on the verge of
becoming a neutral or even slightly enhancing factor for FDI in Croatia.1927
However, most experts interviewed agree that investment policy is only one
of many measures for increasing FDI and economic development in Croatia
overall.1928 Company experts also bring forward that Croatia may have become
more open towards FDI, but that these improvements are offset by a greater
number of (foreign) competitors and higher real estate prices.1929
(e) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that Croatia’s at-
tractiveness for FDI in tourism made a decisive investment policy unnecessary
for a long time. With increasing competition for FDI among SEECs, Croat-
ian policy makers realized the need for a more active approach. The negative
evaluation of the lack of investment policy and nationalist resentments by some
interviewees may actually be too pessimistic; some large investors are present in
Croatia after all (for example in telecommunications and banking) and aversion
towards foreigners seem to be limited to particular areas (such as tourism) and
1926 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister
(2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
1927 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
1928 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007).
1929 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
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particular nationalities (mainly Serbs) which are also decreasing. Furthermore,
Croatia’s focus on a more indirect investment strategy including the establish-
ment of a good infrastructure and a sound financial system may have been at
least as important for future FDI inflows than an active investment policy.
Public policy should cooperate better with potential investors but should
also deal with the remaining worries of domestic companies with regards to
FDI. Public policy should also use education policy in order to overcome
existing resentments and fears. As recommended for Romania, public policy
should focus more on establishing an investor-friendly attitude and a clear
commitment to FDI than on codifying investment policy. Finally, local author-
ities should adapt the insights of the central government and focus investment
policy on greenfield instead of brownfield FDI.
(2) Regarding tax policy Croatia (a) introduced a widely praised tax system
in the early 1990s which (b) is still quite competitive despite its dismantling
since 2000. The tax policy (c) seems to be of only limited importance for Croatia
as investment location. Sub-section (d) presents an assessment.
(a) In 1994 Croatia introduced a tax system that was acknowledged both by
external sources1930 as well as by experts interviewed1931 as modern, simple
and transparent. It consisted of consumption-based personal and corporate
income taxes. Therefore, company profits were only charged on equity income
in excess of some “normal” profit, the so-called protective interest. Tax com-
putation was based on the change in the value of equity and firms were allowed
to deduct the costs of their equity financing.1932
(b) However, the tax system has been corroded since 2000. The govern-
ment led by the Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske
1930 See Law no. 109/1993; see also Rose and Wiswesser (1998); Keen and King (2003).
1931 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV
(2007).
1932 See Keen and King (2003); Svaljek (2005).
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(SDP)) believed that the old tax system was responsible for low tax revenues,
a high government deficit and low investments. The restructuring of both in-
come and corporate taxes included the elimination of the protective interest (in
2001).1933 Furthermore, additional consumption taxes, exceptions and depreci-
ation possibilities were also introduced in the following years by the subsequent
government.1934 However, experts continue to assess the tax system as fairly
simple compared to Western European standards as well as to other EECs.
No tax on capital gains or dividends has to be paid in Croatia, for example.
Most regulations also seem to be already in line with EU requirements.1935 The
analysis of the World Bank (2007b) also shows that companies only have to
make 28 annual tax payments for six different taxes in Croatia (compared to 96
for 15 taxes in Romania). Therefore, several experts interviewed point out that
they do not see a need for Croatia to introduce a flat tax in order to become
more competitive and transparent.1936
Nevertheless, Croatia’s tax system is fairly negatively evaluated in external
surveys. According to AHK (2006) German investors were only less satisfied
with five out of 26 determinants in 2006. And the Global Competitiveness
Report finds that tax regulations have been the 2nd to 4th most problematic
factors for doing business in Croatia since 2004.1937 Maybe this reflects the
disappointment of the transformation of the tax system in recent years as well as
the link to the performance of the (financial) administration which has already
been evaluated as mediocre in section 7.2.3.3 above.
1933 See Keen and King (2003); World Bank (2003), pp.19-20; Svaljek (2005), p.1219.
1934 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate
(2007); Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications
(2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
1935 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007); see also Doc - OECD (2007).
1936 See e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
1937 See World Economic Forum (2007) and earlier editions.
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The corporate tax rate was reduced from 35% to 20% in 2000.1938 Inter-
views1939 as well as external sources1940 show that MNCs are not very satisfied
with the (corporate) tax rate in Croatia, where the statutory rate is 2.2%
higher than the average rate in 18 EECs.1941 However, a look at the total tax
rate of Croatia (figure 49) reveals that the actual tax burden is quite low for
firms in Croatia compared to other countries of the regions. A tax of 33% on
profits represents the second lowest tax rate of 18 EECs.1942 Interviews help
to understand that some of the criticism of the Croatian tax rates are caused
less by the corporate tax than by the income tax which is quite high (15-45%)
and is further increased by regional and local surtaxes that may amount to
30% of the profit tax.1943 Furthermore, the VAT rate of 22% is less competi-
tive in neighboring countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (17%) and Serbia
(18%).1944
(c) Overall, interviews and external sources show that the tax system as well
as the tax rate have only limited impact on the investment decision of MNCs.
For the 1990s external sources suggest that the few existing analyses give little
evidence that the progressive tax system had either a significant positive or
negative impact on FDI.1945
With respect to the current taxation conditions in Croatia, interviews suggest
– as they did for Romania previously – that MNCs often have only little profits
in the first years, they re-invest earnings in the investments or find ways to shift
1938 See Hunya (2002), p.6; see also Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Austr.
MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
1939 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007).
1940 Among the five most deterring factors since 2002; see World Economic Forum (2007)
and earlier editions; similar AHK (2006).
1941 See World Bank (2007b); KPMG (2007); own calculations.
1942 Only behind Montenegro; EECs averags 49%; see also World Economic Forum (2007).
1943 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommuni-
cations (2007).
1944 See Dresdner Bank (2004), p.8; World Bank (2007b); APIU (2006b), p.45.
1945 See e. g. Svaljek (2005).
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profits internationally.1946 Only single experts interviewed see some importance
of this determinant, for example for SMEs.1947
Furthermore, it seems that MNCs are little aware of the advantages of Croa-
tian tax policy. For example, none of the interviewees point out that the total
tax rate is fairly low compared to most other EECs. This confirms the findings
on Romania that the perception of the tax system is more important than the
actual performance. Croatia is perceived as an average performing country in
terms of tax policy in line with MNCs’ expectations and the determinant is only
of limited importance for their investment decision. This evaluation is also con-
firmed by external surveys, for example with Austrian investors1948 according
to whom taxation only has little impact on doing business in Croatia.1949
(d) In the assessment of this section, economists may wonder if the tax
experiment of the 1990s was not abandoned too early to show sustainable
successes. In contrast, none of the experts interviewed seem to regret the abol-
ishment of the innovative tax system. Croatia has nonetheless been able to
maintain some benefits over the years. In fact, Croatia is actually performing
better than Romania in terms of tax policy even without a flat tax or low
statutory corporate tax rate.
However, Croatian public policy needs to market of these benefits more
effectively. At the same time it should curb other tax burdens, notable taxes
and surtaxes on income and continue the reduction of administrative hurdles.
(3) The analysis of investment incentives in Croatia shows that (a) the old
Investment Promotion Act (2000) provided a wide range of support for invest-
ments. Furthermore, (b) regional incentives were introduced. Nevertheless, (c)
1946 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineer-
ing (2007).
1947 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
1948 See Doc - Austrian Econ. Chamber Croatia (2006).
1949 See similar: NCC (2004b), p.25; AHK (2006).
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various general problems can be identified. The (d) new Investment Promotion
Act (2007) aims at a more effective approach, but the (e) importance of this
determinant seems to be limited for FDI overall. An assessment is provided in
sub-section (f).
(a) Croatia’s most important incentive tool in the past was the Investment
Promotion Act (2000-2006). It provided incentives through exemptions, re-
ductions and holidays on profit tax, VAT and customs. The profit tax was
reduced to 10% for investments of at least e540K (and 10 new employees) and
even to 0% for investments greater than e8.1M with 75 new employess.1950
Incentives for both domestic and foreign investors were also granted for com-
panies investing in large infrastructure projects (at least e1M), creating a large
amount of new jobs (worth at least e10M) or re-educating and training new
staff.1951
From the perspective of the interviewees the success of the Act was limited,
because application procedures were strongly centralized and complicated. Reg-
ulations were also quite strict should the investor need to lay off employees; the
MNC would then lose benefits for the entire period for which they were ap-
proved and would also have to reimburse received benefits plus interest. In
addition to this, the minimum investment duration of ten years was seen as an
obstacle. Finally, external sources point out that the legislation favored large
investors rather than SMEs.1952
(b) Croatia also introduced regional incentives, mainly the concept of free
zones and industrial parks in the early 2000s. The first free zones had already
been established in 1997; the Free Zones Act unified several special regulations
in 2002 and aimed at the promotion of export-oriented production.1953 Ac-
cording to the Act, investors benefit from tax and customs reductions in free
1950 See APIU (2006b), p.30; APIU (2006a), p.50; Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
1951 See Hunya (2002), p.6; Dresdner Bank (2004), pp.7-8; APIU (2006b), p.50.
1952 See APIU (2006b), p.50; OECD (2003a), p.47.
1953 See APIU (2006b), p.51.
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zones that go beyond the incentives discussed above.1954 Officially, 13 free zones
are established, mainly at the sea side and rivers close to harbors. However,
state experts interviewed concur that only six zone actually have production
sites.1955
As mentioned previously, investors seem very satisfied with the conditions in
Varazˇdin. However, in contrast to state experts interviewed, company experts
point out that the benefit of Varazˇdin is less a financial one but driven – as
already shown for Romania – by the commitment of some top officials who are
responsible for a good administrative support of the authorities as well as for
a good infrastructure including production facilities.1956 Therefore, company
experts clarify that other zones in Croatia with less senior support also tend
to perform less well.1957 Interviews also suggest that the (economic) success
of Varazˇdin cannot be very representative since it is located close to Western
European markets and has a strong industrial tradition.1958
Croatia has also enabled communities to establish industrial parks1959 since
2000. A development program (2004-2007) foresaw the construction of indus-
trial parks near all the larger cities by 2007, meaning that businesses were
assured of infrastructure needs such as gas and electricity.1960 Interviewees
explain that differences in the quality among the 142 existing parks (2008)
are enormous and an overall assessment seems impossible. State experts inter-
viewed point out that industrial parks help to create more reliable conditions
1954 For investment greater than e136K pay investors do not have to pay any corporate
income tax for five years; see Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); APIU (2006b), p.51.
1955 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); see also APIU
(2006a).
1956 Other positive examples are Slavonski Brod and Rijeka; see Intv. Austrian Econ. Asso-
ciation II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1957 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
1958 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
1959 Also called business park, economic zone or entrepreneurial zone.
1960 See also Doc - NCC (2007); Bfai (2004), p.28; Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
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for investors1961 while others remain skeptical as to what extent the conditions
can be maintained after an accession to the EU.1962
Croatia also developed six technology centers and nine centers for En-
trepreneurship and Business Incubators as well as one biotechnology park (in
Varazˇdin). Other regional incentive schemes were also adopted, including a
reduction of the profit tax rate for investments in the mountain area, an ex-
emption from profit tax in Eastern Slavonia for MNCs until 2012 and state
funding for education programs in the same region.1963
(c) Despite all these opportunities, investors do not seem entirely satis-
fied with the options for state aid in Croatia. One reason for this may be that
the multitude of investment policies is somewhat confusing for investors since
they do not follow one single investment strategy.1964 Many of the investment
incentives are broadly defined and do not distinguish between the needs of do-
mestic and foreign investors (for example regarding administrative support for
foreigners including the translation of relevant documents etc.).1965 External
sources also see shortcomings in the coordination between public policy and
the business community regarding potential incentive schemes.1966
Furthermore, investment incentives were often subject to modifications, for
example, regarding various amendments to the Profit Tax Act and its clauses
regarding tax reliefs related to employment, R&D and training.1967 Local ad-
ministrations have apparently not always been very supportive about giving out
1961 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
1962 See Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); see also APIU website (2008).
1963 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); APIU (2006b), pp.25, 51; APIU website (2008).
1964 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
1965 See also Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
1966 See European Commission (2005a), p.79.
1967 See Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
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incentives. As a consequence of these deficiencies, several investors interviewed
were unsuccessful in their application for larger incentives in Croatia.1968
International statistics seem to confirm this skeptical evaluation of Croatia’s
investment incentives. In the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook Croatia
ranks only 53rd out of 61 countries with regards to investment incentives and
only slightly ahead of Romania (56th).1969 This is confirmed by the survey
among German investors presented in AHK (2006).1970
(d) The new Investment Promotion Act shows that the government
acknowledges the need for a more effective incentive approach. The new scheme
is well aligned with the EU acquis and defines specific areas for investments
instead of functions (such as real estate purchase, employment and training).
Incentives are given to companies with manufacturing operations aimed at
export, outsourcing, share center, and R&D activities. Profit tax reductions are
basically in line with the former regulations. The goal of public policy makers
is to attract FDIs of e1B annually based on the new Investment Promotion
Act.1971 Even though both interviewees and external sources agree that it is
still too early to judge on the effects of this new Act, many experts remain
skeptical because corresponding measures on the regional level are missing so
far and incentives may not be generous enough to attract large amounts of
greenfield investors.1972
1968 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail
(2007).
1969 See IMD (2006).
1970 Investment incentives are the 18th of 26 determinants in terms of satisfaction.
1971 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); see also sub-section on investment policy.
1972 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV
(2007); European Commission (2007a), p.32.
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(e) Interviews1973 but also surveys and FDI studies1974 show that investors
do consider incentives in their investment decision but the overall impact of
Croatia’s incentive policy on FDI has remained limited so far.
According to both company and state experts interviewed the result of the old
Investment Promotion Act was rather disappointing.1975 In all, less than 60 in-
vestors received incentives based on the Act. Half of these were service-oriented,
whilst the other projects were industry projects with a less production-oriented
focus such as R&D investments.1976 The recent revision of the Act may have
improved investment conditions, but Croatia has been unable to establish a
comparative advantage over other countries of the region so far.
With regards to the free zones and industrial parks, interviews as well as data
analyses show that the positive effects of their establishment has been limited
despite the attraction of about 350 companies with about 7,500 employees.
Firstly, many of these investors were domestic firms; secondly, investments re-
mained focused on three or four zones and finally, the extent for which free
zones will continue to function as an incentive for investors after Croatia’s ac-
cession to the EU is not certain.1977 Furthermore, interviewees point out that
industrial zones are rather suited to promote business in Croatia in general,
while the incentives appear to be too weak to actually attract investors. As a
consequence, many industrial parks seem to be inactive.1978
1973 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Doc
- Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
1974 Incentives were 19th of 26 determinant in terms of importance; see AHK (2006); see
also CICD (2006), p.11; Lankes and Venables (1996).
1975 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
1976 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); see also Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
1977 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); APIU website
(2008).
1978 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
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Finally, on the regional level invectives would have been interesting for several
MNCs interviewed, but the lack of administrative support was apparently too
high in several cases in order to receive significant state funding.1979
(f) In the assessment of this section it seems that Croatia initiated invest-
ment incentives very late in its transition process. Furthermore, the approach
of the old Investment Promotion Act was probably too broad, since it was open
to both domestic and foreign investors and did not focus on specific industries.
Those incentives (with some exceptions, such as the free zone in Varazˇdin) had
little success, because they tended to follow a patchwork strategy rather than
a comprehensive approach and because many local administrations were not
supportive enough (in contrast to some communities in Romania who assisted
with bureaucratic problems etc.) to compensate for the limited attractiveness of
the financial incentives. Until the expected EU accession Croatia may actually
have the (legal) possibility to offer more attractive financial incentives than
in most Eastern European EU member states; however, the new Investment
Promotion Act does not seem to fully use this advantage.
Nevertheless, public policy will need to maintain the existing incentive
scheme in order to avoid Croatia being given the reputation of being un-
supportive of FDI. However, incentives will only bring rewards if investment
policy becomes a more local matter and administrative structures significantly
improve (using communities such as Varazˇdin as best practice). Finally, public
policy needs to communicate existing investment incentives to potential in-
vestors more effectively. Interviews revealed that MNCs did not know much
about Croatia’s incentives or the different possibilities free zones or industrial
parks offered.
1979 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products
(2007); received some support for training in Slavonia: Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
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(4) In conclusion, the components of Croatia’s investment climate determi-
nant have developed in different directions, with investment policy and invest-
ment incentives improving and tax policy rather deteriorating (but remaining
on a positive level) in recent years. However, none of the sub-determinants was
used by Croatian governments as decisive tool for the attraction of FDI.
The awareness of the potential of public policy in this field has strongly in-
creased but policy actors have not yet been able to close information gaps of
MNCs and to implement sustainable strategies that distinguish Croatia from
other economies in the region. However, the deficiencies outlined may have
been compensated by improvements of other economic determinants includ-
ing infrastructure and monetary stability. Croatia should continue to improve
the improvement of the attitude of all politicians, bureaucracies and citizens
towards any kind of foreign investment and work on the facilitation of doing
business, particularly on the local level.
7.3.3.4 General insights for transition countries
Based on the analysis for Romania and Croatia and under consideration of
further FDI studies several insights can be derived regarding the investment
climate determinant for transition countries. They reflect (1) the importance
and (2) performance of this determinant and allow for (3) some policy impli-
cations.
(1) The analyses of the importance of the investment climate and its sub-
determinants show that more investor-friendly rules and attitudes as well as
financial benefits have a positive but limited impact on FDI in transition coun-
tries. However, the impact of this determinant seems to depend on the invest-
ment phase.
In the first investment phase, when investors only vaguely consider several
country options, interviews show that eye-catching reforms can be important
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in order to attract the interest of potential investors. In this context, the in-
troduction of the flat tax, for example in Slovakia and Romania, are striking
examples.1980 Company experts confirm that the introduction of the flat tax
already signalizes a business-friendly environment and a lean administration,
even if the system is not flawless. Furthermore, the statutory tax rate seems
to be more important than the total tax rate and the perception of the in-
vestment climate performance strongly depends on the country of comparison
(either with the home country or with other EECs) which is also suggested
by several FDI studies.1981 Apparently this curiosity, that may be triggered
by some outstanding investment climate reforms, often helps MNCs to narrow
down the country selection to a few locations.
In the second phase of the investment decision, when this selection is scruti-
nized (often by site visits), it seems that the attitude of authorities both on the
central and local level can be important for the investment decision of MNCs.
This is especially true for investors who are active in regulated areas, for ex-
ample in sectors related to natural resources.1982 Investors appreciate an open
mind towards foreign investors and a dynamic reform atmosphere, even if ac-
tual conditions are not yet codified or settled.1983 Interviews also confirm the
general finding of FDI literature that BITs do not seem to affect FDI flows.1984
A low tax rate and investment incentives alone may only be a driving factor
for some small investors who have short-term investment aspirations and that
may be more flexible than large MNCs to relocate an operation once the invest-
ment expires.1985 By contrast and in accordance with only a minority of FDI
1980 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting
I (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
1981 See e. g. Blonigen (2005); Bellak and Leibrecht (2005).
1982 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
1983 See also Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); more emphasis on the importance
of investment rules: Campos and Kinoshita (2003); Altomonte and Guagliano (2003).
1984 Se e. g. Hallward-Dreimeier (2003); Blonigen and Davies (2004).
1985 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal
Services II (2007).
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studies1986, tax rates and financial investment incentives seem to only make a
difference for most MNCs, when all other legal, political and economic condi-
tions are equal between two potential host countries.1987 In fact data shows – in
contrast to some of the findings from FDI studies1988 – that countries with low
total tax rates do not necessarily attract larger amounts of FDI than others,
for example Latvia with 33% and e569 FDI inflows per capita versus Estonia
with 49% and e954.1989
In a third phase, once MNCs are operating in the country, the administrative
barriers seem to play an important role, for example regarding the complexity
of the tax system. In contrast, corporate tax rates seem hardly important since
MNCs often do not have profits in the first years and generally aim at long-
term commitments. Few investors believe in sustainable tax rates considering
that tax policy is a highly political issue and often changes quickly.1990 It also
seems that few investors will move to a different location because of a high tax
burden or expired tax incentives, since re-location costs are significant for most
MNCs and tax payments can be shifted internally.1991 Nonetheless, MNCs are
less likely to recommend the host country to other potential investors if the
conditions in this phase are perceived as unsatisfactory.
(2) In the evaluation of the performance of this determinant it becomes
apparent that the timing and success of investment strategies has strongly
1986 Only limited or no effect on FDI: see e. g. Glickman and Woodward (1989); Graham
and Krugman (1991); Wheeler and Mody (1992); findings with larger impact: see e. g.
Swenson (1994); Scholes and Wolfson (1990); Cummins and Hubbard (1995); Moosa
(2002), p.54.
1987 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V
(2007).
1988 See for references Hanson (2001), p.12.
1989 Tax figures for 2007; FDI figures for 2006; see figure 49; see also Hunya (2007); already
finding a fairly low sensitivity fo tax poliy and FDI: Hartman (1984) and Hartman
(1985).
1990 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); see also Hines (1996).
1991 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer
Goods (2007); see also Hartman (1985); Hartman (1984).
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varied across transition countries. While Romania and Croatia are examples for
a rather late opening for FDI, other countries like Czech Republic and Hungary
used the possibilities of investment policy from early on. The frequent change
of investment legislation (especially in reference to taxation) may also have
contributed to the perception that coherent investment strategies were missing
in some of the transition countries (such as Romania and Croatia).1992
Today, it seems that many EECs offer quite attractive investment conditions,
often even better than in Austria and Germany, particularly with respect to the
tax burden.1993 All transition countries guarantee equal treatment of foreign
and domestic investors, protection against expropriation and free repatriations
of profits. Exceptions to the national treatment have apparently decreased in
most countries; the remaining issues generally concern property rights and land
registers.1994 With increasing EU integration the possibilities for transition
countries to make the investment climate (for example regarding free zones) an
important driver for the attraction of FDI further decrease.1995 Furthermore,
governments seem to suffer from the problem that reforms are watered down
as shown for tax policy in Croatia in the early 2000s and for Romania only
recently.
Furthermore, interviewees reveal that the success of investment climate de-
terminants depends heavily on individuals, with attitudes of key politicians
towards FDI, the work of financial authorities and the support by administra-
tion in overcoming bureaucratic obstacles (for example in free zones such as
Curtici-Arad in Romania or Varazˇdin in Croatia playing a particularly impor-
1992 See also Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
1993 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team
(2007).
1994 See OECD (2006a), p.45.
1995 See also Blomstro¨m (2002); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
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tant role).1996 Especially in the early 1990s MNCs criticized resentments by
local actors in various transition countries including the Czech Republic, some-
times because of nationalistic resentments but mostly because of economic con-
cerns.1997 In this context, state interviewees sometimes seem to underestimate
the impact of local actors; they falsely assume that most of the competences
related to the investment climate (such as taxation and incentives) are bound
to the central level.1998 In fact, locally established industrial parks seem to be
among the most successful examples of incentive policy in transition countries.
They seem particularly useful for risk-averse investors as well as if the transi-
tion country has a weak infrastructure, problems with property rights and if it
owns many abundant assets, for example after a privatization.1999
(3) With respect to public policy implications the analysis of the invest-
ment climate indicates that governments often find good reasons not to act,
as long as (some) investors are already coming without active investment pol-
icy. Investors may be attracted by low salaries (Romania) or natural resources
(coast line in Croatia); but given the increasing competition among transition
countries for FDI, public policy makers need to realize that these pre-conditions
are not sufficient anymore and investment policy may be one possible lever in
this context.2000 Furthermore, governments need to keep present companies sat-
isfied because – as the analyses have shown – they can strongly influence the
decision-making process of further potential investors from their home coun-
tries.
Transition countries need to provide a minimum of acceptance towards FDI
both on the central and local level. Public policy actors should then work on
1996 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Croatian Government
Team (2007).
1997 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
1998 Disguised expert statement.
1999 See e. g. Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007);
Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
2000 See OECD (2006a); Estrin, Hughes, and Todd (1997).
7.3 Economic measures 465
the elaboration of long-term strategy (for example to avoid legal gaps like in
Romania after the expiration of the Investment Act). A key success factor
will be the further analysis of the current investment environment and the
identification of best practices as benchmarks, for example for industrial parks,
since interviews show that communities often do not know why some MNCs,
that were interested in a location, do not end up investing. In this context,
a stronger focus on specific industries or home countries of FDI or company
groups (such as micro-enterprises) may be more helpful than a broad approach
that comprises higher hurdles and a lower scope for investments (as in the old
Investment Promotion Act in Croatia).
On the other hand, governments in transition countries should not rely too
strongly on surveys and opinions of the business world that will – understand-
ably – always aim for lower tax rates. Public policy should therefore evaluate
the actual benefits of an incentive competition including tax reductions and
investment incentives and take into account potential negative effects such as
a decrease in tax revenues (Laffer curve) or a fizzling out of these measures if
neighboring countries offer even better conditions. The success of the invest-
ment climate also depends on the right timing of reforms since EU integration
provides a similar level playing field for most EECs. Only when public policy
makers can introduce policies, for example, as first transition country (such as
the flat tax in Slovakia) or in chronological distance to its competitors (such
as the flat tax in Romania), is an investment strategy likely to cause sufficient
awareness and generate a significant FDI boost. This aspect will also play an
important role in the analysis of the subsequent determinant, privatization.
Finally, reforms and good performances only pay off if they are conveyed well
to potential investors as Croatia’s problems with its low total tax rate suggest.
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7.3.4 Privatization
7.3.4.1 Definition
A successful privatization, the sale of former SOEs to domestic and foreign
investors, is a key success factor for the economic growth of transition countries.
This is particularly true when public policy alone has failed to reform and
restructure these enterprises. From the perspective of investors, privatization
sales are an attractive investment opportunity to reduce (some) market access
risks and also to facilitate the search for available labor.2001
7.3.4.2 Romania
The analysis of primary and secondary sources reveals that Romania’s priva-
tization experienced significant problems. They were related to the (1) speed
and timing, (2) institutional set-up and (3) methodology of privatization. Nev-
ertheless, the sale of SOEs (4) is quite advanced today and (5) has played an
essential role for FDI inflows to Romania overall. An assessment is provided in
section (6).
(1) With respect to the introduction and speed of the privatization pro-
cess, interviewees2002 as well as external sources2003 reveal that Romania was
among the last transition countries to begin privatization in the 1990s and
that the process here was particularly slow. Figure 50 shows that not even half
(45%) of the economic activity was in private hands in Romania by 1995. This
was the lowest rate among (today’s) ten Eastern European EU member states.
The privatization of large state monopolies was especially slow to start,
particularly before 1995. During this period the Romanian government was
2001 See Mu¨ller (2005), p.41; Cluse (1999), p.130; Belke, Baumga¨rtner, and Schneider (2005),
p.25.
2002 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
I (2007).
2003 See EBRD (2007b).
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Figure 50: Development of private sector in Eastern Europe
criticized by international organizations for its inadequate response to the
bankruptcy of many large SOEs. Romania received, for example, only 2 out
5 points in the EBRD transition indicator for large-scale privatizations.2004
Some experts also point out that the Romanian government missed the chance
for a “shock therapy” of a more painful but faster privatization in the early
1990s.2005
The sluggish start in the sale of SOEs had both legal and political reasons.
Firstly, from the perspective of foreign investors, the legal framework for pri-
vatization remained incomplete and unclear for many years, even though a
corporatization law was already passed in 1990.2006 Thus until the mid-1990s
foreign investors could only acquire 40% of shares of privatized companies. Fur-
2004 See EBRD (2007b); see also Freedom House (1998); European Commission (1998), p.18;
NBR (2002), p.13; Deloitte (2006), p.33.
2005 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); see also Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001),
p.41.
2006 See Law no. 15/1990; see also Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
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ther legal restrictions, for example, with respect to the acquisition of real estate
(section 7.2.2.2) also limited possibilities for privatization sales by MNCs.2007
Secondly, interviewees2008 and external sources2009 suggest that political rea-
sons also prevented an active privatization policy in Romania for many years.
As already touched upon in sections before, key politicians were afraid that
privatization would lead to restructuring, higher unemployment and – in the
end – less votes. Furthermore, some negative experiences with previous priva-
tizations, in which both domestic and foreign investors had mainly acquired
former SOEs because of their real estate value, also made politicians reluctant
to give up control over the countries’ assets.2010
Not only continuing economic problems in the mid-1990s, such as high infla-
tion rates and government deficits, but also positive privatizations experiences
in other transition countries and a change of government in 1996 led to a more
active privatization approach in Romania since the mid-1990s.2011 They re-
sulted in better protection of investors, a change of the privatization method
(see below) and a corresponding acceleration of the process as a whole. A first
privatization wave of smaller companies took place in 1995/96.2012 Large-scale
privatization began in 1997 and banks were amongst the first institutions to
be privatized (see above section 7.3.1.2).2013 State interviewees in particular
indicate that the increasing pressure of the EU led to a further push towards
large-scale privatization after 2000. This led to some large non-financial priva-
tizations, including that of the steel company Sidex (2001) and the telecom-
2007 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.37; Dresdner Bank (2004), p.21; Mu¨ller (2005),
pp.79 and 171; Eckert (2007), p.245; Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. Supra-
national Authority I (2007).
2008 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
2009 See e. g. Freedom House (1998); OECD (2005d).
2010 See also Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007).
2011 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
2012 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.42; Freedom House (1998).
2013 See OECD (2005d), p.61; European Commission (2005c), p.34; European Commission
(1998), p.18; Deloitte (2006), p.33; NBR (2002), p.13.
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munications company Romtelecom (2002). The privatization peak was reached
with the sales of Petrom (2004) and the BCR (2005/2006).2014
Experts interviewed bring forward contrasting evaluations of the overall tim-
ing of Romania’s privatization process. A minority of experts points out that
a delay of some privatization projects may actually have been beneficial for
Romania. For example, since the BCR was among the last banks to undergo
privatization in Eastern Europe, Romania was able to increase the awareness
of potential investors and the bank realized a high sales price.2015 Furthermore,
a later privatization may have helped those involved to learn from past priva-
tization mistakes in Romania, when very generous conditions had been offered
to some investors (for example to Daewoo).2016
By contrast, the majority of interviewees emphasizes – in accordance with
external sources as well as FDI literature2017 – that the delayed privatization
in Romania hampered economic growth. On the one hand, the lack of financing
for the modernization of SOEs and the operation of these by state officials, who
were often disinterested in the commercial success of the SOEs, often led to high
losses and sometimes even to bankruptcies. On the other hand, the lack of FDIs
meant that their often beneficial effects on productivity, growth, employment
etc were lacking. (as discussed in the theoretical part of this thesis).2018
(2) The institutional set-up represented a further problem for the priva-
tization process in Romania for many years. Between 1990 and 2002 alone eight
privatization laws were passed. This meant that privatization-related institu-
2014 See section 6.2.1; see also Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. Research
Institute I (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ.
Association II (2007).
2015 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
2016 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv.
Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
2017 See e. g. Mungiu-Pippidi (2001); Mu¨ller (2005); Eller, Haiss, and Steiner (2006); Eckert
(2007).
2018 See section 2.2.2; see e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC
- Utilities (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute
(2007); see OECD (2005d), p.30.
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tional competences changed hands and were broadly distributed. A National
Agency for Privatization was established in 1991, followed by the foundation
of the State Ownership Fund and five Private Ownership Funds.2019 However,
some of the SOEs were also allocated to the Ministry of Economy, others to the
State Ownership Fund, while the privatization of agricultural companies was
decentralized. In 1997 the State Ownership Fund was placed under the author-
ity of the Ministry of Reform but was later transformed into the Authority for
Privatization and Administration of State Assets (APAPS). This received the
status of a ministry in 2001.2020
Law no. 137/2002 led to a stronger streamlining of the privatization process
since APAPS received the most important SOEs. After the sale of the bulk of
the portfolio, in 2004 APAPS and the Authority for Valorization of Banking As-
sets were merged into the new Romanian Authority for State Assets Recovery
(AVAS). Since the merger, AVAS coordinates the privatization of the remaining
SOEs and newly liberalized sectors and supervises the post-privatization pro-
cess. As a consequence of the smaller remaining number of companies, AVAS
also absorbed the Privatization Office of the Ministry of Economy, including
its portfolio (such as large utilities, energy, mining companies etc.) in 2007.2021
Interviewees acknowledge that the changing landscape of institutions has
been necessary to some extent in order to cope with the developing portfolio
of SOEs that Romania wanted to privatize. Nevertheless, it seems that the
multitude of institutions and departments, particularly in the 1990s, strongly
contributed to the slow rate of sales evolution. Experts interviewed also criti-
cize the fact that the various privatization authorities tended to lack the legal
competence and political power needed to accelerate privatization in Roma-
2019 See Freedom House (1998); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006c), p.12; Intv. Romanian Au-
thority II (2007).
2020 See European Commission (2005c), pp.104-105; OECD (2005d), pp.32-35.
2021 See OECD (2005d), p.35-37; Deloitte (2006), p.33; Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007).
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nia.2022 Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007) also points out that privatization
would possibly have been more successful if privatization authorities had been
more independent and privately organized (as in Hungary), albeit under gov-
ernment supervision. From his perspective a private organization would have
been an important precondition to avoid frequent political interferences in the
work of the privatization authority and to be able to increase share capital,
make investments etc.
(3) Romania has used various privatization methods, often combining sev-
eral at the same time. The most important ones have been the voucher system,
management and employee buy-outs, direct sales, and share issuing.2023
Vouchers were issued in two waves in Romania. In 1990/1991 and again
– under the pressure of the IMF – in 1995/1996, Romania gave out vouchers
to citizens for a direct subscription but also for shares in small-scale compa-
nies. This coupon privatization was the preferred method in the early phase of
transition because the Romanian government was trying to prevent the sale of
companies to strategic investors and the socially unacceptable measures that
they expected from them.2024
According to interviewees and external sources, this method had little success
because the transfer of the vouchers into company shares proceeded only slowly
and the majority of the SOEs were not actually part of this mass privatization.
Romanian citizens generally had little experience in exercising their shareholder
rights and usually reassigned them to a higher level, mostly to one of the Private
Ownership Funds. Since these Funds were run by state appointees, the actual
privatization effect of this method remained limited in both voucher rounds.2025
2022 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007).
2023 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
2024 See also Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Eckert (2007), p.247.
2025 See Freedom House (1998); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.37; OECD (2005d), p.30;
Eckert (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I
(2007).
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In management and employee buy outs the staff affiliated with the
company received priority rights in the sale of company shares on the market.
This method, mainly used between 1993 and 1997, led to a large share of inside
owners of Romanian companies, averaging 65% per company in that period.2026
Critics of this system point out that the (employee) shareholders generally
had little management experience and no interest in restructuring companies.
Furthermore, the capitalization of these shareholders was generally lower com-
pared to that of outsiders and the Romanian government was often forced to
financially assist these companies.2027
Romania also privatized some SOEs by selling minority shares of the state
on the stock market since 1997, but large firms were not involved until 2001.
This method, however, has been only rarely used; between 1993 and mid-2004
only 219 out of 7,566 privatized companies were sold on the capital market.2028
The analysis of the interviews reveals that the sales price of this method is
less predictable and the preparation of the sale requires more work and effort
than the former methods. Nevertheless, most experts interviewed make positive
comments about this privatization method because of its transparency and
the significant modernization of these companies before the public offering.2029
Some experts conclude that Romania should have tried to sell more SOEs via
the stock exchange.2030
Finally, Romania also used direct sales as a privatization method, either
via negotiations or auctions. After the new government came to power in 1996,
the use of this method strongly increased (particularly for the sale of large
companies), although direct sales had been possible since the early 1990s. An
important obstacle was removed in 2002 when the requirement of a minimum
2026 See OECD (2005d), p.30; Freedom House (1998).
2027 See Eckert (2007), pp.251-252; OECD (2005d), p.30.
2028 See Freedom House (1998); Eckert (2007), pp.251-252; OECD (2005d), p.30.
2029 See Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv.
Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
2030 See e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
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sales price (determined by state authorities) was abolished and a sale for a
symbolic price of one euro, mainly for bankrupt companies, became possible in
2002. Because of the guidelines of the EU, direct sales today are generally only
possible through public tenders.2031
Both primary and secondary sources generally evaluate this method, partic-
ularly auctions, as the most effective and most successful privatization method
for Romania.2032 However, state experts interviewed agree that – from today’s
perspective – Romania was often too naive in previous negotiations by agreeing
to very favorable conditions for buyers and low sales prices.2033 Furthermore,
according to various interviewees, some auction privatizations did not follow
fully transparent rules even in recent years.2034 One reason for the lack of
transparency is the frequent change of the legal framework which represents
a challenge for both buyers and state authorities.2035 Some SOEs could have
realized better terms, according to Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007), if they
had been sold through negotiations instead of public auctions. Nevertheless,
interviewees clarify that the legal framework as well as compliance with the
rules greatly improved in privatization auctions, also as a consequence of Ro-
mania’s integration with the EU.2036 Privatizations are more formalized and
fulfill European standards most of the time.2037
In sum, many expert interviews suggest that some of the privatization meth-
ods that were used in Romania, particularly the voucher system and the man-
agement and employee buy-outs, prevented a faster transition of Romania’s
2031 Law no. 137/2002; see Eckert (2007), p.249; OECD (2005d) p.32.
2032 See Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv.
Romanian Ministry IV (2007).
2033 See Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007).
2034 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007) and some disguised experts statements.
2035 See Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007).
2036 See Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv.
Romanian Authority II (2007).
2037 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007);
Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Austr.
MNC - Legal Services (2007).
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economy in the 1990s. The protection of the companies did little to help smooth
the economic challenges caused by the breakdown of the centrally planned econ-
omy. Interviewees also agree that many larger privatizations in the 1990s did
not follow modern, transparent privatization rules.2038 In line with the inter-
view findings, OECD (2005d) concludes that “Romania’s choice of privatization
methods has largely been responsible for the postponement of restructuring the
economy and is a source of bad governance.”
(4) Interviewees2039 as well as external sources2040 confirm that privatization
is quite advanced in Romania today. Between 1992 and 1999 about 6,100
companies were privatized and about 1,400 have been privatized since then
(figure 51).2041 Sales volumes have been driven by large-scale privatization in
recent years, mainly in the banking and energy sector with peaks in 2004 and
2006.2042 The share of the private sector reached 70% of Romania’s GDP in
2007. This is equivalent to the average of 16 EECs.2043
According to the EBRD transition indicator, Romania reaches 3.7 points
(out of 5) both for large- and small-scale privatization. This gives Romania a
good position particularly in terms of large-scale privatization in comparison
to other EECs (average 3.3).2044
Nevertheless, a higher share of the private sector in other EECs, for example
80% in Czech Republic, indicates that Romania still has potential for further
privatizations. With regards to small-scale privatization in particular, Romania
seems to lag behind. Only Bosnia and Herzegovina and Belarus score lower
2038 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
2039 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2040 See e. g. Raiffeisenbank (2007); EIU (2007b).
2041 See AVAS (2008); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); IMF (2006b), p.113.
2042 See 6.2.1; Deloitte (2006), p.30; Larive Romania (2007), p.46.
2043 See figure 50; EBRD (2007b).
2044 See EBRD (2007b).
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Figure 51: Privatizations in Romania
than Romania in the EBRD index.2045 According to Intv. Romanian Authority
II (2007) more than 1,000 (mostly small) companies are still waiting to be
privatized, of which more than half are under bankruptcy and often with high
debts and many employees. This weak performance of the remaining SOEs
is also reflected in the enterprise restructuring index of the EBRD in which
Romania scores 2.7 while the average of other Eastern European EU members
is 3.24.2046
However, the peak for sales volumes has apparently been reached (see section
6.2.1) and AVAS has the task of finalizing the sale of its portfolio by 2008.
AVAS assumes that only 400-450 companies (out of the about 1,000 SOEs left)
2045 Average for small-scale privatization among 19 EECs: 3.95; see EBRD (2007b); see also
OECD (2005d), p.30; Mu¨ller (2005); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006a).
2046 See EBRD (2007b); European Commission (2006e), p.15; Intv. German Econ. Associa-
tion V (2007).
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actually have a chance to be fully privatized. The state is a majority shareholder
in about 60 of these.2047
From the perspective of several company experts interviewed, not many at-
tractive SOEs are left. Some of the remaining parts of the energy sector (in-
cluding the thermal and hydro power companies) could be attractive for in-
vestors.2048 The CEC bank, formerly the most important private bank in Ro-
mania, could also become a target for privatization. A first sale was stopped
in 2007 because the government was not able to find a buyer for the envisaged
price. A privatization is now predicted not until 2009 following investments in
the modernization of the bank.2049 Most experts interviewed agree that it would
have been better if the CEC had already been sold at the last opportunity as
it is losing fast market shares as well as its most important advantage – the
extensive and often exclusive presence in Romania’s rural areas. Furthermore,
the current investment in the modernization of the bank was not described as
raising the CEC’s prospects.2050
Further companies up for privatization are the pharmaceutical company An-
tibiotice, some chemical companies and, in the future, the waste and waste
water providers on the local level.2051
However, a discussion has recently been resumed about the general benefits of
privatization, mainly between the prime minister and the president. As a result
AVAS achieved an interruption of the privatization in the energy sector in late
2047 See Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007).
2048 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II
(2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007);
see also Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
2049 See Mu¨hlberger (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority I
(2007).
2050 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Associ-
ation V (2007).
2051 See EIU (2008); Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. German Ministry (2007).
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2006, the sector with the greatest political explosiveness and the authority is
awaiting a new strategy of the government.2052
(5) Privatization has been a significant factor for FDI inflows to Ro-
mania.2053 Interviews confirm the insight of general FDI studies (presented in
the theoretical part of this thesis (section 2.2.4.2)) that the slow privatization,
the difficult legal environment and the complex and poorly market-oriented
approach did hinder higher FDI inflows to Romania in the first ten years of
transition. Interviewees confirm that many privatizations at that time were
mainly driven by interests for real estate, with the aim of avoiding major legal
challenges in the land registration process.2054 The analyses of this section also
confirm the findings of Holland and Pain (1998) and others that direct sales
are more attractive for MNCs and FDI than a voucher system.2055
Both interviewees and data presented in section 6.2.1 confirm that the im-
provements in the privatization procedures became a major driver for FDI in
Romania.2056 FDI sales increased in recent years together with privatization
sales volumes. Furthermore, the relative significance of foreign investors of Ro-
mania’s privatization sales has risen from only 6% of sales (1992-1996) to 74%
(2000-2004).2057
Several interviewees assume that FDI will decrease and fewer privatization
sales are expected for the future. However some company experts interviewed
also indicate that the improvements in the handling of privatization procedures
had a significant (indirect) effect on FDI in Romania. Due to their experience,
many authorities that were involved in the privatization process and in public
tenders have become more efficient and more professional in their work and
2052 See Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007); see also Mediafax (2006).
2053 See also OECD (2005d), p.13.
2054 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
2055 See also Merlevede and Schoors (2004); see also Carstensen and Toubal (2004); Bellak
and Leibrecht (2005).
2056 See Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
2057 Latest figures available; see OECD (2005d), p.32; see also Carstensen and Toubal (2004).
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have generally become more open towards (foreign) investors. Therefore, even
MNCs that are not engaged in a privatization tend to benefit from privatization
in Romania.2058
(6) The assessment of this section shows that the bulk of privatizations
was initiated late in Romania compared to most other EECs and suffered from
many difficulties until only recently. Nevertheless, privatization has represented
a key factor for Romania’s economic and FDI growth. As already shown above,
privatization also played a decisive role in the transition of the financial system.
However, a focus on privatization in recent years, coupled with a disregard
of a sustainable investment policy, may have had a negative impact on the
development within Romania. Since most privatizations took place in Bucharest
and in a few formerly industrialized zones, other regions received little attention
and investments leading to an increase of the regional development gaps.
State experts tend to see fewer problems in the transparency of privatizations
in Romania in the past than company experts. However, company experts do
acknowledge that it was in many cases reasonable to begin the privatization,
in order to sell unprofitable SOEs and open protected markets to competition.
When evaluating the timing of privatization in Romania, it seems that those
advocates who criticize the late privatization in Romania have the stronger ar-
guments. It seems that an earlier privatization of large companies in particular
would have contributed to faster productivity gains of Romanian companies and
higher government revenues that would have helped to cope with the financial
crisis at the end of the 1990s. This would have resulted in higher investments in
sustainable projects such as infrastructure upgrades. In many cases an earlier
privatization would probably have prevented the bankruptcy of some SOEs;
due to the delay of many privatization a large amount of companies ended up
in the hands of AVAS and have few chances of being sold in the near future.
2058 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
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Public policy actors should quickly come to an agreement regarding Roma-
nia’s future privatization strategy that enables a quick sale of the remaining
SOEs including loss-making companies but also the CEC since it seems unlikely
that state authorities will be able to prevent a further decline of market shares.
7.3.4.3 Croatia
Croatia has faced some important problems in terms of (1) speed, (2) institu-
tions, and (3) methodology of privatization. However, only few areas are left
for (4) further privatizations. This determinant (5) has been very important
for FDI in Croatia and is assessed in sub-section (6).
(1) In comparison to Romania, Croatia began decisive privatization efforts
even later and proceeded more slowly, at least in the early 1990s.2059 In
1991 Croatia’s private sector share accounted for 20% of GDP and made only
a moderate climb to 40% by 1995, representing the third lowest rate of 16 EECs
(figure 50). Large-scale privatization in particular proceeded (as in Romania)
fairly slowly.2060
Interviews and external sources show that major reasons for the problems in
the early phase of privatization in Croatia were the problems inherited from
the Yugoslavian system, implications of the war, political factors, legal and
bureaucratic issues, and the weak economic performance of many SOEs.
In contrast to many other socialist and communist countries, Croatian en-
terprises were not state but rather socially-owned (actually meaning employee-
owned).2061 This strong position of employees and managers continued after
2059 See also World Bank (2003), p.123.
2060 3 out 5 points in the respective EBRD index; see EBRD (2007b).
2061 Yet firms were controlled by party officials and production plans; see Law on the Trans-
formation of Socially-Owned Companies (1991); see also European Commission (2004c),
p.42; Doc - CPF (2001).
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independence in 1991 and often prevented privatizations and sales to strategic
investors.2062
The war period also led to an increasing number of sales to loyal parti-
sans of President Tudman. Therefore, the number of privatizations during this
period was significant and two thirds of the 3,600 state and socially-owned en-
terprises were sold before 1996. However, only a small number of (domestic)
“tycoons”2063 benefited from the sales and the sales value that they generated
totaled only 1.4% of GDP.
In line with the analysis of the investment climate (see above), intervie-
wees show that political resentments against privatization sales only diminished
slowly after the end of the war. At sites of special national interest, such as the
coast, many politicians apparently want to prevent too many foreign privatiza-
tion sales even today, despite equal rules for domestic and foreign investors.2064
Legal and bureaucratic problems, mainly related to ownership issues and
acquisition conditions (including the maintenance of number of employees and
the salary level), slowed the privatization of the remaining SOEs down in Croa-
tia.2065 Company experts interviewed also give examples with quite significant
problems regarding the work of local authorities in the privatization process.
Due to local and political interests, privatization deals have been pending for
years or have led to long-lasting lawsuits, for example in the case of an Austrian
investor in Slavonia, which lasted for ten years.2066
2062 See Kusˇic´ (2001); World Bank (2003), p.123; Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007);
Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
2063 World Bank (2003), p.85; see European Commission (2004c), p.42; Pommer (2007),
p.116.
2064 See Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv.
Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv.
Former Croatian Minister (2007).
2065 See Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007);
Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); see also World Bank (2003), p.85; European
Commission (2007a), p.20.
2066 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Software
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
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Finally, profound economic deficiencies of SOEs have caused further privati-
zation delays. Privatization preparations proceeded slowly, particularly in those
industries in which extensive restructuring was necessary before a sale to in-
vestors including utilities and other large state monopolies.2067 Furthermore,
many SOEs did not recover from the war and went bankrupt. In 2000, for ex-
ample, 56% of SOEs were operating at loss. Therefore, in some regions (most
notably in Slavonia) and industries (such as steel mills, shipyards and railways),
not many attractive SOEs were left for privatization after 1995.2068
The increasingly westward orientation which was also documented in the
SAA (2001) and a more liberal investment policy (see above) led to increasing
privatization efforts in Croatia. In 2002 an operational plan was adopted for
the privatization of the remaining SOEs, although this plan is currently under
revision.2069 The banking sector represented the first target for large-scale pri-
vatizations, which began with Zagrebacˇka Banka (1995) and accelerated after
the banking crisis in the late 1990s to include Slavonska banka (1997), Rijecˇka
banka (2000) and Privredna banka (2000). Large privatization deals in other in-
dustries followed, including Hrvatske Telekomunikacije (2000), INA (2003) and
Pliva (2006) (see section 6.3.1) which are generally evaluated as success stories
by both primary and secondary sources.2070 The most recent privatizations are
those of the steel plants in Split and Sisak.2071
In sum, experts interviewed, in line with external studies, make the criticism
that privatization was carried out rather slowly in Croatia in the 1990s, in
comparison to other EECs.2072 Furthermore, privatization had the reputation
2067 See KPMG (2001); European Commission (2007a), p.22.
2068 See World Bank (2003), p.86; Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor
(2007); Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications
(2007).
2069 See IMF (2006a), p.20; Raiffeisenbank (2006), p.13; CPF website (2008).
2070 See also Hunya (2002), pp.5-6; European Commission (2005a), p.41; Intv. Germ. MNC
- Financial Services I (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007); Doc - INA (2006).
2071 See EBRD (2007a), p.26; Bfai (2004), p.74.
2072 See also Kusˇic´ (2001); Dresdner Bank (2004), p.7.
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of being “Wild West privatizations”2073 or “robbery privatizations”2074 during
the war period. Even for the early 2000s external sources and interviewees
comment that privatization proceeded more slowly than expected considering
the delays regarding shipyards and agricultural privatization.2075
However, some experts interviewed also argue that privatization may actually
have started too early in Croatia since the mishandling during the war led to
negative economic effects and caused a strong frustration in the population.2076
(2) The institutional arrangement of privatization itself has been less of
a problem in Croatia than, for example, in Romania. The responsibility for the
privatization was mainly given to the Croatian Privatization Fund (CPF) that
was founded in 1992 (Law no. 84/1992).2077 It was given the task of steering,
transforming and privatizing about 3,600 socially-owned enterprises into public
companies.2078
Nevertheless, the CPF had to withstand strong pressures from politics, com-
panies and also from unions (see above).2079 The negative effects of this pressure
became manifest in the CPF scandal in June 2007 in which most members of the
management of the CPF had to resign and eight senior officials were arrested
due to charges of accepting bribes and selling SOEs without legal bids.2080 In-
terviewees criticize that the reaction of the government was still too tentative.
Three ministers were on the supervisory board but did not have to bear any
2073 Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2074 Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
2075 See Pommer (2007), p.147.
2076 See e. g. Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
2077 Ministry of Economy with some influence; see Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007).
2078 See European Commission (2004c), p.42; OECD (2005c), p.22.
2079 See also World Bank (2003), p.85; EBRD (2007a), p.19; European Commission (2007a),
p.20.
2080 The so-called Operation Maestro; see e. g. European Commission (2007a), pp.20, 50.
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consequences.2081 Furthermore, observers seem to start asking about the extent
to which corruption may have played a role in other privatizations as well.2082
(3) As in Romania, several privatizationmethods have been used in Croatia
in recent years, most importantly management and employee buy-outs, direct
sales, and share issuing. They have mainly been based on the Privatization Act
of 1993, which has been amended several times.2083
The management and employee buy-out was the method most fre-
quently used in Croatia between 1991 and 1996 and reflected the gradual tran-
sition from the system of socially-owned firms. These insider sales often came
along with large discounts and installment schemes which put further pressure
on the government budget. Moreover, many employees sold back their shares
to the state because they were defaulting or anticipating the bankruptcy of the
company.2084
Interviewees confirm the evaluation of external sources that the strong po-
sition of managers and insiders was a major burden for Croatia’s economic
development towards a market economy. They emphasize that employees have
a very strong controlling power in many Croatian companies, including signif-
icant influence on benefits (such as holidays) and good wages.2085
As mentioned above direct sales (both by public tenders and negotiations)
were already used during the war when influential investors acquired companies
and assets at very low prices. Starting at the end of the 1990s, large state
monopolies and strategic assets such as banks were also often sold through
public tenders. Today, it is the most common form of privatization in Croatia
(together with share issuing).2086
2081 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
2082 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
2083 Laws no. 21/1996, 71/1997 and 73/2000; see also European Commission (2004c), p.42.
2084 See Kusˇic´ (2001); World Bank (2003), p.87; Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
2085 See e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunica-
tions (2007); see also World Bank (2003), p.123; European Commission (2004c), p.42.
2086 See World Bank (2003), p.85; European Commission (2004c), p.42.
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Interviewees criticize that the direct sales during the war had negative effects
on management, strategy and operations of the company but also on the econ-
omy as a whole because these investors invested neither capital nor ideas; as a
result, the companies’ economic performance quickly deteriorated before they
were sold again. Furthermore, these powerful individuals still play a major role
in Croatia’s politics and economy today. By contrast, Croatia has received in-
creasing appreciation for the use of this method by international organizations
in recent years, for example in the context of the privatization of utilities and
banks.2087
Share issuing was used for the first time with the listing of the Zagrebacˇka
Banka in 1995 and of Pliva in the following year as discussed in section 7.3.1.3.
Further examples followed (including INA in 2006) in which initial public of-
ferings were used for gradual privatizations, particularly in the case of large
companies.2088
Interviewees tend to be most satisfied with this privatization method. The
generally transparent procedures have apparently increased the number of
strategic investors as well as the credibility of Croatia’s economy and adminis-
tration.2089
Overall, expert interviewees2090 as well as secondary sources2091 state that
the problematic use of some privatization methods in the 1990s, most notably
of the management and employee buy-outs and direct sales to loyal partisans,
promoted corruption and substantially harmed the reputation of the Croat-
2087 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II
(2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommuni-
cations (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); see also World Bank (2003),
p.124; European Commission (2004c), p.42.
2088 See e. g. EBRD (2007a); European Commission (2007a).
2089 See Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
2090 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construc-
tion (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2091 See e. g. Kusˇic´ (2001); Grupe and Kusˇic´ (2005), p.3.
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ian economy. These problems apparently also led to continued problems in the
market structure of Croatian companies and competition issues like large mo-
nopolies. However, procedures now seem to be fairly transparent and mostly in
line with EU rules in recent years.
(4) Today, 16 years after its independence, Croatia’s privatization is fairly
advanced. About 1,200 companies were sold out of the portfolio of the CPF
between 1993 and 1999 and about 1,000 between 2000 and 2007. The private
sector share reached 70% in the same year (as in Romania).2092 Small-scale
privatization is very advanced (4.3 points of the EBRD index in 2007) and
Croatia is therefore among the leading nine EECs since 1996.2093 In contrast,
large-scale privatization is somewhat weaker, reaching 3.3 in the EBRD index
which is equivalent to the average of 19 EECs.2094
The CPF’s goal to sell off the remaining 880 SOEs (of which 100 are majority-
owned by the state) has been postponed from 2007 to 2009, also due to the
turmoils following the CPF scandal.2095 The CPF also faces the problem that
a large share of these companies continues to make losses and is thus diffi-
cult to privatize.2096 The continued need for investments and restructuring of
remaining SOEs is also reflected in the mediocre EBRD score for enterprise
restructuring of 3 points in 2007.2097
From the perspective of the interviewees the most attractive companies were
privatized by the early 2000s and there are few remaining opportunities.2098
Important remaining objects for privatizations have already been discussed in
2092 See figure 50; see also EBRD (2007b); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.1; see Misak
(2001); Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007); Doc - CPF (2001).
2093 See EBRD (2007b).
2094 See EBRD (2007b).
2095 See CPF website (2008); see also IMF (2006a), p.18; EBRD (2007a) p.24; European
Commission (2007a), p.20; Intv. European Institution (2007).
2096 See Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
2097 See EBRD (2007a), p.26; see also European Commission (2007a), p.22.
2098 See Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
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section 6.3.1 including the shipyards, the finalization of the privatization in the
telecommunications sector, some parts of the energy sector, companies in the
agricultural but also in the tourism sector as well as in local infrastructure.2099
Experts interviewed see less chances for a complete privatization of the Croatian
energy company, Hrvatska Elektroprivreda and the remaining pharmaceutical
companies.2100
(5) The importance of the privatization for FDI inflows to Croatia has
been very significant – both in positive and negative terms. Interviewees agree
with external studies that the poor privatization environment and the slow
progress in the 1990s was a major deterrent for many MNCs. At that time
the slow privatization process represented a disadvantage for Croatia as an in-
vestment location. Furthermore, the preference given to insiders and partisans
as well as certain resentments about the influence of foreigners during and di-
rectly following the war appear to have been a reason for lower FDI inflows
as well.2101 Moreover, interviewees confirm that legal and political obstacles in
the privatization process were a major constraint in the investment decision of
many MNCs.2102 Nevertheless, several interviewees point out that the unstable
legal and political conditions of the 1990s including the difficulties in establish-
ing a company and registering property (see above), made privatizations (even
though their number was limited) still more attractive to many investors than,
for example, greenfield investments.2103 In fact, 65% of the accumlated FDI
inflows were privatization-related in the period 1993-1999.2104
2099 See CPF website (2008); EBRD (2006a); IMF (2006a), p.4; EBRD (2007a), pp.5, 15;
Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
2100 See e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
2101 See Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007); Intv. European Institution (2007); see also Kusˇic´ (2001); European Commission
(2004c), p.40.
2102 See Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
2103 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
2104 See Hunya (2000); own calculations.
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In the late 1990s, privatization increasingly became a major enhancing factor
for FDI flows to Croatia. Particularly due to the large-scale deals in the early
2000s, privatization visibly became a major driver for FDI as shown in section
6.3.1.2105
Furthermore and as in Romania, it seems that privatization has also had
an important indirect effect on FDI since the improving transparency, notably
after 2000, helped to boost the credibility of Croatia and the Croatian econ-
omy.2106
(6) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that Croatia’s
starting conditions for privatization were far more difficult than in many other
EECs in the first years of transition due to the low level of state assets, the legal
heritage and the war experience. Privatization also suffered from an inconsistent
strategy and strong political pressure on the decision-makers. As a consequence
the mediocre work of the CPF was not more successful than, for example the
performance of the many Romanian privatization authorities, despite its more
favorable institutional set-up.
A main deficiency of the CPF was its failure to restructure SOEs more suc-
cessfully. Furthermore, it seems that the insider privatization and the prefer-
ential treatment of some partisans often led to inefficient companies and may
therefore also have contributed to the high structural unemployment rate Croa-
tia has to deal with until today (as discussed in section 6.3.1). The analysis
of this suggests that the long-lasting impact of these mistakes of the 1990s
are often underestimated by both companies and foreign public policy makers
today.
Recent privatizations have been more transparent and successful and repre-
sent an important step for a mature market economy striving for EU accession.
2105 See Intv. European Institution (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Doc - CPF
(2001); see also European Commission (2004c), p.40; Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
2106 See e. g. Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007).
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The small number of privatizations in recent years causes only limited worries
about potential dependence on a small number of investors as in the 1990s;
current MNCs rather seem to aim at long-term investments, and the positive
benefits of their commitments are generally confirmed by both foreign and
domestic interviewees.
Nevertheless, Croatian public policy should counter potential monopolies by
maintaining a strong competition framework (in line with the EU and including
a strengthening of the court system), accelerating small- and large-scale pri-
vatizations and promoting entrepreneurship by facilitating market access and
creating more attractive incentives for both foreign and domestic investors (see
above).
7.3.4.4 General insights for transition countries
The analysis of privatization policies in Romania and Croatia as well as the
consideration of further FDI studies allow for some general insights regarding
(1) the importance and (2) performance in transition countries. Some public
policy implications are presented in sub-section (3).
(1) The analyses for Romania and Croatia confirm the insights of various em-
pirical studies presented in section 2.2.4.2 stating that privatization policy has
been of very great importance for FDI in transition countries. While exact
figures of the privatization share of FDI in EECs are not available, most studies
suggest that at least half of the Eastern European FDI stock is privatization-
related even though the peak of privatization sales has been reached in most
countries (including Romania and Croatia).2107
However, analyses have shown that the private sector share and annual pri-
vatization sales – as suggested by various FDI studies2108 – are less appropriate
2107 See e. g. Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000); Hunya (2000); UNCTAD (2005).
2108 See e. g. Lansbury, Pain, and Smidkova (1996); Barrell and Holland (2000); Smarzynska
(2002); Bellak and Leibrecht (2005).
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indicators in order to measure the impact of privatization on FDI than several
other privatization determinants discussed in this section.2109
Firstly and most importantly, the political and social willingness to accept
privatizations in general and acquisitions from foreigners in particular are deci-
sive for FDI.2110 For example, economic and nationalistic resentments in both
Romania and Croatia were probably the most important obstacles for an early
and open privatization policy and also affected the legal environment for foreign
investors (such as restrictions in certain areas). In other EECs, for example in
Hungary, a more open approach in the early 1990s also contributed to higher
FDI inflows in the same period. While frequently quoted by interviewees, this
aspect is not generally considered by FDI studies as important privatization
factor.2111
Secondly, interviews2112 confirm the insights of several empirical studies2113
that the method of privatization is essential for the impact on FDI in tran-
sition countries. Direct sales (through auction) seem to be the best form for
attracting FDI followed by stock issuing. The latter seems to be somewhat less
preferable since it is often used when a certain investor is already envisaged
as potential owner. By contrast, voucher and insider privatizations as well as
management and employee buy outs seem to have a deterring effect on MNCs.
Therefore, countries using these methods in the early 1990s, such as Roma-
nia and the Czech Republic, apparently had lower privatization revenues from
MNCs during that period.2114
2109 See also Holland and Pain (1998).
2110 See Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007); see also Sinn and Weichenrieder (1997).
2111 See, however, Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
2112 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority
I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007).
2113 See e. g. Holland and Pain (1998); Carstensen and Toubal (2004); Merlevede and Schoors
(2005).
2114 See also Smarzynska (2002); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Toubal (2004).
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Thirdly, the analyses of this section also reveal (although this aspect tends
not to be covered by FDI studies) that the work of the privatization institutions
may – at least indirectly – affect the decision of foreign investors to participate
in privatizations in transition countries. Coordination problems among the var-
ious institutions responsible for privatization (as in Romania), the low levels of
transparency of the decision-making process (as in Croatia) as well as the prob-
lems in restructuring SOEs (in both countries) decreased the attractiveness for
MNCs to invest in these countries.2115
Finally, some important interdependences can be identified. An attractive
privatization policy only seems to be enhancing factor for a larger number
of foreign investors if a certain macro-economic stability (as in Poland in 1992
when the stabilization program kicked in)2116 and a minimum of legal standards
is achieved. Legal factors such as property rights and legal certainty actually
seem to have been even more important as determinants for the investment
decision for many MNCs in EECs in the 1990s than privatization policy was.2117
Furthermore, privatization policy can also have a positive impact on greenfield
investments (as shown above) when a more progressive privatization strategy
comes along with a more investor-friendly environment and more transparent
bureaucratic procedures.2118
(2) The performance of privatization policy has strongly differed across
transition countries. Most CEECs apparently started privatization faster and
more effectively than SEECs and European CIS.2119 By 1995 the private sector
2115 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construc-
tion (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
2116 See Altomonte (1998).
2117 See also Genco, Taurelli, and Viezzoli (1993); Savary (1997).
2118 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); see also Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Holland,
Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000).
2119 See for country group definitions: section 3.1.1.
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share of the first group had already reached 61%, but only 47% in SEECs and
30% in European CIS (figure 50).2120
The speed and success apparently strongly depended on the method of pri-
vatization, whereas CEECs focused more strongly on direct sales even in the
early phase of transition, while SEECs (as shown for Romania) rather relied
on insider privatizations as well as management and employee buy-outs in the
early 1990s (as in the former Yugoslavian countries).2121 CEECs were also more
active in large-scale privatizations in the early 1990s. The eight CEECs reached
an average score in the respective EBRD index of 3.21 in 1995, whilst the eight
SEECs only reached 1.75.2122
However, SEECs significantly accelerated privatization efforts in the late
1990s and are – unlike European CIS – more or less on the level of CEECs
today.2123 Accordingly, the private sector reached an average of 76% and 71%
of GDP in CEECs and SEECs respectively (while the European CIS are still
trailing with 52%).2124
Large-scale (3.95 out of 5 points) and small-scale privatizations (3.33) are
on average quite advanced in EECs, while the greatest problem remains enter-
prise restructuring averaging 2.72. As in Romania and Croatia, privatization
authorities apparently still have many loss-making companies in their portfolio
for which they have problems in finding adequate buyers.2125
(3) Several public policy implications can be drawn for privatization pol-
icy in transition countries. Privatization has been necessary and useful for tran-
2120 SEECs without Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina; see EBRD (2007b);
see also Lankes and Venables (1996); Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000).
2121 Czech Republic and Slovakia also with strong focus on voucher privatization in early
phases; see Holland, Sass, Benacek, and Gronicki (2000); see also World Bank (2003),
p.85; Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Broadman, Anderson, and Claessens (2004),
pp.224-226.
2122 The three European CIS with 2.22; see EBRD (2007b).
2123 See also Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003)
2124 See EBRD (2007b); see also Broadman, Anderson, and Claessens (2004), p.252.
2125 See EBRD (2007b); see also Broadman, Anderson, and Claessens (2004); Intv. Supra-
national Authority II (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
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sition countries but the analyses show that higher private sector shares and
privatization sales do not necessarily generate higher FDI inflows per se. They
also do not automatically lead to higher competition, lower product prices or
higher quality in transition economies. Therefore, public policy actors need to
consider certain prerequisites in order to benefit from privatization.
Public policy makers should accept privatization as a top priority for the cre-
ation of a favorable investment environment. Given the highly sensitive nature
of privatization, even more than investment climate (discussed above), public
policy should work towards full political support of a consistent and transparent
privatization strategy free from resentments and local interests.
Public policy should focus on direct sales and stock issuing – even before
transition countries enhance EU integration – since these methods tend to
decrease possibilities of corruption and generally increase the number of reliable
and strategic investors. Other methods, such as voucher privatizations, often
lead to inefficient company structures and are not necessarily more socially
acceptable.
Privatization should be organized through a single authority whose work
is based on a strong legal framework and is ideally privately organized (with
government supervision) in order to act flexibly. Employees of the authority and
the officials restructuring SOEs should be renumerated based on an incentive-
oriented salary scheme which rewards a quick sale of healthy and competitive
companies.
Public policy needs to provide economic structures that can successfully cope
with the effects of large privatized companies in the hand of strategic investors;
they need to exploit the possibilities of competition policy but also anticipate
potential restructuring, for instance, by strengthening re-education measures
(see below).
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With these conditions fulfilled, governments should not hesitate to privatize
remaining SOEs as quickly as possible without awaiting the opportunity for
better deals (as discussed for Romania) since the risks and negative effects (on
company, employees and consumers) outweigh the potential benefit of a higher
sales price.
Finally, public policy makers have to realize that their influence on economic
measures is shrinking with the continued sale of state assets. Therefore, gov-
ernments need to focus more on the facilitation of greenfield investments, also
by a stronger investment promotion of their countries.
7.3.5 Investment promotion
7.3.5.1 Definition
In order to promote investments, public policy makers may attempt to improve
the awareness and knowledge of transition countries. Investors may be attracted
in particular by direct promotion efforts of central and local politicians, an
effective investment promotion agency as well as by a positive image of the
country.2126
7.3.5.2 Romania
With respect to investment promotion in Romania, interviewees show –
although the insights of FDI literature regarding this subject are rare – that
(1) the commitment of politics has varied from government to government and
(2) that the impact of Romanian Agency for Foreign Investments (ARIS) has
been limited. The (3) image of Romania has been rather negative abroad but is
improving in recent years and (4) the impact of investment promotion seems to
2126 See Wells and Wint (2000); Loewendahl (2001); Cho (2003); UNIDO (2003); OECD
(2003c); Rajan (2004).
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be quite significant for the attraction of FDI in Romania overall. An assessment
of the findings is presented in sub-section (5).
(1) Interviews suggest that an active investment promotion barely existed in
Romania in the 1990s. Governments did not see the need for promoting the
country abroad and no coherent strategy was established.2127
With increasing reform efforts aiming at EU accession, politicians appar-
ently acknowledged the necessity to campaign for Romania, mainly in political
terms in order to gain support for EU membership (section 7.4.4) but also in
economic terms since the competition among EECs for investors became more
intense in the early 2000s.2128 Most interviewees agree that the government of
Prime Minister Na˘stase (2000-2004) was the first one that accepted the task
of a more active investment promotion. Thus several members of the cabinet
themselves were actively canvassing potential investors, for example, by several
trips abroad to fairs. The prime minister came to Germany three times within
four years in order to speak to potential investors. Roadshows organized by the
embassies also increased at that time.2129
Following the change in government (2004) most interviewees agree that
investment promotion has decreased again.2130 This is exemplified by less pro-
motion visits abroad – Prime Minister Popescu-Ta˘riceanu did not come to
Germany for investor talks until mid-2007 –, and by the experience of MNCs
that the access to ministers has become more difficult.2131 Reasons for this
development may be different policy priorities, but also the ongoing political
2127 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007);
Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
2128 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007).
2129 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); see also Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv.
German Authority IV (2007).
2130 See e. g. Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); more positive: Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I
(2007).
2131 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
V (2007); see also Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
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quarrels (section 7.4.2) and the perception that a promotion of Romania has
become less important since EU membership has been reached and FDI inflows
are significant anyway.2132
Interviewees also identify significant regional differences in terms of invest-
ment promotion. In Bucharest investment promotions seem to be widely ne-
glected and no specific authority exists. Communities with a better reputa-
tion for an active investment promotion are, for instance, Baia Mare (with
about 20 employees in the respective department) and to some extent Ias¸i and
Timisoara.2133 Sibiu is again mentioned as a positive example. Yet, even Sibiu
does not have a special marketing strategy (besides one for tourism) that would
comprise certain target country groups or industries. Investment promotion is
rather based on a positive attitude towards FDI there and a fairly efficient
bureaucracy (see above).2134
(2) The Romanian Development Agency, founded in 1991, was hardly in
use, had no visible success and was closed in 1997. As a consequence of a
more active approach towards investment promotion since the early 2000s (see
above), Romania established the (ARIS) in 2002 (Law no. 390/2002).2135
The responsibility of ARIS is to identify potential investors, establish con-
tacts between investors and authorities, improve the image of Romania abroad,
and advise MNCs throughout their investment engagement, for example, re-
garding the location of their investment within Romania. All services provided
by ARIS are free of charge. Its specific focus is large greenfield investments
of at least e1M.2136 According to Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007) ARIS
primarily targets investments from the EU, followed by other European FDI
2132 See also OECD (2006a), p.61.
2133 See e. g. Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
2134 See Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv.
Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
2135 See e. g. Hunya (2000); BA-CA (2006), p.30.
2136 See ARIS website (2008); BA-CA (2006), p.30; Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II
(2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
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before investments from MNCs outside of Europe such as the U.S. and East-
ern Asia (with increasing focus on China). ARIS is therefore in contact with
foreign institutions in Romania (such as business clubs, GTZ etc.) and also
participates in events abroad such as business exchanges and roadshows, for
example in Austria and Germany but also in China.2137
Interviews and data suggest several insights regarding the performance of
ARIS. Overall, the majority of MNCs does not seem to be overly satisfied with
the work of ARIS.2138 Most importantly, the success of ARIS in attracting
investors has remained limited. Whereas several hundred projects registered for
doing business in Romania through ARIS since 20022139, the number of projects
that were actually successfully assisted and monitored by ARIS has been more
moderate, for example, 12 projects in 2004 as well as nine and 24 projects
in the subsequent years.2140 Furthermore, despite its official focus on large-
scale (greenfield) investments, projects that were assisted by ARIS remained
rather small and even decreased in terms of volume in recent years averaging
e24M (2004), e21M (2005) and e20M (2006).2141 Interviewees confirm: “Large
companies did not come to Romania via ARIS.”2142
The reasons for these shortcomings seem to be manifold. First of all, ARIS
has lacked a consistent strategy and personnel since it has constantly been
re-organized since 2002 and leaders were frequently exchanged. ARIS has also
been given only little power in establishing tools in order to attract FDI while
2137 See also Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv.
Austrian Econ. Association I (2007).
2138 See e. g. Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Int’l
Econ. Association (2007).
2139 391 projects until mid 2005 alone; see Larive Romania (2006), p.44; OECD (2005d).
2140 17 additional projects to be implemented between 2003 and 2008; see ARIS website
(2008); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007).
2141 See ARIS website (2008); own calculations.
2142 Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
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most of the important decisions are taken in the ministries.2143 Moreover, the
budget of ARIS has remained fairly low with about e500K in 2005 and only
increased to about e650K in 2008.2144 The number of staff has stayed on a low
level with 26 employees in late 2007 (of which 12-14 have direct contacts to
investors) which is significantly lower than in investment promotion agencies
of other EECs.2145 For example, CzechInvest had 179 employeed in 2006.2146
Furthermore, the relevance of ARIS and its work has apparently decreased
since Romania’s accession to the EU. Various interviewees point out that the
work of ARIS has been hampered by stricter EU rules regarding investment
incentives (see above), and more severely by political quarrels that have been
aggravated by the appointment of the agency’s leading figures from rivaling
parties. Apparently, some members of the central government did not see the
need to assist large investors free of charges. ARIS may sometimes be headed
by politicians without detailed knowledge regarding the concerns of investors
and only limited international experience and foreign language skills.2147
The necessity to receive important information from ARIS has decreased
for many investors in recent years since more information has become publicly
available (also due to EU accession) and more investors are present in Roma-
nia who can provide first-hand experience to potential investors. Finally, an
increasing number of other organizations offer similar information and assis-
tance including economic clubs, chambers of commerce, business consultants
etc. Interviews suggest that MNCs often prefer services by these organizations,
even if they have to pay fees for them, because assistance from organizations
2143 See e. g. Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007);
see also OECD (2006a), pp.60-61.
2144 See also ARIS website (2008); Larive Romania (2007); OECD (2005d); own calculations.
2145 See also Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
2146 See Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); see also CzechInvest (2007).
2147 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
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that are not associated with the Romanian government may seem to be less
biased and more credible.2148
Nevertheless, interviews also show that those MNCs that did receive support
from ARIS were generally satisfied, particularly when the investments were
conducted between 2004 and 2006. They appreciated the helpful and efficient
assistance in the pre-investment phase (including the organization and execu-
tion of site visits) as well as in later investment periods when ARIS employees
apparently helped to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and to facilitate access to
local and central authorities.2149
(3) The image of Romania has been fairly bad among Western Europeans
overall. This is reflected, for example, in the limited support of the public in
EU countries for Romania’s EU accession in the past. As shown in figure 52
the German support for Romania has remained low since the mid-1990s and
only reached 29% in late 2006 at a time when Romania had already been
granted accession to the EU.2150 It is certatin that the limited support of
the German population (in line with the findings for other old EU member
states) for EU enlargement is largely due to fears about its economic, social and
political impact.2151 However, figure 52 reveals that country-specific differences
do exist. Accordingly, five out of eight countries analyzed of the region received
more support from the German public than Romania in 2006 including (albeit
only minimal) Bulgaria (31%) and Ukraine (30%). Furthermore, the support
of Germans in favor of Romania’s EU accession increased by only 7 percent
2148 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer
Goods (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007).
2149 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods
II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007).
2150 See European Commission (1996b); European Commission (2002b); European Commis-
sion (2007c); according to a different survey of “Die Welt” 39% of Germans were in favor
Romania’s EU accession; see Focus website (2006).
2151 See also Gabanyi (2005); Menzer (2006); Leiße (2006); Pfaller (2007).
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Figure 52: Public opinion about EU accession in selected countries
points from 1996 to 2006 which represents the second lowest improvement of
eight countries analyzed (after Albania).
Interviewees and secondary literature confirm that Romania has traditionally
had a reputation of being a particularly poor country. In this context, Western
Europeans often seemed to connect Romania to its minority problems, namely
to the Roma, whose lifestyle and presence in Western European countries has
caused prejudice and resentments among inhabitants of these countries for cen-
turies.2152
Furthermore, the public in Germany and other Western European countries
has apparently been skeptical for many years as to whether Romania is capable
of establishing an effective democracy, given the authoritarian leaderships of
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (until 1965) and Nicolae Ceaus¸escu, and the polit-
2152 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I
(2007); see also Boia (2006).
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ical instability of Romania in the early 1990s (section 7.4.2.2). The political
classes of some EU countries tended to observe Romania critically in the early
1990s because they were concerned that Romania would strive to become an
important power again, comparable to the times of Greater Romania (1918-
1940).2153 Even recent surveys suggest that some prejudice among decision-
makers remain; a survey among EU officials in mid-2006 produced that 66%
of the respondents considered Romania an old-fashioned country and 52% of
them believed that Romania was disorganized.2154
Interviewees agree that Romanian governments have done little in the past
in order to actively improve the image of their country; apparently, most key
politicians have assumed that the successes in reform efforts itself, including
EU accession, would improve the reputation of Romania.2155
Nevertheless, the image of Romania has started to improve in recent years.
The main reasons for this were that people in Western Europe expected that
the situation would improve with Romania’s integration towards the EU. In the
course of EU negotiations Romania increasingly drew the attention of political
and economic observers which also resulted in a more extensive media coverage
in Western European countries. Moreover, MNCs, who had good experiences
with their investments, served as multipliers. Finally, some of the measures
to promote investments discussed above may also have contributed to this
improvement in an indirect way.2156
(4) FDI research dealing with the impact of investment promotion on FDI
inflows in general and regarding Romania in particular is very scarce.2157 How-
2153 See several disguised state expert interviews; see also Boia (2006).
2154 See Europa Digital (2006).
2155 See Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); Intv.
German Econ. Association III (2007).
2156 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv.
German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv.
German Authority IV (2007).
2157 See Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); see also Hunya (2000); Loewendahl (2001);
Cho (2003); Rajan (2004).
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ever, interviews2158 and a few studies2159 suggest that the three dimensions
analyzed (the government commitment, the work of ARIS as well as Roma-
nia’s image in Western Europe) have had a significant impact on FDI in Ro-
mania. With respect to the 1990s, mainly the negative image of Romania and
(to some extent) also the absence of an effective investment promotion agency
apparently had a deterring effect on some investors, particularly on more-risk
averse MNCs, for example from Germany.
Most interviewees also acknowledge that investment promotion could have
been an important enhancing factor in Romania since 2000.2160 A stronger
government commitment and a more effective work of ARIS may have helped
to improve the image of Romania, close the large information gaps of potential
investors and – in the end – lead to higher FDI in Romania. However, inter-
viewees emphasize, in line with general findings from external studies2161, that
MNCs repeatedly decided not to invest in Romania because they did not know
enough about the country and its investment conditions. Therefore, it seems
that ARIS has not reached many investors. Various experts interviewed had
not heard of ARIS, only very few had been in contact with the agency and the
great majority of interviewees believes that most MNCs would also have come
to Romania without the existence of ARIS.2162
In sum, the investment promotion of Romania in recent years has somewhat
contributed to a better knowledge of investors, but has definitely not reached
2158 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II
(2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
2159 See e. g. International Centre for Entrepreneurial Studies (1999); OECD (2006a).
2160 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I
(2007).
2161 See UNCTAD (2006), p.220.
2162 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
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its full potential in order to create a significantly better image of Romania and
facilitate higher levels of FDI inflows.2163
(5) The assessment of investment promotion in Romania suggests that pub-
lic policy makers have realized the possibilities of an active investment promo-
tion fairly late. More importantly, they have underestimated the negative effects
of a bad reputation, stereotypes and a lack of information on potential MNCs
from Western Europe, also compared to other EECs.
With its accession to the EU Romania’s possibilities to actively design a fa-
vorable investment environment, for example regarding investment incentives,
monetary policy etc. have become more limited. Therefore, investment promo-
tion will gain more importance and Romania will need to work on all (inter-
linked) dimensions discussed.
In particular, ARIS’ potential has not fully been tapped so far. Based on a
new investment law (see above) and following the overcoming of the ongoing
political quarrels, ARIS may have the opportunity to play an important role
in providing helpful information in times of increasing real estate prices and
labor shortage in Romania. With an effective set-up, sufficient budget and close
cooperation with central and local authorities, ARIS may have an advantage
over other information providers in helping smoothing investment imbalances
and mitigating the effects of asymmetric information among potential investors.
7.3.5.3 Croatia
The (1) commitment of Croatia’s governments to promote investments has only
recently increased significantly. In this context, (2) the Trade and Investment
Promotion Agency (APIU) has not reached its full potential, yet. The (3) image
of Croatia is fairly good abroad. However, (4) investment promotion has not
2163 Understandably with a more positive view: Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
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been able to significantly influence FDI inflows to Croatia so far. An assessment
is provided in sub-section (5).
(1) Interviews and secondary literature show that Croatian public policy
makers did not see the need for an active investment promotion until the
early 2000s. FDI was – as discussed in several sections before – not always
desired by Croatian officials and, furthermore, it appeared that FDI (particu-
larly in tourism) was flowing in even without distinctive government marketing
policies.2164
When the Tudman era ended in the late 1990s, investment promotion rep-
resented a tool for Croatian public policy actors to support the envisaged in-
tegration into Western Europe and also to counter the ongoing disputes with
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) regard-
ing the extradition of former members of the Croatian armed forces who were
accused of war crimes (see section 7.4.2.2).2165
Under Prime Minister Sanader the commitment of the Croatian government
to present Croatia as an attractive investment location further increased. This
was also in order to back up the EU accession negotiations that started in 2005
and following the trend of a more active investment promotion in many other
EECs. Therefore, Sanader and his government used many of their visits abroad
(after taking office in 2003) to campaign for Croatia’s EU accession but also for
Croatia as investment location.2166 Many experts certify that Croatia is doing
quite well today overall in terms of self-marketing.2167
Nevertheless, interviewees identify some important remaining shortcomings
of Croatia’s investment promotion policy even today. Various interviewees make
the criticism (as they do for Romania) that investment promotion still does
2164 See e. g. Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
2165 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunica-
tions (2007).
2166 See e. g. Sanader (2006).
2167 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommuni-
cations (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
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not follow a coherent strategy and that political commitment of top officials re-
mains very abstract. For example, experts interviewed refer to several business-
related conferences in which senior officials canceled their participation at the
last minute. Furthermore, experts see room for improvements regarding the
communication of investment goals to (domestic and foreign) investors, for ex-
ample by making bilingual tenders compulsory and enhancing e-government
services.2168 Experts also criticize that Croatia’s participation at fairs has been
quite unprofessional with regards to the organization, distribution of responsi-
bilities, materials etc.2169
As in Romania, the performance of regional investment promotion seems to
depend strongly on individuals and the quality of respective policies generally
corresponds to the performance in other policy fields discussed including the
quality of bureaucracy, investment policy etc. Finally, experts interviewed per-
ceive that local communities that are further away from Zagreb receive less
support from central authorities in terms of investment promotion.2170
(2) The assistance of investors interested in Croatia was usually handled by
local authorities in the past and – even though the Investment Facilitation Di-
vision had already been established in the Ministry of Economy in the early
2000s – a functioning investment promotion agency did not exist in Croatia for
a long time.2171 In late 2005 (APIU) became fully operational because the gov-
ernment aimed at a more active investment promotion approach and because
many local communities did not know how to deal with foreign investors.2172
2168 See e. g. Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate
(2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
2169 See disguised expert interview; see also Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
2170 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. German
Econ. Association IV (2007).
2171 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Bulgaria Economic Forum (2005), p.60.
2172 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); OECD
(2006a) p.61.
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APIU’s main tasks are to facilitate higher investments by providing economic
and legal information, organizing site visits, assisting investors in getting per-
mits, and connecting potential investors to local and central authorities as
well as to business partners. Services are (as in Romania) provided free of
charges.2173 In 2006 APIU also received the right to establish PPPs.2174
A comprehensive evaluation of APIU’s performance may be somewhat too
early. Nevertheless, interviews reveal some first insights.
Apparently, investment promotion has significantly improved since the full
establishment of APIU and the agency has helped to provide more reliable
information and somewhat contributed to a better marketing of Croatia as
attractive investment location. The positive assessment is mainly associated
with the person of the Director, Dr. Mikac. He has the reputation of being a
fairly good political support, hands-on and of “knowing how to talk to business
people”2175.
On the other hand, interviewees criticize that the strong focus of investment
promotion on one person may also have had – at least in the beginning – neg-
ative side effects, including a very hierarchical set-up of the agency and little
delegation of work.2176 Furthermore, interviewees as well as external sources
still do not recognize a comprehensive investment promotion strategy; state
experts in particular believe that the strategies developed for specific target
industries (see above) still lack sufficient detail and resources for a successful
implementation. They also see problems in an insufficient coordination of in-
2173 See OECD (2005b), p.23; Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); APIU (2007); APIU web-
site (2008).
2174 GO 104/2006 and GO 138/06; see Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006), p.168; APIU website
(2008).
2175 Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); see also Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate
(2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv.
Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Financial Services I (2007); OECD (2005a),p.45.
2176 See several disguised expert statements.
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vestment promotion with other agencies including the various Croatian Cham-
bers of Commerce.2177
Despite Croatia’s re-organization of APIU (which followed some of the ideas
of CzechInvest), the gaps still seem to be significant according to interviewees
and secondary literature considering that APIU only has about 15% of the
number of staff of CzechInvest.2178 Interviewees also criticize that APIU used to
provide very little pro-active support of potential and existing MNCs and that
many of the activities and materials tended to lack the required professionalism
including various mistakes in publications.2179
Overall, most interviewees report that very few investors have taken advan-
tage of the assistance of APIU so far.2180
Finally, some experts also argue that the re-organization and strengthening
of APIU may have taken place too late considering that other EECs have been
able to establish a competitive advantage with their investment promotion
agencies and that the possibilities of an active investment policy for Croatia
decrease once it has acceded the EU.2181
(3) Croatia has traditionally had a fairly positive image among Western
Europeans. Figure 52 reveals that 44% of Germans were in favor of an EU
accession of Croatia in 2006, the highest value for the eight countries analyzed.
Furthermore, Croatia’s image significantly improved since 1996 when only 21%
favored an EU accession of Croatia.2182
2177 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Former
Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); see also OECD (2006a),
pp.60-61.
2178 30 employees in 2007; budget figures are not open to the public; see OECD (2006a),
p.61; APIU website (2008); Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. German Econ.
Association IV (2007).
2179 See several disguised expert statements.
2180 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
2181 See Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); also OECD (2006a), p.62; Doc - OECD
(2007).
2182 See European Commission (2007c).
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Interviews2183 and secondary literature2184 help to explain this evolution.
Croatia’s mediocre performance in public opinion in the mid-1990s seems to
have been driven by the impact of the war. Many foreign observers evaluated
the whole Western Balkan region as too risky for closer political and economic
cooperation. Furthermore, Croatia’s involvement in the war, disputes with the
ICTY (see above) as well as the authoritarian style of President Tudman led to
resentment not only amongst the public but also in the political classes both
in EU member states like Germany but also in the European Commission.
However, Croatia was apparently able to quickly regain the support of the
Western European public when the country opened up to the West again, the
cooperation with the ICTY increased and the political stability of Croatia and
the region in general improved since the late 1990s (section 7.4.2.3). This dra-
matic recovery of Croatia’ reputation was built on a fairly good country image
that goes back to the time before 1990, when Croatia (as part of Yugoslavia)
had already been known among many Western Europeans as attractive (and
fairly cheap) tourist destination. This positive image was also fueled by the im-
pression that Tito’s socialism had not been as rigid as the political conditions
in other EECs.2185 Finally, Croatia quickly gained the reputation in the 2000s
of being a quite wealthy nation with good living conditions similar to Western
European standards (section 3.1.3) A further improvement of Croatia’s image
following its accession to the EU.2186
Nevertheless, experts interviewed identify some remaining problems regard-
ing Croatia’s image. Apparently, the perception of Croatia’s war heritage
strongly varies among Western Europeans, especially if they are not very famil-
iar with the region. Some wonder if political tensions, landmines etc. still make
2183 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
2184 See also Hajdinjak (2001); Kusˇic´ and Grupe (2005).
2185 See section 6.3.1; see also Doc - Germ. MNC - Engineering (2001); Ott (2005).
2186 See Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); see also Altmann (2005a); Altmann
(2005b); Lejour, Mervar, and Verweij (2007); Doc - Ekonomski Institut Zagreb (2007).
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working and traveling in Croatia and neighboring countries dangerous.2187 Oth-
ers apparently do not consider the war heritage to have any impact on doing
business in Croatia at all. In reality, company experts reveal, the war heritage
sometimes becomes an issue in a later stage of investment planning, for exam-
ple, when they consider FDI in Slavonia where some the urban landscape as
well as the economic viability of the region is still affected by material damage.
Investors also suggest that the re-integration of Serbs can still be a sensitive
topic that can be problematic for them.2188
More recently, the positive image of Croatia seems to suffer from the problems
and obstacles that some foreign investors experienced during their commitment
in Croatia (as analyzed, for example, for various legal measures above). The
actual performance of Croatia may not have been worse than in other SEECs,
but the generally positive image of Croatia led to higher expectations, for in-
stance, with respect to the quality of bureaucracy and land registration. It
seems that the disappointments of some investors are also experienced by po-
tential investors in their home countries and contribute to a somewhat more
skeptical image of Croatia.2189
The Croatian government is apparently aware of these remaining problems.
Thus the improvement of Croatia’s international image was already declared as
one of five government priorities of the Sanader administration after the election
in 2003 and is also passed on as a task to subsequent authorities including
Croatian embassies.2190
(4) The impact of investment promotion in Croatia has not been tested
systematically by FDI studies so far.2191 However, interviews reveal that the
2187 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2188 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv.
Croatian Mayor (2007).
2189 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007).
2190 See European Commission (2004c), p.6; Pommer (2007), p.126.
2191 See Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
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problems with investment promotion were a deterring factor for FDI inflows to
Croatia in the 1990s. Particularly the negative image of Croatia being located
in a politically unstable region (see below) apparently led to the decision of po-
tential MNCs to invest elsewhere. In fact, state interviewees in particular point
out that the war and its heritage may actually have been an essential problem
for FDI in Croatia, since it supposedly missed the first wave of the largest and
most attractive MNCs.2192 Furthermore, the limited interest and organization
to assist investors both on the local and central level has apparently somewhat
contributed to lower inflows in Croatia in the 1990s and early 2000s.2193
The findings of the interviews suggest that the current “status” of the dif-
ferent dimensions of investment promotion (government commitment, APIU
performance and country image) only have limited impact on FDI. To some
extent Croatia seems to benefit from the positive elements of its image which
is, however, somewhat put into perspective by the more skeptical experiences
of some investors. Furthermore, APIU seems to be fully operational too shortly
in order to significantly influence the investment decision of MNCs.2194
(5) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that Croatia
realized fairly late (as did Romania too) the necessity for an active investment
promotion – although this delay may be understandable in the context of the
war – and relied too long on its natural advantages (such as the coastline). It
also neglected the damage on the image of Croatia as investment location that
has been caused by the war as well as by legal and administrative deficiencies.
Nevertheless (and maybe even more clearly than in Romania), it seems that
Croatia’s officials have acknowledged the need for an improvement of the coun-
try’s reputation abroad even if they do have always acted accordingly until
2192 See Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv.
Croatian Mayor (2007).
2193 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2194 See e. g. Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
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now. Furthermore, it seems that some company experts interviewed may actu-
ally underestimate the potential long-term benefits of APIU. The agency will
be able to establish better information for Western Europeans (who often lack
sufficient knowledge regarding the situation) in the years to come, for example,
with respect to the political stability of Croatia and the region in general.
By contrast, state interviewees may somewhat overestimate the negative im-
pact of the war on FDI inflows since other determinants (discussed before in
this thesis) seem to play a major role in this context as well. Public policy actors
should improve investment promotion through an even more credible commit-
ment of top politicians (for example regarding the participation of business
events). APIU should also become more effective including a better delegation
of work. Croatia still seems to have significant potential for large-scale FDI (in
contrast to the opinion of some state experts), since re-locations continue in
Europe and within Eastern Europe and economic growth will generate large
MNCs and potential FDI in the future as well.
MNCs in Croatia should also consider a stronger coordination with other key
influencers, for example by the establishment of business clubs (as in Roma-
nia), in order to serve as contact point for unfiltered information for potential
investors and to better bundle MNCs’ interests in a non-governmental organi-
zation which may be more credible partners for the Croatian government than,
for example, semi-public Chambers of Commerce.
7.3.5.4 General insights for transition countries
The analysis of the previous country sections and the study of related FDI
studies allows for several insights regarding investment promotion in transi-
tion countries in general, especially with respect to (1) its significance, (2)
differences between state and company interviewees and some (3) public policy
implications.
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(1) The qualitative findings of this section confirm the few FDI studies that
empirically examine the impact of investment promotion on FDI; therefore,
higher investment promotion seems to foster FDI growth.2195 It seems that
investment promotion can be among the most important determinants for FDI
attraction for transition countries comparable to property rights and privatiza-
tion, particularly when a country image is fairly poor and knowledge about the
country is limited. However, it seems that many countries have not yet learned
how to use this factor effectively.
The empirical FDI studies analyzed focus on the impact of the investment
promotion agency. It seems that agencies with high budgets, large staff, visible
presence abroad, reporting mechanisms to higher policy levels, continuity in
the leadership team, strong cooperation with investors, and focus on specific
countries and industries (as mentioned in the case of CzechInvest) have the
greatest potential to influence the investment decision of MNCs.2196
In functional terms, interviews suggest that the impact of these agencies is
specifically driven by their ability to provide useful information and to give
assistance when problems occur, for example with licenses on the local level.
Furthermore, they can be essential when economic constraints (such as labor
shortage and high real estate prices in Romania) may lead to informative ad-
vantages of state agencies compared to other providers.2197
In addition to this (and in accordance with several theoretical studies2198),
this thesis suggests that other dimensions of investment promotion, namely gov-
2195 See Wells and Wint (2000); Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004); Gabriel (2006).
2196 CzechInvest also won various international prices for its work including European Invest-
ment Promotion Agency of the Year 2000 and 2001; see CzechInvest website (2008); see
also Hunya (2000); te Velde (2001); Morisset (2003); UNCTAD (2006), p.223; Intv. Ger-
man Econ. Association VI (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Consulting II (2007).
2197 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); see also Loewendahl (2001); FIAS
(2007), p.4.
2198 See e. g. Loewendahl (2001); Cho (2003); Rajan (2004); OECD (2006a).
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ernment commitment and country image, also influence the investment decision
of MNCs. FIAS (2007) finds that “opinions, perceptions and anecdotal expe-
rience play a crucial role in shaping the investors’ image of a country’s attrac-
tiveness.” UNCTAD (1998) even assumes that the country image is among the
most important factors for business facilitation.2199 Interviews indicate that the
country image can be crucial for the first approach to a country. A (subjective)
negative image may mean that MNCs will not even consider an investment in a
specific country (as in Romania in the 1990s). This seems especially to be true
for smaller investors for which personal reasons play a more important role in
the country selection than for larger companies in which more decision-makers
are involved in the investment planning.2200 An important problem for many
transition countries was apparently their fairly poor image after 1990s which
stemmed from stereotypes, lack of knowledge, war (in former Yugoslavia) as
well as other country-specific deficiencies discussed throughout the thesis.2201
Regarding the government commitment, analyses suggest that a pro-active
promotion of investors abroad by key politicians is positively perceived by po-
tential investors and may help to overcome first objections towards a country.
However, it seems (as in the case of Croatia) that governments need to follow
this approach continuously and as part of a coherent strategy in order to be
credible and successful.2202
(2) The analyses of interviews show some important differences between
state and company interviewees. State representative tend to somewhat
underestimate the importance of the country image. As in the case of Romania,
governments often (falsely) believe that reforms alone will prove critics and
2199 See also Kalotay (2000).
2200 See Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
2201 See also Falcetti, Sanfey, and Taci (2003); OECD (2006a).
2202 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
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stereotypes wrong, while company experts are generally more aware of the
long-lasting effects of the image of the host country.2203
On the other hand, company experts may sometimes underestimate the ef-
fects of investment promotion policies, notably of investment promotion agen-
cies. They generally believe that companies would also invest without the agen-
cies but neglect the long-term benefits with respect to image- and information-
building of these institutions. In some transition countries (particularly when
the number of investors is still limited in absolute terms as in Croatia) MNCs
may also underestimate their own impact on influencing the image of the host
country in their home countries, for example, through the establishment of
business clubs etc.2204
(3) Public policy makers in transition countries should be aware that coun-
try stereotypes are difficult to overcome. For example, many Western Euro-
peans apparently have had a more negative image of Romania regarding some
of its legal determinants (see above) than the analysis of its performance would
suggest. On the other hand, the example of Croatia shows that high expec-
tations may sometimes be disappointed in reality which can lead to a dete-
rioration in the country image, at least among business people. Public policy
actors should therefore thoroughly evaluate the outside perceptions of their
country. They should then use investment promotion agencies as well as key
politicians in order to disperse (negative) misperceptions abroad (such as the
alleged striving for power by Romania). Governments may also make use of
emigrants (which could be helpful for both Romania and Croatia) as multi-
pliers and country promoters. They should however, carefully use the different
possibilities of investment promotion, since an unprofessional participation at
fairs, for example, may actually harm the reputation of a country.2205
2203 See sections above of for various references.
2204 See also Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering
(2007).
2205 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); see also te Velde (2001).
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Furthermore, public policy has to tackle those deficient fundamentals (such as
corruption in various transition countries) for which a negative image may have
a real cause.2206 Therefore, investment promotion alone is generally not suffi-
cient but interdependent to other determinants depending on the host country
situation.
Overall, public policy should be aware that investment promotion is a labori-
ous task that takes a lot of time, continuity and political support from all polit-
ical participants in order to be successful. State actors should not feel deterred
by pundits who question the impact of investment promotion, even though the
success of the work is generally only an indirect one. Yet, it seems that invest-
ment promotion starts to replace investment policy with decreasing possibilities
of investment incentives in many progressing transition countries.2207
7.3.6 Overview of findings on economic measures
This section presents a summary of the analyses of this thesis with respect to
economic measures. Figure 53 gives an overview of the findings regarding the
performance of Romania’s and Croatia’s economic determinants and presents
an evaluation based on the analyses of the interviews conducted, expert doc-
uments and secondary studies. The results of the analyses of this section re-
garding the importance of economic determinants for transition countries in
general are presented in figure 54. The evaluation of both performance and
importance follows the same methodology as presented in the overview of the
legal measures (section 7.2.6).
2206 See also Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
2207 See also Hunya (2000).
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Figure 54: Overview economic determinants – importance
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7.4 Political measures
This section discusses political measures that can be influenced by public pol-
icy actors in order to create – directly or indirectly – favorable conditions
for FDI. Determinants analyzed are human capital (7.4.1), political stability
(7.4.2), corruption (7.4.3), and EU integration (7.4.4). Section 7.4.5 provides
an overview of the results.
7.4.1 Human capital
7.4.1.1 Definition
Interviewees and FDI studies (as discussed in section 6) indicate that human
capital is an important determinant for the investment decision of MNCs. FDI
studies generally focus on enrollment ratios of tertiary level students, while in-
terviews suggest a more thorough approach.2208 Therefore, this section analyzes
(1) the education level of host country employees focusing on the two most im-
portant groups for MNCs, skilled workers and university graduates (mainly
engineers and business economists). Subsequently, (2) the availability of la-
bor is analyzed including the performance of the education system, emigration
and labor mobility. Country-specific conclusions for Romania and Croatia are
presented in sections (3).2209
7.4.1.2 Romania
(1) The analysis of the level of education in Romania reveals that investors
are (a) generally satisfied with the skill level of their Romanian staff, even
though (b) problems exist with the education of skilled workers. Significant (c)
differences exist with respect to the university education. The skill level (d) is
2208 See also Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003); Dunning (1993); Globerman and Shapiro (1999).
2209 See also for this approach OECD (2006a); Doc - Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2005); .
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quite important for the investment decision of MNCs. The results are assessed
in sub-section (e).
(a) Interviews indicate that investors are quite satisfied with the general
educational level of the labor force in Romania. Apparently, MNCs have
often been positively surprised – particularly in early years of transition – by
regards to the skill level of Romanians. MNCs also report that the skill level
in competing countries, such as Ukraine and Bulgaria, seems to be lower than
in Romania overall.2210
Interviews suggest that MNCs are especially satisfied with the science skills
of Romanian employees.2211 Romania’s good performance in this field is also
confirmed by international statistics. According to World Economic Forum
(2007), the quality of Romania’s math and science education is ranked 12th
out of 131 countries. This position is also the second highest among 18 EECs
(only behind Czech Republic (9th)) and clearly ahead of important competitors
in the region including Hungary (23rd), Ukraine (44th) or Bulgaria (50th).2212
Furthermore, interviewees state that MNCs are quite satisfied with the for-
eign language skills of Romanians.2213 By contrast, data reflect a somewhat
more critical evaluation in this field. Figure 55 shows that 29% of Romanians
speak English well enough for conversations, which is just below the average of
33% of eight EECs analyzed, while the value for German (6%) is the lowest.
Furthermore, 53% of Romanians speak – accordingly to the survey of the Eu-
ropean Commission – no foreign language at all, a rate that is only worse in
2210 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Con-
sumer Goods (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
2211 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007).
2212 Austria ranks 26th and Germany 36th.
2213 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007);
Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
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Figure 55: Foreign language skills in Eastern Europe
Hungary.2214 It therefore seems that interviewees somewhat overestimate the
language skills of Romanians in general, probably because MNCs are mostly
engaged in boom regions such as Bucharest, where people are usually better
educated, or regions with a German minority (such as Transylvania).
Some more critical interviewees indicate that the general educational level
is – despite its positive aspect – not comparable to Western Europe2215 and
that it may actually have decreased in the last years. Reasons for this evolution
may be that education policy and – more specifically – the curriculum on all
levels of education has been modified many times. Furthermore, experts point
out that education spending for the 52 institutions for tertiary education is
fairly low today. This is confirmed by a comparison with other countries of the
2214 See European Commission (2006c); own calculations.
2215 See also OECD (2006a), p.176.
520 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
Figure 56: Education spending and graduate share in Eastern Europe
region (figure 56).2216 Therefore, Romania’s public spending on educational
institutions reached 3.4% of its GDP in 2005 which is lower than, for example,
in Ukraine (6.4%) and Bulgaria (3.9%).2217
(b) With regards to the education level of skilled workers in Romania,
company experts criticize that no comprehensive education scheme exists: “The
education of skilled workers is only extemporized”2218. Professional schools
existed during communist times but most of them apparently vanished with the
privatization of SOEs since 1990. Vocational training is thus rare, apparently
very theoretical and little accepted among Romanians.2219
2216 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Political Adviser (2007);
Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007).
2217 Apparently, the rate was increased to 5.2% in the 2007 budget; see Rompres (2006); see
also UIS (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); INSSE website (2008).
2218 Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
2219 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII
(2007); Intv. German Political Adviser (2007).
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From the perspective of MNCs, the Romanian government does not fully
recognize the importance of the education of skilled workers and does not suf-
ficiently invest in these programs. As a result, company experts interviewed
see deficiencies among skilled workers in various fields such as the construction
industry, in craftsmen professions and in rural areas. MNCs also tend to focus
on skilled workers under 35 years old, since they worry that older employees
may not have a very performance-oriented working attitude.2220 It seems that
MNCs have to invest a lot of money, time and capacities in the education of
skilled workers. Larger MNCs such as Siemens, Continental and Metro, have
started their own education programs while smaller investors rather try to re-
cruit skilled workers from other investors.2221
This rather negative evaluation is interesting in the light of the study pre-
sented in OECD (2006a) according to which Romania’s vocational train-
ing strategy (adopted in 2005) is the most advanced program out of nine
SEECs.2222 Apparently, this strategy has not had sufficient impact on the daily
operations of MNCs so far and may also be undermined by the increasing labor
shortage discussed below.
(c) Experts interviewed indicate that MNCs are generally quite satisfied
with the quality of Romanian universities.2223 Especially in Western Roma-
nia higher education seems to benefit from the Austrian heritage. Universities
that frequently receive a positive evaluation from interviewees are those in
Timis¸oara and Bras¸ov (for technical programs) and Cluj (particularly for law),
but occasionally also those in Bucharest and Ias¸i.2224
2220 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I
(2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007).
2221 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007);
Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Ger-
man Econ. Association III (2007).
2222 Ssee also Intv. German Political Adviser (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007).
2223 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
2224 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007).
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However, many experts interviewed comment that the quality of the Ro-
manian university education has also deteriorated in recent years. Therefore,
entering university has become easier, the drill of earlier years has decreased
and the curriculum is – from the investors’ perspective – not always sufficiently
linked to business reality.2225 With professors who are often still in the same
position as in 1990, overburdened with work and receiving low salaries, it is
not surprising that experts interviewed have repeatedly heard about bribes for
better grades and degrees in Romanian universities.2226 This rather skeptical
evaluation of the university education overall is also reflected in international
statistics. Therefore, Romania ranks 54th out of 131 countries (or 11th out of
18 EECs) in the higher education and training ranking of the Global Compet-
itiveness Report.2227
In contrast to the general evaluation of the university education, the large
majority of interviewees acknowledge that the technical education, namely en-
gineering and IT, is very good in Romania. The strong industrialization of
Romania before 1990 as well as the presence of IBM in Romania since the
mid-1970s apparently created a strong tradition in these fields.2228 Particu-
larly (Romanian) state experts interviewed assess these skills as major asset
for Romania.2229 With respect to IT even company experts interviewed agree
2225 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
2226 See e. g. Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv.
German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
2227 Bulgaria is the only EU member behind Romania (66th); Austria: 17th, Germany: 20th;
see World Economic Forum (2007).
2228 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute
I (2007); more critical: Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
2229 See Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007);
Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007).
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that Romanian universities may have better-educated graduates than many
other EECs.2230
In contrast, interviews show that Romanian business administration educa-
tion has a poor reputation among MNCs. Most experts criticize business courses
as too theoretical and lacking focus on the needs of modern enterprises; spe-
cific gaps seem to exist in marketing and controlling. Therefore, MNCs tend
to have problems in finding appropriate staff for their middle management.2231
While new providers of management schools are pouring into the country, they
mostly do not meet international standards yet; accordingly, Romania only
ranks 80th of 131 countries in the management school ranking of the Global
Competitiveness Report.2232
(d) As already observed in the theoretical part of this thesis, FDI studies gen-
erally find a positive impact of human capital and FDI. However, the measures
of these studies usually refer to the availability of labor and less to education
levels of potential employees.2233 In contrast, interviews indicate for Romania
that the educational level of employees has played a very important role for
the investment decision of MNCs but that this is now decreasing slightly.2234
The overall positive perception of the skill level of Romanians by MNCs
– which may not always have been in line with empirical findings as shown
above – apparently played an important enhancing role for FDI in Romania,
particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The fairly high educational level
stuck out as positive characteristic of Romania’s investment environment at
2230 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007);
Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); see also
Financial Times (2006d).
2231 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
2232 Only slightly better than Bulgaria (83) and Ukraine (85th); Austria: 24th, Germany:
25th; see World Economic Forum (2007); see also Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I
(2007).
2233 See section 2.2.4.2.
2234 See Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); see also Lankes and Venables (1996).
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that time and was actively communicated from investor to investor, while other
factors (including tax policy and infrastructure) were less discussed at that
time.2235
With a decreasing performance in some educational fields and reforms re-
lated to other determinants, investors who are present in Romania now do not
seem to count the skill level as one of the decisive FDI determinants. This is
also confirmed by the survey results presented in AHK (2006) according to
which the qualification of graduates only represents the 21st most important
criterion (out of 26) for investors in Romania. However, interviews also show
that the education level still plays an important role for MNCs who are inter-
ested in initial investment in Romania and who have little knowledge about
the country.2236
(e) In the assessment of this section the analyses have shown that Romania’s
economy and investment climate have benefited from a high level of education
for a long time. However, it seems that the perception of many MNCs of the
skill level has sometimes been even more positive than statistics would suggest.
This may also be influenced by the specific needs (engineers) and location
(Transylvania) of many investments. However, state experts also occasionally
seem to overestimate Romania’s advantages compared to other countries in the
region.
Public policy should increase efforts to maintain the actual and perceived
advantage in the education level of its workforce. Public policy makers should
primarily work on increasing the practical knowledge of education. Most im-
portantly, they should improve the education of business economists and skilled
workers. For the latter group, three-year vocational training, as it exists in
2235 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
2236 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services
II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007);
Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
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Germany, may not be realistic, but a minimum of practical training co-financed
by central or local authorities, seems essential in order to satisfy the demands
of a strongly growing economy.
(2) The availability of labor (a) represents a major problem for MNCs
in Romania despite some regional and industry-specific differences. The labor
shortage seems to be driven by (b) some non-policy factors, (c) deficiencies
in the education system, (d) emigration, and (e) a lack of mobility among
Romanians. This determinant seems to be (f) very important for the investment
decision of many MNCs. An assessment is presented in sub-section (g).
(a) The great majority of interviewees confirms that Romania suffers from a
general labor shortage, particularly since the beginning of 2007.2237 MNCs
especially have troubles finding sufficient staff in Bucharest and in Western
Romania. In Timis¸oara company experts interviewed have recognized a short-
age since late 2004. Other regions, such as Moldova and in the Danube region
towards Bulgaria but also rural areas around boom centers like Sibiu, still seem
to offer larger amounts of available workers.2238
From the perspective of the MNCs even unskilled workers are lacking in
Romania to some extent. However, the greatest problem for recruiting depart-
ments is in obtaining young skilled workers and academics in various fields,
especially when specialized skills are required. Industries with the greatest
problems are the construction industry as well as the banking sector, but man-
2237 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
2238 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Intv.
Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
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agers, engineers, sales people, accountants, and craftsmen are missing in many
industries as well.2239
(b) Some reasons for this labor shortage can or should not be influenced
by public policy. Firstly, the recent economic boom – as discussed in section
6.2.1 – has probably been the main driver for the low unemployment (5.2%
in 2006) with rates below 3%, for example in Sibiu. The corresponding salary
surge in many industries also aggravated the problem of finding adequate and
affordable labor.2240
Secondly, many MNCs complain about a significant turnover of employees in
Romania, which also seems to be higher than in other EECs. In some service-
related jobs including insurances, advertising companies, retail sales etc. more
than half of the staff apparently changes jobs within one year. Reasons are the
many opportunities due to the economic boom, low company loyalty and the
prospect of higher salaries and better benefits.2241 Apparently, some MNCs in
boom areas, for example in Sibiu, have responded to the labor shortage with a
tacit agreement according to which companies do not recruit employees from
each other.2242
However, Romanian public policy makers may not want to influence these
factors, since counter measures, such as minimum wages or minimum duration
contracts, are not advisable – as suggested in section 7.2.5 on labor law – and
could stall the economic upswing.
2239 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007); see also AHK (2006).
2240 See Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007).
2241 The turnover among top mangers seems to be less significant; see Intv. Austr. MNC -
Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC
- Software (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007).
2242 See Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007).
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(c) Apparently, the education system does not produce enough high-skilled
labor, particularly not in the fields relevant for MNCs. Figure 96 in the ap-
pendix indeed reveals, in line with FDI studies2243, that Romania’s gross en-
rollment ratio in tertiary education (the share of tertiary students of the total
relevant age group (generally 18-23 years old)) is at 52% fairly low, compared
to the average of 15 EECs (60%) and especially important competitors such as
Ukraine (73%) and Hungary (69%).2244
However, this ratio does not reveal how many students actually finish the
programs they started and, more importantly, it does not give any insights
regarding the distribution of students by field. figure 57 gives a better reflection
of the perspective of MNCs on the education system. As discussed before,
interviewees generally mention engineering, business and law graduates as the
most important fields for the operations of MNCs;2245 they account for 64% of
the Romanian 175K graduates in 2006, the third highest value of the countries
analyzed. However, the evaluation of Romania becomes less favorable when
these figures are related to the size of the population. Therefore, only 5.2 out
of 1,000 inhabitants graduated in Romania in 2006 in those fields of study that
are most relevant for MNCs, clearly trailing behind Lithuania and Latvia (7.2)
as well as four further EECs.2246
These findings are also in line with the interviews that suggest that Romanian
public policy makers should work on making engineering and business education
more attractive in Romania and invest in staff, research capacities but also in
a stronger cooperation with Western European universities and MNCs.2247
2243 See section 2.2.4.2; Carstensen and Toubal (2004); Altomonte and Guagliano (2003).
2244 Bulgaria only with 46%; UIS (2007); own calculations; see also OECD (2006a), p.176.
2245 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Austr. Research Institute
(2007); Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting
I (2007).
2246 Weighted average of 15 EECs: 6.2; UIS (2007); own calculations; see for a similar ap-
proach: Doc - BA-CA (2007).
2247 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I
(2007); Intv. German Ministry (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
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Figure 57: Graduates of tertiary programs by study field
(d) A further reason for the labor shortage in Romania is the large-scale
emigration of workers to Western European countries. According to figures of
the European Commission about 500K Romanians worked abroad in 2005 and
this figure had risen to over one million by 2007.2248 External reports speak
rather of 2M2249 and interviewees even of 3M emigrants (even though the peak
of emigration flows may have been reached).2250 Apparently, most Romanian
emigrants go to Italy (59%) and Spain (29%) which are particularly attractive
due to the low language barriers for Romanians.2251 Interviewees confirm that
especially young and well-educated Romanians emigrate, some only for summer
2248 See EurActiv (2007b); own calculations.
2249 See e. g. Pfaller (2007); Salzburger Nachrichten (2007).
2250 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association
I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv.
Romanian NGO (2007).
2251 See EurActiv (2007b); own calculations.
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jobs (in the agricultural and construction sector) but many also for a longer
period including engineers and managers. 2252
Important reasons for emigration in the past were the language advantages
compared to other Eastern Europeans in some countries, the large salary gap
between Romania and Western countries, the freedom of travel due to intensi-
fied EU integration, supposedly better working conditions, and a liberal immi-
gration policy in target countries like Spain. Especially when they have worked
before in an MNCs in Romania for a while, employees seem to find a job abroad
easily.2253
Experts agree that public policy should actively work on reversing emigra-
tion.2254 Apparently, the Romanian government has also realized the need for
more decisive measures and announced a strategy to motivate emigrants to
return to Romania including better information regarding recent reforms and
salary increases.2255
(e) Interviews suggest that a lack of mobility of Romanians also contributes
to the labor shortage in the country. Apparently, many Romanians show little
willingness to move within Romania for a job and will rather emigrate for a
job offer. Experts interviewed see evidence for this inflexibility in any region,
for every educational level (besides the top management) and age group in
Romania.2256
The reasons most frequently mentioned are the high price level and high rents
in Romanian cities, particularly in boom areas, on the one hand and moder-
2252 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007);
Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007).
2253 See Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
2254 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
VI (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
2255 See Salzburger Nachrichten (2007).
2256 See Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007); Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods II (2007).
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ate salaries on the other hand; therefore, living in rural areas (generally in the
dwelling of the parents) rather pays off for young graduates even if more attrac-
tive job opportunities exist in the cities. Experts interviewed emphasize that
public policy needs to invest in social housing in order to make living in cities
affordable. Furthermore, interviewees point out that the bad infrastructure (in-
cluding roads, public transportation, railroad network etc.) between rural and
urban areas also prevents an increase of labor mobility. For parts of the Hun-
garian minority in Western Romania potential language difficulties may also
affect the mobility of the workforce.2257 As a consequence, some MNCs have
started to provide housing for their employees and introduced shuttle services
to rural areas that are too distant to reach for employees who do not have a
car.2258
(f) Experts interviewed agree that the current labor shortage is a very im-
portant constraint for higher FDI in Romania.2259 Various investors inter-
viewed even define the labor shortage as the most important constraint for
doing business in Romania today.2260 Particularly those MNCs that are al-
ready in the country with a focus on high-skilled labor and bound to a specific
location are often restrained in their investment potential. Potential investors
now often receive warnings from country experts that finding labor is an impor-
tant impediment to doing business in Romania. On the other hand, potential
investors seem slightly less deterred by the labor shortage since many of them
rather have the chance to invest in areas with abundant labor.2261
2257 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I
(2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); also acknowledged by: Intv. Romanian County
Council (2007).
2258 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
2259 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007).
2260 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automo-
tive (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I
(2007).
2261 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
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Experts confirm the findings of FDI studies for Romania that the low ter-
tiary enrollment is an important factor in this context2262, but interviews show
that more factors are driving this shortage including the distribution of stu-
dents by study field, emigration2263 and mobility. FDI studies generally do not
evaluate the availability of labor as dramatic because they were completed be-
fore the recent tightening of the Romanian labor market.2264 Overall, primary
sources indicate that the availability and as well as the skills of labor (discussed
above) are just as important for the investment decision for MNCs interested
in Romania as the actual labor costs.2265
(g) The assessment of this section shows that the availability of labor is a
complex determinant that is not only driven by economic forces but also by
various factors that can be influenced by the government. Romanian public
policy has reacted too late with regards to the different dimensions analyzed in
order to prevent the current shortage that also decreases the potential of FDI
inflows to Romania today. The labor shortage may be somewhat mitigated with
the next economic downturn but the structural problems of labor availability
in Romania that were discussed still need to be tackled. In order to do so,
education policy makers, need to realize that an increasing number of MNCs
comes to Romania for the production of high-value goods and that this requires
an increase of highly-skilled graduates and a shift within the academic fields of
study. Public policy should also aim at an improvement of infrastructure (see
above) and an increase of social housing in order to improve the mobility of the
Romanian workforce. The involvement of local policy makers seems essential in
this context. Romania should also enhance efforts to reverse emigration; ARIS
2262 See Lankes and Venables (1996); Pye (1998); Altomonte and Guagliano (2003);
Carstensen and Toubal (2004).
2263 See also IMD (2006).
2264 See also several surveys that present the availability of workforce as medium constraint
for doing business in Romania, e. g. AHK (2006); World Economic Forum (2007).
2265 See e. g. Doc - Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2005); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal
Services I (2007).
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(in cooperation with Romanian embassies abroad) could be supportive in this
context, for example, by providing useful information for emigrants regarding
job opportunities and trainings at home but also by establishing contacts to
MNCs that often appreciate employees with international experience. Finally,
the labor shortage may be further reduced by improving conditions for immi-
grants from other countries as already commenced for construction workers
from China.2266
(3) In conclusion, this section has shown that human capital has been
among the key factors influencing Romania’s investment climate. Company
experts may somewhat overestimate the quality of education and the problem
of labor shortage but public policy makers should not neglect the long-term
effects of the current deficiencies and work on the structural problems, mainly
the education system, but also on interdependent factors such as infrastructure.
7.4.1.3 Croatia
(1) Croatia’s educational level is (a) generally evaluated by MNCs in a posi-
tive way. More specifically, (b) the capabilities of skilled workers are apparently
satisfactory, while (c) differences exist in different fields of university education.
This (d) determinant seems to be quite significant for the investment decision
of MNCs. An assessment is provided in sub-section (d).
(a) Interviews and secondary sources certify that the general education
level of the Croatian workforce is “fairly good”2267 or even “excellent”2268 even
though it may not fully reachWestern European levels. Company experts report
2266 See Rompres (2007a); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
2267 Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunica-
tions (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); OECD (2003b), p.286; Dresdner Bank
(2004), p.7; Doc - OECD (2007).
2268 Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also Intv. Croatian Company - Real
Estate (2007).
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for Croatia that the skill level in cities and rural areas are equally high, while the
latter tends to be lower in many other SEECs including Romania.2269 Experts
interviewed appreciate the broad knowledge of Croatians and particularly – as
for Romania – their technical and science skills2270; the quality of the latter
is confirmed by World Economic Forum (2007) according to which Croatia
is ranked 28th in math and science; Croatia therefore ranks 16 places behind
Romania and 18 behind Serbia, but is still the 8th out of 18 EECs and math
and science skills still seem better in Croatia than in other competing countries
including Slovenia (37th) or Bosnia and Herzegovina (54th).
Interviewees specifically emphasize the good foreign language skills of Croa-
tians2271, which also corresponds to survey data; more than 70% of Croatians
apparently speak a foreign language well enough to make conversation (figure
55); 49% of the population speaks English and 34% speaks German. These
are the highest values in the region (only behind Slovenia).2272 Particularly in
Northern Croatia MNCs apparently find many employees – not only on the
management level – with foreign language skills.2273 Since 2005 further mea-
sures have been introduced in order to promote the learning of foreign languages
form the first school year.2274
Nevertheless, interviews agree that education is still somewhat too theoreti-
cal; this seems to be one of the reasons why expats generally support the first
investment phase of MNCs in Croatia and responsibility to locals is only passed
on in a later stage.2275 However, company experts interviewed also state that
2269 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007).
2270 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007).
2271 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
2272 See UIS (2007); APIU (2006b), p.12.
2273 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services I (2007).
2274 See European Commission (2005a), p.97.
2275 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); see also skeptical: Intv. Supranational
Authority II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
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these deficiencies are partly compensated by a high motivation, particularly
among young employees.2276
In sum – and in contrast to the findings for Romania – interviews and sec-
ondary sources suggest that the quality of education in Croatia is generally im-
proving. As a response to the remaining problems (and also to criticism by inter-
national organizations2277) an Adult Education Strategy (2004), an Education
Development Plan 2005-2010 (2005) as well as corresponding action plans were
adopted.2278 The overall goal is to transform Croatia into a knowledge-based
society; reforms include a revision of the curricula and a stronger decentraliza-
tion of the education system which comprises a greater autonomy for education
institutions. On the other hand, a stronger centralization of the evaluation of
the education system was initiated by the foundation of a National Center for
the External Evaluation of Education in 2005.2279 Yet, external sources still
see room for improvements considering that education spending remains fairly
low with 4.6% compared to the Eastern European average of 4.8% (figure 56)
but also to Western Euorpean countries (5-8%).2280
(b) Interviews show that MNCs seem to be quite satisfied with the quality of
skilled workers in Croatia, especially in the metal processing industry. Ap-
parently investors can still rely on a large pool of employees who have benefited
from a well-advanced vocational training in Croatia in the 1980s.2281
However, experts interviewed are more critical in their the evaluation of
the current vocational training. Even though a respective system continued
2276 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial
Services I (2007).
2277 See e. g. OECD (2003b), p.276.
2278 See CMSES (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
2279 See OECD (2006a), p.174; European Commission (2005a), pp.96-97; UIS (2007).
2280 See OECD (2003b), p.279; NCC (2004b), p.32; EBRD (2005a), p.51; Bertelsmann
Stiftung (2006b), p.2.
2281 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); see also
Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); see also CMSES (2007), p.39.
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to exist after 1990, the possible fields of training and curricula often did not
match the need of the business world and institutions lacked sufficient qualified
staff.2282 Therefore, young entrants, for example in production and retail, often
require further education provided by the companies even after the attendance
of vocational programs.2283 The German dual system was introduced in the
late 1990s but has apparently not progressed much so far and has received
little support from companies. The reform of the education system mentioned
above also included a revision of the vocational training. A national agency for
vocational training was set up in 2005 and the curriculum is apparently being
adjusted to the needs of the labor market; however, external sources as well as
experts interviewed point out that the visible impact of these reforms is scarce
so far.2284
(c) Company experts suggest that MNCs are quite satisfied with the general
quality of university education in Croatia, maybe even slightly more than in
Romania. They note the fact that the Bologna process was introduced (in 2005),
the teaching staff is generally quite qualified, the curricula basically provide
a good theoretical foundation, and that many international programs exist,
meaning many university graduates have studied abroad for some time.2285
Remaining problems identified by interviewees are again the practical di-
mension of academic education and a slow adaptation of the curricula to the
economic development.2286 In the ranking of higher education and training pre-
2282 See e. g. OECD (2003b), pp.298-299; European Commission (2005a), pp.44, 97; CMSES
(2007), p.35.
2283 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007);
Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
2284 See also European Commission (2007a), p.57; EBRD (2005a), p.50; OECD (2006a),
pp.174-175; see also Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority III
(2007).
2285 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007); more skeptical: Intv. Austr. MNC - Consult-
ing (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
2286 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv.
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sented in World Economic Forum (2007) Croatia takes 46th place (out of 131
countries) behind eight Eastern European member states but ahead of all other
SEECs including Romania. Furthermore, national authorities have apparently
realized that the Croatian university system has to undergo significant changes
in order to reach the goal of a knowledge-based society.2287
As for Romania, experts interviewed speak highly of the academic education
of Croatian engineers which appears to be at least as valuable as in other
EECs.2288
Regarding the evaluation of the business education the evidence from the in-
terviews is mixed. Interestingly, company experts are mostly satisfied with the
business skills of the Croatian workforce, particularly of young graduates.2289
In contrast, Croatian company and state experts are more skeptical regard-
ing the management education in Croatia. They criticize that the education is
too theoretical and often based on old curricula.2290 The different evaluation
can probably be explained by the fact that MNCs can generally recruit the
most skilled graduates since they have the reputation of being able to offer
– as discussed previously – higher salaries, more attractive incentive schemes
and better working conditions than domestic firms. Therefore, the somewhat
more skeptical view of the non-MNC interviewees give a more realistic picture
of the average skill level of business education in Croatia. The mediocre per-
2287 See OECD (2003b), p.311; NCC (2007); European Commission (2005a), p.97; CMSES
(2007), p.136.
2288 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Min-
ister (2007); see also Dresdner Bank (2004), p.7; more skeptical: Intv. Austr. MNC -
Consulting (2007).
2289 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods
I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
2290 See Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007);
Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007).
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formance of management schools is also supported by findings of the World
Competitiveness Report ranking Croatia’s 71st behind Slovenia (44th).2291
(d) The education level of the domestic employees is quite important for
the investment decision of MNCs and a strong argument in favor of Croatia. It
seems that the skills of Croatian workers and academics can make a difference if
the country selection is narrowed down to a few options. Good foreign language
skills and the broad knowledge among Croatian university graduates in par-
ticular seem to compensate the (perceived)2292 high labor costs.2293 Interviews
therefore suggest a higher importance of this determinant for Croatia than the
FDI surveys in AHK (2006) suggests, which only see a mediocre importance of
qualification in general (9th out of 26) and a low impact for MNCs regarding
the skill level of graduates (21st).2294
However, interviews also reveal that the importance of the skilled labor force
is somewhat decreasing for MNCs in Croatia. This may be because the interest
in industrial FDI is decreasing. In tourism, where many unskilled workers are
employed, the skill level also seems to play only a secondary role.2295
(e) In the assessment of this section it seems that Croatia benefits from a
fairly good education system that has been very competitive among SEECs.
The very positive perception of MNCs may however not give a full picture of the
status of Croatia’s current education system. The Croatian education system
may in fact have some important deficiencies; however, MNCs (especially if
they are large and well-known) are probably less affected by them since they
can generally recruit the most talented staff by offering attractive benefits.
2291 But ahead of Serbia (84th) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (104th); see World Economic
Forum (2007).
2292 See section 6.3.2
2293 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007).
2294 See similar: Lankes and Venables (1996).
2295 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
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Besides, Croatia’s high unemployment creates less problems of labor shortage
as in Romania.
However, interviews with state representatives show that public policy mak-
ers are well aware of Croatia’s need to invest more in education to remain
competitive and to enable high future FDI inflows. Most importantly, Croatia
needs to implement the envisaged reform of the vocational training for skilled
employees and continue with the reforms in the university, most notable of
business education including the promotion of private management schools.
(2) The availability of labor is also for Croatia (a) a general problem,
although to lesser extent than in Romania. While (b) non-policy determinants
are less decisive, (c) the education system seems to be an important reason
for the labor shortage. Furthermore, (d) emigration and (e) labor mobility
apparently only play a subordinate role in this context. The ability of labor
(f) has a medium importance for the investment decision of MNCs in Croatia
today. Sub-section (g) provides an assessment.
(a) According to the interviewees, MNCs repeatedly complain about a gen-
eral labor shortage in Croatia albeit less than in Romania.2296 Compared
to the situation in the early 2000s, investors seem to have more difficulties in
finding highly-skilled employees today, such as engineers (for example for the
construction industry), but also employees for the management and admin-
istration of their operations including accountants as well as specialized pro-
duction workers. The availability of highly-skilled labor apparently decreases
in rural areas distant from the large universities.2297 Nevertheless, (large) for-
eign investors seem to have fewer problems in recruiting sufficient employees
2296 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
2297 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate
(2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority
II (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
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than domestic firms for the reasons mentioned above.2298 The availability of
unskilled workers seems to be less of a problem for MNCs in Croatia (also in
comparison to Romania).2299
(b)Non-policy factors do not seem to play an important role in explaining
this shortage of adequate labor for MNCs in Croatia.2300 As elaborated in
section 6.3.1, Croatia has been suffering from high unemployment for many
years, with a registered unemployment rate of 17.0% in 2006. Furthermore, the
turnover rate seems to be lower than, for example, in Romania and employee
fluctuation mainly affects the jobs in public administration and in some tourist
hotspots at the coast.2301
(c) Problems of the education system seem to be most important in ex-
plaining labor shortage in Croatia. According to figure 96 in the appendix only
44% of Croatia’s relevant age group were enrolled in a tertiary program in 2006.
This is 16% below the Eastern European average and even 39% less than in
Slovenia. Accordingly, public policy has not been able to enroll the majority of
Croatians – either in vocational training or university programs – after finishing
high school.2302
Furthermore, figure 57 shows that only 21K tertiary students graduated in
Croatia which represents 4.7 out of 1,000 inhabitants. More importantly, only
2.4 graduates came from key sectors for MNCs (engineering, business adminis-
tration etc.). This is the lowest value of the 13 EECs analyzed.2303
It seems that the vocational training has significantly lost its attraction; the
decrease of employees with vocational training from 37% in 1988 to 18% in 2003
2298 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
2299 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); see also NCC (2004b), p.33.
2300 See e. g. Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
2301 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods
I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
2302 See Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.10; CMSES
(2007), p.136.
2303 Some MNCs may also recruit staff from “services” programs.
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may reflect the de-industralization in all transition countries, but according to
the interviewees as well as secondary sources, the quality of vocationally-trained
employees has fallen below acceptable levels.2304
Furthermore, the seven public universities and 16 public polytechnics do not
seem to produce enough students with skills needed by MNCs. Interviews2305
and secondary sources show2306 that students would appreciate lower bureau-
cratic hurdles for entering universities. The investment strategy focusing on
high-technologies such as biotechnology (section 7.3.5.3) is apparently not suf-
ficiently reflected in the programs offered by the universities. Finally, young
people from rural areas also find the offers for tertiary education significantly
less attractive than in larger cities.
(d) Emigration seems to have only limited influence on the labor shortage
experienced by MNCs. No precise figures exist but official sources speak of
about 40,000 Croatians with tertiary education working abroad.2307 Even if
the total number of Croatian emigrants (including unskilled workers) reached
200K – as some other sources suggest – the share of emigrants of the total
population would still be significantly lower (about 1-5%) than in Romania
(about 10-15%). The main reasons for Croatians to work abroad seem to be the
experience abroad and better working conditions rather than economic motives
(as in Romania). Most of these emigrants apparently return after some time
and are well appreciated by MNCs for their professional and language skills.2308
(e) Some interviews suggest that the limited mobility of Croatians may
also influence the labor shortage. As in other EECs, young Croatians tend
2304 See CMSES (2007), p.176; Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
2305 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
2306 See OECD (2003b), p.278; NCC (2004b), p.33; Grupe and Kusˇic´ (2005), p.2; APIU
(2007); CMSES (2007).
2307 This does not comprise those Croatian who left the country before 1990 as discussed in
section 6.3.2; see CMSES (2007), p.42.
2308 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007);
NCC (2004b), p.33; CMSES (2007), p.42; own calculations; more skeptical: IMD (2006).
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to live longer at home with their families than in Western Europe. However,
Croatians rather seem to be willing to move or commute for a job than in
Romania, also because infrastructure is better, the relative real estate prices
are lower (see above) and distances are less remote.2309 Finally, Croatians may
be used to moving, given the recent experience of war, when many families from
the southern and eastern parts of the country moved to safer cities in Northern
Croatia.
(f) Interview results are in line with the finding of FDI studies that the avail-
ability of unskilled workers has basically no impact on FDI in Croatia, while
the availability of high-skilled labor has medium importance on the investment
decision of MNCs that are interested in Croatia.2310 Most importantly, MNCs
seem less affected by the labor shortage than domestic firms due to their good
reputation among top graduates in Croatia. MNCs also seem to benefit from
many Croatians who switch from high-profile government jobs to the business
world (even more than in Romania). 2311
(g) In the assessment of this section, analyses have shown that Croatia
has a labor shortage despite a very high unemployment rate. Therefore, public
policy should take actions quickly in order to meet the requirements of the
business world better; most importantly, the number of tertiary graduates,
especially in engineering and business administration needs to be increased.
Even though MNCs may not be as strongly affected today, public policy should
anticipate their increasing problems in finding sufficient labor, also considering
Croatia’s ambitious targets to boost FDI in technology-oriented industries. A
connection of the availability of labor to the education level therefore seems
more prominent in Croatia than, for example, in Romania, since an increase of
2309 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
2310 See AHK (2006); see also Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
2311 See also Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv.
Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007).
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the average education level could enlarge the pool of future high-skill graduates
and potential employees for both domestic and foreign businesses in Croatia.
(3) In conclusion, human capital is a quite important factor for FDI in
Croatia. Analyses have shown that MNCs are in a better position than, for
example, MNCs in Romania since MNCs here have to compete more with
domestic companies for the top graduates (who are also less mobile) of the
host country.
7.4.1.4 General insights for transition countries
Based on the analysis of prevision sections and further secondary sources, sev-
eral insights can be derived regarding human capital in transition countries.
Findings comprise (1) the performance of transition countries, (2) the impor-
tance of this factor and (3) several implications for public policy makers.
(1) MNCs seem to be quite satisfied with the educational level of skilled
workers and academics in transition countries.2312 Various statistics show that
most EECs are performing quite well in terms education, particularly regard-
ing science and technical skills. In the math and science ranking presented in
World Economic Forum (2007) 18 EECs analyzed take a (weighted) average
36th position out of 131 countries (and even ahead of the EU 15 (40th)).2313
Engineers are generally well perceived by investors across most former commu-
nist countries; however, cases such as the Romanian one, suggest that various
countries have not sufficiently adjusted their curricula according to the needs of
today’s economy up to now.2314 It seems that some governments have realized
2312 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Austr.
MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2313 Weight based on population; see also Der Fischerweltalmanach 2007 (2006); own calcu-
lations.
2314 See for further examples: OECD (2006a), pp.169-189; see also Intv. Supranational Au-
thority I (2007).
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only lately that the demand of their economies has been shifting from low to
higher skilled workers with good tertiary education, particularly in the fields
that are most asked for by investors including engineering, business economy
as well as law.2315 The level of business education still seems to be significantly
lower in the vast majority of transition countries than in Western Europe and
often lacks a systematic approach. This is also reflected in management school
rankings in which EECs take a (weighted) average 71st place clearly behind
the EU 15 (21st).2316 Language skills seem to strongly differ from country to
country with some very positive examples (such as Croatia), while the knowl-
edge seems to depend on the education level and the region in other EECS
(such as Romania).
(2) Human capital seems to be a very important FDI determinant for tran-
sition countries and on comparable levels like labor costs or infrastructure2317,
even though state interviews may to some extent overestimate the positive as-
pects (as suggested for Romania). The skill level generally seems to be more
important for investors than the availability of labor because MNCs are often
in a privileged position regarding the search for highly-skilled employees and
are frequently able to recruit the most skilled workers of their field. These in-
sight expands the findings of FDI studies that generally focus on enrollment
ratios.2318 The impact of emigration on human capital seems to depend on
host country characteristics (such as liberal immigration legislations in Spain
and the UK)2319 as well as home country specifics whereas lower language
barriers (as for Romanians) and high unemployment (as in Poland) may be
2315 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
2316 See World Economic Forum (2007); Der Fischerweltalmanach 2007 (2006); own calcu-
lations; see also Pommer (2007), p.142.
2317 See e. g. Doc - Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2005); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics
(2007).
2318 See also Savary (1997); Pye (1998); AHK (2006); Borsos-Torstila (1999).
2319 Even though UK increased migration barriers for Bulgaria and Romania; see Sofia Echo
(2007); EurActiv (2007a).
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important factors. When emigrants return they are generally well appreciated
as employees by MNCs because they bring language skills, flexibility and mo-
tivation.2320 According to interviews and secondary sources the availability
of unskilled workers generally does not seem to be an important criteria for
MNCs in any transition countries. In fact, German investors in 11 out of 14
EECs evaluate the availability of unskilled workers as the least important of 26
determinants overall.2321
(3) Possibilities of public policy to improve human capital are manifold
despite constraints such as low unemployment and high turnover rates. Most
EECs should increase government spending in education, particularly regard-
ing the education of skilled workers (vocational training) as well as in key aca-
demic fields in order to close remaining gaps to Western Europe. Furthermore,
tertiary education in rural areas should be enhanced.2322 Transition countries
should also increase the cooperation with both foreign and domestic companies
in order to better understand the skills needed by the economy.2323 Cooper-
ations with foreign universities (as shown for Romania) may also be helpful
in this context. Furthermore, education policy should be closely linked to the
goals of investment promotion (see above). Investment promotion agencies may
also help to facilitate the return of emigration and their placement in MNCs.
Finally, governments should work on interdependent factors that further influ-
ence human capital, most importantly infrastructure. Social housing should be
increased in order to decrease living costs and increase the mobility of the work
force.2324
2320 See also Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007)
2321 In Romania, Estonia and Slovakia among the three least important factors; see AHK
(2006).
2322 See also Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007).
2323 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007).
2324 See also Intv. German Political Adviser (2007).
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7.4.2 Political stability
7.4.2.1 Definition
As elaborated in the theoretical part of this thesis (section 2.2.4.2), political sta-
bility is frequently cited in FDI studies as important driver for FDI in transition
countries.2325 Interviews suggest that MNCs distinguish between two different
types of political stability when they analyze the attractiveness of potential
host countries – internal and external political stability.2326 The (1) internal
political stability refers to the political situation within the host country in-
cluding the maturity of democracy as well as the functioning of institutions
and the government; the reliability of political decisions and country-specific
issues (such as minority policy) may also play a role in this context. When
MNCs from Austria and Germany scrutinize the (2) external political stability
of transition countries, they generally consider the relationship to Western Eu-
rope and to neighboring countries but also the cooperation with international
organizations. Sections (3) provide conclusions for Romania and Croatia re-
spectively. EU integration, also an important dimension of political stability, is
analyzed separately in section 7.4.4.
7.4.2.2 Romania
(1) Crucial aspects of Romania’s internal political stability are (a) the
attitude of Romanians towards their leaders, (b) the exchange of elites, (c) the
stability of the political system, (d) the participation of civil society, and (e)
the reliability of government decisions. The (f) importance of this determinant
was high but decreased over time. An assessment is provided in sub-section (g).
2325 See e. g. Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Woodward, Rolfe, Guimaraes, and Doupnik
(2000).
2326 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also Bertelsmann Stiftung
(2006a), pp.93-94.
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(a) Many investors and observers from Western countries have doubted Ro-
mania’s ability to establish a stable democracy for a long time considering
its tendency to support strong leaders. Political opposition in Romania re-
mained limited during Ceaus¸escu’s regime compared to other EECs. Even after
its end external sources identify a trend towards authoritarianism in Romania,
since all new presidents (Iliescu (1989-1996 and 2000-2004), Constantinescu
(1996-2000) and Ba˘sescu (since 2004)) were celebrated as saviors by the Roma-
nian population. Characteristically, president Iliescu led a party alliance after
1989, that was called the National Salvation Front (Frontul Salva˘rii Nat¸ionale
(FSN)). Romanians have also expected large changes to be initiated rather by
the president than by the parliament. Nevertheless, observers acknowledge that
Romania is in little danger of sliding into a regime that is opposed to democ-
racy today, also because Romanian presidents have hardly been able to fully
use their powers (discussed below).2327
(b) After the end of communism in Romania – which was the bloodiest one
in Eastern Europe with more than 1,000 fatalities – the exchange of elites
proceeded only slowly. Many sources raise doubts that a clear rupture with
the past was carried out since Romania was the only EEC in which the politi-
cal leadership was not significantly exchanged (with the exception of Slovenia)
and in which various former communist cadres governed Romania between 1989
and 1996 including the president who had been a second rank communist him-
self under Ceaus¸escu. Therefore, the first years of the post-communist period
were marked more by continuity than by change.2328 One important reason
was that no underground opposition existed under Ceaus¸escu (as in Poland
or Czech Republic because opponents of the regime were expelled) that could
have stepped up to establish a credible political restart after 1990. As a con-
2327 See Kunze (2000); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.14; Lisske (2001); Boia (2006).
2328 See e. g. Lisske (2001), Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), pp.14-15; Intv. Germ. Political
Foundation II (2007); different: Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
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sequence, the rupture with communism was not finalized until 1996 when the
center-right politician, Emil Constantinescu, became president. Nevertheless,
politicians who had been active during communist times can be traced in most
political parties even today.2329
Furthermore, many former members of the secret police force, the Departa-
mentul Securita˘t¸ii Statului (Securitate), were apparently able to stay in key
positions even after 1990. Various experts also assume that former Securitate
members were successful in privatizations because they had good access to in-
formation and key decision makers. Some experts interviewed point out that
a network of former Securitate members may exist even today with significant
influence on public policy.2330 The authority to study the past of the Securi-
tate, the Consiliul Nat¸ional Pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securita˘t¸ii (CNSAS),
was established in 1999 but lacked the political support during the left-wing
government from 2000-2004. Under the new government the CNSAS revealed
some spectacular connections of politicians to the Securitate (including the for-
mer Minister of Culture, Mona Musca). A special commission installed by the
president presented a report about the consequences of communism in Decem-
ber 2006 which was interpreted as important step towards a clarification of
the role of the Securitate during and after communism. However, a systematic
examination of the Securitate archives has not been accomplished so far and
a lustration law has been debated in parliament since 2006. Primary and ex-
ternal sources also criticize that the work of the CNSAS has repeatedly been
abused and use to pressure political opponents instead of serving as a basis
for systematically addressing issues of the past. Most recently, the work of the
2329 See Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.21;
Lisske (2001).
2330 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II
(2007).
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CNSAS has even been questioned in general by a controversial verdict of the
constitutional court.2331
(c) Many observers have mistrusted the stability of the political system
throughout Romania’s transition. Western observers doubted in the past that
Romania was on its way towards a democratic and reform-oriented country
considering various difficult government constellations and the strength of ex-
tremist parties. This seemed to be particularly true when the rightist extremist
Partidul Romaˆnia Mare (PRM) was part of the government of 1994-1996, to-
gether with the post-communist Partidul Social Democrat (PSD).2332
Many experts were thus relieved when the center-right government took office
in 1996. The achievement of the political Copenhagen criterion in 1997 can
also be understood as an acknowledgment of the European Commission of
Romania’s development towards a democratic political system.2333 Company
experts confirm that they do not expect a future political radicalization (neither
towards the right nor the left) and that political stability could be maintained
even if extremists become part of a Romanian government again one day.2334
Another aspect worth mentioning are the quarrels between the president and
the prime minister which have a long tradition in Romania and have often re-
sulted in a delay of reforms. Problems originate from a weak constitutional
description of rights and duties of the two functions as well as in the obligation
(that recalls of the French cohabitation) of president and prime minister to co-
operate even if they are from different political parties. However, personal issues
may aggravate these institutional challenges.2335 The most recent conflict, for
example, between President Ba˘sescu and Prime Minister Popescu-Ta˘riceanu is
2331 See Gray (2004); Dill, Vasiu, and Voinea (2006); Der Tagesspiegel (2008).
2332 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.21; Wagner (2001); Boia (2006), p.18.
2333 See European Commission (1997), p.19; European Commission (1998), p.12; BA-CA
(2006), p.7; see also Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
2334 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007); see also Doc - KAS (2007).
2335 See Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001); Gabanyi (2005).
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interpreted by various experts interviewed as the fight for supremacy between
two ambitious men.2336 Experts criticize the harsh and unprofessional tone of
this “embarrassing duel”2337 and even state representatives assume that this
conflict – also called “war of the palaces”2338 – reveals deficiencies in Romania’s
political culture.2339 The current quarrels caused a constitutional crisis in July
2005 when president and prime minister argued about reelections as well as in
a (failed) impeachment procedure against President Ba˘sescu in May 2007.2340
Figure 58 underlines that the functioning of government – which also reflects
the quarrels between the president and the prime minister – remains the weak-
est point in Romania’s political system and leads to a lower performance in the
Freedom House ranking compared to all other Eastern European EU members
as well as Croatia.2341
Nevertheless, most experts assume that the political quarrels (of these two
prominent figures) will be over after the parliamentary and presidential elec-
tion in November 2008.2342 Experts interviewed emphasize that – despite all
political struggles – institutions are functioning in Romania and that impor-
tant political reforms have been accomplished (including EU accession). There-
fore, both company and state experts agree that internal political stability is
generally given in Romania today.2343 External sources also acknowledge that
Romania has – despite all problems mentioned – significantly strengthened its
2336 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); Intv. German
Authority IV (2007).
2337 Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007).
2338 The prime minister resides in the Victoria Palace and the president in the Cotroceni
Palace.
2339 See Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007).
2340 See Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC
- Software (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. Research
Institute I (2007).
2341 See Freedom House (2007); see also Bfai (2005), p.26.
2342 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
2343 See Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv.
Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); Bfai (2005), p.26; AHK (2006).
550 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
Figure 58: Political rights by category in Eastern Europe
democratic system in recent years and figure 59 indicates that political rights
have reached a decent level since the change of government in 1996.2344
(d) Interviews show that many Romanians are frustrated by politics as
a result of the ongoing political quarrels.2345 External studies confirm that the
trust of Romanians in politicians is very low in general, placing Romania 112th
out of 131 countries in a respective ranking in 2007 (representing the second
worst place of 18 EECs only ahead of Bosnia and Herzegovina).2346
Furthermore, the participation of civil society remains limited. Apparently,
Romanians are not always sufficiently aware of their civic and political rights
and experts identify few good non-governmental organizations (NGOs); ac-
tive support is often low because citizens are afraid to share personal data
2344 See Freedom House (2007); see also CICD (2006), p.15.
2345 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V
(2007).
2346 See World Economic Forum (2007); Lisske (2001).
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Figure 59: Political rights development in Eastern Europe
(for example when signing a petition) based on their negative experiences dur-
ing communist times.2347 Moreover, the commitment of the youth to involve
themselves in political matters seems quite low as well. Overall, Romania only
receives 5 out of 10 points in terms of social self-organization according to the
BTI. Serbia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina are the only countries out of 15
EECs with lower scores.2348
(e) The reliability of government decisions was not always present in
Romania throughout the 1990s, since decisions that had once been taken were
often revised due to political pressure or changing government priorities.2349
By contrast, the majority of investors acknowledges that the reliability of gov-
ernment decisions increased during the second term of President Iliescu (and
2347 See Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007).
2348 With four points; see Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006c); see also Habersack (2002).
2349 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); see also FIC (2005), p.15; Mu¨ller
(2005), p.195.
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Prime Minister Adrian Na˘stase (2000-2004)). Apparently the former commu-
nists had learned from their mistakes of the first term and realized that credible
government decisions were necessary in order to overcome the existing economic
and social problems that had hampered Romania’s transition in the 1990s (see
section 6.2.1 on the economic development). The pressure from the EU to fulfill
the acquis also increased the necessity of reliable political decisions.2350
However, the current quarrels between president and prime minister have
apparently decreased the continuity, reliability and effectiveness of Romanian
politics again. Experts interviewed make the criticism that this conflict led to
many institutional re-organizations and to the shuﬄing of many ministers and
state officials (even on lower levels of the bureaucracy).2351 As a consequence,
many processes, reforms and political decisions were delayed or even stalled that
are important, for example, for privatizations and infrastructure projects.2352
Funds from the EU have also been put on hold. This impairs local projects
and the motivation of state officials.2353 In sum, some company experts find
political decisions in Bulgaria, for example, to be more reliable than in Romania
today.2354
(f) Interviews reveal that the internal political stability is an important
factor that MNCs look at before an investment in Romania.2355 However,
several specifications can be drawn from the expert interviews.
2350 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
V (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
2351 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III
(2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
2352 As shown for privatizations in section 7.3.4.2.
2353 See Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Political Adviser (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC
- Legal Services I (2007).
2354 See e. g. Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007).
2355 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive
(2007); see also Doc - GTZ (2006b).
7.4 Political measures 553
According to both interviews2356 and FDI studies2357 the importance of the
determinant was very significant until the early 2000s. The somewhat undemo-
cratic tendencies as well as inefficient and unreliable governments (at least
until 1996) were apparently important obstacles for many investors from Aus-
tria and Germany, particularly in comparison with more stable EECs such as
Czech Republic and Poland. The lack of exchange of elites as well as of civil
society participation and the constitutional set-up contributed to a greater in-
security of potential investors in the 1990s, particularly when MNCs were little
experienced in transition countries. However, increasing progress in reforms
showed many potential investors in the early 2000s that Romania’s internal
political stability had reached a point of no return. Therefore, interviews show
that political stability has become either irrelevant for the investment decision
of MNCs2358 or even an enhancing factor in favor or Romania for companies
that consider Ukraine or Moldova as alternative country options.2359
The current quarrels apparently do not have any major influence on investors
and their investment decision so far.2360 Interestingly, interviews show that
political turmoils, for example, in Hungary in 2006 regarding the state of the
economy and the credibility of the government of Ferenc Gyurcsa´ny (since
2004) had a more severe impact on the investment climate than the ongoing
quarrels in Romania. The main reason seems to be – once again – the specific
perception of Romania; MNCs are less surprised about political imbalances in
2356 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services
I (2007).
2357 See e. g. Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003); Holland and Pain (1998).
2358 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail
(2007).
2359 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007);
Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
2360 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting
II (2007).
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Romania but would generally not expect them in Hungary and may prefer to
wait with follow-up investments there.2361
Experts interviewed also point out that internal political stability does not
represent an obstacle for MNCs anymore, because the economic development
seems to be decoupled from politics. According to them, the economy is de-
veloping very well despite the current political quarrels and only a significant
aggravation of the current crisis and a long-lasting standstill of reforms would
influence the investment decision of MNCs.2362 State experts even believe that
“the political situation of a country is not as important since investors are
looking at the mere economic performance”2363.
Finally, the importance of the internal political stability depends on the
type of investment and seems to be most crucial for MNCs interested in pri-
vatizations or FDIs in areas with high political visibility (including financial
intermediaries). Yet, this group of investors has apparently not been largely de-
terred by the current political quarrels so far which is shown by the significant
privatization sales and FDI inflows from banks and insurance companies since
2004 as well as by the recent acquisition of the Craiova plant by Ford.2364 If
political quarrels continue to aggravate, they may also represent a “push fac-
tor” for MNCs who have been thinking about leaving the country anyway (even
though the main reason may be a different one, such as labor shortage).2365
2361 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007); see also Financial Times (2006b);
Mayer (2006).
2362 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007);
Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
2363 Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); see also Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
2364 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software
(2007); see also Siebenbu¨rgische Zeitung (2007).
2365 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv.
Romanian Authority II (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv. Germ.
Political Foundation II (2007).
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(g) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that there was
little or hardly any internal political stability in Romania in the 1990s but
that this significantly increased between 1996 and 2004. The evaluation of the
current situation is mixed. Shortcomings in the past such as deficiencies in
definition of political functions and a lack of a comprehensive dealing with
the past have contributed to today’s remaining problems. Interviews have also
shown that the evaluation of internal political stability is a highly subjective
matter for MNCs that is strongly influenced by the perception that investors
have of Romania. In this context Romania may actually benefit from lower
expectations in its internal political stability since political turmoils may have
less deterring effects than in (supposedly) more stable countries.
The impact of political stability on the economic development and on FDI
may have decreased for Romania in recent years but some state representatives
may somewhat underestimate the (potentially negative) impact of current
political quarrels, given the effects that these can have on law-making, reforms,
privatization, and Romania’s country image. Public policy should work not
only on establishing a mature political culture but also on the deeper causes,
including a comprehensive examination of misdemeanors before 1990.
(2) The analysis of the external political stability shows that Romania
has undergone important developments with respect to (a) international coop-
erations in general and (b) IMF and (c) NATO in particular. This determinant
has been (d) of medium importance for the investment decision of MNCs for
the most part of Romania’s transition. An assessment is provided in sub-section
(e).
(a) Romania’s international cooperation in general remained vague in
the first years of its transition. President Illiescu attempted a balancing act
aiming at improving ties to both the West as well as to Russia. Efforts of Prime
556 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
Minister Petre Roman’s (1989-1991) however, failed to make Romania more
open to the West. When Romania’s isolation of the 1980s continued, Iliescu
had to change his policy, proclaiming EU integration and NATO accession as
strategic priorities of Romania’s foreign policy in 1993.2366
The section about the image of Romania (section 7.3.5.2) revealed that some
Western countries remained skeptical regarding the goals of Romanian foreign
policy in the early years of transition. They doubted the sincerity of its west-
ward orientation and were afraid of, for example, ambitions for a Greater Ro-
mania when the PRM became part of the government. As a consequence, the
relationship of Romania, for example, to Germany remained frosty during the
chancellorship of Helmut Kohl (until 1998) who mad no formal visit to Roma-
nia. Since the early 2000s relations with Western countries improved (see below)
as well as the cooperation with neighboring states such as Hungary, Bulgaria
and Ukraine with respect to bilateral subjects including border issues. In 2002
Ferenc Ma´dl became the first Hungarian president to visit Romania after the
breakdown of communism.2367
The relationship of Romania to Russia remained difficult. Apparently Russia
in particular attempted to prevent Romania’s accession to NATO for a long
time and contacts to Russia did not normalize until late 2001 when Russia’s
geostrategic priorities shifted.2368
(b) Romania’s relationship with the IMF symbolizes the ambiguous devel-
opment of the country’s cooperation with international organizations, which
often changed depending on the government in power and the respective policy
goals. Romania had been an IMF member in 1972 but Bucharest suspended
cooperation in 1984. The IMF repeatedly granted financial support but also
demanded drastic fiscal and monetary measures, for example, following the
2366 See Strelchuk (2003); Georgescu (2004); see also Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007).
2367 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007);
see also Strelchuk (2003), p.19; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003b), p.22.
2368 See Gabanyi (2002), pp.30-31; Habersack (2002).
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years of stagnating reforms (1989-1994). Under president Constantinescu Ro-
mania gave priority to the calls of the IMF for budget consolidation in 1999
even though these measures caused the elimination of investment incentives
and drew significant protest from political opponents and businesses. In 2004
the IMF announced financial support amounting to over USD60M; neverthe-
less, Romania suspended the cooperation with the fund in 2005 after a dispute
over its reform policies (including the introduction of the flat tax), and the
stand-by agreement was not extended in 2006.2369
The ambivalent relationship to the IMF (as well as the ambiguous course
towards the EU, see below) were apparently main drivers why Romania only
took an average position in the BTI ranking of international cooperation in a
regional comparison in 2006 as shown in figure 97 in the appendix according to
which all other Eastern European EU members as well as Croatia performed
better.2370
(c) Despite Iliescu’s slalom course in the very first years of transition between
West and East, Romania was aiming at NATO membership quite early in its
transition, when compared to other EECs. After initial talks with NATO in
1991 and the publicly announced goal of membership in 1993, Romania became
the first former communist country in Eastern Europe to sign a “Partnership for
Peace agreement” with NATO in 1994.2371 Under president Constantinescu the
rapprochement towards NATO increased further, also because the government
expected this to increase the attractiveness of Romania for foreign investors.2372
Moreover, Romania missed the first wave of accession in 1999 (which comprised
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) because it did not meet the political
criteria since NATO recognized shortcomings in its human rights policies due
to problems with the integration of the Hungarian and Roma minorities; some
2369 See Maniu, Kallai, and Popa (2001), p.42; Bfai (2005), p.27; Rabobank (2006), p.4.
2370 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006c), p.18; see also ABN-Amro Romania (2006), p.25.
2371 See Habersack (2002); Gabanyi (2002), p.24; Georgescu (2004).
2372 See Chiritoiu (1998), p.73; Gray (2004), p.93.
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observers also assume that NATO tried to reduce the fears of Russia of a new
military front by limiting the number of new entrants at that time.2373
Despite this failure Romania continued its cooperation with the alliance in
subsequent years irrespective of which political party was in power. The turn-
ing point in the relationship with NATO (but also in terms of international
cooperation in general) was Romania’s positive role in the Kosovo war in 1999
when the country opened its air space for NATO planes.2374 Furthermore, a
change in the NATO enlargement strategy set in after the terrorist attacks
on September 11th, 2001 and strategic aspects became more important than
political criteria for accession. Romania also re-emphasized its accession efforts
by sending troops to Afghanistan as the only NATO candidate country to do
this.2375 The support of the great majority of parliamentary parties as well as
of the Romanian population remained strong throughout these years, reaching
64% in 1996 (representing the second highest value in EECs after Poland with
69%) and 84% in 2002.2376
In 2004 Romania became a NATO member under the left-wing government
of Prime Minister Na˘stase, together with six other EECs. This was broadly
interpreted as an important sign of a further increase in external political sta-
bility to very high levels today.2377
(d) Interviews reveal that the external stability of Romania has been of
medium importance for the investment decision of MNCs. In the 1990s the
uncertain foreign policy goals contributed somewhat to the skepticism of some
investors and were a medium constraining factor for FDI (even though this
2373 See Sharp (1997); Mungiu-Pippidi (2001), p.177; Gabanyi (2002), p.31.
2374 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); see also Habersack (2002); Gabanyi (2002),
p.16.
2375 See Gabanyi (2002), p.5; Habersack (2002); Strelchuk (2003), p.19.
2376 See European Commission (1996a); see also Gabanyi (2002); Strelchuk (2003), p.18.
2377 The other new members were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slo-
vakia; see Habersack (2002); Mu¨ller (2005), pp.145, 209; BA-CA (2006), p.4, PWC
(2007), p.15.
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aspect was less discouraging than Romania’s internal political stability).2378
While Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003) find evidence that the Kosovo crisis
(1999) may have contributed to lower FDI inflows to Romania, interviewees do
not see such a correlation.
With increasing orientation towards the West since the early 2000s, exter-
nal political stability became a slightly enhancing factor for FDI in Romania.
According to the experts interviewed, the accession of Romania to NATO in
2004 was even an important encouraging factor for FDI to Romania – at least
for one or two years.2379 By contrast, Romania’s difficult relationship to the
IMF apparently had only little impact on the investment decision of MNCs.
For instance, primary and secondary sources evaluate the introduction of the
flat tax as a more important factor for FDI than the end of the support by the
fund; furthermore, interviewees acknowledge that other foreign policy goals,
most importantly EU accession, were not obstructed in any way by the dispute
with the IMF.2380
(e) The assessment of this section reveals that Romania’s initial hesita-
tions to open up fully to the West disturbed its external political stability
(in the perception of Western European MNCs) for a long time. Despite a
clear orientation towards NATO and EU since 1993 and significant efforts by
various governments, Romania had substantial problems to convince external
observers from its open foreign policy course. In the end, external events such
as the Kosovo crisis and the attacks of September 11th, 2001, were necessary
to change the image of Romania. External political stability is clearly given
today. Nevertheless, Romanian public policy makers should be aware that
problems, for example with neighboring states (such as Moldova), may affect
2378 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute
I (2007).
2379 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv.
Romanian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
2380 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); ABN-Amro Romania (2006);
Mu¨ller (2005), p.74.
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the positive image again that Romania has attained with great efforts and that
this could also have a negative impact on FDI.
(3) In conclusion, political stability has been an important determinant for
MNCs in the analysis of Romania as a location for FDI. The downside potential
of a poor performance has proved to be greater for Romania than the upside
potential since forward-looking measures, such as accession to NATO, seem to
lose their impact fairly quickly. Romania mainly has to work on its internal
political stability including the constitutional set-up of its leading political
functions as well as its political culture and confrontation with its history.
7.4.2.3 Croatia
(1) Croatia’s internal political stability was (a) fragile in the 1990s. The
situation significantly improved after the death of Tudman in 1999 and when
the political system was characterized by (b) a more democratic institutional
set-up, (c) a strengthening of minority rights and (d) more reliable government
decisions. Today, (e) Croatia seems to be well advanced in terms of internal po-
litical stability. The (f) importance of this determinant has been very significant
for FDI in Croatia. Sub-section (g) assesses the findings.
(a) Primary and secondary sources agree that Croatia’s internal political
stability was extremely weak in the 1990s. Problems mainly stemmed from
democracy deficits that were caused by the authoritarian regime style under
President Tudman.2381 The former general and nationalistic dissident under
Tito became the first president of Croatia in 1990. He was elected by the par-
liament and confirmed in a general election in 1992 (with 56.7% of votes).
Deficiencies during his presidency that are identified by interviewees and ex-
ternal observers include a personally-tailored constitution (adopted in 1990)
2381 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
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that gave him far-reaching competences (for example, versus the (prime) min-
isters), an authoritarian-led party, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska
Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ)) and limited civil rights (for example regarding
the freedom of the press). Opposition politicians also faced repressive mea-
sures.2382
Observers acknowledge that the slow democratization of Croatia in its early
years was aggravated by the war that required a somewhat quicker decision-
making process and a less democratic governance than during peace times. It
also seems little surprising that Tudman’s leadership was hardly questioned in
Croatia during the war. However, the government style did not change signif-
icantly after the end of the war. Press freedom in particular continued to be
limited, for example, through strict defamation laws and the extensive control
of publishing houses through the HDZ. Furthermore, external observers refer
to continued pressures on political opponents even in the late 1990s. Tudman
was confirmed in presidential elections in 1997 (with 61%) and a new political
era did not begin until his death in 1999.2383
(b) Under President Stjepan Mesic´ (since 2000, HDZ) and Prime Minister
Racˇan (2000-2003, SDP) institutional reforms facilitated a stronger democ-
ratization of Croatian policy. Constitutional amendments in 2000 and 2001
decreased the powers of the president in favor of the parliament and the prime
minister which turned Croatia into a classic parliamentary system.2384
Even though the SDP as well as the HDZ governments (since 2003) had dif-
ficulties integrating the different coalition parties, the system itself proved to
2382 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003a), p.2; Kusˇic´
(2003); OECD (2005b); Helmerich (2005), p.242; EBRD (2005a), p.47; Pommer (2007),
p.117.
2383 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.2; Scho¨nfelder (2005); Kusˇic´ (2003); OECD
(2005b).
2384 See European Commission (2004c), p.11; EBRD (2005a), p.47; Bertelsmann Stiftung
(2006b).
562 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
be stable and also functioned also with a president from a different political
party. At the same time extremist parties have lost considerable influence in
recent years, receiving less than 2% of the votes in the last two parliamentary
elections.2385 Furthermore, the HDZ became less hierarchical and more demo-
cratic under Prime Minister Sanader. Even though some observers also see a
certain chance that HDZ will separate one day (since very different political
currents exist within the party), the general stability of the party system does
not seem to be in danger and interviewees identify a quite stable party system
in Croatia today.2386 The EU Commission also acknowledges that Croatia’s
democratic institutions are functioning properly and that free and fair elections
are assured, for example in the parliamentary elections in 2003.2387 Figure 59
emphasizes this positive development after the change of government in 2000
when Croatia’s political rights score significantly improved.2388
(c) Various sources also point out that the protection and integration of
minorities have improved in Croatia in recent years. During the 1990s the
situation of the Serbs in particular had been very difficult. The Serbian pro-
portion of the population dropped from 12% in 1991 to 4.5% in 2004. Some
Serbs voluntarily left the country, others were expelled during the war. Some
of those who attempted to return to their homes after the war became victims
of violence and harassments. Offenses against Serbs were often only hesitantly
stopped and persecuted by Croatian police and courts.2389
2385 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), pp.2-3, 13; IMF (2006a), p.1; Die Presse (2008).
2386 See Doc - KAS (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); Intv. Int’l Research
Institute I (2007); EBRD (2005a), p.47.
2387 See European Commission (2005a), p.10.
2388 See Freedom House (2007).
2389 See Doc - GTZ (2006a); OECD (2003b); European Commission (2004c), p.6; EBRD
(2005a), p.50; European Commission (2005a), pp.10, 31-32; Pommer (2007), pp.54, 111,
117.
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After 2000 Croatian governments have significantly increased efforts to im-
prove the rights and protection of minorities.2390 Most importantly, the Consti-
tutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities from 2002 provided a respec-
tive legal framework. The current legislation also stipulates the election of mi-
nority representatives to the parliament, a certain degree of self-determination
(including the rights for minority schools) and their representation in public
institutions. National and local advisory bodies were established to promote
the implementation of the framework.2391 Croatia concluded mutual agree-
ments with Serbia and Montenegro to protect minorities in their countries
and increased funding for minority organizations. Croatia also signed various
agreements of the UN and the Council of Europe regarding the protection of
minorities.2392
External observers acknowledge that minority protection has improved and
that the political participation, for example of the Serbian minority, has
increased. In fact, the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (Samostalna
demokratska srpska stranka (SDSS)) became part of the new government under
Prime Minister Sanader in 2007 and sent Slobodan Uzelac as Vice Prime Min-
ister and Minister for Regional Development, Reconstruction and Return.2393
However, interviews2394 and external sources2395 identify some remaining
deficiencies, especially regarding the implementation of the Constitutional Law
and with respect to the representation of minorities on the local level. Other
criticism refers to the problems of Serbs applying for Croatian citizenship, in
finding adequate employment, retrieving expropriated property, and receiving
2390 Firs efforts to improve the living conditions of Serbs in Eastern Slavonia were already
launched in the Erdut Agreement in 1995; see European Commission (2004c), p.25.
2391 See European Commission (2004c), pp.12, 25; EBRD (2005a), p.50; Pommer (2007),
p.136.
2392 See European Commission (2005a), p.20; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.15; European
Commission (2007a), pp.12, 53; see also Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007).
2393 See European Commission (2005a), p.22; EBRD (2005a), p.48; Die Presse (2008).
2394 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007).
2395 See European Commission (2005a), pp.13, 20; Pommer (2007), pp.124-125.
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equal treatment at court. As pointed out in the section on investment policy
(7.3.3.3), remaining nationalistic resentments make investments from Serbs a
highly sensitive issue in Croatia. These problems are also reflected in a lower
score in the political pluralism and participation score of the respective Freedom
of the World ranking (figure 58).2396
(d) Primary and secondary sources also acknowledge that Croatian politics
have become more coherent and reliable since the early 2000s. Interviewees
agree that government policies have become more predictable, main parties
have similar political goals and that changes of government have caused only
few modifications of internal politics (also because of the pressure from the
EU). In fact, company experts do not see that changes of government had major
visible effects on their operations.2397 Nevertheless, interviewees also emphasize
that room for improvements continues to exist and that political decisions are
even more reliable in other CCEs such as Slovenia.2398 Particularly on the local
level a change of government may still have negative consequences for investors,
for instance, regarding the support of privatization projects but also because
local politics lack the resources and the know-how to quickly implement new
government strategies.2399
Overall, Croatian citizens seem to have decent trust in their politicians. Croa-
tia takes the 69th out of 131 countries in the Global Competitiveness Report
and is the 4th out of 18 EECs (only behind Slovenia, Estonia and Lithuania).
Furthermore, the Sanader administration was one of the first governments in
transition countries to be re-elected (in November 2007).2400
2396 See Freedom House (2007); see also European Commission (2007a), pp.13-14.
2397 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Int’l Research
Institute I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2398 See Intv. German Authority II (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007).
2399 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007).
2400 See World Economic Forum (2007); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007).
7.4 Political measures 565
Interviewees also recognize a high political participation (with turnouts in
national elections of over 70% since the 1990s) and an active civil society that
developed after the end of the war with various NGOs, a bourgeoisie that sur-
vived socialist time and participates in political debates as well as an influential
catholic church (even though it has been less active and independent than, for
example, in Poland. In the BTI score for social self-organization Croatia re-
ceives 8 out of 10 points with only Slovenia having a higher score out of 18
EECs.2401
(e) In sum, both primary and secondary sources acknowledge that inter-
nal political stability significantly increased in Croatia since the early 2000s.
This country is now an irreversible and quite mature democracy.2402 This was
also confirmed by the first comprehensive EU report on Croatia in 2004 that
recognized Croatia as functioning democracy according to the Copenhagen cri-
teria.2403 Interviewees also point out that Croatia’s internal political stability
is greater than in any other former Yugoslavian country (except Slovenia).2404
(f) Interviews show that internal political stability has been a very impor-
tant aspect for the investment decision of MNCs in Croatia.2405 Interviews
confirm the findings of some FDI studies2406 that the rigid course of Tudman,
including human rights abuses and a lack of government reliability, contributed
– as did a rather hostile attitude towards MNCs and general nationalistic re-
sentments towards foreigners – to lower FDI inflows to Croatia during the
1990s.
2401 See also Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); Zakosˇek (2004); Pommer (2007),
pp.115-116.
2402 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007);
Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Germ.
Research Institute II (2007).
2403 See European Commission (2004c); see also Bfai (2004), p.18; CICD (2006), p.11.
2404 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association
II (2007).
2405 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
2406 See e. g. McGee (2003).
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According to experts interviewed, the strong improvements in internal politi-
cal stability since the early 2000s removed an important obstacle and represents
an FDI-enhancing factor for Croatia today when MNCs’ alternative country op-
tions are, for example, Serbia as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example,
Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007) decided to invest in Croatia and
not in Serbia after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Dindic´ in 2003.
Moreover, interviews do not suggest that the somewhat lower performance of
Croatia compared to Slovenia (or Western European countries) embodies a dis-
advantage for Croatia since a sufficiently high level of internal political stability
has already been reached. Deficiencies in Croatia’s minority policy may be dis-
turbing for some managers once they are in the country but they do not seem
to have any major impact on the investment decision of MNCs anymore.2407
Only investors who are dependent on political support (for instance in highly
regulated industries) may consider local problems of internal political stability
as a slightly constraining factor for FDI; they may postpone an investment
decision before an election in order to wait and see if investor-friendly politicians
come into power.2408
(g) The assessment of this section shows that internal political stability has
been a crucial issue for Croatia throughout its transition process. The break
with the past after 1999 seems dramatic and has been very positively acknowl-
edged by MNCs. In fact, internal political stability seems to be (together with
economic stability) a major anchor of Croatia’s investment climate. Croatia
apparently benefits in this context from the fact that investors generally com-
pare Croatia with countries of the region that all show a significantly poorer
performance in this field. Public policy should further extend the promotion
2407 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Es-
tate (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC -
Construction (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
2408 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunica-
tions (2007).
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of these advantages of Croatia and tackle remaining problems that relate more
to the local level, for example regarding the integration of Serbs.
(2) Croatia’s external political stability was (a) lacking in the 1990s but
strongly improved after the death of Tudman, which is mainly reflected in
a (b) clear westward orientation and a (c) positive regional role of Croatia.
The determinant had (d) a very significant constraining impact on FDI in the
1990s and a slightly enhancing effect since then. The findings are assessed in
sub-section (e).
(a) The external political stability of Croatia was lacking in the 1990s and
the political situation of Croatia (as well as in other former Yugoslavian states)
was very different to the one in other EECs.2409 The most obvious reason
for this was the war, which endangered the territorial integrity of the new
state until 1995. However, even in the late 1990s some MNCs experienced an
atmosphere of “crisis and civil war”2410 in Croatia. Moreover, the isolationist
course of President Tudman and his refusal to cooperate with international
organizations (including the ICTY) prevented an approximation towards the
West for many years. As a result, Croatia was one of the few transition countries
in 1999 without a Partnership for Peace with NATO and without an association
agreement with the EU.2411
(b) With the SDP government in power since 2000, Croatia significantly
opened towards the West and announced EU integration as its most impor-
tant political goal (see section 7.4.4.3) and cooperation with the ICTY some-
what improved. This course was also strongly supported by most opposition
parties in parliament including the HDZ. The governments under Prime Min-
2409 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007).
2410 Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007);
European Commission (2005a), p.23.
2411 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); Kusˇic´
(2003).
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ister Sanader further attempted to present Croatia as reliable partner abroad,
also because public policy makers realized that external political stability was
essential for the evaluation of Croatia through the EU.2412 International co-
operation was enhanced with both international organizations (including IMF,
World Bank etc.) and neighboring countries.2413 Relations with Hungary and
Bosnia do not seem to cause any major problems today and remaining is-
sues with Slovenia regarding the border and fishing rights can apparently be
solved within the next couple of years with the support of the EU.2414 Rela-
tions with Serbia have also improved and normalized in recent years. In 2004
Sanader became the first Croatian Prime Minister to officially visit Belgrade
since Croatia’s independence in 1991.2415
Finally, Croatia increased its cooperation with NATO (that had already
started in the mid-1990s). In 2000 Croatia joined the Partnership for Peace
and signed a Membership Action Plan.2416 It soon became clear that NATO
membership was more about values and international recognition than about
military alliance. This idea received increasing support by Croatians (52% in
2007) and an invitation to accession was extended to Croatia at the Bucharest
summit of NATO in April 2008.2417
This clear westward course of Croatia (unlike, for example, in Serbia) to-
gether with its international cooperation is not only appreciated by the experts
interviewed2418, but are also reflected in the BTI score for international coop-
eration (figure 97 in the appendix) according to which Croatia received 9 out
2412 See Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Financial Services I (2007); see also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b).
2413 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); see also Bfai (2004), p.27.
2414 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007).
2415 See European Commission (2005a), p.30; OECD (2005b), pp.4-5; EBRD (2006a), p.2.
2416 See EBRD (2005a), p.48.
2417 See Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Wheaton (2001); Financial Times (2006c).
2418 See e. g. Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007);
Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
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of 10 points in 2006 representing the 9th out of 18 EECs and a position ahead
of Poland as well as all SEECs.2419
(c) External sources as well as experts interviewed appreciate that Croatia
has started to play an important stabilizing role in the region of South East
Europe. Croatia has been able to mediate in some of the remaining conflicts
(such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and has announced that it will continue
doing so in its position as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council
2008-2009.2420 According to the interviewees, Croatia “has been doing very well
politically in the international arena”2421 in recent years and has shown in a
credible way its interest in stability and regional cooperation without aiming
at political power.2422 Therefore, Croatia is now sufficiently stable so that the
ongoing problems in the region, notably with respect to the situation in Kosovo,
are generally not associated with Croatia.2423
(d) External political stability has been a very important determinant for
the investment decision of MNCs interested in Croatia. FDI studies, interviews
and data suggest that Croatia (as well as the other former Yugoslavian coun-
tries) were not part of the investment map of foreign investors in the 1990s.
As already covered in the FDI sub-determinant country image (7.3.5.3), the
collapsing former Yugoslavia appeared to be a very risky investment location
throughout the 1990s. Croatia indeed received only marginal FDI inflows of
only about e100M annually until 1995.2424
Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003) find that the Dayton Peace agreement (1995)
had a first important positive impact on FDI in Croatia; however, interviews
2419 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006a).
2420 See Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); see also EBRD (2007a), p.70.
2421 Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
2422 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); see also European Commission
(2005a), p.23.
2423 See Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007).
2424 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007); see also figure 91 in the appendix.
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suggest that only the increasing westward orientation since the early 2000s
enabled higher FDI inflows (of over e1B annually) to Croatia. The trust of
investors thus increased in the external stability of Croatia (which has become
a minor enhancing factor) compared with other countries of the region, notably
Serbia. Croatia may benefit from those investors who use Croatia as bridge
for occasional operations in other former Yugoslavian countries.2425 However,
interviews also show that some unpredictable developments in the region, for
example regarding the situation in Kosovo, could also have a negative impact on
FDI in Croatia, since investors may hesitate to invest when they are interested
in a regional distribution of goods (such as retail companies).2426
Interview results relating to NATO accession are mixed. State representatives
expect NATO accession to boost the Croatian economy including higher FDI
inflows (as in the case of Romania).2427 By contrast, company experts do not
see any direct impact of NATO accession on Western European investors since
it is only one (rather unimportant) part of a general westward orientation of
Croatian foreign policy.2428
(e) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that external po-
litical stability was achieved in Croatia a lot later than in other EECs. However
and in contrast to Romania, Croatia was able to achieve this by virtue of its
own efforts and the westward orientation became a logical step to guarantee
its territorial security also in the future. Croatia’s external political stability is
hardly contested today despite some issues such as the situation in Kosovo and
its unpredictable effects on FDI in the whole region. With respect to NATO
accession state representatives seem to overestimate the potential impact on
FDI because Croatia has already been quite stable since the early 2000s and
2425 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); Intv. Croat.
Company I - Legal Services (2007); Doc - Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
2426 See Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2427 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007).
2428 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
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investors do not seem to be waiting for another sign of stability as was the case,
for instance, for Romania in 2004.
Public policy should address remaining issues including the further normal-
ization of relations to Serbia, the overcoming of the border issues with Slovenia
and an even more extended cooperation with ICTY. Finally and most im-
portantly for FDI inflows, Croatia should continue its positive role in the region.
(3) In conclusion, political stability has been a very important asset for
Croatia’s investment climate in recent years. Common political goals of all
major parties, successful institutional reforms, a positive image in Western
Europe, and a more difficult situation in neighboring countries have led to the
transformation of this determinant in the early 2000s – in a very short period –
from a strongly deterring to an enhancing factor for Croatia. This is especially
true for those MNCs that also consider operations in other former Yugoslavian
states (except Slovenia) and that do not expect to be affected by an increase
of the Kosovo crisis (2007/2008).
7.4.2.4 General insights for transition countries
The analysis of the country sections and the consideration of further FDI stud-
ies allow for some general insights regarding political stability in transition
countries. Key issues are the (1) performance, (2) impact on FDI and (3) pub-
lic policy implications.
(1) In the analysis of the performance it becomes apparent that most EECs
have made tremendous improvements in terms of both internal and external
political stability in the last 10 years of transition and only Belarus is clearly
lagging behind (see figure 58).2429 With respect to internal stability, most East-
ern European transition countries faced similar challenges, such as establish-
2429 See also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006a).
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ing a functioning, democratic and pluralistic governmental system as well as
strengthening minority rights. Many of them elaborated quite effective con-
stitutions and legal frameworks which often were based on the legislation of
Western European countries. In contrast, the establishment of non-legal as-
pects of a modern democracy such as a political culture of debate, an active
civil society, the actual integration of minorities (as shown for Croatia) and the
exchange of elites, have proceeded a lot more slowly. Delays in the removal of
old cadres and addressing the past in particular seem to have negative effects
on the functioning of the democratic systems even today, as the current debates
in Romania and in Poland show.2430
In terms of external political stability, many countries faced dramatic chal-
lenges in the 1990s including independence (as the Baltic states), secession (as
in Czechoslovakia in 1992/1993) or even war (as in the former Yugoslavia).
In fact, 14 out of 19 EECs analyzed did not exist in this form in 1989.2431
Western observers may sometimes underestimate the enormous efforts that
these countries had to undertake in order to establish external political stabil-
ity and that countries like Croatia were surprisingly successful in decoupling
from political turmoils of neighboring states within only five years.2432 For
many of the countries Western integration (including rapprochement to EU
and NATO) appeared to be the best solution to guarantee territorial integrity
and overcome bilateral problems. The cooperation with other international
organizations has strongly differed from country to country and was often
driven by pragmatic short-term strategies (as shown for Romania and the
IMF), but has reached a fairly advanced level in most transition countries
today (figure 97 in the appendix ).
2430 See also Kappert (2008).
2431 Including Czech Republic and Slovakia that originated from Czechoslovakia in 1993.
2432 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
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(2) With regards to the importance, interviews confirm the findings of
various FDI studies2433 that political stability was a crucial determinant for
transition countries in the 1990s and investors looked closely at country-specific
differences both with regards to internal and external stability in the course of
their investment decision. In the case of war or a failure to reach a certain level
of stability (for example in former Yugoslavia states until the late 1990s) these
countries were clearly avoided as investment locations even if not the whole
country was affected (as shown for Croatia).2434
Political stability is therefore a factor – other than many other determinants
analyzed in this thesis – which alone can lead to the decision of an MNC not
to invest in a specific country, even without the consideration of other de-
terminants. Therefore, some transition countries are still rarely considered as
investment locations even today, either because internal stability is not given
(as in Belarus) or external political stability is in danger (as in Moldova).2435
Interviews also show that less visible aspects of political stability, such as an
unclear westward integration (as in Romania in the early 1990s) or an au-
thoritarian tendency (as in Croatia under Tudman) may have deterred foreign
investors. Furthermore, interviews suggest that the relations between the home
and (potential) host country of MNCs can play an important role in the eval-
uation of political stability by MNCs (as in the case of Romania and Germany
under Chancellor Kohl).2436
Increasing political stability since the late 1990s apparently contributed to
higher FDI inflows in most transition countries.2437 Certain threshold events,
such as NATO accession, have been of particular importance for FDI in those
countries in which investors had been more skeptical regarding their external
2433 See Lankes and Venables (1996); Pye (1998); Disdier and Mayer (2003); Carstensen and
Toubal (2004)
2434 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
2435 See also Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
2436 See also Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
2437 See e. g. Merlevede and Schoors (2004); Brada, Kutan, and Yigit (2003).
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political stability (as in the case for Romania).2438 It also remains an enhancing
factor when neighboring states continue to struggle (as in former Yugoslavia).
Interviews also show that the impact of internal political stability strongly
depends on the perception, the experience of MNCs and the type of invest-
ment.2439 Internal political turmoils (as they currently exist in Romania) seem
to have only limited impact on FDI today, if stability is expected to decline,
companies have already gathered some experiences in the country and their
investment is less connected to government decisions; they may have, however,
significant effects if they occur in supposedly stable countries (as in Hungary).
(3) Some public policy implications can be drawn from this section for
transition countries. Public policy should be aware that a political sign, such
as NATO accession for Romania, can have the same weight as the level playing
field for an investor2440; however, transition countries with low political sta-
bility also need to realize that the mere announcement of the goal to accede
international organizations, such as EU or NATO, is not sufficient in order to
increase political stability.
Public policy should be aware that both internal and external political sta-
bility are more fragile than often assumed2441, even in transition countries that
are already in the EU. Even though the economies of transition countries may
react less sensitively to political turbulences once a certain minimum threshold
of internal political stability has been reached2442, interviews show that this
sensitivity apparently depends on the perception and expectation of the busi-
ness world (as discussed for Hungary), and public policy makers should not
underestimate the negative long-term consequences of political imbalances (as
2438 See also Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
2439 See similar: Woodward, Rolfe, Guimaraes, and Doupnik (2000); Merlevede and Schoors
(2004).
2440 See also Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007).
2441 See e. g. Intv. German Authority I (2007).
2442 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
7.4 Political measures 575
shown for Romania). A clear definition of political functions may reduce the
impact of political turmoils.
The experience of Romania also shows that public policy should adopt a
clear and consistent foreign policy course as early as possible in order to attain
maximum credibility and trust among investors (which seems to be difficult,
for instance, in the case of Serbia and Ukraine today). In spite of all political
efforts, bilateral cooperations remain unpredictable and often challenging for
the external political stability of transition countries. As various debates show,
for example in Croatia (with Slovenia), but also in the Baltic states (with Rus-
sia), public policy makers should make use of international mediation (most
notably of the EU) from early on in order to avoid more substantial crises.
Political efforts should be strongly dovetailed with significant economic inte-
gration (as shown for Croatia’s cooperation with Serbia) in order to increase
the advantages of cooperation.
7.4.3 Corruption
7.4.3.1 Definition
Corruption is a topic that has been identified only recently by FDI studies as
an interesting determinant for the country location of MNCs. The theory of
institutional quality has (as pointed out in the theoretical part of this thesis)
put special emphasis on the effect of corruption (section 2.2.4.1).2443
Both company and state experts make unprompted reference to corruption
as a crucial aspect for Romania and Croatia. Major issues are petty corruption
to speed up daily operations of MNCs (at customs and local authorities for ex-
ample), more far-reaching administrative decisions (such as permits, public pro-
2443 See also Wei (2000a); Baniak, Cukrowski, and Herczynski (2005).
576 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
curement and privatizations which will be called “medium-level corruption”)
and top-level corruption (for example with respect to law-making).2444
7.4.3.2 Romania
Corruption (1) was a major problem for Romania in the past. A (2) large
number of strategies and laws to lower corruption since the late 1990s have
(3) led to some success. However, (4) the remaining problems in all relevant
areas seem to be even more essential. These are caused by (5) institutional and
political challenges. Nevertheless, (6) the importance of this determinant seems
to be limited for most investors interested in FDI in Romania. Sub-section (7)
provides an assessment of the results.
(1) In the 1990s (and even before then) Romania had the reputation of be-
ing very corrupt, also when compared to other EECs. Even though data points
are rare, various interviewees and external sources identify massive briberies
in the administration both on the local and the central level at that time.
Public procurement in particular had been an eye-catching area for corruption
for many years when contracts were generally given away without tenders.2445
State representatives interviewed also admit: “It is true that there used to be
a lot of corruption in Romania.”2446
Reasons include those mentioned earlier (for example bribes for tax authori-
ties, the judiciary systems and customs authorities2447) – the poor qualification
of the personnel, the low salaries, the lack of loyalty of public servants to their
employer (the state), and the limited experience of a meritocracy.2448
2444 See OECD (2006a); FIC (2005), pp.35-36.
2445 See Bfai (2005); Mu¨ller (2005), p.144; Leiße (2006), p.10; Zu¨hlke (2006); see also Intv.
Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
2446 Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
2447 See sections 7.3.1.2 and 7.2.4.
2448 See also Scheele (2004); FIC (2005), p.36; Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
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(2) In the mid-1990s Romanian governments took the first steps to enhance
the fight against corruption. Important legislative steps were the anticor-
ruption law (1996) and several laws dealing with money laundering, public
service and asset monitoring in subsequent years. In 2001 a National Anticor-
ruption Strategy was launched. This was renewed in 2005 and accompanied by
corresponding action plans.2449 Furthermore, several sector-specific regulations
and codes of conduct have been elaborated in recent years, for example for cus-
toms. Romania also introduced the “whistleblower law” (in 2004) according
to which state officers can report the breaking of rules by their authorities
without fearing negative consequences. Romania has also ratified all major
international conventions and is a member of the group of states against cor-
ruption (GRECO) of the Council of Europe. Interviewees as well as external
sources point out that EU pressure was an important driver to initiate these
comprehensive changes and was also responsible for corruption becoming one
of the central topics in the presidential campaign in 2004 and remaining a top
priority for President Ba˘sescu until today.2450 Thus OECD (2006c) finds that
Romania and Bulgaria (EU aspirants in 2006) were the only two out of 9 SEECs
that had created and adopted a clear anti-corruption strategy including some
evidence of implementation by 2006.
Various institutions have been established that focus on the implementation
of the anticorruption policies in Romania. In 2002 the National Anticorruption
Prosecution Office (NAPO) was established within the Ministry of Interior and
Public Administration to coordinate Romania’s anti-corruption policies. It was
re-organized several times and became the National Anticorruption Directorate
(NAD) in 2006. It is now attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice
and deals with bribery with involving sums of over e10K. The Anticorruption
2449 See Gabanyi (2005), p.17; World Bank (2006a), p.65; Doc - Min. of Justice (2005b).
2450 See EBRD (2005b), p.14; Leiße (2006), p.10; World Bank (2006a), p.XII; see also Intv.
Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Romanian NGO (2007).
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General Directorate (DGA) was founded in 2005 and investigates corruption in
the public sector. The Department for the Fight against Fraud (DLAF), which
controls the distribution and use of EU funds, was set up in 2004 within the
Prime Minister’s Chancellery. Finally, a National Integrity Agency was founded
to verify assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest of higher
public servants and elected officials.2451
With respect to public procurement, the Emergence GO 60/2001 regulates
contract awarding for the first time on the basis of EU law and prohibits the
split of orders in order to remain under the minimum for public tenders. Con-
tracts of over e2,000 can be awarded through the electronic tender system since
2002 (VO 20/2002).2452
(3) As a result, both primary and secondary sources identify some improve-
ments. Several experts interviewed find that corruption has decreased since
the early 2000s and particularly since 2004.2453 A few interviewees even find
significant progress.2454 Especially corruption in public procurement and the
willingness of younger civil servants to accept bribes seem to have sunk.2455
Experts interviewed also notice that bribery at customs has significantly de-
creased with Romania’s accession to the EU. Generally, Western companies in
particular seem to have little problems with corruption today.2456
The combat of top-level corruption seems to show some progress as well.
260 higher state officials were charged with corruption between 2000 and 2004,
among them four ministers and ten mayors. Important trials were initiated
including one against former Prime Minister Na˘stase. Some top politicians have
2451 See Law no. 78/2000; Government Emergency Ordinance no. 43/2002; Law no. 54/2006,
see also FIC (2005), p.35; European Commission (2006e), p.7.
2452 See Bfai (2005), pp.114-116; Gabanyi (2005), p.17; European Commission (2007e), p.2.
2453 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial
Services II (2007).
2454 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
2455 See World Bank (2006a), p.57; see two disguised expert statements.
2456 See section 7.3.1.2; see Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC
- Utilities (2007).
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apparently left politics due to prosecutions or public pressure and corruption
in all political parties seems to have decreased.2457
Despite the success of some of the legal reforms both primary and secondary
sources suggest that indirect measures have been even more important and
effective for Romania’s combat of corruption. Therefore, the World Bank finds
that recent reforms of the tax and the judicial system (such as the flat tax
and higher salaries for judges (sections 7.2.4 and 7.3.3)) have been the most
important drivers for lower corruption in Romania.2458 Experts interviewed also
point out that the efforts to increase the electronification of data (for example,
regarding land registration, tax declaration and public procurement) etc. have
particularly helped to decrease the number of possibilities for corruption. Only
5% of firms viewed bribery as frequent in tax administration in 2005.2459
Overall, interviewees agree that the awareness of corruption as a nation-wide
problem has increased in Romania and that of many Romanian officials and
civil servants are visibly committed to fight against corruption.2460
(4) However, remaining problems seem to outweigh the ameliorations
identified. Company and state experts interviewed agree that corruption still
exists in Romania, even though MNCs – understandably – deny ever having
paid bribes.2461 Some experts even point out that Romania’s anticorruption
fight did not reach the expectations of the EU Commission by 2007, although
the Union did not postpone the accession for political reasons (see section be-
low).2462
2457 See Gabanyi (2005), p.17; OECD (2006c), p.98.
2458 See World Bank (2006a), pp.47-48, p.55; see also European Commission (2006e), p.6.
2459 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); see also Bfai (2005), pp.115-116; OECD
(2006c), p.102.
2460 See Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007).
2461 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Associ-
ation II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Software (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
2462 See e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
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Figure 60: Perceived corruption in Eastern Europe
The frequently cited Corruption Perception Index (CPI), developed by
Transparency International and presented in figure 60, also suggests only lim-
ited improvements of Romania in recent years; after a decline between 1999-
2002, the score improved only marginally to 3.1 (out of 10 points in 2006).
Romania is thus clearly behind important competitors such as Hungary (5.2)
but also behind Bulgaria (4.0) that has been improving its anticorruption per-
formance faster than Romania since the late 1990s; even Ukraine has been
catching up fast in recent years (2.8).2463
Other surveys confirm that investors still find corruption to be very present
in Romania and to have a stronger effect than in many other EECs.2464 In a
2463 See Transparency International (2007); more optimistic: Intv. Rom. Company - Con-
sulting (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007).
2464 E. g. 8th out of 9 EECs only ahead of Poland according to IMD (2006).
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World Bank survey 80% of respondents admitted that they had paid bribes for
a public service in 2005.2465
Interviews suggest that petty cash corruption in particular still seems to be
very frequent in Romania. Often cited examples are schools2466 and the health
system.2467 Some investors even believe that petty corruption is sometimes
inevitable.2468
Experts interviewed are also aware of continued corruption in daily (local)
administration procedures as already discussed for earlier determinants (section
7.2.2). This is usually to speed up processes (where not more than e100 are
involved), for example for car inspections or permits and licenses on the local
level. Investors also heard about cases in which authorities attempted to make
the approval of permits dependent on, for example, the purchase of land by a
relative.2469
Several interviewees also assume that privatizations and public procurement
are still often affected by corruption because large amounts of money are in-
volved.2470 The construction and infrastructure industry seems to be the fields
most vulnerable to corruption, as discussions of contract awarding to Bechtel
(U.S.) and Vinci (France) in 2004 have shown. However, the privatization of
Petrom (discussed in section 7.3.4.2) has also come under criticism lately.2471
Experts make the criticism that tenders should actually decrease the possi-
bilities for briberies, but are still very complex and lengthy and their imple-
2465 See World Bank (2006a); Mu¨ller (2005), p.144; Leiße (2006), p.10.
2466 When students are urged to take private lessons from the teacher in order to avoid bad
grades.
2467 When patients are urged to give money or presents in order to get a treatment.
2468 See several disguised experts statements.
2469 Experts who have heard about that: see e. g. Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv.
Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007).
2470 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I
(2007).
2471 See Bfai (2005); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Legal Services I (2007).
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mentation often exceeds the capabilities and capacities of local authorities.2472
External surveys confirm this evaluation. According to a survey of EBRD and
World Bank, 10-20% of respondents admitted that in Romania bribery is fre-
quently use when obtaining government contracts.2473 Some experts also point
out that problems with the distribution of EU funds (see section 7.4.4 for de-
tails) have even led to a certain re-increase of corruption in public tenders since
EU accession.2474
As a consequence of these remaining shortcomings, the EU established a mon-
itoring system even after Romania’s accession to the EU. In the so-called “coop-
eration and verification mechanism” for judiciary and corruption matters, the
European Commission gives advice and can even enforce counter measures.2475
(5) Several reasons have been responsible for these remaining problems.
Firstly, it seems that the large number of anticorruption initiatives led to fre-
quent legal and institutional changes as well as overlaps and gaps in the defi-
nition of tasks and competences.2476 For example, 1.5 years after the adoption
of the “whistleblower law” only about 15% of the public institutions had im-
plemented it.2477
Secondly, legal prosecutions may have increased but the conviction rate is
still very low, especially in cases involving senior officials. The cases may be
difficult to prove but some experts also argue that the justice system is still
not as independent of political influence as it should be. In this context experts
interviewed also point out that political interests may sometimes prevent a more
comprehensive approach against corruption. The political combat of high-level
2472 See e. g. Intv. German Ministry (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
2473 See European Commission (2004a), p.53; Gabanyi (2005), p.19; OECD (2006c), p.101.
2474 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); see disguised state expert interview.
2475 See European Commission (2007e); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2007b).
2476 See FIC (2005), p.9 and 35; European Commission (2005c), p.11; Gabanyi (2005), p.18;
Leiße (2006), p.10; European Commission (2007e), p.3; Intv. German Authority I (2007).
2477 A roundtable by the Romanian NGO Asociat¸ia Pro Democrat¸ia (APD) then helped to
increase implementation; see Intv. Romanian NGO (2007).
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corruption still seems to be greatly politicized in Romania and is often used –
as in the case of the coping with Romania’s Securitate past (section 7.4.2.2)
– as a political weapon against opponents.2478 The commitment to fight high-
level corruption may actually have decreased since the resignation of Minister
of Justice, Ms. Macovei in April 2007 (despite the mixed evaluation of her
work).2479
Thirdly, experts interviewed point out that it may take another generation
to abolish a traditional mentality in the Romanian society that generally views
petty corruption as something acceptable and to create sufficient awareness of
the legal and moral problems of corruption among Romanians.2480
Finally, it seems that the increasing salary gap between private and public
jobs also runs contrary to the envisaged faster decrease of corruption in the
administration.2481
(6) Some more recent FDI studies and other publications assume that cor-
ruption was among the greatest barriers for higher FDI in Romania for a long
time2482 and is still a crucial factor for MNCs and their investment decision
regarding Romania.2483 However, interviews show that the importance of cor-
ruption on the investment decision for MNCs interested in Romania depends
on the experience of investors and is only limited overall.
The level of corruption is doubtless an issue for MNC that consider Romania
for an initial investment. Various MNCs interviewed report that they were wor-
ried about being confronted with corruption in Romania, for example, during
2478 See Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); see also Gabanyi (2005), pp.15 and 17.
2479 See Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II
(2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007);
see European Commission (2007e).
2480 See Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Legal Services I (2007).
2481 See 7.2.3.2.
2482 See Mu¨ller (2005), p.144; Leiße (2006), p.10; see similar Smarzynska (2002).
2483 See also AHK (2006).
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their first site visits.2484 The lack of transparency in the administrative pro-
cedures was even the decisive reason for Schuko to back pedal from an earlier
investment project because they did not want to get involved in corruption.2485
However, Schuko pursued a different investment project in Romania; this
example therefore shows that investors may be deterred from a specific in-
vestment opportunity but they generally will not be deterred by Romania as
investment location per se by such an experience. Intv. Supranational Author-
ity I (2007) therefore seems to be right when stating that “corruption is an
important matter but investors will probably not rule out Romania because of
it”2486.
Furthermore, those investors who are already in the country do not evaluate
corruption as an important issue that could obstruct follow-up investments or
even force them out of Romania. With increasing experience they even assume
that corruption may be lower than often expected by external observers and
that Romania may still suffer from its bad reputation of the past.2487 More
experienced MNCs also often assume that they do not need to pay bribes in
Romania as long as they know their rights and are willing to wait somewhat
longer. Since most MNCs are assisted by lawyers and other experts they may
also be less helpless than Romanian citizens or companies.2488 Moreover, some
important areas of petty corruption listed above (such as the health system),
seem to be less relevant for investors than for Romanians and therefore foreign-
ers may be less confronted with corruption.2489 Finally, it seems that companies
2484 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods III (2007).
2485 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007).
2486 See similar: Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
2487 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services
III (2007).
2488 See Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007).
2489 See e. g. Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007);
Intv. German Authority I (2007).
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are sometimes even willing to pay some low bribes when they can avoid compli-
cated, time-consuming and expensive procedures with (local) authorities.2490
In contrast, interviews show that Romania’s strong focus on anti-corruption
policies in recent years also causes some problems for investors. The om-
nipresent fear of persecution apparently makes many civil servants insecure
and reluctant to decide quickly or – in some cases – decide at all because they
do not want to come under the suspicion of corruption. This seems to be true
for the judicial system as well in which almost all trials go to the highest level
in order to avoid reproaches of intransparency.2491 These aspects may not pre-
vent MNCs that are interested in an initial engagement in the country from
investing in Romania. However, follow-up investments of some of those MNCs
that are already in the country may be delayed.2492
(7) In the assessment of this section the long list of strategies and measures
indicate that the combat of corruption is generally taken seriously in Roma-
nia today and public policy makers seem to do well in tackling the myriad
dimensions of corruption at the same time; yet, indirect reforms (such as sim-
plifications in the administrative procedures and electronifications) have been
more successful than, for example, the juridical persecution of corruption.
Nevertheless, corruption still exists both on the local and the central level,
but the actual level is difficult to determine since corruption has become such a
central and highly politicized issue in Romanian politics and in Western Euro-
pean media. The problems with the implementation of anticorruption strategies
and the new difficulties due to the distribution of EU funds may, in the end,
effectuate that corruption has remained on a comparable level as in the early
2000s.
2490 Several disguised company expert interviews.
2491 See Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007); Intv. Romanian County Council
(2007).
2492 See Intv. German Ministry (2007).
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Even though many MNCs assumed that paying bribes was an unavoidable as-
pect of doing business in Romania in the early 1990s, corruption has apparently
not had any substantial negative impact on FDI so far. It seems that investors
can avoid paying bribes, are willing to pay low sums or accept to lose some
money because of longer procedural times. Overall, some state representatives
may overestimate the negative impact of corruption on FDI in Romania.
However, the existing delays of political, administrative and juridical de-
cisions, due to the problems of the implementation of anticorruption policy,
may cause negative indirect effects on FDI in the future. Romanian public pol-
icy makers thus need to decrease the existing insecurities and fears within the
authorities. Anticorruption measures may sometimes be too restrictive and reg-
ulations like the “whistleblower law” may actually jeopardize the cooperation
among state officials and paralyze bureaucracies. Nevertheless, further efforts
are needed to decrease corruption in a sustainable way in order to catch up to
more advanced countries of the region.
7.4.3.3 Croatia
Croatia performed (1) very poorly in the 1990s in terms of corruption, but
(2) significant measures were initiated in the post-Tudman era that (3) showed
some first improvements. Nevertheless, (4) an overall rather negative evaluation
remains and this has (5) several root causes. Corruption (6) seems to have a
medium impact on FDI in Croatia. This section is assessed in sub-section (7).
(1) According to interviewees2493 and external sources2494 corruption was
omnipresent in Croatia in the 1990s. The authoritarian and nepotistic ten-
dencies, the slow administrative reforms as well as the lack of awareness of
corruption as something condemnable under Tudman apparently facilitated
2493 See e. g. Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineer-
ing (2007).
2494 See e. g. Schmidt-Ha¨uer (2000); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003a).
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the existence of corruption. It was most visible in the privatization process –
as already shown in section 7.3.4.3 – when insiders and Tudman minions were
often favored. Furthermore, corruption was very common in the judiciary and
in the bureaucracy at that time, for example, when dealing with land regis-
trations, permits or licenses on the local level (sections 7.2.3.2 and 7.2.2.3).
As a result, Croatia received only 2.7 points (out of 10) in the CPI in the last
year of Tudman’s presidency (1999). This put Croatia behind Romania (3.0)
(although ahead of Serbia with (2.0)) (figure 60).2495
(2) Under Prime Minister Racˇan significantmeasures were initiated to com-
bat corruption in Croatia and were further extended under Prime Minister
Sanader. Two subsequent national anticorruption programs were launched for
2002-2005 and 2006-2008. In this context the Office for the Prevention of Cor-
ruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) was established. Its goals are the dis-
closure and prosecution of corruption. USKOK was strengthened and upgraded
several times and was also given the responsibility of tracing corruption in pub-
lic offices (2007).2496
Important legal steps included laws on public procurement (2001), preven-
tion of conflict of interest in pursuance of public offices (2003), internal finan-
cial control within public sector (2006), and on the financing of political parties
(2006). Moreover, a National Council was established in 2006 to monitor the
implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Program.2497 Furthermore,
Croatia has become a GRECO member in 2000 and ratified various interna-
tional treaties including the UN convention against corruption (2005). Overall,
both primary and secondary sources identify that a substantial legal framework
2495 See Transparency International (2007).
2496 See Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006); Doc - NCC (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV
(2007); see also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003a), p.4; OECD (2003a); EBRD (2005a), p.4;
European Commission (2005a), p.16; European Commission (2007a), p.50.
2497 See Doc - Gov’t. of Croatia (2006); EBRD (2005a), p.49; OECD (2006a), p.100; Doc -
NCC (2007); see also Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007).
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is in place which is largely aligned with EU regulations and enables – in theory
– an effective fight against corruption.2498
State interviewees also point out that the increase of awareness for corruption
has become an important dimension of the recent Anticorruption Program
including public seminars with state officials, citizens and companies.2499
(3) Both interviewees2500 and secondary studies2501 identify some positive
effects of Croatia’s efforts and a certain decrease in corruption in recent years.
A few (Croatian) interviewees even find “very significant”2502 improvements.
Complaints about briberies in the areas of company registration, tax author-
ities, customs, public procurement, and in the judiciary seem to be less fre-
quent.2503 However, it seems that reforms which focus indirectly on corruption
were belonged to the most effective ones. An example here is the electronifica-
tion of the case management in the judiciary and the introduction of Hitro and
Hitrorez.2504
External sources also see some progress in the combat of top-level corruption.
Therefore, some high-level officials had to resign due to a corruption affair,
for example, Foreign Minister Zˇuzˇul (2005). International organizations also
acknowledge that USKOK has prosecuted an increasing number of corruption
cases (156 in 2006) and also discovered the scandal in the CPF in June 2007.2505
As a consequence, MNCs interviewed report that the awareness of corruption as
2498 See Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); see also European Commission (2005a), pp.16,
87; OECD (2006a), p.97; European Commission (2007a), pp.10, 50.
2499 See e. g. Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); see also European Commission (2007a),
p.62.
2500 See e. g. Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007);
Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
2501 See e. g. World Bank (2006a), p.9; European Commission (2007a), p.10.
2502 Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); see also Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal
Services (2007).
2503 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services
(2007); Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); Intv. German Authority III
(2007); World Bank (2006a), p.50.; OECD (2006a), p.102.
2504 See also sections 7.2.3.3 and 7.2.4.3; World Bank (2006a), p.50; OECD (2006a), p.105.
2505 See OECD (2003a), p.14; EBRD (2005a), p.49; European Commission (2007a), pp.10,
50.
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criminal offense has somewhat increased among state officials and two members
of the parliament gave up their supervisory board seats and demanded the same
from all state officials and ministers.2506
These improvements are also reflected in the CPI, according to which Croatia
jumped significantly from 2.7 in 1999 to 3.7 points in only one year (figure 60)
and therefore climbed from the 75th to the 57th percentile of the countries
analyzed by Transparency International.2507
Most interviewees assume that corruption will decrease in the course of Croa-
tia’s further EU integration and may be less dominant than in most other
SEECs today including Romania, Bulgaria or Bosnia and Herzegovnia.2508
(4) In line with the findings for Romania, remaining problems with cor-
ruption seem to be greater in Croatia than the improvements sketched above.
Interviews2509 confirm the findings of external studies2510 that corruption is still
widespread. Interestingly, Croatian state representatives depict an even more
dramatic overall image of the situation than company experts. Intv. Croatian
Authority II (2007), for example, describes corruption as “the greatest prob-
lem” in Croatia.2511
Corruption seems to be most problematic in the Croatian bureaucracy. Petty
corruption is apparently frequently used to speed up processes in the adminis-
tration for daily procedures such as licenses and permits (for instance for land
2506 See e. g. Intv. German Authority II (2007).
2507 74th out 99 countries (1999) and 51st out of 90 countries (2000); see Transparency
International (2007) and earlier editions.
2508 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv.
Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); see
similar: OECD (2006a), pp.103-104.
2509 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
2510 See e. g. OECD (2003a); Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003a), p.9; NCC (2004b); European
Commission (2005a), p.16; European Commission (2007a), p.10.
2511 See similar: Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
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registration).2512 One company expert admits: “If you have problems with the
local administration, the use of petty corruption helps you to solve these prob-
lems in a fairly short time.”2513 Another one agrees: “I do not know anybody
who would not pay some extra money to avoid problems with local adminis-
tration.”2514
The second field of corruption that is frequently cited is the court system.
Many verdicts continue to be influenced by political pressure or by briberies.
Furthermore, few corruption charges have actually led to a conviction so far.2515
Moreover, public procurement remains prone to corruption, for example, re-
garding infrastructure projects.2516 According to external surveys 10%-20% of
the respondents said that bribery to get a government contract was common (in
2005).2517 Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007) points out that “we, un-
fortunately, know more cases in which public tenders ended with a disreputable
outcome than fully transparent ones”.
Primary and secondary sources also identify significant top-level corruption.
Interviewees see a tendency for government decisions to be unfairly influenced,
using existing loopholes of the new legislation on party financing.2518
2512 See also section 7.2.2.3; Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ.
Association II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007); Doc - NCC (2007); Doc
- GTZ (2006a); OECD (2003a), p.35; European Commission (2005a), p.16; Pommer
(2007), p.142.
2513 Disguised company expert interview.
2514 Disguised company expert interview.
2515 See Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv.
German Authority II (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); see also Ber-
telsmann Stiftung (2003a), p.12; NCC (2004b), p.27; European Commission (2007a),
p.50.
2516 See Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007);
Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007); see also European Commission (2005a),
p.16.
2517 See OECD (2006a), p.101.
2518 See Doc - NCC (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority
II (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007);
European Commission (2005a), p.16.
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Finally, corruption in privatization remains an important issue as underlined
by the scandal in the CPF (section 7.3.4.3).2519 This scandal has led some ob-
servers to ask what role corruption may have played in other privatizations.2520
Thus, the INA privatization, for example, could have been a case in which cor-
ruption is not completely unlikely.2521
As a result, it seems that anticorruption policy has only had limited success
in Croatia so far and the high expectations in Croatian governments since 2000
for the fight against corruption were somewhat disappointed.2522 This explains
why Croatia’s performance of perceived corruption, according to the CPI, even
slightly decreased from 3.9 points in 2001 to 3.4 in 2006 while neighboring
countries such as Serbia and Slovenia improved their performance in recent
years (figure 60).2523 According to IMD (2006) Croatia is the 4th most corrupt
country out of 9 EECs.
(5) Several reasons may explain why anticorruption policies have had only
limited success in Croatia so far. Firstly, external sources still see some defi-
ciencies in the legal framework of Croatia’s anticorruption fight. For example,
ethics codes and codes of conduct are still lacking for many areas in the public
and private sector, some laws (such as the ones on conflict of interest and asset
declaration) need better definitions and clearer interpretation. Some elements
of the international conventions has not been fully accomplished yet.2524
More importantly, interviewees identify significant shortcomings regarding
the implementation of the existing anticorruption legislation. In 2007 the Min-
istry of Justice only had five officials to monitor the implementation progress
of the anticorruption laws and the resources of USKOK are apparently too low
2519 See Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); European Commission (2007a), p.20.
2520 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
2521 Disguised company expert statement.
2522 See NCC (2004b), p.3; European Commission (2005a), p.16.
2523 See Transparency International (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007).
2524 See OECD (2006c); European Commission (2007a), pp.50-51; see also Intv. Croatian
Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
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as well. The implementation of international conventions also seems to be not
fully accomplished so far.2525
Finally, the awareness of the criminal nature of corruption still seems to be
low (despite recent efforts discussed above). Interviewees point out that citi-
zens, bureaucracy as well as top officials need to understand better that even
petty corruption is not acceptable and something that has to be sanctioned.2526
Interviews also show that local authorities may underestimate their responsi-
bility since local politicians interviewed consider corruption mainly to be a
problem of the central authorities.2527
(6) Corruption seems to have a medium impact on FDI in Croatia overall,
but the specific impact varies depending on the type of investment. In the 1990s
corruption was one of the problems that led to lower FDI inflows in Croatia.
However, MNCs generally did not perceive corruption as a separate issue but
as part of weak governing in Croatia overall at that time which included a poor
performance of bureaucracy, the favoritism of a small elite of Tudman minions
and a weak internal and external political stability.2528
Interviews suggest that since the early 2000s corruption has become less
important for large firms, greenfield investors and particularly MNCs that were
already present in Croatia and who realized that conditions were comparable or
even better than in some of the neighboring countries.2529 In contrast, smaller
and medium-sized MNCs may postpone or even suspend investment decisions
if they expect the need for higher briberies or strongly dependent on central or
2525 If the increase to 15 people by 2008 will be enforced needs to be seen; Intv. Croatian
Ministry IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007); see also European Commission
(2005a), pp.16, 87.
2526 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Croa-
tian Ministry IV (2007); see also European Commission (2007a), p.10.
2527 See Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007).
2528 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007).
2529 See e. g. Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
IV (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007).
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local government support, for example in privatizations, investments in natural
resources or when a multitude of licenses are needed.2530
These findings also put the evidence from the survey of the World Com-
petitiveness Report into perspective that states that corruption is the second
most problematic factor for doing business in Croatia (after inefficient bureau-
cracy).2531
Recent scandals, such as the CPF, do not seem to irritate MNCs and their
investment decision. Rather, the discovery of former shortcomings is seen as
progress.2532 Nevertheless, several interviewees point out that more scandals
and ongoing problems with corruption would contribute to a more negative
country image of Croatia and its bureaucracy.2533
(7) The assessment of this section reveals that corruption was highly present
in the 1990s. It is still a problem today that is mainly driven by the deficiencies
that were already discussed under the legal measures of this thesis (notably the
quality of bureaucracy and court system).
Important anticorruption measures have been established and the framework
and institutional set-up has probably been more streamlined than in Romania.
Top officials seem to be very willing to accept corruption as a crucial is-
sue. They may even overemphasize it because they are aware that the EU
looks closely at anticorruption policies of candidate countries. Moreover, rigid
anticorruption policies do neither seem to be abused as political weapon nor
represent an obstacle for business operations as it is sometimes the case in
Romania.
2530 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007);
see also EBRD (2005a).
2531 See World Economic Forum (2007); see also CICD (2006).
2532 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); European Commission (2007a), p.20.
2533 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. European Institution (2007); see
also Doc - NCC (2007).
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In contrast, local politicians still seem to lack the awareness that they also
have a responsibility for improving the situation.
The majority of investors interested in Croatia does not seem to be deterred
by corruption because they know that the situation in other SEECs may be
even worse and they may actually be willing to pay some bribes (although none
of them will, of course, publicly admit that).
Croatian public policy should focus on reforms of the legal measures dis-
cussed above in order to establish more transparent procedures and decrease
the possibilities of corruption. In contrast, the completion of the legal frame-
work and a more successful prosecution of corruption cases only seem to have a
secondary importance for an effective and sustainable reduction of corruption
in Croatia.
7.4.3.4 General insights for transition countries
The analysis of Romania, Croatia and further FDI studies allows for some
general insights regarding (1) the impact of corruption on FDI, (2) the per-
formance of transition countries and (3) possible recommendations for public
policy makers.
(1) The large majority of FDI studies dealing with corruption assumes that a
higher level of corruption has a negative impact on FDI, particularly in tran-
sition countries. They assume that corruption is a sign of weak institutions and
therefore a less attractive investment location.2534 Some studies even find that
corruption has been among the most important reasons why some transition
countries received little FDI, particularly in the 1990s.2535
The analysis of the interviews offers a more detailed picture of the effects of
corruption. It suggests that corruption only has a medium constraining impact
2534 See Wei (2000a); Bevan and Estrin (2000); Morisset and Neso (2002); Campos and Ki-
noshita (2003); Be´nassy-Que´re´, Coupet, and Mayer (2005); Blonigen (2005); Goodspeed,
Martinez-Vazquez, and Li (2006); Eigen (2006).
2535 See McGee (2003); Dunning (2005).
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on FDI overall.2536 Greenfield investors seem to be confronted with medium- or
top-level corruption quite rarely. Larger MNCs may have few difficulties with
petty corruption and do not seem to exploit the possibilities of influencing the
decision-making of top-level politicians as may be the case for domestic com-
panies. Furthermore, MNCs that already have experiences in the host country
do not seem to be greatly deterred by corruption.2537 They seem to be aware
that they will not have to pay bribes as long as they know their rights or are
even willing to participate in petty corruption in order to speed up daily ad-
ministrative procedures (as shown for Romania and Croatia).2538 Interviews
cannot confirm the findings of Smarzynska (2002) that corruption encourages
the establishment of joint ventures with domestic firms since the analyses in
section 7.2.1.2 suggested that potential problems with local partners exceed
those of corruption from the perspective of MNCs.
However, corruption does seem to have a deterring effect on companies with
little experience in transition countries in general and that frequently have to
cooperate with authorities (for example for privatizations, permits etc.) and
therefore often face medium-level corruption. However, these MNCs will only
decide in favor of a different country if conditions are significantly better there
(as shown for Croatia).2539
In addition to this, corruption seems to have some negative indirect effects
on FDI levels in transition countries. Important aspects are that the longer
consideration time and uncertainty of MNCs, whether corruption is involved
as part of a envisaged investment project, may delay or even postpone the
investment decision of MNCs (although they usually stick to their country
2536 See similar Wheeler and Mody (1992); Demekas, Horva´th, Ribakova, and Wu (2005).
2537 See e. g. Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
II (2007).
2538 See several disguised expert statements.
2539 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial
Services II (2007).
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decision as shown for Romania).2540 Corruption also increases bureaucratic
inefficiencies. This delays procedures and business operations (as shown for the
court system in Croatia). An overstretched combat of corruption may also have
a negative indirect effect on FDI, if it is used as political weapon as it creates
insecurity and standstill in the bureaucracy and political reform.2541
(2) Most transition countries performed only poorly in their anticorruption
fight in the 1990s. Awareness and frameworks barely existed and the persecu-
tion of corruption by MNCs was difficult since bribery was not illegal abroad
in many Western European countries. Respective laws were not adopted in
Germany and Austria until 1999. However, even today most transition coun-
tries seem to suffer from fairly high corruption in “all areas where the state is
involved”2542. Interviews as well as secondary sources confirm that corruption
can be traced in all dimensions discussed (petty, medium-level and high-level
corruption) and is most frequent at customs, tax authorities, public procure-
ment, permit procedures, and conflict of interest. A larger disparity of salaries
between the public and private sector also seems to increase corruption (as
shown for Romania).2543
Even though most EECs have established substantial anticorruption frame-
works including regulations, institutions and strategies, international organiza-
tions see only limited effect so far. In fact, indirect measures, such as the sim-
plification and shortening of administrative procedures and constant pressure
from the EU (which actually may also overemphasize this aspect as negotiation
tool), seem to be more effective for reducing corruption in transition countries
2540 See e. g. Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
2541 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. German Ministry (2007).
2542 Disguised expert statement.
2543 See Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007);
EBRD (2004); OECD (2006a), p.104; Eigen (2006).
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.2544 The awareness among top officials may therefore have increased but is
still limited among local authorities (as shown for Croatia) and citizens today.
The fight against corruption thus remains one of the weakest points of reform
policies of transition countries2545 and interviews suggest that a genuine change
of mentality will take another generation.2546
(3) Several public policy implications can be derived from this section.
Firstly, the combat of corruption is (together with EU integration) the deter-
minant with the largest amount of interdependences with other determinants
that influence FDI in transition countries including the quality of bureaucracy,
company registration, property rights, privatization, and infrastructure. Cor-
ruption thus needs to be understood as part of an overall reform process and
less as an isolated aspect.2547
Secondly, prevention seems to be more effective than punishment in the
fight against corruption in transition countries. Therefore, public policy mak-
ers should work on clear regulations as well as simple and quick procedures of
bureaucracy in order to minimize the possibilities for corruption (as discussed
for Croatia and Hitrorez). Furthermore, the fight of corruption needs better
definitions (for example through codes of conducts) since many actors involved
– foreign and domestic companies, citizens, civil servants, and top-level politi-
cians – often have only a vague or contradictory understanding of corruption,
for example, with respect to the difference between gratefulness and bribery in
petty corruption. At the same time public policy needs to prevent administra-
tive actions coming under the suspicion of corruption in general (as discussed
for Romania). The prosecution of corruption cases only represents a helpful
factor in the combat of corruption if not only (top-level) officials but also cit-
2544 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I
(2007); see also EBRD (2004); OECD (2006a), p.91; World Bank (2006a), p.XVIII.
2545 See McGee (2003); OECD (2006a), p.91.
2546 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
2547 See also Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
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izens and companies are actually convicted. Otherwise the credibility of the
host country and its court system can actually suffer which may even have a
slightly deterring effect on investors in the longer-run.2548
Thirdly, public policy makers should be aware that EU integration includes
both opportunities and risks in the fight against corruption. The pressure of the
EU to establish anticorruption norms and preemptive measures may represent a
chance to increase the awareness and barriers for corruption. On the other hand,
the distribution of EU funds and the many new regulations may actually cause
confusion and corruption (as in Romania).2549 EU candidates (such as Croatia)
should therefore examine closely how Eastern European EU members have
dealt with these challenges and schedule sufficient time to establish functioning
institutions and regulations.2550
7.4.4 EU integration
7.4.4.1 Definition
The experience of the EECs that acceded to the EU in 2004 as well as the
analysis of the interviews conducted suggests that the relationship between host
countries of FDI and the EU is an aspect observed closely by potential investors.
Investors may expect from EU accession important advantages such as the
harmonization and simplification of the legal framework but also higher market
potential through access to the internal market of the EU. The most relevant
aspects in this context seem to be the (1) development of EU integration and (2)
EU funding. Sections (3) provide conclusions for the countries in question.2551
2548 See also Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv.
Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); Baniak, Cukrowski, and Herczynski (2005).
2549 See also next section.
2550 See Oman (2000); Charlton (2003); World Bank (2006a), p.81.
2551 See Mu¨ller (2005), pp.111-137; Neuhaus (2005), pp.13-16; Larive Romania (2006), p.43.
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7.4.4.2 Romania
(1) Romania’s EU integration is based on (a) the development of relations
with the EU towards accession, (b) Romania’s perspective on this evolution, (c)
the results of Romania’s reform process and the (d) impact of EU integration
on the investment decision of MNCs. Section (e) provides an assessment of the
findings.
(a) Romania’s path towards EU accession was long and complicated.
Romania was the first EEC to conclude a trade agreement with the European
Community in 1974. Diplomatic relations were established in 1990 and this
was followed by a trade and cooperation agreement in the following year. The
Association Agreement was signed in 1993, came into force in 1995 and was
called Europe Agreement. It mainly foresaw free trade with the EU and the
adoption of the acquis.2552
Despite this initial progress in integration, the EU remained skeptical re-
garding to Romania’s application for accession in 1995 and interviewees agree
that Romania’s EU accession was uncertain in the 1990s. This is also reflected
in the first monitoring reports of the European Commission (since 1998). Brus-
sels criticized (as discussed in previous sections) the slow transition process, the
instable political situation and the difficult economic development. When Ro-
mania showed more substantial reform efforts in the late 1990s, the EU decided
to promote Romania’s course, increased the financial support and opened ac-
cession negotiations in 2000. After a slow beginning, the adoption of the acquis
accelerated after 2001 and was largely completely by 2003.2553
In 2004 Romania was able to conclude negotiations and signed the acces-
sion treaty on April 25th, 2005. However, the attitude of the EU to Romania’s
actual accession remained cautious. One reason for this was the bad experi-
2552 See section on trade policy 7.3.1.2; see Leiße (2006), p.7; Hartwig (2001).
2553 See European Commission (1998); see also Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I
(2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
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ence with the Romanian implementation of reforms since some regulations had
been implemented late or only partially. As mentioned previously Romania also
had problems finding advocates for its accession due to the large reform gaps
compared to other EECs and its poor reputation in Western Europe (section
7.3.5.2).2554
The reservations of the European Commission and many EU member states
also explain the establishment of safeguard clauses to allow a delay or even sus-
pension of Romania’s accession. The first safeguard clause (that also existed
for the other ten countries that already joined the Union in 2004) enabled the
EU to take counter measures – and even prevent accession with an unanimous
vote of the European Council – if the implementation of certain obligations was
deemed insufficient and included home and justice affairs. The second safeguard
clause, which was only developed for Bulgaria and Romania, foresaw a post-
ponement of accession until 2008, if reforms in important areas were deemed
insufficient. Finally, the EU designed a “super safeguard clause” exclusively for
Romania, with eleven requirements regarding domestic and justice affairs which
Romania had to fulfill before accession. A qualified majority of the European
Council would have been sufficient in order to postpone Romania’s accession
to 2008.2555 Nevertheless, the final monitoring report of the European Com-
mission and the confirmation by the European Council in late 2006 cleared
Romania’s way to accession on January 1st, 2007.2556
In their assessment of the timing of accession some experts criticized the
EU for letting Romania in too early considering Romania’s weak performance
2554 See European Union (2005); Leiße (2006), p.6; Gabanyi (2005), pp.6-7; see also Intv.
Germ. Research Institute I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007).
2555 See European Union (2005), articles 36-38, annex IX; Gabanyi (2005).
2556 See European Commission (2006d); European Commission (2006e); European Council
(2006); EBRD (2005b), pp.14-15, 46; Bfai (2005), pp.25, 125-127; Leiße (2006), pp.7-8.
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in the judicial sphere and the fight against corruption.2557 In contrast, other
experts point out that a later EU accession would not have changed much,
since a delay would only have postponed Romania’s reform efforts.2558
As discussed in the previous section on corruption, a cooperation and verifi-
cation mechanism remained in place even after Romania’s EU accession. Here
the EU reserved the right to survey the progress of reforms (in food safety,
payment of EU funds, justice and anticorruption measures) and even introduce
sanctioning measures such as the suspension of the applicability of Romanian
court decisions in the other member states of the EU. However, none of the
experts interviewed expects that the EU will actually impose sanctions on Ro-
mania.2559 This is also suggested by the moderate tone of the European Com-
mission’s first post-accession report in June 2007, which concluded that “much
remains to be done”2560 but which did not mention any possible consequences
for the shortcomings of Romania’s efforts in the fields in question.
(b) From the Romanian perspective, EU accession had been a goal of
all governments since the early 1990s (section 7.4.2.2). However, interviews
suggest that a clear and reliable commitment of local and national Romanian
public actors to EU accession from did not set in until the early 2000s.2561
On the other hand, the the Romanian population’s support of EU membership
was high from early on and reached 81% in 2003. This represented the highest
value of 13 countries surveyed.2562
2557 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority
II (2007); Intv. German Political Adviser (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I
(2007); see also Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
2558 See e. g. Intv. German Authority I (2007).
2559 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007).
2560 European Commission (2007e), p.1; see Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007).
2561 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
2562 Croatia was not considered in the survey; European Commission (2004b).
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Nevertheless, internal power struggles repeatedly endangered the progress of
accession negotiation and contributed to the irritations of the European Com-
mission and EU member states. Between 2000 and 2004 the implementation of
the required reforms was sometimes impeded by the many former communists
still in the parliament, who were unwilling to abolish the laws of the socialist
times.2563
Furthermore, Romanian governments apparently did not always show much
commitment to the promises and actions of previous governments. Interviews
refer to statements made by President Ba˘sescu in front of EU officials to the
effect that (amongst others his predecessor had negotiated badly and he was
planning to reverse some of the decisions made in earlier years, including several
privatization sales. He is also referred to asserting that Romania wanted to
accede to the EU together with Moldova.2564
As a result of these political roadblocks within Romania, experts acknowl-
edge that Romania’s willingness alone would probably not have been sufficient
to implement the reforms necessary to enter the EU. They assume that strong
and relentless reform pressure of the EU was essential to bring about the ac-
complishments enabling Romania to enter the Union.2565 This evaluation also
seems to be validated by the fact that many interviewees see a significant de-
crease of Romania’s reform efforts since EU accession (and the decreasing EU
pressure).2566
(c) The vast majority of interviewees welcomes the fact that EU integration
caused significant reforms in Romania, although company experts in particular
2563 See for the problems regarding the exchange of elites: also 7.4.2.2; see Intv. German
Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. German
Econ. Association III (2007).
2564 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007).
2565 See e. g. Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007).
2566 See Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007).
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agree that most of the effects of these reforms did not become visible until
2004 or even later.2567
Most improvements were part of a gradual process and cover a large num-
ber of determinants and sub-determinants previously analyzed. Experts inter-
viewed point out that EU integration has strongly contributed to better, more
reliable and more credible business conditions in Romania overall.2568 More
specifically, they acknowledge a higher political and economic stability, more
legal certainty, a strengthening of property rights, a harmonization of the legis-
lation, and a simplification of administrative procedures.2569 Company experts
also emphasize that the motivation and willingness of civil servants and the
labor force increased strongly after EU membership became within Romania’s
grasp.2570 Romania also received much more public attention abroad as the
prospect of accession drew nearer (media coverage has increased significantly
since 2006) and was able to improve its fairly poor image in Western Europe
(section 7.3.5.2).2571
The most visible immediate improvement that set in with EU accession in
2007 was the abolishment of the remaining trade barriers for goods that were
traded within the EU. This was discussed in section 7.3.1.2. For many MNCs
2567 See Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007).
2568 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services
II (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007);
Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
2569 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software
(2007).
2570 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services
(2007).
2571 See Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007);
see also Du¨ckers (2007).
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this aspect was also the most important reform aspect of EU accession over-
all.2572
Despite this predominantly positive evaluation of EU integration, experts in-
terviewed also note some (mostly temporary) deteriorations of the investment
climate due to Romania’s accession to the EU. Thus, irritations of authorities
increased for several months due to the many new regulations.2573 As elabo-
rated previously, EU integration also led to an increasing amount of emigration
to other EU countries2574 and may have negatively affected those MNCs that
mainly trade goods with non-EU countries.2575 Finally, some experts also as-
sociate the EU accession with an increase of salaries and real estate prices in
Romania2576, while others point out that they would have risen anyway.2577
(d) Interviews show that EU integration had little impact on FDI in Romania
until the early 2000s but that it has become a very important factor since
then.2578
Romania’s application for membership (1995) and the beginning of accession
negotiations (2000) had few consequences for FDI inflows. This finding from
the interviews is in contrast to the majority of FDI studies that suggest that
even these steps have a positive impact on FDI levels of transition countries.2579
2572 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); see also Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
2573 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007).
2574 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive
(2007).
2575 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); see also Intv. German Authority IV
(2007).
2576 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial
Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007).
2577 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
2578 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services
(2007).
2579 See e. g. Brenton, Di Mauro, and Lu¨cke (1999); Merlevede and Schoors (2004); Clausing
and Dorobantu (2005).
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Interviews suggest that the investment decisions of large and less risk-averse
MNCs in particular were not dependent on the state of Romania’s EU integra-
tion or the prospect of accession. In fact, they even benefited from the lower
market saturation and prices until the early 2000s.2580
However, the great majority of experts interviewed indicates – in line with
FDI theory2581 – that the interest in Romania as an investment location signif-
icantly increased among potential investors from Germany and Austria when
the likelihood of Romania’s accession to the EU increased in 2004/2005.2582
EU accession was one of the reasons, for example, an Austrian investor inter-
viewed to invest in Romania instead of Ukraine in 2006.2583 Experts also agree
that FDI surged sharply following Romania’s accession in 2007 and that EU
accession seems to be one of the most important reasons for higher FDI inflows
today.2584 Experts point out that in the first months after accession the FDI of
smaller MNCs and those MNCs increased that were waiting for an increasing
of political stability, legal certainty and lower market entry barriers (such as
financial service providers).2585 Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007) also em-
phasizes that Romania (and Bulgaria) benefited from the fact that they were
the only countries joining the EU in 2007, which drew additional attention from
potential investors. State experts in particular point out that EU accession will
2580 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); see also Intv. German Authority I (2007).
2581 See e. g. UNCTAD (2002); Zakharov and Kusˇic´ (2003).
2582 See Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
2583 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007).
2584 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007); Intv.
Romanian Ministry I (2007).
2585 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007);
Intv. German Authority IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv.
German Econ. Association III (2007).
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remain the most important factor for the attraction of FDI in Romania for the
next couple of years.2586
Nevertheless, a minority of interviewees warns that EU accession may also
have a certain deterring effect on FDI in the long-run, due to increases in prices,
salaries and competition.2587
(e) The assessment of this section reveals that Romania has adopted and
implemented an impressive reform framework in a very short time of only six or
seven years. This surprised many external observers, given the slow transition
of Romania in the 1990s and the turbulences of internal Romanian politics until
today.
The mere prospect of EU accession was an important driver for FDI to Ro-
mania. However, it seems that the effect became noticeable fairly late, due to
observers’ doubt as to whether Romania was able to accomplish the require-
ments of EU accession. The increasing confidence in Romania’s accession and
its positive effects on FDI since 2004 may be difficult to isolate from those
attributed to NATO accession (section 7.4.2.2) but interviews clarify that the
growth of FDI inflows in the subsequent years (2005 and 2006) was strongly
driven by the prospect of EU accession (together with higher privatization
sales).
However, public policy makers should be aware that the positive effect of
EU accession may have already peaked in 2007 and that state interviewees
may be overestimating the long-term effects of EU integration. Even though
the benefits of EU integration still seem to outweigh the disadvantages (such as
higher prices and salaries), public policy makers should work hard on improving
the deficiencies discussed for previous determinants and focus on higher-value
FDI in order to receive comparable high levels of FDI in the years to come.
2586 See Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007).
2587 See Intv. Rom. Company - Consulting (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III
(2007).
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The current slowdown of reforms may be due to the internal political quar-
rels described above and probably does not have any direct effect on the
investment climate. Nevertheless, public policy makers should work on the
remaining issues (as sketched in the reports of the European Commission) in
order not to jeopardize the good image that Romania has elaborated in recent
years.
(2) The analysis of primary and secondary sources shows that EU funding
(a) strongly increased for Romania since the late 1990s, (b) but various prob-
lems occurred regarding the use and distribution of the money. The (c) impact
of EU funding on the investment of MNCs remained low but seems to have
increased recently with higher amounts flowing in. This section is assessed in
sub-section (d).
(a) The EU’s financial support for Romania has strongly increased over
the years. In 1991 Romania joined the PHARE program.2588 Assistance in-
creased to about e650-700M annually since the beginning accession negotia-
tions in 2000 and Romania also became a recipient of ISPA (for transport and
environment)2589 and SAPARD (for agriculture)2590. Romania received e1.2B
as a pre-accession support until 2007.2591 Finally, Romania will receive a total
of e32B of EU subsidies between 2007 and 2013. Of this amount e13B are pro-
vided for agricultural projects and the remaining e19B for structural projects
(such as infrastructure and environment). In this context special focus is given
to the promotion of SMEs.2592 State representatives expect that MNCs will
2588 The PHARE program was established in 1989 and stands for Poland Hungary Assistance
for Restructuring the Economy. The group of beneficiaries was soon extended.
2589 ISPA stands for Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession.
2590 SAPARD stands for Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development.
2591 See Georgescu (2004); Larive Romania (2006), pp.45-46; Deloitte (2006), p.29.
2592 See Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv. Supra-
national Authority I (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007); see also Agence
France Press (2006).
608 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
mainly play a role as contractors for institutions, for example in infrastructure
projects.2593
Interviewees expect that the increase in EU subsidies will help to improve the
desolate infrastructure situation.2594 Experts assume that the positive effects
of the EU funds will improve the investment conditions in Romania overall and
compensate for other disadvantages of EU accession (such as the expiration of
some investment incentives).2595
(b) Romania has experienced significant problems with the use and distri-
bution of EU funds. An important example for the deficiencies is Romania’s
use of the assistance received through the PHARE program from which Ro-
mania obtained a total e2,6B in the period between 1999 and 2005.2596 The
European Court of Auditors examined the use of PHARE money between 2000
and 2005 in a special report. The report concludes that the projects goals were
largely in compliance with the general goals of PHARE; however, in more than
half of the projects, the money was not used for the planned goals and in many
cases the planning was running more than 2 years behind schedule (for 3 year
projects). The report comments that Romania often lacked a coherent strategy
for the implementation of the PHARE projects and provided too few human
and financial resources.2597
Furthermore, the distribution of the large amounts of the new and large
amount of EU assistance (of e32B) is still behind schedule. Main problems
seem to be the lack of effective structure to absorb EU funds, complicated
procedures of the application process that require either good contacts to local
authorities or external help, the strong centralization of the projects (that are
2593 See Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007).
2594 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007).
2595 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007).
2596 See EBRD (2005b), p.33; HVB Bank (2006), p.17; Deloitte (2006), p.29; ABN-Amro
Romania (2006), p.26.
2597 See European Court of Justice (2006).
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generally steered from the ministries and tend to neglect local requirements),
and the limited preparation of the local authorities. Interviewees also report
that plans for infrastructure projects, for instance, exist and the funds of the EU
are available but Romania has not provided its contribution to the financing
so far.2598 In sum, Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007) describes
the situation regarding the distribution of EU funds since Romania’s accession
to the EU as “chaotic”. Therefore, even though 3,000 companies had already
applied for EU funds no project had been approved by June 2007.2599 Other
experts criticize that the deficiencies in the distribution of money increase the
chances for corruption.2600 On the other hand, Intv. German Ministry (2007)
points out that the authorities responsible for the distribution seem to be more
cautious to grant subsidies because they are afraid of coming under suspicion
of corruption.2601
Regarding this recent EU funding, experts also point out that Romanian
authorities have not been able to present enough appropriate projects to ab-
sorb such a large amount of money so far. Municipalities (that are generally
responsible for the elaboration of these projects) seem to lack staff, experi-
ence and contacts in the ministries steering the projects. State interviewees
also point out that MNCs have made little progress (compared to Romanian
companies) in their preparations for absorbing EU subsidies and still need time
to understand the opportunities and procedures required.2602 However, experts
also clarify that Romania understandably has difficulties identifying sufficient
projects considering that Romania would have to invest, for example, about
2598 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. German
Political Adviser (2007); Intv. German Ministry (2007).
2599 See Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007).
2600 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II
(2007).
2601 For example the Central Financing and Contracting Unit.
2602 See e. g .Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007).
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five times more money in the environmental sector within the next six years
than in the 17 years since 1990 in total.2603
(c) The importance of EU financial support for FDI inflows in Romania has
increased over the years. In the 1990s when Romania mainly received assistance
through PHARE, interviewees assume that only few investors decided to come
to Romania, based on the prospect of receiving EU subsidies.2604
However, during the preparation of EU accession the availability of funds as
well as the awareness of EU supported projects increased strongly. Therefore,
interviewees now recognize an increasing number of MNCs that are interested
in investment opportunities in Romania because of the available EU funding,
particularly in the infrastructure (and construction), energy and environmental
sector.2605 Some MNCs that are already in the country may also perceive the
EU subsidies as a way of compensating for the lower productivity of their opera-
tions in Romania compared to the home country.2606 However, large companies
usually do not expect to receive any EU subsidies.2607
Nevertheless, since none of the projects had been approved by the end of
the interview phase of this thesis, the actual direct and indirect effect of EU
funding on FDI remains to be proven.2608
(d) The assessment of this section shows that Romania has had significant
problems with the use and distribution of EU funding (demonstrated by the
assistance from the PHARE program). Its implementation appears to have
often exceeded the capabilities and capacities of local authorities. With respect
2603 See Intv. German Ministry (2007); see also Intv. Romanian County Council (2007);
Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007).
2604 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III
(2007).
2605 See Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services
II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
2606 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007).
2607 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007).
2608 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007).
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to the absorption of the future EU funding it seems that Romanian authorities
have until now underestimated the preparation time, efforts and financial
contribution that are required for a successful absorption of EU funds. This
may be because until only recently they were preoccupied with the finalization
of accession to the EU. However, only when Romanian public policy manages
to quickly establish effective organizations and structures to absorb the EU
funds can this expected large amount of money – totaling to about e4.6B
annually or 50% of FDI inflows in 20062609 – fulfill its potential to become an
important driver for FDI in Romania.
(3) In conclusion, this section shows that EU integration has been a very
important driver for FDI in Romania in recent years, whereas the impact of
EU funding on the investment decision of MNCs will depend on the decision
and action taken by Romanian authorities in the future. FDI research is still
at an infant stage with regards to the effects of both EU integration and EU
funding on FDI in Romania and will be an interesting field for further research.
7.4.4.3 Croatia
(1) Croatia’s EU integration (a) proceeded slowly in the 1990s but accelerated
in recent years and (b) Croatian public policy showed strong efforts to reach
the common goal of EU accession. Experts expect (c) some important effects
on the investment climate with the country’s accession to the EU. This (d)
may have quite a significant impact on future FDI inflows. An assessment is
provided in sub-section (e).
(a) The EU strongly supported Croatia in the early phase of its independence
and established diplomatic relations in 1992. However, the relationship be-
tween EU and Croatia deteriorated in the mid-1990s, when the EU criticized
2609 See figure 89; own calculations.
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Croatian conduct during the last weeks of the war in 1995 (such as the expulsion
of Serbian minorities), its ambiguous policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Tudman’s autocratic leadership, and his unwillingness to cooperate with the
ICTY.2610 Financial support of the EU for Croatia (see below) was suspended
and EU accession seemed very unlikely under Tudman. After his death (1999)
a rapprochement (and a somewhat better cooperation with the ICTY) began.
This led to the signing of the SAA in 2001 which came fully into force in Febru-
ary 2005 and also included Croatia’s participation in twinning projects. In 2003
Croatia officially applied for EU membership and was granted a candidate sta-
tus by the EU in 2004. In 2005 the European Commission published a first
progress report.2611
However, the EU hesitated to initiate accession negotiations because it
doubted Croatia’s full cooperation with the ICTY, particularly in regard to
General Ante Gotovina, who had been charged with crimes against humanity
because of his role in the Operation Storm and the expulsion of the Serbian
minority from the Krajina. Nevertheless, the EU decided to open accession ne-
gotiations in October 2005 even before the detention of Gotovina on the Canary
Islands and his extradition to the ICTY in December 2005.2612
As a consequence of the difficulties of the new members states – particularly
of Romania and Bulgaria – in meeting the requirements of accession, the EU
introduced opening benchmarks (such as the proof of a legal harmonization or
implementation) for ten (out of 33) chapters. These must be fulfilled by Croatia
before the initiation of the actual negotiations including competition policy,
2610 See Bertelsmann Stiftung (2003a), p.3; European Commission (2004c); Pommer (2007),
pp.160-162.
2611 See also the analysis of Croatia’s trade policy in section 7.3.1.3; Kusˇic´ (2003); European
Commission (2005a), pp.4, 7; Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007).
2612 See also section 6.3.1; CICD (2006), p.11; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2007a); Eu-
ropean Commission (2005a), pp.23-24; Pommer (2007), p.175.
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justice, agriculture etc.2613 Croatia is thus facing hurdles that are higher than
those in other acceding countries and require more time, institutions, staff and
financing.2614 However, even state experts interviewed feel that Croatia should
accept all obligations and become a regular member state “instead of becoming
a second-class member state like Bulgaria and Romania”2615 (since they are
still monitored by the EU).
The mandatory screening process – the comparison of the Croatian legislation
with the EU acquis – was completed in October 2006 and 14 negotiations
chapters were opened and two of them (science and research as well as education
and culture) were provisionally closed by November 2007.2616
With respect to the accession schedule it seems that the EU, Croatian policy
makers and MNCs have little doubt that Croatia will join the EU one day.2617
Many interviewees assume that Croatia probably would have joined the Union
earlier had it not been for the heritage of the war and the Tudman regime.2618
Croatia had envisaged an accession by 2007 (before the dispute about the coop-
eration with the ICTY) but then changed the goal to 2009.2619 The interviews
reveal that most of the state and company experts expect an accession not un-
til 2010 or 2011.2620 Reasons for a likely postponement of accession include a
2613 See Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007);
Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); Doc - OECD (2007); see also Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (2007c); European Commission (2007a), p.6.
2614 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II
(2007).
2615 Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
2616 See European Commission (2007a), p.6; Financial Times (2006c); Intv. Germ. Research
Institute II (2007).
2617 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real
Estate (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
2618 See Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate
(2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007).
2619 See Dresdner Bank (2004), p.8; Sanader (2006); EBRD (2006c), p.2.
2620 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv.
Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); see also Pommer
(2007), p.221.
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delay in the negotiation process, the strong focus of the EU on the ratification
of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the current enlargement fatigue in the EU, and
the related discussion about an accession of Turkey.2621 In contrast, Croatia
may have an advantage in that it is a small country whose accession will cause
few objections. Croatia’s accession is also perceived as contributing to a greater
regional stability on the Western Balkans. Furthermore, experts assume that
accession could hardly be refused once Croatia has fulfilled all requirements of
the EU despite political concerns and the general enlargement fatigue.2622
(b) From the Croatian perspective, EU accession may have been “the
logical goal even before the end of the war”2623; however, as pointed out in
relation to external political stability, EU accession did not become a publicly
discussed and realistic goal of Croatian politics (similar to the case of Romania
but for different reasons) until the early 2000s (section 7.4.2.3). Experts also
emphasize that this aspect represents an important difference to the situation
in Serbia where the EU orientation strongly depends on the ruling party.2624
Under Prime Minister Sanader the commitment and efforts enabling accession
have increased further. Experts also agree that all major parties are aiming
at EU accession and a government change would not cause a deviation of this
course.2625 This is also emphasized by the National Committee for the Super-
vision of Croatia’s Memberships Talks (established in 2005) that coordinates
and streamlines the EU requirements and the negotiation procedures. It in-
cludes not only all major parties, but also trade unions and representatives of
employees and attempts to avoid negotiation talks leading to ongoing disputes
2621 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); see also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(2007c); Zu¨hlke (2008).
2622 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry IV
(2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007).
2623 Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007).
2624 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007).
2625 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team
(2007); Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services
I (2007); see also Dresdner Bank (2004), p.6; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.2.
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about accession in general. Croatia also set up a large negotiating team of 30
members, supported by a total staff of 2,000.2626
The majority of experts interviewed acknowledge that Croatia has not made
any major mistakes in the negotiating phase so far and that accession prepara-
tions are advancing fairly well, especially since Croatia has to fulfill the opening
benchmarks.2627 Interestingly, some state experts are more pessimistic stating
that reforms are proceeding rather slowly, are mainly driven by EU pressure
and that the difficult chapters (such as agriculture, competition, fishery and
energy) are still ahead of Croatia.2628 Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007) even
admits that “Romania and Bulgaria show in many areas better results than
Croatia”.
In contrast to the general support for EU accession amongst the political class
in Croatia, much of the general population has remained skeptical regarding
the EU in general and Croatia’s EU accession to the EU in particular. Only
37% of the respondents in an EU survey carried out in 1996 had a positive
opinion of the Union and this value had only increased to 40% in 2006. In
the same year only 48% of Croatians were clear supporters of a Croatian EU
membership.2629 Apparently, Croatians have been dissatisified with the EU,
the many delays of the negotiation process and the rigid evaluation regarding
cooperation with the ICTY, considering the fact that Gotovina is still perceived
as a war hero among many Croatians. Furthermore, many Croatians seem to
expect only limited advantages from an EU membership and worry more about
deteriorations in Croatia’s economic performance (in the agricultural sector for
2626 See European Commission (2005a), p.8; Sanader (2006); Financial Times (2006c).
2627 See Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv.
Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Germ.
MNC - Telecommunications (2007).
2628 See Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007);
Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007); Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007).
2629 See European Commission (1996a); see for an analysis of the 2006 PULS survey: Pommer
(2007), pp.192, 194.
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example).2630 Experts interviewed also point out that accession negotiation (as
well as issues of external political stability) remain a very emotional field in
Croatia in which public support can quickly jump or drop depending on how
negotiations develop.2631
Furthermore, interviews also reveal a certain disappointment amongst Croat-
ians about the fact that their country missed the first two waves of EU accession
of transition countries. There is evidence of a feeling that Croatia deserved to
join the Union at least as early as Slovenia but especially at the same time as
Romania and Bulgaria (and definitely before Serbia). This is due to a focus
on fairly good economic performance of Croatia. Thus some Croatians seem to
believe that Croatia should avoid making further concessions to the EU and
should even consider a delay of an accession if necessary.2632
(c) Interviews suggest that EU integration generally has positive effects
on the investment climate of Croatia.2633 Experts acknowledge that Croatia’s
accession efforts thus far have contributed to a clear westward orientation (and
therefore greater (external) political stability), an important degree of legal
harmonization with the European regulative framework and first positive signs
of a more flexible and transparent bureaucracy.2634
Experts interviewed expect further gradual improvements due to the contin-
ued integration. Most importantly they anticipate a further legal harmonization
(for example in sensitive areas such as food safety and environment), a decrease
of old elites’ influence and local networks, a higher reliability of political deci-
2630 See Pommer (2007), pp.7, 196-199; see also Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
2631 See Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007); Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
2632 See Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007);
Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007).
2633 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
2634 See 7.4.2.3; see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC
- Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007); Intv. Croatian
Ministry II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007).
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sions, and an improvement of the court system.2635 Some experts also believe
in a certain positive effect in the combat of corruption due to EU pressure.2636
Moreover, Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007) assumes that Croatia
will receive at least partly the attention that has been given to Bulgaria and
Romania right before accession.
Company experts mainly expect that the accession itself will lead to a greater
legal certainty as well as the abolishment of all remaining legal, financial and
administrative barriers for goods and capital (for example regarding cash pool-
ing). They also assume that international recruiting and training of employees
will become easier.2637 Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007) points out
that an EU accession of Croatia will increase the external stability of the West-
ern Balkan region.
In contrast to Romania, experts interviewed worry less about potential neg-
ative effects for Croatia from EU integration. They do not expect that EU
integration will lead to an increase of bureaucratic difficulties.2638 However,
neither do these foresee that EU accession will increase Croatian salaries; in
contrast, retailers and financial service providers rather expect prices to drop
because of the increasing competition in the market.2639
Finally, several interviewees expect that “not many things will change in
Croatia.”2640 They argue that Croatia has already significantly progressed in
2635 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007); Intv. Croatian Econ. Association
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007).
2636 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007);
see also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2007c).
2637 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv.
Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
2638 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also Intv. Croatian Authority II
(2007).
2639 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007).
2640 Disguised expert statement; see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Supra-
national Authority II (2007).
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terms of legal harmonization (for example with respect to tax legislation).2641
However, they assume that EU integration will contribute only slightly to a
solution for some of the most serious investment obstacles in Croatia, such
as the deficiencies in the work of the bureaucracy or regarding the combat of
corruption.2642
(d) EU integration is quite an important aspect for the investment decision
of MNCs that are interested in Croatia. Interviews show that investors and
potential investors studied Croatia’s progress in EU integration closely in the
past. Therefore, Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007) points out that EU
integration (namely the signing of the SAA in 2001) was an important factor
when MNCs considered an investment in Croatia in the early 2000s. Others
confirm that the opening of accession negotiations in late 2005 created a further
interest for investors in Croatia.2643 However, most experts assume that Croatia
will benefit the most in the following years when more risk-averse investors
and those interested in a first-mover advantage are attracted by the prospect
of accession as well as by the reform efforts that were discussed above.2644
This increasing impact of EU integration on FDI is also underlined by the fact
that the German Economic Chamber of Commerce is receiving and increasing
amount of queries from potential investors about when Croatia will supposedly
accede the EU.2645
Furthermore, the majority of experts interviewed expects a boost of FDI in-
flows when Croatia enters the EU (as also predicted by theory)2646. However,
2641 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007); Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I
(2007).
2642 See Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II
(2007); Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. German Authority II (2007).
2643 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. European Institution
(2007); see also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006c), p.9.
2644 See Intv. German Authority III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); see also Bulgaria Economic Forum (2006), p.2.
2645 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
2646 See Zakharov and Kusˇic´ (2003).
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they mainly anticipate a pull for larger, market-oriented companies that ben-
efit from the elimination of the borders. EU accession may foster FDI growth
particularly in those areas that lose their current protection such as tourism,
nature, agriculture etc. (see also section 6.3.1 on Croatia’s economic develop-
ment).2647 In the longer run interviewees as well as external sources suggest
that the impact for EU integration on FDI will decrease again.2648
(e) In the assessment of this section it becomes apparent that Croatia’s
EU integration started very late. This was caused by internal political prob-
lems that were analyzed before. Interviews suggest that visible progress is only
limited in Croatia so far, even though accession negotiations have been going
on for more than two years now. The most important reason seems to be that
Croatia had already been quite advanced in terms of legal harmonization while
the main challenges for Croatia’s investment climate, such as the increase of the
quality of the Croatian bureaucracy, will take more time and long-lasting pres-
sure of the EU. This is also acknowledged by top officials and leading politicians
who agree that a delay of the accession date may actually be beneficial for the
thoroughness and sustainability of Croatian reforms. In contrast, parts of the
population (and in fact some foreign companies as well) seem to overestimate
Croatia’s performance in terms of transition and may focus too strongly on the
economic performance of the country. Therefore, public policy makers should
increase their efforts to explain in detail the benefits of EU accession to the
population
Nevertheless, Croatia can expect positive future effects for FDI from EU
accession. This seems particularly true because Croatia may be the only coun-
try that will join the EU within the next five years. This will cause a special
2647 See Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007);
Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); see similar: IMF (2006b), p.11; more
pessimistic.
2648 See also Bulgaria Economic Forum (2006), p.2.
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attention from potential investors. Nevertheless, Croatia’s EU accession is in
danger to be ignored because of its small country size; therefore, public policy
makers should enhance marketing efforts for Croatia abroad.
(2) Croatia has started to benefit from EU funds (a) only lately on a larger
scale and (b) has only limited experience with the use and distribution of the
subsidies so far. EU funds (c) may become a slightly enhancing factor for FDI
in the years to come. Sub-section (d) assesses the findings.
(a) Croatia was included in the PHARE program in 1995. However, since
the relations to the EU cooled down in the mid-1990s (see above), the pay-
ments were suspended and did not resume until the signing of the SAA (2001).
Thus between 1991 and 2000 Croatia only received EU assistance to a total
value of e367M (mainly for humanitarian purposes) whereas Albania, for ex-
ample, received e912M during the same period.2649 As a result, Croatia had
to master its economic transition (and the consequences of the war) mainly on
its own.2650 After the re-invigoration of the relations with the EU, Croatia re-
ceived e279M between 2000 and 2004 as part of the CARDS program, mainly
for the assistance of the economic development and administration capacity
building.2651 As a candidate country Croatia has become a beneficiary of pre-
accession assistance programs, of which the most important ones are PHARE,
ISPA (2005-2006) and SAPARD (2006).2652 In 2005 Croatia received e105M
and e140M in 2006 in terms of pre-acession financing. Since 2007 Croatia also
receives support through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)
(e141M in 2007) which focuses on institution building and the preparation for
the implementation of the agricultural and cohesion programs. For 2008 and
2649 See European Commission (2002c), p.23; Ott (2005), p.21; own calculations.
2650 See Kusˇic´ (2003).
2651 See European Commission (2005a), p.6; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2006b), p.14; European
Commission website (2008).
2652 See Bfai (2004), p.35; European Commission (2005a), p.6.
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2009 Croatia can expect financial support as part of IPA totaling of e146M
and e151M.2653
(b) As shown above, EU funding in Croatia has remained limited so far, as
has the experience of interviewees with the use and distribution of EU funds.
Experts have experienced difficulties in receiving funding on the local level, for
example Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007), who found no admin-
istrative structure in place in Slavonia in order to absorb EU assistance and
who had difficulties to find the right contact person only a few years ago. Intv.
Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007) has found that authorities in Romania
are less restrictive and more willing to grant European subsidies than in Croa-
tia. Interviews also suggest that Croatian authorities have made little effort to
contact new EU members and learn from their experiences in retrieving EU
assistance thus far.2654 The European Commission also agrees that the institu-
tional and administrative set-up for the absorption of EU financial assistance
is still only in the beginning stages so far and that the use of EU assistance still
suffers from certain weaknesses including an effective program evaluation.2655
Nevertheless, the European Commission recognizes some important progress
in recent years and praises, for example, a stronger decentralization of the pre-
accession aid and good progress in the implementation of some of the programs,
namely SAPARD (for instance, regarding the establishment of mandatory stan-
dards for the eligibility of applicants).2656
(c) Regarding the importance of EU financing for the investment decision
of MNCs, interviews suggest that it has had only little impact on FDI in Croa-
tia so far. It seems that the amounts available were too small and in areas that
have been of little interest for the majority of foreign investors (such as ad-
ministrative capacity development and agricultural development). However, it
2653 See European Commission (2006a), p.5; European Commission (2007a), p.6.
2654 See e. g. Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007); Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007).
2655 See European Commission (2007a), p.6.
2656 See European Commission (2005a), pp.6, 63-64; European Commission (2007a), p.7.
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seems that only few investors have already entered the country in expectation
of increasing EU funds in the future, also because the date of accession is still
uncertain.2657
Nevertheless, experts interviewed assume that Croatia will also benefit from
somewhat higher FDI inflows once Croatia enters the EU and qualifies for larger
amounts of EU assistance. Interviewees expect inflows particularly from SMEs
winnig tenders in projects related to tourism, agriculture and environment.2658
However, interviewees also point out that many investors believe that state
incentives (as discussed in section 7.3.3.3) may continue to be more important
(and more realistic) than potential EU funds.2659
Finally, interviews also suggest that Croatia will benefit from EU funding in-
directly, because the use and distribution of EU financing will lead to a strength-
ening of central and local authorities. They may learn how to set measurable
goals, work with different methodologies of implementation and cooperate with
different partners.2660 In sum, the quality of Croatian bureaucracy may improve
which may also, in the long-run, lead to higher levels of FDI (see above section
7.2.3.3).
(d) An assessment of this section reveals that Croatia has shown that it is
capable to master economic transition even without significant help of the EU.
The low payments of the EU in the 1990s may help to explain the resentments
towards the EU among many Croatians. More importantly, the low inflow of
EU money caused Croatia’s weak spot, the bureaucracy, not be mordernized
earlier. FDI inflows may become more significant due to higher EU funding
after accession than currently assumed. Croatian public policy makers should
thoroughly scrutinize the experiences of other EECs in order to maximize the
2657 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007).
2658 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007).
2659 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007).
2660 See Intv. German Authority III (2007).
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impact of the increasing EU funds. Nevertheless, the much smaller amount of
EU assistance expected, compared to Romania for example (due to Croatia’s
smaller population), may simply not be significant enough in order to attract
a large amount of (additional) investors to Croatia.
(3) In conclusion, this section has shown that the legal and political di-
mension of EU integration has been a very important factor for FDI inflows
to Croatia, while the financial aspects has had limited impact so far. Further
EU pressure is likely to help Croatia master the necessary reforms in many
areas touched upon in previous sections of this thesis including bureaucracy,
corruption and judiciary.
7.4.4.4 General insights for transition countries
This section presents several insights regarding the impact of EU integration
on (1) FDI in transition countries and (2) the reforms of transition countries.
Section (3) discusses some implications for public policy makers.
(1) The analysis of the country sections and further FDI studies shows that
EU integration has a very important impact on the decision of MNCs to in-
vest in a specific transition country. In this context, interviews suggest that the
gradual success in reforms (as part of accession preparation) is the most im-
portant aspect for those MNCs that are already in the country, while potential
investors tend to be attracted by a clear prospect and the actual accession to
the EU by country in question. However, interviews as well as FDI studies on
earlier accession rounds suggest that the positive impact on FDI ceases within
several years after accession. In fact, historical analyses of the impact of EU
accession on FDI suggests that the effect for new EU members decreases every
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EU accession round.2661 As a consequence, Croatia may see a shorter period
of beneficial FDI effects after EU accession than, for example, Romania.
FDI studies generally focus on the experience of CEECs and their integration
process. According to the great majority of these studies (but also to those
experts with experience in other EECs), transition countries benefited strongly
from the prospect of EU accession in general in terms of FDI inflows.
Furthermore, FDI studies as well as experts interviewed identify important
events as psychological thresholds for investors such as the application for mem-
bership, the public commitment of the EU to Eastern enlargement in Essen in
1994, the beginning of individual accession negotiations as well as the first wave
of accession in 2004. SMEs in particular seem to be attracted by the increasing
legal harmonization, easier market access and greater legal certainty that is
established in the course of EU integration.2662
Interviews and data show that concerns of some studies, that countries that
acceded later (namely Romania and Bulgaria) would attract lower FDI inflows,
were unfounded. Interviews show that MNCs were for a long time unconvinced
that Romania would actually join the union but once accession became irrevo-
cable Romania (and Bulgaria) benefited from the special position of being the
only countries joining the EU in 2007. The prospect of the large amounts of
EU funding available may also have contributed to this push.2663
The remaining SEECs and European CIS that have not joined the EU so far
also seem to benefit strongly from the perspective of EU integration in terms of
FDI inflows. Particularly due to a long period of political instability, the more
2661 See Brenton, Di Mauro, and Lu¨cke (1999); Merlevede and Schoors (2004); Clausing
and Dorobantu (2005); see also Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007); Intv. German
Authority IV (2007).
2662 See Borsos-Torstila (1999); Brenton, Di Mauro, and Lu¨cke (1999); Bevan and Estrin
(2000); UNCTAD (2002); Zakharov and Kusˇic´ (2003); see also Intv. Germ. MNC -
Consulting I (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007); more skeptical: Intv. Germ.
MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007).
2663 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I
(2007); Bevan and Estrin (2000).
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recent steps of EU integration (such as the signing of SAAs by Macedonia and
Croatia in 2001 or the opening of accession negotiations as in the case of Croatia
in 2005) seem to be major drivers for risk-averse investors. An EU accession may
have less effect on FDI in Croatia than it may have on other non-EU countries,
as Croatia is already perceived (by many potential MNCs) quited stable and
having made good progress in reforms. Therefore, EU accession may be an even
even more important factor for other countries in question (including Serbia and
Ukraine) and their future FDI development. Interviews suggest that the region
may become more attractive particularly for large investors after EU accession
leads to the lifting of remaining trade barriers and easier market access. EU
funding seems to have only limited impact on FDI in non-EU countries but
may grow once more is available directly before and after accession.2664
(2) EU integration has contributed significantly to the good performance of
many Eastern European transition countries to implement significant reforms
since the early 1990s. Particularly countries that only recently initiated reforms
(such as Romania and Croatia) showed an impressive catching up process in
recent years. EU integration therefore helped some EECs to make up for an
only gradual reform process in the 1990s. The case of Romania shows that EU
pressure enabled reforms that did not seem possible to many observers in such
a short time. EU integration apparently has a positive impact on investment
conditions in all EECs. Experts interviewed praise the legal harmonization in
particular as well as the improvement of the legal certainty and the positive
effects on the functioning of the bureaucracies in the course of EU integra-
tion.2665
Interviews also show many challenges in the accession preparation of EU
aspirants. They include the risk of frequently changing government policies (as
2664 See Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction
(2007); see also Kalotay (2000); UNCTAD (2004b).
2665 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. German Authority III (2007).
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shown for Romania) and a limited support of the population (as in Croatia).
Interviews and external studies also confirm that the use and distribution of
EU funds cause difficulties in the great majority of EECs (for example, Czech
Republic and Bulgaria) before and after EU accession.2666
The varying speed of EU integration has mainly been driven by the reform
efforts of candidate countries, but the EU also plays a vital role in this pro-
cess. State interviewees point out that negotiations are often slowed down by
the length of time that national authorities have to wait for an evaluation of
certain reform steps by the European Commission.2667 Company experts inter-
viewed also criticize that requirements of the EU often suppress business reality
because they do not sufficiently consider the perspective and demands of do-
mestic and foreign investors (for example regarding customs regulations).2668
The analysis of EU funding in Romania also raises the question as to whether
the EU does not sometimes promise unrealistically high financial assistance
for the years after accession, since – even if Romania was perfectly prepared
formally – such large amounts seem to be difficult to absorb in such a short
time for a sufficient number of adequate projects.2669 Finally, state experts in
particular show that the political motives of EU enlargement policy can be
irritating or even dangerous for reform efforts. Therefore, Croatian authorities
may ask whether comprehensive efforts, for example with respect to the combat
of corruption, are actually necessary, when Romania and Bulgaria (which are
both seen as having a worse corruption record) were still able to accede the
Union.2670
2666 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); see also European Court of Justice
(2006).
2667 See Intv. Romanian Ministry II (2007).
2668 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
2669 See e. g. Intv. German Ministry (2007).
2670 See also Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007); Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities
(2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
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(3) Several public policy implications can be derived with regards to EU
integration. Firstly, interviews suggest that a successful accession preparation
is driven by a very good chief negotiator of the host country (politically and
technically), a capable and independent Ministry of European Integration, a
good communication between the different ministries regarding EU related is-
sues, a clear scheduling with timelines, tasks and responsibilities and a good
statistical basis that facilitates the gathering of the information demanded by
the European Commission throughout the accession process.2671
Secondly, public policy makers should not underestimate the potentially neg-
ative effects of EU integration, including an increase in prices and salaries,
a possibly higher level of corruption (due to problems in the distribution of
EU money) and a shortage of labor. Public policy should therefore introduce
counter measures (including social housing, changes in education policy etc.)
early enough to mitigate negative effects.2672
Thirdly, public policy makers should be aware of the potential negative effects
of a delayed accession. A delay may not be as bad for investors for whom the
prospect of accession may be just as important as the actual accession. However,
a delay – whether driven by the EU or by political problems in the host country
– may frustrate authorities and slow down necessary reforms.2673
Finally, public policy should prepare well for the phase after accession to
the EU. It should be prepared to deal with possible disappointments of the
population that positive effects are less visible than expected.2674 Countries
could also actively ask for the maintenance of cooperation and a mechanism to
keep up the EU pressure and prevent a slowdown of reforms in sensitive areas.
Public policy actors should also elaborate further in advance a strategy for
an effective absorption of EU funding. It seems in this context that transition
2671 See Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007); Intv. Romanian Ministry II (2007).
2672 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007).
2673 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2674 See also Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007).
628 7 Public policy and its effects on FDI
countries often ignore the fact that a significant contribution on their part (in
terms of human and financial resources) is necessary.2675 They also seem to ask
only rarely for advice from other EECs with similar experiences.2676
7.4.5 Overview of findings on political measures
The findings of the analyses regarding the political determinants are summa-
rized in this section. Figure 61 presents an overview of results regarding the
performance of these determinants by Romania and Croatia since the early
2000s whereas the evaluation is based on the expert interviews, documents
collected and external publications studies. The impact of political measures
on FDI in transition countries is summarized in figure 62 following the same
methodology as for legal and economic determinants.
2675 See Intv. German Ministry (2007); see also Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
2676 See Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007).
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Figure 61: Overview political determinants – performance
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Figure 62: Overview political determinants – importance
8 Overview of country findings
This chapter provides an overview of this thesis’ findings with respect to all
FDI policy determinants analyzed, together with the most important results for
Romania (section 8.1), Croatia (section 8.2) and transition countries in general
(section 8.3).
8.1 Romania
The previous sections have provided important insights regarding public policy
reforms that have influenced the environment for FDI in Romania. This section
summarizes the findings on Romania’s (1) performance in creating a favorable
investment environment and (2) the impact of policy determinants on FDI.
(1) Figure 63 summarizes Romania’s current performance by converting
the findings into a graph that were already presented in the sections at the end
of the analysis of the legal, economic and political determinants (figures 44,
53 and 61). According to this, Romania performs rather well in twelve out of
28 sub-determinants2677 and rather weakly in eleven other determinants. For
five determinants assessments balance between positive and negative evalua-
tions. Legal determinants (such as corporate law, company registration and
legal system) are among the most successful factors today from the perspective
of the interviewees. The figure also reveals that political factors are included
amongst the determinants with the greatest need for further reforms (such as
corruption, EU funds and availability of labor). It is also worth noting that
2677 Regional differences of bureaucracy are not considered since performances strongly vary.
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Figure 63: Country performance – Romania
Romania’s performance has been only partly driven by EU accession prepara-
tions. For example, reforms leading to a good or rather good performance of
company registration, construction permit and educational level were not so
much instigated as a response to EU pressure but were rather part of overall
reform efforts in Romania (particularly since the early 2000s).
(2) The analyses of this thesis have also shown that the performance of
Romania’s determinants often does not correspond to their impact on the
investment decision of MNCs. Looking at the impact of all determinants an-
alyzed in this thesis, figures 64 and 65 present four key enhancing and four
constraining determinants for FDI in Romania that were most frequently cited
by interviewees. Therefore, Romanian public policy makers should emphasize
these key benefits (legal system, privatization, external political stability and
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Figure 64: Key enhancing FDI determinants – Romania
company registration) when promoting Romania as an investment location to
existing and potential investors. However, they should also be aware of the
decreasing impact of some of these factors (as shown for privatization and ex-
ternal political stability) and elaborate future strategies for the attraction of
FDI, namely greenfield investments. Furthermore, Romanian public policy ac-
tors should work on the greatest impediments to higher levels of FDI, including
road infrastructure and labor availability (whereas monetary policy and prop-
erty rights had their greatest deterring effect on the investment decision of
MNCs in the 1990s).
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Figure 65: Key constraining FDI determinants – Romania
8.2 Croatia 635
8.2 Croatia
This section summarizes the key results of the main chapter for Croatia regard-
ing (1) the performance of the factors analyzed and (2) their impact on MNC
investment decisions in favor of Croatia.
(1) Figure 66 shows that the distribution of determinants in Croatia with
a positive (11), negative (12) or neutral (5) performance is similar to that
of Romania. Interestingly and in contrast to Romania, Croatia’s strengths are
clearly the political as well as the economic factors which have often been
successful for many years (such as monetary policy and political stability). In
contrast, legal measures (such as bureaucracy, property rights and the judicial
system) clearly show the greatest need for further improvements. Croatia ap-
pears to have relied for many years on its success in stabilizing the country after
the turbulences of the 1990s and public policy makers have failed to initiate
sustainable reforms in the legal field in recent years. This is also in comparison
to other countries in the region. The actual legal framework of these measures
may already be in place but in many cases implementation (particularly on
the local level) is being delayed. Further pressure from the EU will probably
only have limited success in this context since accession preparations focus only
little on administrative reforms.
(2) Four key factors with enhancing and constraining impact respectively
on FDI in Croatia are presented in figures 67 and 68. Therefore, interviews
indicate that MNCs interested in Croatia are most attracted by its internal
political stability, positive country image, economic stability, and high level of
education. The most significant deterring factors for FDI in Croatia used to be
the lack of political stability and the problems with privatization in the 1990s.
The property rights situation and the quality of the bureaucracy are identified
as today’s greatest constraints for Croatia as investment location. As pointed
out previously, Croatia strongly benefits from its impressive achievements in
636 8 Overview of country findings
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Figure 67: Key enhancing FDI determinants – Croatia
the past in stabilizing the country. In contrast, daily operations are still con-
straining for investors. Counter measures of public policy actors seem urgent
since MNCs (that are already present in Croatia) increasingly pass on informa-
tion to potential investors about Croatia’s (mostly bureaucratic) deficiencies.
This may result in a deterioration of the positive country image which has been
a major asset for Croatia as investment location.
8.3 Transition countries
This thesis derived general insights for transition countries from the general-
izable findings from the country cases (Romania and Croatia) in addition to
the analysis of further external FDI studies and data. This section summarizes
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Figure 68: Key constraining FDI determinants – Croatia
8.3 Transition countries 639
the findings regarding the (1) importance of FDI determinants in transition
countries and the (2) key differences between company and state experts based
on the analysis of the interviews.
(1) Figure 69 presents the qualitative results regarding the importance of
the different determinant categories (legal, economic and political) and FDI
sub-determinants on the investment decision of MNCs in transition countries
in general. It converts the previous summaries at the end of the sections dealing
with the legal, economic and political measures into a graph (figures 45, 54 and
62). Several insights can be derived from this figure:
Firstly, legal and political measures tend to have a somewhat greater overall
impact on FDI than economic measures. This is also interesting because the 34
most frequently cited FDI studies on transition countries (that were presented
in section 2.2.4.2) put a strong emphasis on economic measures in their analyses
(as highlighted in figure 69).
Secondly, the removal of barriers tends to be more important than the pro-
vision of incentives. Therefore, the reduction of the time required for admin-
istrative procedures (for example regarding land and company registration or
at customs), as well as the reduction of uncertainties (for example, regarding
the goals of foreign policy) seem to have a greater impact on FDI in transition
countries than the provision of investment incentives, low taxes, EU assistance
etc.
Thirdly, the graph shows that the importance of several determinants with
high or even very high importance seems to decrease as transition progresses.
Examples are property law and internal political stability (with improving per-
formance), privatization (once only few SOEs are left to be sold) or EU inte-
gration (whose effect tends to decrease after several years of accession).
Finally, public policy makers should be aware that the importance of FDI
determinants may vary across countries, forms of investments and MNCs from
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Figure 69: Overview all determinants – importance
different home countries. Figure 69 supports the results of previous analyses,
which showed that differences may exist if a certain quality threshold has been
reached (court system). The impact may also depend on the country expec-
tation of investors (as for bureaucracy) or regional circumstances (external
political stability).
(2) The analyses of the 90 interviews conducted with experts and the 30 ex-
pert documents collected, permit a more differentiated picture of the diverging
opinions and perceptions held between company and state experts. The
four most striking differences are summarized in figure 70. They include cor-
ruption, country image, external political stability and a diverging evaluation
of legal and administrative barriers.
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Figure 70: Key differences state versus company experts
642 8 Overview of country findings
The next chapter elaborates how the findings of this theses help to derive
further insights regarding the possibilities of investment policy in transition
countries with the help of the NIE theory.
9 FDI determinants and public policy – an NIE
approach
9.1 Introduction
Section 2.3 elaborated how the NIE approach can help to analyze the findings
of this thesis from a different angle and maximize the insights for public policy
makers. It has been elucidated that NIE frameworks allow for a more realistic
picture of FDI policies because they assume “bounded rationality” (asymmet-
ric information of MNCs and state actors) and highlight the possibilities and
constraints of organizations (public policy makers), institutions (FDI determi-
nants) and the time they need for the realization of their policies.
This chapter analyzes the impact of different public policy actors on FDI in
transition countries (section 9.2) and the time horizons of FDI determinants
(section 9.3). The most important public policy implications are summarized
in section 9.4.
9.2 Actors and FDI determinants
FDI determinants are influenced by different (and often several) public policy
actors. Public policy actors may ask which group is best suited to influence FDI
determinants (key question #4.)2678 These aspects appear to have not yet been
systematically analyzed in FDI literature dealing with transition countries.2679
2678 See section 1.1.
2679 See e. g. for a distinction between local and central level (but without the consideration
of the political and bureaucratic differences): Murrell (2002).
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This section elaborates (1) a definition and methodological approach for the
analysis of the impact of different public policy actors and (2) presents the
results of the analyses.
(1) Based on the interview statements with company and state experts, six
groups of actors with the greatest influence on FDI policies can be defined2680:
• Central governments (including the president and ministers with their
key staff as well as the members of the parliament)
• Central authorities (including state officials in ministries and state agen-
cies, such as privatization and investment promotion agencies, central
banks etc.)
• Local governments (including mayors as well as key local and regional
politicians)
• Local authorities (including local and regional administrations and agen-
cies (such as land registers, construction authorities, trade registers etc.)
• Courts (including central, regional and local courts)
• European Union (including the European Commission and EU member
states)
In a subsequent step the interviews are analyzed and ranked based on the
question which of these actor groups – the “players of the game” in NIE the-
ory2681 – have the greatest potential to improve each of the FDI determinants
considered (followed by the second most influential actor and so forth). An
analysis of interviews for Romania as well as for Croatia appears legitimate in
this context because responsibilities of specific public policy actors do not seem
to depend on specific country characteristics.
2680 See also Jacobs (2003); Kikeri, Kenyon, and Palmade (2006).
2681 See also North (1990a).
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The ranking methodology is exemplified for road infrastructure focusing on
highways: Interviews show that central authorities are identified as being in the
best position to improve the quality of road infrastructure in transition coun-
tries. Accordingly, infrastructure projects most frequently suffer from slow im-
plementation, intransparent procedures and wrong use of funding (and less from
inadequate planning and financing by politics). These aspects are generally in
the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport and Construction and subordi-
nate authorities.2682 Central governments seem to be the second most influen-
tial actors, because they are responsible for elaborating reasonable long-term
goals, providing sufficient financing and cooperating with other national gov-
ernments on transnational projects (as in the case of Croatia and Slovenia).2683
Local authorities seem to be the third most influential actor because they are
often responsible for the tender procedures of the infrastructure projects and
can help making procedures swifter and more transparent. However, their im-
pact is less obvious than that of the the central level because many projects do
not even reach the local level.2684 The EU is identified as the fourth most in-
fluential actor because it can provide funding based on realistic analyses of the
transition country’s needs and capacities, but it does not have direct influence
on the design and implementation of infrastructure projects.2685 Finally, local
governments represent the fifth most influential policy actors for improving
road infrastructure. Their formalized influence on (highway) projects may be
2682 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007); Intv.
Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007).
2683 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Consulting II (2007).
2684 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007).
2685 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods II (2007).
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# Cate-gory Determinant Sub-determinant
Most 
influential actors
2nd most 
influential actors
3rd most 
influential actors
4th most 
influential actors
5th most 
influential actors
1 Market access Corporate law Central governments Local authorities European Union -
2 Company registration Local authorities Central governments Central authorities Courts -
3 Joint ventures - Central governments Local authorities - -
4 Property rights Property law Central governments Local authorities European Union -
5 Land registration Local authorities Central authorities Central governments Courts Local governments
6 Construction permit Local authorities Central governments Local governments - -
7 Quality of bureaucracy Bureaucracy Local authorities Local governments Central governments Central authorities -
8 Implementation of laws Local authorities Central authorities Central governments Local governments European Union
9 Regional differences Local governments Local authorities - - -
10 Legal certainty Legal system Central governments Central authorities European Union - -
11 Court system Courts Central governments Local governments Central authorities European Union
12 Labor law Labor law overall Local authorities Central governments European Union - -
Legal measures Legal measures overall Local authorities Central governments Central authorities Local governments European Union
13 Economic stability Financial system Central governments Central authorities - - -
14 Monetary policy Central authorities Central governments European Union - -
15 Trade policy Central authorities Central governments - - -
16 Infrastructure Roads (highways) Central authorities Central governments Local authorities European Union Local governments
17 Real estate Local governments Central authorities Central governments - -
18 Investment climate Investment policy Central governments Local governments Local authorities - -
19 Taxes and tax system Central governments Local authorities - - -
20 Investment incentives Local authorities Central governments - - -
21 Privatization Privatization overall Central governments Central authorities Local authorities Local governments Courts
22 Investment promotion Investment promotion overall Central authorities Central governments Local authorities Local governments -
Economic measures Economic measures overall Central governments Central authorities Local authorities Local governments European Union
23 Human capital Education level Local authorities Central authorities Central governments - -
24 Availability of labor Local governments Local authorities Central authorities - -
25 Political stability Internal political stability Central governments Central authorities Local authorities Local governments -
26 External political stability Central governments Central authorities - - -
27 Corruption Corruption overall Local authorities Central authorities European Union Courts Central governments
28 EU integration EU integration Central governments Central authorities European Union Local authorities Courts
29 EU funds Local authorities Central authorities European Union Central governments -
Political measures Political measures overall Central authorities Central governments Local authorities Local governments European Union
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Figure 71: Influence of public policy actors – overview
limited, but they can have some impact by pressuring central governments to
proceed more quickly with national highway projects (as shown for Sibiu).2686
This methodological approach for road infrastructure is followed for all 29
FDI sub-determinants. The summary of the analyses is presented in figure 71.
The detailed documentation of the analysis, including the rationale for each
ranking as well as the interview references, is recorded in a comprehensive
database of the author.
The analysis does not necessarily comprise all possible actors possible but
reflects the perception of the interviewees. A clear ranking is difficult for some
of the less influential actors because of the low number of data points. In these
cases (such as taxes and tax systems) ranking has been limited to the most
important actors. No actor could be defined as the most influential in the case
of joint ventures. Here interviews reveal that the greatest problems with this
2686 See e. g. Intv. Romanian County Council (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association V
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
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determinant relate to mentality differences between domestic and foreign com-
panies and that legal (central government) and administrative barriers (local
authorities) are only of secondary importance.2687
(2) The analysis of the responsibilities of public policy actors allows for
several insights regarding (a) the influence of the actors on different policies,
(b) the impact of the actors in relation to the importance of FDI determinants,
as well as (c) in relation to the different categories of FDI determinants.
(a) Figure 72 presents a graphical summary of the influence of public
actors on policies that are relevant for the investment conditions in transitions
countries. It shows that central governments are the most important actors to
improve the conditions of the FDI determinants analyzed. They represent the
most influential actors in ten out of 29 sub-determinants because they generally
initiate reforms and new ideas (such as the tax reform in Romania).2688 This
insight is in contrast to hypothesis #4 2689 that assumed sub-national actors to
be the most influential public policy makers in transition countries.
Local authorities – which are often essential for the implementation of govern-
mental reforms – are the second most influential actors overall and are often in
key positions for the improvement of those determinants that benefit the most
from a removal of administrative and technical barriers (such as company regis-
tration) and for which legal frameworks are of only secondary importance.2690
This quite strong influence of local authorities is also confirmed by some FDI
studies.2691
Central authorities are the third most important actor group for twelve
sub-determinants. They often have the responsibility to detail and implement
2687 See 7.2.1; see also Meyer (2001).
2688 See section 7.3.3.2.
2689 See section 1.1.
2690 See section 7.2.1.
2691 See Morisset and Neso (2002); Campos and Kinoshita (2003); Jacobs (2003); Kikeri,
Kenyon, and Palmade (2006).
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Figure 72: Most influential public policy actors
strategies of the central governments (especially for political determinants such
as a NATO accession strategy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).2692
Interestingly, local governments – the fourth most important actor group –
seem to have a lower impact on investment conditions than, for example, local
authorities. The high degree of centralization in many transition countries – a
heritage of socialism – is apparently an important reason why the central level
either realizes investment policies itself or passes responsibilities or tasks for
implementation directly to the local authorities with only minor involvement
of local governments.2693
Finally, the EU and courts seem to have only limited impact on the invest-
ment conditions in transition countries.
2692 See also section 7.4.2.
2693 See also Murrell (2002).
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(b) The findings regarding the influence of public policy actors are now
matched with the impact of FDI sub-determinants on the investment de-
cision of MNCs in transition countries (that were already presented in figure
69).
Figure 73 depicts the three most influential actor groups for all FDI sub-
determinants (derived from figure 71). The width of the sub-determinants
represents the importance of the determinant for the investment decision of
MNCs.2694 The most influential actors for the most important determinants
are therefore in the upper right part of the graph. Accordingly, central gov-
ernments in transition countries are in a key position to improve several of
those determinants which have the greatest impact on the investment decision
of MNCs, including privatization, EU integration, internal political stability,
and property law (emphasis I. in figure 73).2695
Furthermore, the graph shows that local authorities are also in key positions
for many policies, but rather for determinants that are less decisive for FDI in
transition countries such as the implementation of laws and construction per-
mits (emphasis II.).2696 Nevertheless, local authorities may want to focus more
on these aspects, rather than investing efforts and resources on determinants
in which they only have a secondary or tertiary role (such as internal political
stability).
Finally, the previous findings for central authorities that this actor group
often plays an important role for the execution of the strategies of central gov-
ernments (emphasis III.) are confirmed. The coordination with key politicians
therefore seems to be a main challenge for central authorities (for example
regarding an effective sale of SOEs).
2694 The width is converted from the qualitative findings presented in figure 69.
2695 See also for the distribution of competences for privatization: Belke, Baumga¨rtner, and
Schneider (2005).
2696 See also section 7.2.3 on bureaucracy; see Morisset and Neso (2002); Kikeri, Kenyon,
and Palmade (2006).
650 9 FDI determinants and public policy – an NIE approach
Figure 73: Public policy actors and impact on FDI
(c) In a next step the most influential groups of public policy actors (figure
72) are matched with the impact of FDI determinants categories (based
on figure 69). The results are presented in figure 74. They suggest that local
authorities are essential for the success of legal determinants (emphasis I.). This
means that local authorities need to make sure that they have highly-skilled
employees (with legal and administrative skills which also puts pressure on the
education system) and to minimize the turnover rate of the most skilled civil
servants (as in Romania).2697
Moreover, figure 74 reveals that key influencers of economic determinants
are generally on the central level, either the central government (for example,
by defining the speed and method of privatization) or central authorities (for
2697 See also section 7.2.3; see Morisset and Neso (2002).
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example, by designing and realizing effective investment promotion) (emphasis
II.).2698
Finally, this graph shows that central governments are in a key position to
influence the policies with the greatest impact on FDI (emphasis III.). How-
ever, all of these aspects, which represent key responsibilities of the central
government (property law, privatization, EU integration, and internal political
stability) are in danger of losing their significance for FDI (for reasons discussed
in section 8.3). This insight seems to confirm the assumption of the locational
competition theory according to which state actors lose their possibilities to in-
fluence FDI flows over time.2699 However, this may be only partly true because
central governments may increase their involvement in those determinants in
which they only represent the second most important actor group (for exam-
ple regarding investment promotion and court system (figure 73)) or they may
work on less decisive determinants (such as the legal framework for the non-
banking sector in Romania and Croatia)2700. Last but not least, the decrease
of influence does not seem to be valid for all public policy actor groups. This
aspect will be further verified in the next sections.
9.3 Time horizons of FDI determinants
The NIE theory emphasizes that changes of economic conditions take place
incrementally, rather than suddenly. Therefore public policies should be ana-
lyzed in the light of political constraints and the decision-making processes of
all actors involved.2701 This section examines the relation between the time
dimension of FDI determinants on the one hand and the impact of these de-
terminants on the investment decision of MNCs on the other hand, using the
2698 See sections 7.3.4 and 7.3.5 on privatization and investment promotion for further ex-
amples.
2699 See Siebert (2000); Siebert (2005); see also Dreyhaupt (2006).
2700 See section 7.3.1.
2701 See Williamson (2000); see also section 2.3.
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Figure 74: Influence of public policy actors and determinants category
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two angles that have been essential for this thesis: the company and the state
view.
Section 9.3.1 analyzes FDI determinants in relation to the different phases in
the decision-making process of MNCs. The relevance of the time requirements in
the transformation of FDI determinants by public policy is analyzed in section
9.3.2.
9.3.1 Phases of MNCs’ investment decision and FDI determinants
This section provides (1) a definition of the different phases of the investment
decision process of MNCs and presents (2) several analyses.
(1) MNCs do not have a full set of FDI country determinants in mind at
the very beginning of their considerations to invest abroad. Due to limited
information and irrational procedures, MNCs tend to elaborate their invest-
ment decision in different phases (which reflects the NIE concept of transac-
tion costs).2702 The intensity of the contact with public policy actors may differ
from phase to phase.2703
Based on the interviews conducted with MNCs and external company ex-
perts four decision phases in relation to the initial investment (pre-analysis,
information gathering, business model, and host country visit) can be defined,
as well as an additional phase for follow-up investments2704:
• Pre-analysis (stereotypes): Investors consider investing in one of the tran-
sition countries, without specifying further and usually without carrying
out anything more than a superficial assessment. Much of the attitude
at this point is governed by emotion and personal experiences without
2702 See also North (1990b); Peng, Lee, and Wang (2005).
2703 See also Meyer (2001).
2704 Data points are not sufficient in order to analyze the rationale of MNCs that exit the
market; see e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC -
Industrial Goods II (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); Intv. Croatian
Company - Real Estate (2007); see also Dunning (2005); OECD (2006a).
654 9 FDI determinants and public policy – an NIE approach
deeper knowledge of the markets (for example regarding stability, image,
corruption etc.)2705
• Information gathering: Investors collect information about specific coun-
tries (for example regarding legal requirements, skill levels etc.) from na-
tional and international institutions such as ARIS, APIU, AVAS, CPF,
EU, and EBRD2706
• Elaboration of business model: Information on costs (such as taxes and
incentives) and cost drivers (such as the availability of labor) is gathered
and analyzed. This decision phase is also crucial for the analysis of non-
policy determinants such as labor costs2707
• Host country visit, contact to other MNCs and bureaucracy: Talks with
ministries, mayors, business clubs, and foreign institutions (such as the
German Embassy) as well as further collection of data2708
• Follow-up investment: Phase in which MNCs that are already in the coun-
try reconsider some of the determinants of their location decision, gen-
erally based on own experiences and some further information (such as
state incentives)2709
(2) This categorization permits the carrying out of analyses relating to (a)
the decision phases of MNCs and their relation to the impact of FDI determi-
nants, (b) the relevance of different FDI categories for the investment decision
2705 See also Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods
I (2007).
2706 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
2707 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
2708 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods II (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Authority IV (2007).
2709 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary
Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007).
9.3 Time horizons of FDI determinants 655
e
fghfigj kg
l
ghminon
lp q rs
o
p
g
p t
u
infg
pl
mgn
l
kgvi
p
i
t
n w im
rt
h
l
onvg
t
u xyz r{
|}
iv
rt
}
iv~ kg
l
ghminon
lp

gh~
s
i

s

i

s

gki
{
m

t
j

gh~
}
t
j


Ł












Ł




 




 


Ł

















 




 



 

 ¡
¢
 £








¤
ŁŁ
¥
















Ł









¡


¦ §Ł





 

Ł


 















 




¨
©



¦ ª
¥
 Ł


«

¥










¨
¬
­
®
¯
°
±
²
³
´
µ
¶
¯
°
·
¸
¬
¹











¨




 


¹

º



Ł

Ł




Ł




Ł



¹
¢







¹




»




¹








Ł
¥
¹ ¼
Ł




¹











¨
¹







 Ł

Ł
¹
½









¹





Ł

Ł
¨ 



Ł



¹
¢






 Ł
¥
¹
¤




Ł




¹
 



 
Ł



¹ ¼


Ł
¥
¹¾

º


¹

















¹¿



Ł

Ł





Ł

¹¾





Ł



¹À
Ł 





¹
½




¹À


Ł




















¹
§Ł













¹ ¼











¹
















¹





Ł

Ł
¨ 



Ł



¹
¢



 








¹


Ł



¨


Ł
¥
¹
¢







¹À



¹À
Ł 





¹
¢












¹










Ł



¹
§Ł













¹
¢







¹¿



Ł

Ł





Ł

¹
½









¹
¢












¹¾





Ł



¹ À
Ł 





¹ À



¹







Ł Ł

Ł
¹
½




Á













¹ ¼


Ł
¥
¹Â











¹
¢







¹
§Ł













Figure 75: Investment decision phases and FDI determinants
phases and (c) the impact of different public policy actors on the different
phases of the investment decision.
(a) In a first step, the FDI determinants are matched with the established
investment decision phases. The interviews are examined with respect to the
question what determinants are considered in more detail in each investment
decision phase. The results are recorded in a database of the author and sum-
marized in figure 75. This allows for several conclusions.
Firstly, the pre-analysis phase contains determinants with high or even very
high importance for FDI in transition countries, including the country image
(as part of investment promotion, external political stability, and corruption).
An initially positive impression of the country and an acceptable performance
of these specific determinants seem to be crucial for host countries. Public
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policy actors should therefore try to get in contact with potential investors in
this early phase in order to guarantee that the transition country is considered
for a more detailed analysis.2710 This phase is especially important for smaller
investors who do not have sufficient human and financial resources to analyze
a large number of potential investment locations.2711
Secondly, some FDI determinants are considered several times. Their respec-
tive impact on the investment decision can vary depending on the investment
decision phase. For example, the quality of bureaucracy is already considered
by MNCs in the pre-analysis phase and generally has a medium impact on the
country evaluation. During the next stages this determinant is not considered
since reliable numerical information is scarce. Once the potential investors visit
the host country the quality of bureaucracy gains in importance again, because
foreign managers are then personally confronted with the positive and negative
aspects of bureaucracy. Investors also reconsider the quality of bureaucracy
when considering a follow-up investment. Their experiences with both local
and central authorities are then of significant importance for a decision in favor
or against the expansion of their commitment in the host country.2712 Public
policy makers should therefore be aware of the challenge of having to fulfill
different roles throughout the MNCs’ investment decision process. ARIS, for
example, may help to create a positive image of Romania abroad (pre-analysis),
provide helpful general data for the investment conditions in different regions
of Romania (information gathering) and – as in the case of one Austrian MNC
2710 See e. g. Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007).
2711 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods III (2007); Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007).
2712 See Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods
III (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting
(2007).
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interviewed – organize a site visit and be available as external adviser (host
country visit).2713
Thirdly, the host country visit seems to be the most crucial phase in the
investment decision process of MNCs (however, insights from FDI studies re-
garding this phase are quite scarce).2714 The number of potential country loca-
tions is then generally narrowed down to about three countries. Figure 75 shows
that a large number of determinants (13) is considered in detail with five deter-
minants with high or even very high impact on their investment decision.2715
Therefore, public policy makers should be aware that their personal contact
belongs to the crucial factors for the final investment of potential MNCs.
Finally, the sum of FDI determinants considered in detail seems to decrease
for follow-up investments. This is also confirmed by other economic studies.2716
For example, external political stability is not re-evaluated in detail if the cur-
rent investment is not negatively affected by border issues and if no substantial
crisis (such as war) can be expected.2717 Interestingly, four of the determinants
reconsidered seem to have an increasing importance for FDI flows to transi-
tion countries, including court system, availability of labor, labor law, and con-
struction permit. Investors either may have underestimated problems regarding
these determinant before their initial investment (regarding the court system
in Croatia for example)2718 or face larger challenges once they are bound to a
specific location and its conditions within the host country, especially if they
2713 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see also Intv. German Econ. Associ-
ation I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007).
2714 The importance for companies to have the right contact person is also emphasized by
NIE; see e. g. Henisz and Zelner (2004).
2715 See also Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial
Goods I (2007); Intv. Int’l MNC - Utilities (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association IV
(2007).
2716 See e. g. Peng, Lee, and Wang (2005).
2717 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007);
Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007).
2718 See section 7.2.4.3.
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Figure 76: Investment decision phases and FDI categories
are efficiency-seeking MNCs (for example regarding labor shortage in parts of
Transylvania).2719
(b) In a subsequent step, the investment decision phases are matched with
the three FDI categories of this thesis (legal, economic and political determi-
nants). The results are depicted in figure 76 and allow for several conclusions.
First of all, political factors seem to be given detailed consideration during the
early stages of the decision making process but are only superficially assessed
during the host country visit (emphasis I.). Findings show that the performance
of political determinants can be verified and analyzed fairly easily (for example
with respect to the progress of EU accession).2720 Therefore, investors tend
2719 See section 7.4.1.2.
2720 See e. g. Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Software
(2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007).
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to have formed quite a clear opinion about the political determinants before
visiting the country (even if this opinion does not fully correspond with the
reality). As a result, an acceptable performance of these determinants as well as
transparent and easily accessible information is essential for transition countries
to reach the last round of country selection by MNCs.
Legal determinants are hardly considered in the business modeling phase
(with the exception of labor law conditions, emphasis II.). It is understandable
that financial data such as real estate prices or the availability of EU funding,
have a more tangible impact on the business case of MNCs than, for example,
the quality of bureaucracy. This phase does not contain FDI determinants with
high or very high impact on the investment decision of MNCs, probably because
non-policy factors, namely labor and energy costs, are the most important
factors for the business case of MNCs.2721
Legal aspects dominate the determinants that are considered during the host
country visit of MNCs (emphasis III.). Especially the bureaucratic dimension
of these determinants, such as the speed and transparency of land and company
registration as well as regional differences of bureaucracy, seem to be important.
The evaluations of the MNCs are mostly based on first hand experiences with
authorities and field reports of other investors (and foreign institutions).2722
Public policy makers may want to push foreign business communities (that
are already present in the host country and important contacts for potential
investors) to recommend central authorities, for example ARIS and APIU, for
the organization of site visits.2723 In the preparation of these site visits central
authorities may want to identify best practice bureaucracies on the local level
and assist communities in optimizing their self-portrayal.
2721 See e. g. Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
II (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007).
2722 See e. g. Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007); Intv. German Econ. Association
VI (2007); Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities
(2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007).
2723 See similar Meyer (2001); Mallya, Kukulka, and Jensen (2002); Murrell (2002).
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Figure 77: Investment decision phases and most influential actors
Finally, aspects from all categories are re-considered for follow-up invest-
ments. However, economic measures do not seem to have a significant impor-
tance on the investment decision of MNCs in this phase anymore (emphasis
IV.). Investors apparently come to terms with the economic conditions of the
host country as they gain more working experience and if conditions maintain
an acceptable level (for example regarding monetary policy).2724
(c) In a final step of analysis the investment decision phases of MNCs are
matched with the most influential public policy actors. The results are
presented in figure 77 and several findings can be derived from this analysis.
2724 In contrast, the impact of road infrastructure may be higher for follow-up investments
in Romania where the poor quality prevents an extension of the business; see also Intv.
Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007); Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007); section
7.3.2.2.
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Firstly, all authorities as well as central governments play an important role
in creating a positive image of the host country in the pre-analysis phase of
MNCs (emphasis I.). This calls for a comprehensive analysis of actors from
all levels in order to give a more detailed understanding of the way in which
potential MNCs, located in different home countries, perceive the potential
host country. They then should work on the existing weaknesses and spotlight
the country’s achievements. This is especially important if achievements (for
example regarding recent improvements in Romania’s bureaucracy) are less
well-known abroad.2725
Furthermore, the actors on the central level are essential in the informa-
tion gathering phase (emphasis II.). Central governments seem to be especially
important for providing information regarding the status of privatization, EU
integration or the financial system.2726 The central level may consider the cen-
tralization of this kind of information in a special agency because the examples
of Romania and Croatia show that investors often lack sufficient and consistent
data (for example regarding the work of ARIS).2727
All national actor groups have a key responsibility for determinants that are
considered by MNCs during their site visits (emphasis III.). Given the large
number of determinants that are considered by investors in this period, public
policy actors should aim at a comprehensive orchestration of such a visit since it
is the last and generally most important hurdle before the investment decision
of MNCs. Public policy actors should establish channels to receive information
about site visits of potential investors (through the foreign business commu-
nity, embassies in the home and host country, offices of investment promotion
agencies etc.). They may want to establish a task force that can quickly set
up a tour for potential investors, including visits of best practice authorities.
2725 See also Intv. German Authority I (2007); Intv. Int’l Econ. Association (2007); Intv.
Supranational Authority I (2007).
2726 See also Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004).
2727 See section 7.3.5.
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The coordination of such a visit and the various public policy actors that are
involved may be more successful if handled by a central authority such as an
investment promotion agency. CzechInvest and ARIS (in the period between
2004 and 2006) represent interesting examples in this context.2728
Finally, figure 77 reveals that local actors are highly relevant in the follow-up
investment decision phase (emphasis IV.)2729, while central governments seem
to have only limited influence.2730 It is possible to confirm the finding of the
locational competition theory with regards to the decreasing impact of state
actors on FDI: the dominant role of central governments may decrease but local
actors gain in importance for follow-up investments. Central governments can
also conduct successful FDI policy through the improvement of less prominent
determinants (see above). Local actors need to be aware that they have a key
responsibility for FDI once investors have entered the country because their
reform efforts will lead to a positive evaluation, for instance, of the availability
of labor, the bureaucracy or permit procedures. Good ties to MNCs and the
(displayed) willingness to reform may be helpful tools for local actors in this
context.
9.3.2 Transformation time and public policy actors
This section analyzes the time needed by public policy actors to achieve signif-
icant transformation of the FDI determinants in question. Section (1) presents
the methodology and section (2) discusses the results of the analyses.
(1) The change of public policy variables does not occur suddenly but de-
mands much time and effort.2731 Based on the interviews and the previous
2728 See section 7.3.5.
2729 This finding is also confirmed by FDI studies that focus on the impact of institutions
on FDI; see e. g. Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004).
2730 See Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007); see also Intv. Rom. Local Authority I
(2007); Intv. Int’l Research Institute I (2007).
2731 See also North (1997); Henisz (2004); Henisz and Zelner (2005).
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analyses five periods of transformation time can be defined: less than 3 years,
3 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, and over 15 years.
In a subsequent step, the FDI determinants of this thesis are analyzed (based
on the experiences of Romania and Croatia) in relation to the question of how
much time public policy makers realistically need in transition countries (re-
flecting political constraints, elections, implementation, legal revisions etc.) in
order to accomplish satisfactory conditions for MNCs. This methodologi-
cal procedure is exemplified for corporate law: Romania already introduced a
corporate law in 1990 but the legal framework remained incomplete and unsat-
isfactory for MNCs. 1997 saw the introduction of major revisions, which were
completed by 2006 (after about 9 years). Croatia established a corporate law
based on German and Austrian law in 1993 but did not create reliable condi-
tions for (foreign) investors.2732 The regulations were significantly modernized
after the death of Tudman in 1999 and interviews and the reports of the Euro-
pean Commission indicate that the status is satisfactory for investors today (8
years).2733 Corporate law is therefore defined as determinant of the 6-10 year
period.
This approach is being followed for all FDI sub-determinants and the re-
sults are presented in figure 78. Accordingly, two sub-determinants are further
specified. A distinction of the transformation time is introduced for investment
incentives (regional incentives versus the regulatory framework) and investment
promotion (institutions and government commitment versus country image).
For some determinants a satisfactory level has not been achieved so far and
the categorization is based on the expectations of the experts interviewed or
the experience of the second country analyzed (for example regarding Croatia’s
EU integration).
2732 See section 7.2.1.2.
2733 See section 7.2.1.3.
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Cate-
gory Determinant Sub-determinant
Time needed for 
significant change Example from transition countries
Market access Corporate law 6-10 years Romania: Introduced in 1990, major revisions in 1997-2006; 
Croatia: Established in 1993, major revisions since 1999, EU satisfied today
Company registration 6-10 years Romania: Breakthrough regulations introduced 2003/2004, implemented until today
Croatia: Reforms started in 2003, but far from complete
Joint ventures More than 15 years Romania: Mentality problems persist since the early 1990s (despite legal reforms)
Croatia: Sector-specific differences, but problems since the early 1990s (at least)
Property rights Property law 11-15 years Romania: First reforms in late 1990s, more significant 2005-2006, some open issues
Croatia: Reforms since 1996 and since 2005 but ongoing problems (e. g. at the coast)
Land registration More than 15 years Romania: Continued problems since early 1990s (documentation, reliability etc.)
Croatia: Registers since >100 years, but legal bases not established until 1996, still major problems
Construction permit 6-10 years Romania: Satisfactory regulations already in the 1990s
Croatia: Working on reforms since the early 2000s (merger with location permit in 2007)
Quality of bureaucracy Bureaucracy More than 15 years Romania: Takes several generations according to some experts, but acceptable level today
Croatia: Experts speak of the challenge of a century for Croatia, but succes with Hitro, Hitrorez
Implementation of laws 11-15 years Romania: Efforts to improve implementation taken since the early 2000s, further reforms needed
Croatia: Problems in communication between central & local authorities, many changes of laws
Regional differences 3-5 years Romania: E. g. Sibiu with significant reforms since 2000, investors already satisfied in 2004
Croatia: E. g. Varaždin with successful reforms since 2002
Legal certainty Legal system 6-10 years Romania: Significant better law-making since early 2000s (driven by EU preparation)
Croatia: Significantly improved between 2002 and 2007
Court system More than 15 years Romania: Various reforms since 1990, but ongoing problems with duration of trials & quality of verdicts
Croatia: Various reforms and EU pressure, but still slow trials, large backlog, problems with corruption 
Labor law Labor law overall 3-5 years Romania: Unification of labor code 2003 and 2005 led to significant changes
Croatia: Labor code from 2003, problems with sending expats will decrease with EU accession
Economic stability Financial system 6-10 years Romania: Banking reform & privatizations after the end of the financial crisis in the late 1990s
Croatia: First reforms and privatizations in mid-1990s, quite advanced in early 2000s already
Monetary policy 6-10 years Romania: Radical reforms since 1996 and 2004/2005 (currency reform)
Croatia: Significant stabilization after currency reform 1994, stable since early 2000s
Trade policy 11-15 years Romania: Began trade liberalization in mid-1990s, but customs authorities still cumbersome
Croatia: Substantial opening since early 2000s, to be fully liberalized by accession to the EU
Infrastructure Roads 11-15 years Romania: Only few improvements since 1990, very weak, experts estimate another 10-20 years of work
Croatia: First highway extension under Tu¸man, significant & quic improvements since 2000
Real estate 6-10 years Romania: Many communities have failed to expand supply and develop real estate strategies since 2000
Croatia: Construction of office buildings since the early 2000s eased demand and price pressures
Investment climate Investment policy 6-10 years Romania: Legal framework in place since late 1990s but no significant improvements until 2004/2005
Croatia: After 2000 more active investment policy, legal frameworks in 2000 and 2007
Taxes and tax system 6-10 years Romania: Tax reforms in 1999 and 2005, but still very complex, problems with bureaucracy
Croatia: New tax system successfully introduced 1994, but corroded after 2000
Investment incentives
(regional incentives)
3-5 years Romania: Successful industrial parks in early 2000s
Croatia: Good regonial conditions in a short time (Varaždin, in early 2000s)
Investment incentives
(regulatory framework)
6-10 years Romania: First legal framework in early 2000s but requires revision after EU accession
Croatia: Weak legal measures since 2000
Privatization Privatization overall 6-10 years Romania: Bulk of large-scale privatization between 1997 and 2005
Croatia: Major privatizations between 2000 and 2006
Investment promotion Investment promotion 
(institutions, commitment)
3-5 years Romania: Strong commitment under N¹stase, ARIS established in 2002 and quite effective 2004-2006
Croatia: With Sanader in office (since 2003) stronger APIU and commitment since 2005
Investment promotion 
(country image)
More than 15 years Romania: bad image since the 1990s, stronger commitment to image promotion since 2004
Croatia: positive image despite mediocre investment environment, only recently counter measures
Human capital Education level 11-15 years Romania: Socialist effects deteriorated since early 2000s, problems with skilled workers since mid 1990s
Croatia: Various measures since 2004, but success only partly visible so far
Availability of labor 11-15 years Romania: Strategy necessary, reforms in education system, roads, and social housing necessary
Croatia: Problems since the late 1990s to make tertiary education more attractive
Political stability Internal political stability 6-10 years Romania: Consolidations since 1996 but still ongoing (and currently affected by political quarrels)
Croatia: Since death of Tu¸man (1999) clear improvements, despite remaining problems
External political stability 6-10 years Romania: Clear approach of West since Kosovo crisis (1999)
Croatia: Stabilization since the death of Tu¸man (1999)
Corruption Corruption overall More than 15 years Romania: Various initiatives and institutions since 1996, but no breakthrough so far
Croatia: First anticorruption program in 2002, but far from satisfactory today
EU integration EU integration 6-10 years Romania: Begin of negotiations in 2000
Croatia: Begin of negotiations in 2005, but important reforms already after SAA (2001)
EU funds 6-10 years Romania: Despite important efforts since 2000 no effective use and distribution of EU funds so far
Croatia: Only limited experience so far, but similar problems expected as in Romania
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Figure 78: Transformation time of FDI determinants in transition countries
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Figure 79: Transformation time and FDI categories
(2) The results of the analyses are interpreted in relation to (a) the different
FDI categories and (b) public policy actors involved.
(a) Figure 79 reveals some important insights regarding the transformation
time and FDI categories.
Firstly, all determinants analyzed need at least three years in order to achieve
significant change (emphasis I.). This confirms the assumption of NIE that
changes are incremental and difficult to implement given the political and eco-
nomic constraints.2734 At the same time, this finding also proves that the as-
sertion in the theoretical part of this thesis (see figure 14) – according to which
significant improvements of many determinants can be achieved “continuously”
2734 See North (1990a); see also section 2.3.1.
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– was too optimistic for transition countries facing a multitude of simultaneous
reform challenges. This is certainly the case for Romania and Croatia.
Rather, the bulk of determinants in Romania and Croatia (45%) only reached
a satisfactory level after six to ten years of significant reforms (emphasis II.).
The country examples have underlined that improvements are basically never
based on a single action (such as a GO) but require several rounds of strategic
planning, the establishment of a (legal) framework and implementation. Public
policy actors also seem to require substantial time to decide on a revision of
poor existing frameworks. This is demonstrated by the case of the investment
incentive frameworks in Romania and Croatia (from the early 2000s) that were
running without much success for many years before new regulations were
brought forward only recently.2735
Figure 79 also shows that the reform of political determinants requires at
least five years to reach an acceptable level (emphasis III.). Change in this
areas is especially challenging because many actors are involved (including for-
eign actors for EU integration for example2736) and often require substantial
efforts and financial resources (for the improvement of the educational level for
example).2737
Finally, six of the determinants analyzed require more than fifteen years of
reforms before significant improvements are achieved. This has been shown
by the difficulties experienced by Romania and Croatia in their fight against
corruption.2738 Legal determinants seem to belong to the most crucial aspects
in this context (emphasis IV.) because they usually require the development
of a new working culture (for example in the bureaucracy) or the exchange
2735 See section 7.3.3; see also UNCTAD (1998).
2736 See also Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004).
2737 See also sections 7.4.4 and 7.4.1.
2738 See section 7.4.3.
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Figure 80: Transformation time and public policy actors
of specialists that can only succeed gradually (as with regards to the court
system).2739
The final step of analysis relates the transformation time of FDI determinants
to the most influential public policy actors. Several conclusions can be derived
from figure 80.
Firstly, many of the most important FDI determinants are successfully
changed by central governments in the period of six to ten years (emphasis
I ).2740 From the perspective of the national politicians, this means that key
improvements generally require more than one legislative period (generally of
four or five years). This may cause the dilemma that central governments have
2739 See also Murrell (2002).
2740 Property law with eleven to 15 years.
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little motivation to achieve significant reforms in these fields because results
will not be visible before the next election.2741 These issues therefore require
a general consensus amongst the political parties in order to be implemented
successfully (as shown for Croatia’s efforts towards EU accession).2742
The dilemma described is further aggravated by the fact that five of the de-
terminants in which central governments are key influencers tend to show a de-
creasing impact on the investment decision of MNCs (emphasis II.). Therefore,
central governments may be frustrated that reforms (for example regarding the
legal system)2743 take a long time but do not have a long-lasting effect on FDI.
However, public policy makers should be aware that these efforts are necessary
in the location competition of transition countries in order to reach a minimum
performance threshold (for example regarding property rights) and in order to
be considered for an investment at all.2744
Finally, figure 80 reveals that long-term changes of at least ten years are
mostly in the responsibility of (central and local) authorities (emphasis III.).
Therefore, the implementation of strategies and regulations (which is often the
key task of authorities) is one of the greatest challenges of transition countries.
Authorities suffer from a combination of remaining old elites, lack of experience
amongst the more junior staff and the high mobility of the most skilled staff.2745
9.4 Public policy implications
Some public policy implications are summarized with respect to (1) the actor
groups, (2) timing of reforms and (3) possible reform priorities.
(1) The analysis of the different public policy actor groups has shown that
central governments and local authorities are of particular importance for the
2741 Even though MNCs do not have the right to vote.
2742 See also section 7.4.4.
2743 See section 7.2.4; see also Jacobs (2003); Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004).
2744 See section 7.2.2.
2745 See also Morisset and Neso (2002); Kikeri, Kenyon, and Palmade (2006).
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creation of satisfactory investment conditions in transition countries. However,
there is a need for strong cooperation among all levels involved since a good per-
formance of FDI determinants is generally dependent on the efforts of various
actor groups.2746 Public policy makers face the challenge that their influence
changes in the course of transition, with higher levels of FDI and in different
investment decision phases of investors. A thorough and realistic analysis of
the investors’ needs and the capabilities of the actor group is therefore crucial
for the creation of favorable investment conditions.
(2) Regarding the timing of reforms public policy makers need to be aware
that significant changes require quite a long time (of at least three to five years).
This may be challenging for public policy makers who aim at visible results be-
fore the next election. Authorities are often in key positions to reform those
determinants that particularly require a long period for significant improve-
ments (of more than ten years as the experience from Romania and Croatia
show).2747
However, some specific areas of reform – for which local governments are
the most influential actor group – such as the improvement of the regional
bureaucracy or the establishment of industrial parks can be accomplished fairly
quickly.
(3) As a result of the previous analyses a qualitative list of three possible
reform priorities for each actor group is derived (figure 81), including the
approximate time that is needed for significant change, the investment decision
phase(s) in which the determinant is of greatest importance for MNCs and a
rationale for the prioritization.2748
2746 See also Jacobs (2003).
2747 Even though significant changes may not require as much time as sometimes suggest by
NIE theory, for example with respect to property rights; see e. g. Benham and Benham
(1997).
2748 The priorities for each group are not ranked by importance.
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Public policy 
actor group Priorities FDI sub-determinant
Time needed for 
significant change
Investment 
decision phase Explanation
Central governments # 1 Privatization 6-10 years Information gathering Significant direct & indirect effects on FDI
# 2 External political stability 6-10 years Pre-analysis Crucial for host countries in order to be 
considered more in detail by MNCs, threshold 
events may be enhancing factor
# 3 EU integration 6-10 years Information gathering, 
follow-up investment
Significant direct effects on FDI, important for 
various determinants
Local authorities # 1 Quality of bureaucracy >15 years Pre-analysis, host country 
visit, follow-up investment
Strongly influences perception of MNCs, effect 
on many other determinants (e. g. corruption)
# 2 Educational level 11-15 years Information gathering, 
follow-up investment
High skill level especially important with 
increasing high-value FDI, positive effects from 
socialist time are running out
# 3 Land registration >15 years Host country visit Reliable process particularly important for risk-
averse investors, important for regional 
distribution of FDI
Central authorities # 1 Country image >15 years Pre-analysis Very important determinant for countries to be 
considered in detail at all
# 2 EU integration 6-10 years Information gathering, 
follow-up investment
Only involved as second most influential actor 
but very important for overall reform success
# 3 Road infrastructure 11-15 years Host country visit, follow-up 
investment
Important for long-term development of FDI, 
bottleneck for other determinants (such as 
availability of labor)
Local governments # 1 Regional differences of 
bureaucracy
3-5 years Host country visit Fairly easy to accomplish, very important for 
investors, strong effects on other determinants
# 2 Regional incentives 3-5 years Business model Fairly easy to accomplish (industrial parks), can 
make difference in regional competition
# 3 Availability of labor 11-15 years Business model, follow-up 
investment
Crucial for follow-up investments & with 
increasing economic growth (mobility concepts, 
social housing etc.)
Reform priorities for public policy actor groups in transition countries
Figure 81: Possible priorities for public policy actors
10 Conclusion
This conclusion (1) summarizes the approach of this thesis, (2) revises the
initial research questions and hypotheses and (3) highlights possibilities for
further research.
(1) Based on a comprehensive theoretical and methodological approach
this thesis has analyzed the impact of public policy on the investment decision
of German and Austrian MNCs in transition countries, using Romania and
Croatia as two parts of a multiple case study. A pre-selected list of 19 public
policy determinants was analysed in depth, using the locational competition
theory as a point of reference (this theory represented the first theoretical pillar)
and was based on the evaluation of 34 FDI studies on transition countries.
(chapter 2 ).
The case study approach laid the methodological groundwork for this the-
sis (chapter 3 ). In 2007 the author conducted 90 experts interviews (based
on an interview selection matrix) with MNCs, company experts, state repre-
sentatives, and external state experts. 40 experts documents providing further
interpretation of the expert statements were collected (chapter 5 ). These pri-
mary sources and the analysis of the non-policy determinants were used as a
basis for a revision of the pre-defined list of FDI determinants (chapter 6 ). This
resulted in the analysis of three FDI categories (legal, economic and political),
including 14 determinants that were divided into 29 sub-determinants in the
main part of this thesis, including the 19 determinants from the FDI studies
derived from the theoretical part (chapter 7 and 8 ). The analysis was focused
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on Romania and Croatia but various insights for transition countries in general
could be derived (under the consideration of further secondary studies).
The second theoretical pillar, the NIE theory, permitted further analyses
that enabled a better understanding of the results for transition countries in
reference to the actors involved and the time horizons of decisions and changes
(chapter 9 ).
(2) The analyses of this thesis enable a revision of the key questions and
hypotheses of the introductory chapter (section 1.1). The answers are sum-
marized in figure 82.
Figure 82: Key questions, hypotheses and answers
Key question #1: Public policy determinants are indeed significant for
FDI inflows to transition countries. Non-policy determinants may trigger the
interest of MNCs for an investment abroad in general (such as labor costs) or
for a specific region (such as market potential) as suggested by the majority
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of econometric FDI studies. However, this thesis has found that public pol-
icy determinants are essential for FDI as well. Public policy determinants can
make a difference particularly when investors are choosing between transition
countries. This is largely because non-policy determinants are generally quite
similar (at least on a regional basis, for example regarding proximity and labor
costs in SEECs).
Furthermore, the possibilities of public policy actors to influence these factors
are manifold. Four different roles of public policy makers have been discussed
most frequently in this thesis:
Firstly, public policy actors have to provide a satisfactory level of public
policy determinants overall. A weak performance of the sum of public policy
determinants (as was the case for Romania until the late 1990s) tends to deter
most serious investors.
Secondly, public policy makers have to provide a minimum quality level for
some specific policy determinants so that their host countries are considered
as potential investment location by MNCs at all (this is demonstrated with
relation to external political stability for Croatia in the 1990s as well as for
property rights).2749
Thirdly, public policy actors can make a difference – as implied by the find-
ings of locational competition theory – when the “playing field” (such as a
legal harmonization with the EU acquis) between potential host countries is
otherwise on the same level. This can be done by taking extra reform steps or
aiming (and reaching) at threshold events that are clearly visible to investors
and significantly increase the foreign attention of the host country.2750 Exam-
ples include Romania’s NATO accession, the introduction of one-stop shops
(in Romania and Croatia) and a belated privatization (as discussed for the
Romanian BCR). In this context the increased awareness is more influential
2749 See also Pournarakis and Varsakelis (2004).
2750 See also Henisz and Zelner (2005).
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for FDI than the actual performance as shown by the positive attention of the
“big-bang tax reform”2751 in Romania 2005 despite a continued high total tax
rate for companies.
Finally, the NIE approach has shown that public policy actors play an es-
sential role in influencing the perception of the policy determinants by MNCs
throughout the investment decision process. Public policy actors can therefore
influence the host country assessment particularly by creating a positive image
(in the pre-analysis phase), providing reliable and comprehensive information
since investors often have information gaps as shown for investment incentives
for Romania and Croatia (information gathering phase) and organizing a
successful host country visit of the potential MNCs (as shown for the visit
organized for one Austrian MNC interviewed by ARIS).2752 Just as important
– and often underestimated by state experts – is the follow-up investment
phase. In this phase it is the state actors (particularly local authorities) who
are responsible for keeping investors satisfied because MNCs can delay or
cancel investments and generally act as multipliers for other MNCs. Examples
from different regions in Romania have shown strong deviations in the extent
to which public policy actors keep in contact with MNCs and how investors’
demands are analyzed and transformed into policy changes.
Key question #2: The broad methodological approach and the in-depth
analysis of the 29 FDI sub-determinants have also confirmed (and in contrast
to many FDI studies) the finding of the locational competition theory that
the investment decision of MNCs is indeed extremely complex, influenced by a
great variety of FDI determinants and is often determined by the perception
and expectations of investors.
2751 See HVB Bank (2006), p.18.
2752 See Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007); see section 9.3.1.
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The most important determinants identified for FDI in transition countries
in general are privatization, EU integration, internal political stability, property
law, regional differences of bureaucracy, and the country image. Furthermore,
investment opportunities in growing financial and infrastructure sectors are
often important drivers for FDI as well.
Overall, legal and political determinants tend to be more important for
FDI in transition countries than economic determinants. Classical determi-
nants such as taxes, incentives and corruption seem to have a lower impact on
the investment decision of MNCs than suggested by some of the 34 FDI studies
on transition countries analyzed.
Furthermore, significant interdependences have been identified for various
FDI determinants. Factors that seem to influence most frequently the perfor-
mance of other determinants are corruption, the quality of bureaucracy and
EU integration.
The analysis of the impact of FDI determinants also shows the limits of public
policy. The importance of several determinants with high or even very high
importance seems to decrease as transition progresses. Examples are property
law and internal political stability (with improving performance), privatization
(once only few SOEs are left to be sold) or EU integration (whose effect tends
to decrease after several years of accession). However, other determinants (such
as availability of labor) may gain in importance and interviews suggest that
the impact of public policy does not change over time overall.
Finally, a comparison between state and company view reveals that some
misperceptions exist regarding the impact of FDI determinants. For example,
state experts seem to overestimate the effects of corruption, external political
stability and legal barriers while they tend to underestimate the impact of a
negative country image and administrative barriers.
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Key question #3: Progress in transition and the reform of the investment
climate in particular began late and proceeded slowly in Romania and Croatia
for many years. Progress was also slowed by economic, internal and external
political factors. Therefore, Romania and Croatia were unable to attract signifi-
cant amounts of investors in the 1990s despite good basic conditions. Significant
reforms started in both countries in the late 1990s and were important drivers
for the large FDI stock in Romania (e34.5B in 2006) and Croatia (e21.4B)
today.
Although Romania initiated reforms in the late 1990s significant results were
not visible until 2004, when EU pressure but also reform efforts independent
of the EU accession preparations, caused substantial improvements. In recent
years Romania has attracted FDI based on various policy determinants, partic-
ularly due to a good legal system, a company registration process that performs
above the expectations of MNCs, attractive privatization conditions, and a high
external political stability (including a largely successful EU integration). Im-
portant remaining constraining factors are the weak road infrastructure and
rising labor shortage.
Croatia started gradual reforms after the end of the Tudman era in 1999.
Reforms may accelerate further with the approaching of EU accession (probably
2010 or 2011). Major enhancing determinants for Croatia as an investment
location have been its political and economic stability since the early 2000s,
the high educational level and the positive country image. The property rights
situation and the weak bureaucracy continue to represent the most significant
constraining factors for FDI.
For transition countries in general, the removal of administrative barriers
(such as the reduction of the amount of bureaucratic procedures and time that
is required for land and company registration or at customs) as well as the
reduction of uncertainties (for example, regarding the goals of foreign policy)
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seem to have the greatest impact on FDI. These appear to be more effective
than the provision of investment incentives, low taxes, EU assistance etc.2753
Most MNCs are thus willing to renounce incentives and even accept somewhat
higher costs (for example regarding registration processes or at customs) if pro-
cedures are quick, reliable and transparent. This finding may also comfort those
critics who worry that FDI policy may exaggerate the impact of the state on
economic activities and disturb market mechanisms. In contrast, successful and
active public policy means a good marketing of the country in the competition
for FDI and an aiming at reforms that are beneficial to transition countries
in general without excessive government spending. Therefore, FDI competition
policy is not in danger to become “a race to the bottom”2754 among transition
countries but rather “a race for quality”. For example, Romania is developing
from a country that is in focus due to its low labor costs to an investment
location that is attractive because of the increasing quality of its public policy
determinants.
This quality goal may also be a guideline for situations in which state actors
face potential trade-offs of public policy measures. Therefore, the qualitative
advantages that come along with EU accession for transition countries clearly
outweigh potential negative benefits (such as salary increase and higher trade
barriers with non-EU countries) as long as public policy makers consider
adequate counter measures such as an adjustment of the education system in
order to avoid unemployment.2755
Key question #4: Six public policy actor groups were identified that have
the greatest influence on FDI determinants in transition countries: central gov-
ernments, central authorities, local governments, local authorities, courts, and
2753 See also Mallya, Kukulka, and Jensen (2002); Kikeri, Kenyon, and Palmade (2006).
2754 See e. g. Rauscher (1995).
2755 See also Mu¨ller (2005), p.63; Belke, Go¨cke, and Hebler (2005).
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the EU. A successful design of investment conditions requires a constant inter-
action between all of these actors. In contrast to hypothesis #4 central govern-
ments – rather than sub-national actors – seem to be the most influential public
policy actor group both in terms of iniating the most significant reforms and in
addressing the greatest concerns of MNCs in particular. The point during the
transition process at which local authorities seem to become more significant
in relation to central governments is when the strategies are actually imple-
mented, and in the follow-up investment decision phases of investors. At this
stage administrative barriers, human capital and attitude towards (foreign)
business may be the most crucial factors for FDI. They also represent the key
to the reform of determinants that traditionally take a long time to be signif-
icantly altered (i. e. a period of more than ten years) such as corruption and
land registration.
Public policy actor groups should generally tackle the deficiencies of those
determinants for which they have the greatest influence for significant improve-
ments rather than working on secondary issues even if the determinants may
be somewhat more influential for the FDI decision of MNCs (see figure 73).
Key question #5: Romania was clearly lagging behind in terms of reforms
in the 1990s and did not represent a positive example for other transition
countries (let alone EU candidate countries) at that time. However, Romania
has shown an impressive catching up process since the early 2000s, particularly
with regards to the legal and economic measures. Therefore (and in contrast to
hypothesis #5 ), the current Romania may not be such a bad example for other
transition countries after all. It has proved that the goal of external stability (e.
g. through NATO accession), economic stabilization (e. g. through the currency
and tax reforms) and EU accession caused substantial reforms that impressed
and attracted foreign investors. The case of Romania also shows that decisive
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reforms (for example with respect to company registration) do not necessarily
only occur under the pressure of EU accession.
Croatia did not need to work as hard as Romania in the past on reforms
because it inherited fairly good living standards from the 1980s and benefited
from the image of being a beautiful and quite advanced EEC. Despite the
increasing locational competition, Croatian state representatives have realized
only lately the need for more thorough reforms. Croatia has shown in the past
that it has the capabilities for comprehensive reforms (for example regarding
major legal adjustments) and sustainable projects (such as the quick extension
of the highway system) as well. Croatia should make use of these capabilities
in order to accomplish its part of EU accession negotiations and overcome the
remaining deficiencies for higher levels of FDI that are often underestimated
by Croatia (such as the quality of bureaucracy).
(3) The in-depth analyses and the multi-angle approach of the case study
methodology of this thesis helped to contribute to FDI research. It is hoped that
it has provided a means to a more thorough understanding of the possibilities
and limits of public policy to attract MNCs in transition countries in general
and to Romania and Croatia in particular. Throughout this thesis references
were given with respect to potential future research questions, including an
econometric analysis of the FDI impact (specifically for Romania and Croatia)
of labor standards, monetary policy and investment promotion.2756
With respect to Romania and Croatia, an analysis of those public policy
determinants that contribute to a termination of an investment project could
be of interest to public policy makers. An analysis of the impact of FDI de-
terminants for MNCs from other EECs or Asia could also become important,
given the increasing FDI inflows from these regions.2757
2756 See sections 7.2.5, 7.3.1 and 7.3.5.
2757 See also Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007); Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007).
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Finally, research projects focusing on a formalization of the NIE approach
may also be rewarding. NIE frameworks are also well suited to analyze in a more
comprehensive way the impact of the MNCs’ perception of the determinants’
quality on their investment decision.
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Figure 83: FDI per capita development
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Int 
#
Interviewee 
(fulfills following categories:)
Internal vs. 
external
Domestic 
vs. foreign
Large firms 
vs. SMEs
Industry 
vs. services
Greenfield 
vs. 
Brownfield
Investment 
until vs. 
after 2003
Top vs. 
medium 
hierarchy 
level
General vs. 
specific 
questions
All 
categories 
fulfilled
1 Intv. Germ. MNC - Retail (2007) Internal German Large Services Both After Top General À
2 Intv. Austr. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007) Internal Austrian Large Industry Greenfield After Medium Both À
3 Intv. Germ. MNC - Automotive (2007) Internal German Large Industry Greenfield Before Medium General À
4 Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services II (2007) Internal Austrian Large Services Brownfield Before Top General À
5 Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods III (2007) Internal German SME Industry Brownfield After Top Both À
6 Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods II (2007) Internal Austrian SME Industry Greenfield Before Top General À
7 Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services I (2007) Internal German SME Services Greenfield After Top Specific À
8 Intv. Austr. MNC - Legal Services (2007) Internal Austrian SME Services Greenfield Before Medium Specific À
9 Intv. Romanian Company - Advertising (2007) External Domestic SME Services n/a n/a Top General À
10 Intv. Rom. Company - Consulting (2007) External Domestic SME Services n/a n/a Top Specific À
11 Intv. German Econ. Association III (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Medium General À
12 Intv. Austrian Econ. Association I (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Top General À
13 Intv. German Econ. Association V (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Top General À
14 Intv. Germ. MNC - Legal Services II (2007) External Domestic SME Services n/a n/a Top Specific À
15 Intv. German Econ. Association II (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Medium General À
Additional interviews
61 Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007) Internal German Large Services Both After Medium Both
62 Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007) Internal Austrian Large Services Brownfield Before Medium General
63 Intv. Germ. MNC - Logistics (2007) Internal German Large Services n/a Before Top General
64 Intv. Int'l MNC - Utilities (2007) Internal International Large Industry Both Before Top General
65 Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting I (2007) Internal Foreign Large Services Greenfield Before Medium Specific
66 Intv. Germ. MNC - Utilities (2007) Internal German Large Industry Brownfield Before Top Specific
67 Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services III (2007) Internal German Large Services Both Before Medium Specific
68 Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods II (2007) Internal German SME Industry Both After Medium Both
69 Intv. Austr. MNC - Consumer Goods (2007) Internal Austrian SME Industry Greenfield After Top General
70 Intv. Germ. MNC - Consulting II (2007) Internal German SME Services Greenfield Before Top General
71 Intv. German Econ. Association I (2007) Internal German SME Both Greenfield Before Top General
72 Intv. German Econ. Association VII (2007) Internal German SME Services Greenfield Before Top General
73 Intv. Germ. MNC - Medical Techn. (2007) External Domestic SME Industry n/a n/a Top General
74 Intv. German Econ. Association VIII (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Top General
75 Intv. Int'l Econ. Association (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Top General
76 Intv. German Econ. Association VI (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Top General
Formal analysis - company expert interviews Romania
Source: Author's database of formalities and author's concept.
Interviewed organization Interviewee
Figure 84: Formal analysis – company expert interviews Romania
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Int # Interviewee (fulfills following categories:)
State 
representative vs. 
external expert
Domestic 
vs. 
foreign
Governmental 
vs. other 
organization
National vs. 
regional 
representation
Direct or 
indirect 
involvement 
in FDI policy
Intense vs. 
occasional 
MNC 
interaction
Top vs. 
medium 
hierarchy level
General vs. 
specific 
questions
All 
categories 
fulfilled
16 Intv. Romanian Authority II (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental National Direct Intense Top Specific Á
17 Intv. Romanian Authority I (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental National Indirect Intense Medium General Á
18 Intv. Romanian Ministry IV (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental National Direct Intense Top General Á
19 Intv. Romanian Ministry V (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental National Indirect Occasional Medium General Á
20 Intv. Romanian Ministry I (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental National Indirect Occasional Top Specific Á
21 Intv. Romanian Ministry III (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental National Direct Occasional Medium Specific Á
22 Intv. Rom. Local Authority I (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental Regional Direct Intense Top General Á
23 Intv. German Authority IV (2007) External expert Foreign Governmental National Indirect Intense Top General Á
24 Intv. German Authority I (2007) External expert Foreign Governmental National Indirect Occasional Medium General Á
25 Intv. Supranational Authority I (2007) External expert Foreign Governmental National Indirect Intense Top General Á
26 Intv. Germ. Legal Expert (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Occasional Medium Specific Á
27 Intv. Germ. Research Institute I (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Occasional Medium General Á
28 Intv. Germ. Political Foundation II (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Occasional Top Specific Á
29 Intv. Romanian Econ. Association II (2007) External expert Domestic Other National Indirect Intense Top General Á
30 Intv. Romanian NGO (2007) External expert Domestic Other National Indirect Occasional Top Specific Á
Additional interviews
77 Intv. Romanian Ministry II (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental National Direct Occasional Medium Specific
78 Intv. Rom. Local Authority II (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental Regional Indirect Intense Medium Specific
79 Intv. Romanian County Council (2007) State 
representative
Domestic Governmental Regional Direct Intense Top General
80 Intv. German Ministry (2007) External expert Foreign Governmental National Indirect Occasional Medium Specific
81 Intv. Austr. Research Institute (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Occasional Medium General
82 Intv. German Political Adviser (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Intense Top General
83 Intv. Romanian Econ. Association I (2007) External expert Domestic Other Regional Indirect Intense Top Specific
IntervieweeInterviewed organization
Formal analysis - state expert interviews Romania
Source: Author's database of formalities and author's concept.
Figure 85: Formal analysis – state expert interviews Romania
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Int # Interviewee (fulfills following categories:)
Internal vs. 
external
Domestic 
vs. foreign
Large firms 
vs. SMEs
Industry 
vs. services
Greenfield 
vs. 
Brownfield
Investment 
until vs. 
after 1999
Top vs. 
medium 
hierarchy 
level
General vs. 
specific 
questions
All 
categories 
fulfilled
31 Intv. Germ. MNC - Telecommunications (2007) Internal German Large Services Brownfield After Medium General Â
32 Intv. Austr. MNC - Construction (2007) Internal Austrian Large Industry Both Before Medium Both Â
33 Intv. Germ. MNC - Food Products (2007) Internal German Large Industry Brownfield After Top General Â
34 Intv. Austr. MNC - Financial Services I (2007) Internal Austrian Large Services Brownfield Before Medium General Â
35 Intv. Germ. MNC - Industrial Goods I (2007) Internal German SME Industry Greenfield After Top Specific Â
36 Intv. Austr. MNC - Primary Goods I (2007) Internal Austrian SME Industry Brownfield Before Medium General Â
37 Intv. Germ. MNC - Engineering (2007) Internal German SME Services Greenfield After Top General Â
38 Intv. Austr. MNC - Real Estate (2007) Internal Austrian SME Services Greenfield Before Top Specific Â
39 Intv. Croat. Company II - Legal Services (2007) External Domestic SME Services n/a n/a Top Specific Â
40 Intv. Croat. Company - Utilities (2007) External Domestic Large Industry n/a n/a Top Specific
Â
41 Intv. German Econ. Association IV (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Medium Specific Â
42 Intv. Croatian Company - Real Estate (2007) External Domestic SME Services n/a n/a Top General Â
43 Intv. Austrian Econ. Association II (2007) External Foreign n/a n/a n/a n/a Top General Â
44 Intv. Croat. Company I - Legal Services (2007) External Domestic SME Services n/a n/a Top Specific Â
45 Intv. Austr. MNC - Consulting (2007) External Foreign Large Services Greenfield After Top General Â
Additional interviews
84 Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services I (2007) Internal German Large Services Both Before Medium Specific
85 Intv. Austr. MNC - Retail (2007) Internal Austrian Large Services Both Before Top General
86 Intv. Germ. MNC - Software (2007) Internal German Large Services Greenfield After Medium Both
87 Intv. Germ. MNC - Financial Services II (2007) Internal German Large Services Both Before Medium Specific
Formal analysis - company expert interviews Croatia
Interviewed organization Interviewee
Source: Author's database of formalities and author's concept.
Figure 86: Formal analysis – company expert interviews Croatia
Int # Interviewee (fulfills following categories:)
State representative vs. 
external expert
Domestic 
vs. 
foreign
Governmental 
vs. other 
organization
National vs. 
regional 
representation
Direct or 
indirect 
involvement 
in FDI policy
Intense vs. 
occasional 
MNC 
interaction
Top vs. 
medium 
hierarchy level
General vs. 
specific 
questions
All 
categories 
fulfilled
46 Intv. Croatian Authority II (2007) State representative Domestic Governmental National Direct Intense Top General Ã
47 Intv. Croatian Authority I (2007) State representative Domestic Governmental National Indirect Intense Medium Specific Ã
48 Intv. Croatian Ministry II (2007) State representative Domestic Governmental National Direct Intense Top General Ã
49 Intv. Croatian Ministry I (2007) State representative Domestic Governmental National Indirect Occasional Medium Specific Ã
50 Intv. Croatian Government Team (2007) State representative Domestic Governmental National Indirect Occasional Top General Ã
51 Intv. Croatian Ministry IV (2007) State representative Domestic Governmental National Direct Occasional Medium Specific Ã
52 Intv. Croatian Mayor (2007) State representative Domestic Governmental Regional Direct Intense Top General Ã
53 Intv. German Authority III (2007) External expert Foreign Governmental National Indirect Intense Top General 
Ã
54 Intv. German Authority II (2007) External expert Foreign Governmental National Indirect Occasional Medium General Ã
55 Intv. Supranational Authority II (2007) External expert Foreign Governmental National Indirect Intense Top General 
Ã
56 Intv. Germ. Research Institute II (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Occasional Medium Specific Ã
57 Intv. European Institution (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Occasional Medium General Ã
58 Intv. Int'l Research Institute I (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Occasional Top Specific Ã
59 Intv. Former Croatian Minister (2007) External expert Domestic Other National Indirect Intense Top General Ã
60 Intv. Croatian University (2007) External expert Domestic Other National Indirect Occasional Top Specific Ã
Additional interviews
88 Intv. Croatian Ministry III (2007) State representative Domestic Governmental National Indirect Occasional Medium Specific
89 Intv. Germ. Political Foundation I (2007) External expert Foreign Other National Indirect Occasional Top Specific
90 Intv. Croatian Econ. Association (2007) External expert Domestic Other National Indirect Intense Medium Specific
IntervieweeInterviewed organization
Formal analysis - state expert interviews Croatia
Source: Author's database of formalities and author's concept.
Figure 87: Formal analysis – state expert interviews Croatia
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Category Unit 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP
Total € B 48.6 30.0 23.9 15.1 22.5 25.3 27.1 27.8 31.0 37.6 33.5 40.1 44.9 48.5 52.6 60.7 79.4 97.1
Annual change* % -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.1 -4.8 -1.2 2.1 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.5 4.1 7.7
GDP per capita € 2,098 1,295 1,031 654 979 1,109 1,196 1,233 1,381 1,683 1,507 1,813 2,037 2,210 2,407 2,787 3,655 4,486
GDP per capita in PPP € 5,106 4,329 4,010 3,593 4,152 4,374 4,370 4,797 5,155 5,047 5,341 6,465 7,253 7,381 6,651 6,775 7,290 8,063
Inflation % 0.9 127.9 161.1 210.4 256.1 136.7 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.0 6.6
Unemployment % n/a n/a 3.0 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.6 8.9 10.4 11.8 10.5 8.8 8.4 7.4 6.2 5.9 5.2
Hourly labor costs € n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.41 1.55 1.67 1.75 1.98 2.59 3.17
Trade
Exports (FOB) € B n/a n/a 3.4 3.4 4.2 5.2 6.0 6.4 7.5 7.4 8.0 11.3 12.7 14.7 15.6 18.9 22.3 25.9
Imports (CIF) € B n/a n/a 4.7 4.8 5.6 6.0 7.9 9.0 10.0 10.5 9.8 14.2 17.4 18.9 21.2 26.3 32.6 40.8
Trade openness % n/a n/a 34 54 43 44 51 55 56 48 53 64 67 69 70 74 69 69
FDI
Inflows € M 0 0 32 59 80 287 320 207 1,071 1,813 963 1,144 1,293 1,211 1,957 5,242 5,204 9,074
Inflows per capita € 1 3 3 13 14 9 48 81 43 52 59 55 89 241 240 419
Stock € M 35 94 183 338 628 864 2,131 4,041 5,316 7,523 9,323 8,254 10,777 16,507 20,786 34,512
Stock per capita € 2 4 8 15 28 38 95 181 239 340 423 376 493 758 957 1,595
Inflows/ GDP % 0.1 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.7 3.5 4.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.5 3.7 8.6 6.6 9.3
Population M 23.2 23.2 23.2 23.1 23.0 22.8 22.7 22.6 22.4 22.3 22.2 22.1 22.0 21.9 21.9 21.8 21.7 21.6
Sources: Eurostat website (2008); IMF (2008); UNCTAD website (2008); ILO website (2008), INSSE website (2008) currency conversion from US$ to € according to EIU (2007).
* Based on national currency not reflecting currency development
Key economic indicators - Romania
Figure 89: Key economic indicators Romania
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Category Unit 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP
Total € B 7.9 9.2 12.3 14.4 15.7 17.7 19.3 18.6 19.9 22.2 24.4 26.2 28.7 31.2 34.2
Annual change* % n/a -8.0 5.9 6.6 5.9 6.8 2.5 -0.9 2.9 4.4 5.6 5.3 4.3 4.3 4.8
GDP per capita € 1,665 1,985 2,713 3,229 3,483 3,874 4,289 4,092 4,546 4,998 5,483 5,892 6,459 7,027 7,696
GDP per capita in PPP € 4,792 5,104 5,566 5,590 6,160 7,358 7,843 8,188 10,328 11,252 11,442 10,287 10,043 10,784 11,566
Inflation % n/a 1,517 97.8 1.9 3.5 3.6 5.7 4.0 4.6 3.8 1.7 1.8 2.0 3.3 3.2
Unemployment** % n/a n/a 14.8 15.1 15.9 17.6 18.1 20.4 22.6 23.1 21.3 18.7 18.5 17.8 17.0
Hourly labor costs € 0.54 0.70 0.98 1.48 1.64 1.89 2.09 2.24 2.41 2.63 2.77 2.88 3.09 3.28 3.49
Trade
Export of goods (FOB) € B 4.60 3.90 4.26 4.63 4.51 4.17 4.08 4.12 4.95 5.31 5.29 5.57 6.60 7.22 8.43
Import of goods (CIF) € B 4.46 4.67 5.23 7.51 7.79 9.10 7.71 7.22 8.42 9.89 11.25 12.55 13.33 14.74 16.80
Trade openness % 115 93 77 84 79 75 61 61 67 69 68 69 70 70 74
FDI
Inflows € M 10 103 98 87 402 474 834 1,367 1,170 1,490 1,190 1,812 987 1,437 2,832
Inflows per capita € 2 22 22 20 90 104 185 300 267 336 268 408 222 324 638
Stock € M 97 210 306 365 779 1,883 1,724 2,402 3,807 4,347 6,383 7,505 9,933 11,661 21,353
Stock per capita € 21 45 68 82 173 412 383 527 869 980 1,437 1,689 2,238 2,625 4,808
Inflows/ GDP % 0.1 1.1 0.8 0.6 2.6 2.7 4.3 7.3 5.9 6.7 4.9 6.9 3.4 4.6 8.3
Population M 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
* Based on national currency not reflecting currency development; ** registered unemployment
Note: Some  indicators due to war not available
Key economic indicators - Croatia
Sources: Eurostat website (2008); IMF (2008); UNCTAD website (2008); ILO website (2008), EU Commission (2007); DZS (2008); WIIW (2008) currency conversion from US$ to € according to EIU 
(2007).
Figure 91: Key economic indicators Croatia
690 11 Appendix
Figure 92: Property rights in Eastern Europe
Figure 93: Efficient use of administrative resources in Eastern Europe
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Figure 94: Quality of roads in Eastern Europe
Figure 95: Bilateral Investment Treaties
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Figure 96: Gross enrollment of tertiary education in Eastern Europe
Figure 97: International cooperation
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